


THEATER OF SHADOWS



Annual Report 2021

Information System about Aggressions against Human Rights Defenders in Colombia -SIADDHH-



**PROGRAMA
SOMOS DEFENSORES**
PROGRAMA NO GOBIERNAMENTAL DE PROTECCIÓN A
DEFENSORES DE DERECHOS HUMANOS



Calle 19 No. 4-88 Oficina 1302 Bogotá D.C. – Colombia.

Tel: (051) 2814010 / www.somosdefensores.org

prensa@somosdefensores.org

2022

The Somos Defensores (We Are Defenders) Program, is a protection area that seeks to develop a comprehensive proposal to prevent aggression and protect the lives of people at risk due to their work as human rights defenders, when they protect the interests of social groups and communities affected by violence in Colombia.

The Somos Defensores program is formed by::



This edition was made by the Somos Defensores Program, under the direction of the MINGA Association

Editorial and Publishing Coordination

Lourdes Castro García and Sirley Muñoz Murillo

Research

Lourdes Castro García, Diana Sánchez Lara, Sirley Muñoz Murillo, Nancy Villota, Suly Pinzón, Leonardo Díaz, Sebastián Herrera

SIVeL System

Vladimir Támara (<https://sivel.sf.net>)

Design, Layout and Printing

El Búho S.A.S. Publishing House

Traslation

Osiris Duarte

Illustrations

Eduardo Montoya

Maps

Claudia Campo Cisneros

ISBN: 978-958-56838-9-1

The content of this report holds responsibility on its authors and does not compromise the organizations and institutions that support this publication. This publication is of a cultural, pedagogical nature and its distribution is free. It can be photocopied and reproduced as long as the source is cited. The printing of our 2021 report is possible thanks to the resources of Diakonia Sweden and the Norwegian Embassy in Colombia.



Embajada de Noruega



Diakonia



Suecia

Sverige

The work of the Somos Defensores Program is possible in 2021 thanks to the economic and political support of the Royal Norwegian Embassy and the cooperation agencies Misereor, Diakonia, International Amnesty and Bread for the World.

INTRODUCTION

The elaboration of this annual report 2021 coincided with the final stretch of the government of Iván Duque, a period in which the panorama of violence against human rights defenders continued to worsen amid a visible deterioration of the human rights situation throughout the country.

After considerable thought, we decided to call this report “Theater of Shadows”, as we consider that it defines very well what we have experienced in these four years of aggressions against human rights defenders, since we are facing a staging in which, through effects, a very different image is projected from what really happens.

In this State staging, the so-called peace with legality simulates the implementation of the final peace agreement, when the reality is that it distorts it; the figures of aggressions against defenders are frequently distorted, trying to show a decrease when there is an increase; the public opinion is provided with high figures of clarification in the murders against defenders that in reality correspond to advances in the investigations; we are frequently presented with the hits on the heads of criminal organizations as the end of such structures, when in reality they do not stop growing numerically and expanding territorially; A CONPES document is presented

to us as the public policy of guarantees, when in reality it is a revamped Plan of Opportune Action (PAO); as if all of the above were not enough, we continue to be presented as a strong democracy, when the reality of its deterioration is evident, among others due to the lack of action in accordance with its constitutional mandates by investigative and control entities such as the Attorney General’s Office, the Ombudsman’s Office and the Attorney General’s Office, which in reality move to the rhythm of the government.

In this theater of shadows in which the dramatic Colombian reality moves, aggressions against human rights defenders once again show an increase. Nine hundred and ninety-six (996) individual aggressions registered by the Somos Defensores Program in 2021, the highest figure documented by our Information System since 2010, a matter that has been reiterated in report after report in recent years. Every year we think that our records have reached the limit of horror, but it is not so, violent actions tend to increase. The 996 aggressions of the year 2021 are equivalent to the occurrence, on average, of almost three aggressions per day.

This report, following the theatrical perspective that inspires it, is divided into 4 acts: in the first act entitled ***The Shape of Shadows***, some elements

considered relevant in the reconfiguration of the dynamics of the conflict in several regions of the country are addressed, adopting in some of them the gigantic shadow of humanitarian crises that became recurrent during 2021. In contrast, there is evidence of a state response focused primarily on actions to attack figures of criminal organizations considered of high value, which according to the human rights report of the Ministry of Defense shows as a result the affectation of 8 criminal and delinquent structures, which in reality have not meant their dismantling as a criminal organization, but have implied spectacular operations that have not taken into account protection measures for the attending communities and leaderships, which have resulted, in some cases, in an increase of their risks.

Consequently, the dynamics of the reconfiguration of the conflict, which involve a variable geometry on a territorial scale, mutations and alliances between the different armed structures that are difficult to follow, remains unchanged in terms of the high degree of risk and victimization of communities, different social expressions present in the territories and their leaderships. In the meantime, while the report concludes in this section, the governmental response repeats old recipes and the power apparatuses that move behind these illegal armed structures remain unscathed in defense of their interests and economic projects.

This act also addresses the expansion of political participation modalities as

one of the objectives set forth in the Peace Agreement, a fundamental piece for a democratic strengthening from and for the territories that are at risk, as well as the leaderships from the commitment with their communities and social organizations. Specifically, reference is made to the risks and obstacles of important election processes that took place or were conceived in 2021, such as the postponed elections of the members of the Community Action Boards, the election of the members of the Youth Councils and the historic election for the first time of the victims' representatives to the House of Representatives in the framework of the Special Peace Constituencies provided for in the Peace Agreement and held on March 13 of this year, leaving a bittersweet taste as a result of all kinds of obstacles and risks that this report points out.

The second act of the report is entitled ***The Absurdity*** and it dedicates a broad analysis to the absurdity of the fact that the issuance of CON-PES 4063 is considered the *Public Policy of Guarantees and Respect for the Work of Human Rights Defense and Social Leadership*, when in fact, according to the report, it is not designed to stop violence and criminality against human rights defenders; it is an expanded version of the Timely Action Plan -PAO- and maintains it as the pillar of the protection policy; it is not a policy focused on guarantees, but on physical and material protection and, in addition, it does not incorporate a human rights approach; nor did it take into account important and

recognized spaces of participation such as the process of the National Roundtable of Guarantees, of which the main human rights platforms of the country are part.

This act also draws attention to the lack of transparency in the information on the implementation of Decree 660 of 2018 regarding collective protection programs and, likewise, to how the reforms introduced to the State Protection Program headed by the UNP are in the key of an austerity policy, rather than advancing in overcoming the limitations presented by the current model with a view to overcoming the markedly individual vision and the granting of material measures that makes it distinctive.

The third act is called ***What's behind the curtain?*** and it refers to the behavior of the control and investigation entities such as the Procurator General's Office, the Ombudsman's Office, and the Attorney General's Office during 2021, highlighting the poor results of their actions in the face of the serious situation of aggressions faced by defenders in the exercise of their work.

It is emphasized how this lack of an adequate state response from the control and investigation entities not only generates a deterioration of democracy which the Program has already referred to in previous reports, but also a loss of citizen confidence in them, which contributes to reinforce the silence of communities and social organizations in some territories where armed actors seek to impose

themselves, thus favoring their pretensions.

In the fourth act named ***Darkness*** we present, as usual, the information regarding the behavior of aggressions against human rights defenders that the Information System of the Somos Defensores Program was able to verify. As always, the data presented do not pretend to show the totality of aggressions committed during the period but are those known and confirmed directly by the Program. It is precisely the worsening of the situation in multiple territories of the country that affects the verification process of cases and, therefore, the underreporting of aggressions may persist.

However, the analyzed figures are conclusive in terms of the deterioration of the general panorama of aggressions during the year 2021, we verified 996 individual aggressions, which means an increase of 3% in relation to the previous year. In this framework it is important to draw attention to the increase of certain aggressions such as arbitrary arrests with an increase of 73% and information thefts with an increase of 225%; threats and attacks, as in previous periods, continue to increase.

Slightly more than 75% of the aggressions are concentrated in 9 departments of the country and in Bogotá Capital District. The department of Cauca maintains the worrying trend sustained over the last 5 years of being the region where most aggressions are committed against

social leaders. 84 of the recorded aggressions took place in territories considered Integral Intervention Zones -ZEII- in which security has been reinforced with a greater presence of troops.

Human rights activists or defenders occupy the first place as the most attacked category, with a notable increase of 62% in relation to the previous period, which is unusual and has to do with the role played by these activists in the framework of the mobilizations during the National Strike.

Although the information verified by the Program's Information System indicates a 30% reduction in murders compared to 2020, it is still of great concern that the occurrence of murders ranges between 9 and 19 per month.

It is important to note the 4% increase in the number of murders of female social leaders. On the other hand, members of Community Action Boards and indigenous leaders share the first place in the number of murders.

By presenting this report during a presidential election, we hope that it will draw attention to the importance of including the issue of guarantees for the work of human rights defenders in their government programs.

Finally, all that is left for us to do in this presentation is to express our deep gratitude as a team of the Somos Defensores Program to all the

people, organizations and cooperation agencies that continue to believe in the importance of our work and in the value of the reports we prepare.

Special thanks to all those who provided us with information for this report, especially the Early Warning System -SAT- of the Ombudsman's Office, Defending Freedom is Everyone's Business Campaign, Temblores ONG (Grita platform), Colombian Commission of Jurists -CCJ-, Office in Colombia of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, CINEP, Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination, Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca, Territories for a Dignified Life, Civic Committee for Human Rights of Meta, Sumapaz Foundation, OBSURDH, Colombia Diversa, Development and Peace Foundation- FUNDEPAZ-, Rebel Youth, Sisma Mujer, Corporation for Regional Development, Joel Sierra Human Rights Foundation, Corдоберxia, Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights Risaralda, Social Process of Guarantees of Chocó, Mothers for Life, Indigenous Authorities of Colombia, Wayuú Women's Force, Movice Atlántico, Association of Peasants and Landless Communities of Cesar-ASOCAM-TICE-.

Our gratitude also goes to the cooperation agencies that not only support our work but also encourage and motivate us to continue, such as Misereor, Bread for the World Germany, Amnesty International, Global Witness and Front Line Defenders.

A special acknowledgement to the Royal Norwegian Embassy and Dia-konia who, like us and many organizations and institutions that demand

it, believe in the importance of getting these reports into the hands of many people.

IN LOVING MEMORY OF THE ASSASSINATED HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

During 2021, violence took the lives of 139 human rights defenders in Colombia. People who, from their processes in different territories, worked for their communities to build a more just and peaceful country. Here, we recall the names and profiles of the people murdered in the second half of 2021, so that their memories will live on and to demand that their murders do not go unpunished.

JULY 1, 2021

LUIS PICASIO CARAMPAIMA


Member of the Emberá Dóbida indigenous community of the Catrú, Dubaza and Ankozo reservation

Alto Baudó, Chocó

Luis Picasio Carampaima, 30 years old, was a leader of the Emberá Dóbida community of the Catrú, Dubaza and Ankozo reservation, located in the Alto Baudó municipality.

On July 1 at 3 a.m. he was murdered by paramilitary members of the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia-AGC). In previous days there had been actions by armed groups that led, for example, to the displacement of 8 families.

Since 2016 it is known that in the territory there are situations of violation of the rights of human rights defenders, forced recruitment, clashes of illegal armed



groups for territorial control and mining of fields.

The Ombudsman's Office had issued early warnings since 2019 in which it requested protection for the communities of the Catrú, Dubasa and Ankozo reservations.

Alleged responsables: Paramilitary


JULY 3, 2021

JOSÉ GREGORIO LUGUEZ


**Member of La Chica Village JAC and the PNIS
Tierralta, Córdoba**

José Gregorio Luguez was a member of the Community Action Board of La Chica and of the National Program for the Integral Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS). He led peasant processes. He was also a single father of three children.

He was killed on the morning of Saturday, July 3. Apparently he was called by members of the Gaitanistas Self-Defense Forces of Colombia -AGC- in the village of Loma Colorada, however, it is said that the murder took place in another village.



Alleged responsables: Paramilitary

JULY 3, 2021**FERNANDO VELA****Environmental Leader
Florencia, Caquetá**

Fernando Vela, 42 years old, was a medical doctor, human rights and environmental defender in Caquetá. He specialized in internal medicine at the Javeriana University. He studied and researched environmental conflicts in the Amazon. In his writings he addressed issues such as deforestation and water pollution.

He created the Rumi Kumu Foundation with the objective of raising awareness about the care of the environment in the Amazon and to promote the culture of the region. He is remembered for saving many animals from wildlife trafficking and for developing the "Soy Harpía Caquetá" (*I am Harpy Caquetá*) project to support the conservation of the harpy eagle.

His murder took place on July 3. Armed men on a motorcycle shot him while he was in his truck. He was taken to a hospital but passed away there.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

JULY 4, 2021

NELSON GALVÁN ASCANIO

**Delegate of the Association of Community
Action Boards of San José del Tarra
Hacarí, Norte de Santander**



Nelson Galván Ascanio was a delegate of the Association of Community Action Boards of San José del Tarra. He was well known for his leadership of more than ten years in different management positions within La Valentina Community Action Board.


His assassination occurred on July 4, amid the events some of his belongings were stolen. In the same incident, a woman was seriously injured.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

JULY 5, 2021

HIGINIO BAILARÍN

**Indigenous guard, Emberá Eyabida community
Dabeiba, Antioquia**



Higinio Balarín, 23 years old, was an indigenous guard of the Emberá Eyabida community in Amparradó Medio.

On Monday, July 5, while he was trying to help Mrs. Eulalia Balarín, a woman from his reservation who was injured when an antipersonnel mine exploded, he accidentally set off another one of these devices and died.

It is stated that these mines are responsibility of the National Liberation Army -ELN-, and that since 2020 up to the date of the facts in the department of Antioquia 10 people have died in similar events and several more have been injured.

Alleged responsables: ELN

JULY 7, 2021**DERLY PASTRANA YARA****Coordinator of the Departmental Board of Victims
Neiva, Huila**

Derly Pastrana Yara, 45 years old and mother of three daughters, was coordinator of Huila's Departmental Board of Victims. She worked in the defense of women affected during the armed conflict and made possible the creation of the Museum of Historical Memory of Victims in her department. She also served as vice-president of the Colombian Federation of Victims of the FARC and as president of the National Network of Women Human Rights Defenders.



On June 15 she was attacked by unknown assailants who shot her 8 times as she arrived at her home in Neiva. She was wounded and hospitalized for several weeks, but due to the severity of her injuries, she passed on July 7.

Alleged responsables: FARC dissidents**JULY 10, 2021****GERTRUDIS HERNÁNDEZ LEAL****Founder of the Palmarito Women's Association
Cúcuta, Norte de Santander**

Gertrudis Hernández Leal defended women's rights for more than 15 years. She was a founder of the Palmarito Women's Association, treasurer on the board of directors of the town's wood cooperative and a reading promoter for the municipal mayor's office.



On July 7, while she was with her family at a farm in a rural area of Cúcuta, she was murdered by armed men who arrived at the place and shot her four times. Days later it was reported that five members of the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia -AGC-), who were allegedly responsible for the leader's death, were captured.

Alleged responsables: Paramilitary

JULY 13, 2021

ALEXANDER ENRIQUE ESCOBAR MOLINA
Nuevo Amanecer Community Action Board
(JAC)
Sabanalarga, Atlántico

Alexander Escobar Molina, 43 years old, was the former president of the Nuevo Amanecer Neighborhood JAC in the municipality of Aguachica.

He was murdered during the night of July 13, in the Los Campanos neighborhood of the municipality of Sabanalarga, Atlántico. While he was in front of his house, he was attacked with a firearm by subjects on a motorcycle.



Alleged responsables: Unknown

JULY 14, 2021**OSCAR IVÁN SUÁREZ RIASCOS****Town councilor of Cali's Commune 15
Cali, Valle del Cauca**


Oscar Iván Suárez Riascos, 33 years old, was councilor of Cali's Commune 15 for the period 2020 - 2023. He had two minor children aged 3 and 5 years old.

He was murdered on July 10. The events occurred in the Mojica neighborhood in the east of Cali when unknown subjects approached the place where he was and shot him. He was left wounded and was taken to a health care center, where he died on Wednesday, July 14 after four days in intensive care.

The town councilor had received threats and physical aggressions prior to the murder, for which he had filed a lawsuit.

Alleged responsables: Unknown**JULY 14, 2021****YEISI CAMPO****Member of La Fortaleza Community Council
Morales, Cauca**

Yeisi Campo, 37 years old, mother of two children, was a member of the La Fortaleza community council in the municipality of Morales and former president of the El Playón Community Action Board.



On July 12 she was reported missing and two days later, in the village of Altamira, municipality of Morales, her lifeless body was found with several gunshot wounds. Yeisi had apparently received death threats from armed groups operating in the area.

Alleged responsables: Unknown


July 18, 2021


LUIS HERNANDO CASTRILLÓN MOLINA
Treasurer of La Cruz JAC
Yolombó, Antioquia

Luis Hernando Castrillón Molina, 55 years old, was treasurer of La Cruz Community Action Board.

The leader was killed on July 18 during a massacre in the municipality of Yolombó. About 10 members of Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia -AGC- arrived at a public establishment and opened fire on the present people. Luis Hernando, his wife María Piedad Ramírez, his son Esneyder and a young man named Fray Zapata were executed.


Alleged responsables: Paramilitary



JULY 21, 2021**JUANA IRIS RAMÍREZ MARTÍNEZ****Secretary of the Luis R. Calvo Neighborhood JAC****Santa Marta, Magdalena**

Juana Iris Ramirez Martinez, was recognized for her dedication to the community and social activism. She had two children and was secretary of the Luis R. Calvo neighborhood JAC, from where she led a group of social management and community accompaniment.

On July 21, when she was in a public establishment, armed men arrived at the place to attack a young man. The bullets hit Juana, who was wounded and was taken to a medical center where she finally perished.

Alleged responsables: Unknown**JULY 23, 2021****JOSÉ VIANEY GAVIRIA HOYOS****Prosecutor of La Virgen Neighborhood JAC
La Montañita, Caquetá**

José Vianey Gaviria Gaviria Hoyos, 40 years old, was the prosecutor of La Virgen neighborhood Community Action Board and vice-president of the La Unión Peneya Community Center.

He was murdered during the morning of July 23 by men on a motorcycle. He was intercepted and shot several times on the

road that connects Unión Peneya with San Isidro, near the village of Los Andes. Inhabitants of the area said that the same motorcycle followed Gaviria before he left Unión Peneya.

Alleged responsables: FARC dissidents

JULY 25, 2021

JEAN CARLOS RODRÍGUEZ DÍAZ
President of Las Águilas JAC
El Carmen, Norte de Santander

Jean Carlos Rodríguez Díaz was president of Las Águilas JAC in El Carmen, Norte de Santander.

He was murdered on July 25 and his body was found with three bullet wounds between the borders of the municipalities of Convención and El Carmen. Apparently, the events took place in the village of Guamalito.



Alleged responsables: Unknown

JULY 26, 2021**OSWALDO DE JESÚS PÉREZ NAVARRO****JAC President of Mina Piojó
Montecristo, Bolívar**


Oswaldo de Jesús Pérez Navarro was president of the Mina Piojó JAC and leader of the Agromining Federation of Southern Bolívar.

On the night of July 26, he was murdered while at his place of residence in the municipality of Montecristo. The perpetrators were allegedly armed men belonging to the 37th front of the FARC dissidents, who had previously threatened the leader. Members of his family left the village for fear of being killed.

**Alleged responsables: FARC dissidents****JULY 31, 2021****ELÍAS PAI GUANGA****Indigenous leader
Ricaurte, Nariño**

Elías Pai Guanga was an indigenous leader and former governor of the Awá people. He was murdered on July 31 in Ricaurte, Nariño.

The indigenous Awá communities in this department have generated several alerts warning of the risk faced by community members and leaders because of the escalation of the armed conflict in the territory.

**Alleged responsables: ELN**

AUGUST 5, 2021

MIGUEL MUCHAVISOY

Traditional medic, Kamentsá Biyá Indigenous

Chapter

Sibundoy, Putumayo



Miguel Muchavisoy was recognized since his youth for his wisdom with traditional medicine in the Kamentsá Biyá indigenous Chapter. He was active in the council's participatory spaces and was projected as governor.

He was murdered on August 5 around noon, in Sibundoy, Putumayo department. Apparently two unidentified persons entered his house and shot him three times with silenced firearms. He was left wounded but died while being transported to a medical center.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

AUGUST 9, 2021

FRANCISCO JAVIER POSADA POSADA

JAC President, Montebello Village

San Andrés de Cuerquia, Antioquia



Francisco Javier Posada Posada, 54 years old, was president of the Montebello Community Action Board in the municipality of San Andres de Cuerquia in Northern Antioquia.


He was killed with a firearm in a commercial establishment he owned. He had received previous threats from FARC dissidents in retaliation for denouncing their illegal actions in the village.

Alleged responsables: FARC dissidents

AUGUST 11, 2021**CARLOS FREDDY LONDOÑO BAUTISTA****Teacher at El Progreso Educational Institution****Fuente de Oro, Meta**

Carlos Freddy Londoño Bautista was a defender of the “llanera” culture and tradition (*related to the area of “llanos Orientales”, Eastern area in Colombia which includes departments such as Meta*). He worked as a teacher at the educational institution El Progreso and was also a substitute delegate of the Association of Meta Educators -ADEM-; affiliated to the Colombian Federation of Educators -FECODE-.

He was murdered during the morning of August 11. When he arrived at the educational institution where he was teaching, he was approached by assassins on a motorcycle who shot him four times in front of several students.

Alleged responsables: Unknown**AUGUST 19, 2021****NERIO FERNANDO RODRÍGUEZ****Afro-descending leader****Cumbiatara, Nariño**

Nerio Fernando Rodríguez, 43, was an Afro-descending leader. On August 19, men from the National Liberation Army -ELN- arrived at the leader's house, located in the village of Santa Rosa in the municipality of Cumbiatara, and killed him in the presence of his relatives.

After the murder the men fled to the Damasco village.

Alleged responsables: ELN

AUGUST 21, 2021

ELIÉCER SÁNCHEZ CÁCERES

Vice President of La Punta JAC

Cúcuta, Norte de Santander

Eliécer Sánchez Cáceres was vice-president of La Punta JAC. He was murdered on August 21, when he was intercepted by a group of armed men who indiscriminately shot and killed both the leader and a man who accompanied him.

It is known that he had previously reported threats against him.

Alleged responsables: Paramilitary



AUGUST 22, 2021

JHON JAIRO CHOCUÉ


Indigenous Communicator

Caldono, Cauca

Jhon Jairo Chocué was a community leader, indigenous communicator and broadcaster recognized for his support to the community and the dissemination of cultural, sports and social activities.

His murder occurred during the early morning of August 22, in the Pueblo Nuevo reservation, in the middle of a fight between people present at a cockfighting site. Jhon Jairo was stabbed in the chest, which caused his death while he was being transported to the Francisco de Paula Santander hospital.

Alleged responsables: Unknown



AUGUST 23, 2021**ESTEBAN MOSQUERA IGLESIAS****Educational leader****Popayán, Cauca**

Esteban Mosquera Iglesias was a youth leader, journalist in alternative media and student activist at the University of Cauca, where he studied music.

The events in which the 26-year-old leader lost his life, took place in the La Pamba neighborhood of the Popayán city. Subjects on a motorcycle stopped him while he was walking through the historic center and opened fire against him, several times.

The leader participated in the mobilizations of the National Strike and repeatedly denounced threats against him. In December 2018, Mosquera had lost one of his eyes due to a shot by the ESMAD (Mobile Anti-riot Squad) in the middle of a mobilization.

**Alleged responsables: Unknown****AUGUST 24, 2021****MAIRON JAVIER CHAVERRA MOSQUERA****Community Leader****Zaragoza, Antioquia**

Mairon Javier Chaverra Mosquera, 38 years old, father of two children, sanitary engineer and councilman of Zaragoza. He was a member of the thematic board of potable water and basic sanitation of Bajo Cauca, was a consultant for the Indigenous Organization of Antioquia -OIA-,



university professor, member of the Conservative Party and was projected as a candidate for mayor of his municipality.

He was murdered on August 24 when he was in front of his place of residence. A man arrived at the place and after making sure of his identity, he shot him several times.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

AUGUST 25, 2021


JESÚS ALBEIRO GUTIÉRREZ

**Member of the National Agrarian Coordinator
Cajibío, Cauca**

Jesús Albeiro Gutiérrez, 40 years old, was a peasant leader, member of the National Agrarian Coordinator -CNA- in Popayán and member of the El Plateado Community Action Board.

The leader disappeared on August 21 and his corpse was found on August 25, in the sector known as San José de la Laguna, in Cajibío, Cauca. Due to continuous threats and acts of violence against him, Jesús Albeiro was displaced from this municipality and resided in Popayán.

Alleged responsables: Unknown



AUGUST 29, 2021**MARÍA DORFENIS LÓPEZ CORDÓN****Member of the Caño Lindo village JAC
El Castillo, Meta**


María Dorfenis López Córdón, 38 years old, was a member of the Caño Lindo village JAC and of the Independent Agricultural Workers Union of Meta – SINTRAGRIM.

She was murdered on August 29 at night, when she was traveling on the El Castillo-Caño Lindo road with her husband, Rigoberto Cabanzo Arévalo. The couple was intercepted by armed men who shot them, thus ending María Dorfenis' life and wounding her husband.

**Alleged responsables: Unknown****SEPTEMBER 1, 2021****JUAN DANIEL QUINTERO LIZCANO****Member of the Peasant Association of Inzá
Tierradentro –ACIT–
Inzá, Cauca**

Juan Daniel Quintero Lizcano was a youth and peasant leader, and member of the Inzá Tierradentro Peasant Association -ACIT-. He was recognized for his leadership in community processes in favor of children and youth in the village of La Palmera.

He was murdered on September 1, while spending time with some friends in the village of Pedregal. Juan Daniel was assaulted with a knife by a man who was alcohol intoxicated.

**Alleged responsables: Unknown**

SEPTEMBER 10, 2021


MARCO TULIO GUTIÉRREZ MENDOZA

**JAC Secretary for the Albania Village
Lejanías, Meta**

Marco Tulio Gutiérrez Mendoza, 62 years old, was an agricultural worker and served as secretary of the Albania Village JAC, where he resided.

The murder was carried out on Friday, September 10 in the municipality of Lejanías, Meta, when the leader was in the Lusitania village, where armed men arrived and attacked him with firearms.

Alleged responsables: Unknown



SEPTEMBER 16, 2021

EFRÉN ANTONIO BAILARÍN CARUPIA

**Indigenous guard, Chidima Tolo Reservation,
Embera Eyabida people
Acandí, Chocó**

Efrén Antonio Bailarín Carupia was an indigenous leader of the Embera Eyabida people, former governor and indigenous guard of the Chidima Tolo Reservation located in Acandí, Chocó.

He was murdered on September 16 when he was fishing in the Tolo River with a colleague. The latter managed to escape alive from the attack, but unfortunately the leader was shot several times and killed. It is alleged that the paramilitary group Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia -AGC- is responsible for the assassination. It is not known if he had previous threats.



Alleged responsables: Paramilitary

SEPTEMBER 19, 2021**MARCOS EFRAÍN MONTALVO ESCOBAR****Journalist****Tuluá, Valle del Cauca**


Marcos Efraín Montalvo Escobar, 68 years old, was an independent journalist and founder of the newspapers El Reportero, La Variante, El Otro and El Picacho. He worked for different media outlets nationwide and, in recent times, he was focused on disseminating information through his social networks in which he denounced the corruption and violence affecting his region.



He was murdered on the night of September 19 in Tuluá. The events occurred while the leader was shopping in a commercial establishment in La Esperanza neighborhood, a man arrived at the site and shot him. The assailant fled on a motorcycle with an accomplice.

Alleged responsables: Unknown**SEPTEMBER 20, 2021****DILIO BAILARÍN****Indigenous leader, Alto Guayabal Reservation****Carmen del Darién, Chocó**

Dilio Bailarín was an indigenous leader of the Emberá Eyabida people in the Alto Guayabal reservation. He was known for defending the traditions of his community, promoting cultural and ancestral values.



The leader fought against mining, forced recruitment, displacement of the inhabitants of his Reservation and, especially, against megaprojects that affected his territory and traditions.

He was assassinated on September 20 when he was cutting wood 20 minutes from the reservation. It is known that he had received previous threats.

Alleged responsible: ELN

SEPTEMBER 22, 2021

MARTÍN BAYONA

**JAC President of La Cuchilla Village
Morales, Bolívar**

Martín Bayona was president of the La Cuchilla JAC, member of the Board of Directors of the Sports, Recreation and Culture Institute of Morales -INDERMOR- and promoter of the Territorially Focused Development Programs -PDET-.



On September 22, he was murdered by armed men who shot him several times. His lifeless body was found in a farm of his property located in La Cuchilla, Corcovado, in the municipality of Morales.

Alleged responsible: ELN

SEPTEMBER 22, 2021

ILIA PILCUÉ YULE**Traditional doctor of the Nasa people
Jambaló, Cauca**

Ilia Pilcué Yule, 75 years old, was a traditional doctor of the Nasa people. Her murder was committed on September 22 in the village of La Laguna in the rural area of the Jambaló municipality. While she was on her way to an agricultural exchange activity in her community, she was assaulted by armed men who shot at her.


**Alleged responsables: Unknown**

SEPTEMBER 30, 2021

APOLINAR RIVERO**Peasant leader
Puerto Leguizamo, Putumayo**

Apolinar Rivero was a farmer leader, former president of the Lorencito Community Action Board. He led crop substitution processes in Puerto Leguizamo.

During the morning of September 30, while he was having breakfast with his family, armed men came to his house and shot him. According to the community, the leader had received previous death threats from FARC dissidents.

**Alleged responsables: FARC dissidents**

SEPTEMBER 30, 2021


HENRY PEREA MONTAÑO

**Member of the Afromayo Community Council
Puerto Leguizamo, Putumayo**

Henry Perea Montaña was a member of the Afromayo community council and defended the rights of the Afro-descendant community.

On September 29 he was murdered by members of FARC dissidents. When he was at his farm located in La Patagonia, Piñuña Negro inspection, armed men arrived at the place and shot him.

Alleged responsables: FARC dissidents



SEPTEMBER 30, 2021

JAIME CUADRADO

**Community Leader
Bogotá, D. C.**

Jaime Cuadrado, 53 years old, was a member of the Patriotic Union -UP-, defender of community, environmental and animal rights. He actively participated in spaces such as the Local Citizen Observatory and the Copaco of the Usme health board.

On September 30, he was murdered with a knife, he received a wound in the chest. The crime occurred in a park located in the sector of Compostela next to the road that leads to Bolonia in the locality of Usme. Apparently, the leader had received threats prior to the crime.


Alleged responsables: Unknown



SEPTEMBER 30, 2021**JOHN ALBERTO PASCAL****Indigenous Guard Coordinator, El Gran Sábalo
Reservation
Tumaco, Nariño**


John Alberto Pascal, 25 years old, father of two children, was the coordinator of the Indigenous Guard of the El Gran Sábalo Awá reservation, Panelero community.

On September 30, morning hours, while he was on his way to the village of La Guayacona with his mother, where they would be buying groceries, the leader approached the shore of the Güiza river and accidentally set off an antipersonnel mine that took his life.

**Alleged responsables: ELN****OCTOBER 2, 2021****HILDO GUTIÉRREZ GÓMEZ****Member of the Mirolindo village JAC
Argelia, Cauca**

Hildo Gutiérrez Gómez, community leader, sportsman, promoter, and organizer of sports events in the community municipality of Argelia, department of Cauca, was a member of the Mirolindo Community Action Board and was promoting the creation of a community toll on the Argelia-Plateado road.

On October 2, he was murdered while at his residence in the Mirolindo village by members of the FARC dissidents, specifically the Carlos Patiño front, who shot him five times.

**Alleged responsables: FARC dissidents**

OCTOBER 5, 2021

OSVALDO ENRIQUE HERNÁNDEZ ZÚÑIGA

**Delegate of Erika Beatriz Neighborhood JAC
Maicao, La Guajira**



Osvaldo Enrique Hernández Zúñiga, 38 years old, was a delegate of the Erika Beatriz neighborhood Community Action Board and worked around school nutrition in the Maicao Education Secretariat.


He was murdered on October 5; when he was riding a motorcycle in the Villa Amelia 2 neighborhood, he was approached by hired assassins who fired two shots at him. Osvaldo had earned the recognition of the inhabitants of the municipality for his social work.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

OCTOBER 5, 2021

JORGE ANTONIO LOAIZA

**Vice President of Alea
Puerto Caicedo, Putumayo**




Jorge Antonio Loaiza was vice-president of the Alea village, a community belonging to the Perla Amazónica Peasant Reserve Zone -ZRCPA-. He was murdered on Tuesday, October 5 during the afternoon hours in the Nuevo Progreso community, Arizona inspection, municipality of Puerto Caicedo. While he was on his way to his farm, armed men held him, tied his hands and feet, and shot him.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

OCTOBER 11, 2021**WINNY GERALDINE LUISA FORERO GÓMEZ****Community leader****Ansermanuevo, Valle del Cauca**

Winny Geraldine Luisa Forero Gómez was an activist, territorial defender, promoter of culture, tourism, and sports in Ansermanuevo. On October 11 she was murdered in the Potrero de Gonzaga sector of her municipality. She was at her home when an armed man arrived and shot her several times.

**Alleged responsables: Unknown****OCTOBER 16, 2021****OMAR CÁRDENAS LOZANO****Member of the Cimarrona Guard****Litoral del San Juan, Chocó**

Omar Cárdenas Lozano was a member of the Cimarrona Guard in the municipality of Litoral del San Juan, Chocó.


He was killed on the afternoon of October 16 by members of the National Liberation Army (ELN) while he was at his home in the community of Pangalita. Several men arrived and shot him.

**Alleged responsables: ELN**

OCTOBER 17, 2021

VÍCTOR ORLANDO MOSQUERA

**Coordinator of the Retorno al Campo Ethnic
Vegetable Garden
Cali, Valle del Cauca**



Victor Orlando Mosquera, 33 years old, was a community leader and environmental defender. He coordinated the planting and harvesting process of the Retorno al Campo Ethnic Vegetable Garden, promoted productive projects for young people, encouraged social activities, food sovereignty and supported land restitution. He was also a promoter of Law 70 for black communities.

On October 10 he was reported missing, days later his body was found buried in a grave with stab wounds in a canyon near the Ethnic Vegetable Garden.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

OCTOBER 18, 2021

LUIS ALFONSO NARVÁEZ ESCOBAR

**Vice-governor of the Santa Bárbara Chapter
La Vega, Cauca**



Luis Alfonso Narváez Escobar, 44 years old, was the coordinator of the Victims' Table in the municipality of La Vega, coordinator of the COCCAM and vice-governor of the Santa Bárbara Chapter, he was also a former indigenous governor and carried out processes in defense of the territory.

The murder of the ex-governor occurred on October 18 in the parcel of land where he was performing agricultural work in El Guayabo. Unknown armed men arrived at the place and inflicted wounds with knives and firearms in several parts of his body.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

OCTOBER 18, 2021

EFRÉN ESPAÑA

**Co-founder of the Argelia Peasant Workers Association –ASCAMTA–
Argelia, Cauca**

Efrén España, member and co-founder of the Argelia Peasant Workers Association -ASCAMTA- was recognized as a leader with a high vocation for service who led community processes in the Nueva Colombia neighborhood of the El Sinaí district.

He was murdered on October 18 when the leader was at his place of residence. Armed men on a motorcycle arrived at the site and shot him repeatedly.



Alleged responsables: Unknown

OCTOBER 19, 2021

ROGELIO LÓPEZ FIGUEROA

Peasant leader

Cajibío, Cauca



Rogelio López Figueroa, 50 years old, was a member of the National Association of Peasant Reserve Zones -Anzorco-, the Process of Popular Unity of the Southwest of Colombia -Pupsoc- and the Patriotic March -MP-. He was also a member of the Association of Peasant Workers of Cajibío -ATCC-, the National Integral Program for the Substitution of Illicitly Used Crops -PNIS- and the National Coordination of Coca, Poppy, and Marijuana Growers -COCCAM- and promoted work in defense of the rights of communities in Cauca and Antioquia.

He was attacked by an armed man on a motorcycle while he was riding a vehicle in the rural area of La Primavera in Cajibío on October 19, during evening hours. His body was found the next morning by a farmer, with several bullet wounds.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

OCTOBER 19, 2021**LUIS EFRAÍN SÁNCHEZ BALAGUERA****President of the Paramillo Village JAC****Sardinata, Norte de Santander**

Luis Efraín Sánchez Balaguera was president of the Paramillo Community Action Board. On the afternoon of October 19, while he was working in the fields in Las Mercedes village, he accidentally set off an anti-personnel mine. The leader died and a young minor who accompanied him was injured.

**Alleged responsables: Unknown****OCTOBER 21, 2021****SANTIAGO GUARÍN****Environmental Defender****San Rafael, Antioquia**

Santiago Guarín, 21, was a musician and rapper, as well as a recognized environmental defender who accompanied regional processes promoting the defense of natural resources.

He was massacred on October 19 in the park "Mi Río" in the municipality of San Rafael. Four armed men on a motorcycle shot indiscriminately at him and three other companions while they were rehearsing for a cultural event. The young men were between 16 and 26 years old and they all died as a result of the shots.

The rappers were preparing a musical protest to oppose the concession for the construction of the Churimo Small Hydro-electric Power Plant (PCH).


**Alleged responsables: Unknown**

OCTOBER 23, 2021

NAZARIA CALAMBÁS TUNUBALÁ

**Indigenous leader, Guambía Reservation
Morales, Cauca**

Nazaria Calambás Tunubalá, 34 years old, was an indigenous leader of the Misak people's Guambía Reservation, in 2013 she was mayor of the Piscitaut Reservation. She also participated in the actions of the National Strike in 2021.



On October 23 she was murdered in her place of residence located in the village of La Cuchilla, municipality of Morales, Cauca. Armed men gave her four shots.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

OCTOBER 25, 2021

NOEL CORSINI ZÚÑIGA

**Member of COCCAM
Buenos Aires, Cauca**

Noel Corsini Zúñiga was a member of the National Coordinator of Coca, Poppy, and Marijuana Growers (COCCAM) in the municipality of Buenos Aires, Cauca.



He was murdered on October 25 in the afternoon, in the Santa Rosa village in Buenos Aires, Cauca. While he was traveling in his vehicle, he was approached by armed men who shot him indiscriminately.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

OCTOBER 30, 2021**EDINSON VALENZUELA CÚAMA****Sports and Culture Coordinator
of the Community Council of the Raposo River
Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca**


Édison Cúama was coordinator of sports, integration and culture and member of the Governing Board of the Community Council of the Raposo River in Buenaventura. He was known for his solidarity and for promoting the welfare of the families of the community.

He was murdered on November 2 when armed men came to the village where he lived and opened fire on him. As a result of the murder, several families were displaced.

Alleged responsables: Unknown**NOVEMBER 3, 2021****VÍCTOR LÓPEZ GÓMEZ****Coordinator of the Watsal Pa Indigenous Guard
Chapter
Orito, Putumayo**

Víctor López Gómez 36 years old, was coordinator of the Indigenous Guard of the Awá people and member of the Watsal Pa Chapter of the same community.


In the early morning of November 3, in the village of El Prado, municipality of Orito, four hooded and armed individuals entered the leader's house and took his life along with the ones of two family members. The perpetrators identified themselves as members of a paramilitary group.

**Alleged responsables: Paramilitary**

NOVEMBER 8, 2021

ROBINSON JIMÉNEZ BAUTISTA

**Deputy Director of the Workers' Syndical
Union –USO–
Puerto Wilches, Santander**



Robinson Jiménez Bautista was president of the Association of Santander Drillers and deputy director of Sindical Workers Union - USO.

On October 6 at 6:30 a.m. he was attacked by a subject who approached a group of workers and upon identifying the leader, shot him 7 times. Due to the seriousness of his wounds, he was transferred to a hospital in Bucaramanga where he remained in intensive care for a month. He died in the afternoon of November 8.


Days before the event Robinson was threatened in a pamphlet signed by a paramilitary group.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

NOVEMBER 8, 2021

LUIS ALBERTO RAMOS BERTEL

**JAC President, San Antonio Village
Montelíbano, Córdoba**



Luis Alberto Ramos Bertel was president of the San Antonio Community Action Board and had been in office for 8 years. He was also a member of the Association of Farmers of Southern Córdoba -ASC-SUCOR-. In recent months his work was focused on promoting projects for the substitution of illicit crops and advancing

a request for a peasant reserve for the south of Córdoba.

The leader left his house on November 8 after receiving a phone call. Later, his lifeless body was found with a wound in his chest and blows with a blunt object.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

NOVEMBER 9, 2021

WILLINGTON HERNÁNDEZ

JAC President, El Centro neighborhood

in La Unión Peneya

La Montañita, Caquetá

Willington Hernández was president of the Community Action Board of the El Centro neighborhood in La Unión Peneya. He promoted the return to the territory of the 2004 massive displacement victims in the region and supported the Search Unit and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace in the recognition and recovery of 46 unidentified bodies in the cemetery of the inspection.

He was assassinated on November 9. When he was leaving a meeting with other members of the JAC, he was attacked with a firearm by unknown men.



Alleged responsables: Unknown

NOVEMBER 18, 2021


HERMER ANTONIO MONSALVE

Aspiring president for the Community Action Board of the Carrizal township Remedios, Antioquia

Hermer Antonio Monsalve was a candidate for the presidency of the Community Action Board of the Carrizal village in the municipality of Remedios, Antioquia.

On the night of November 18, hooded men entered a commercial establishment owned by the leader and took him away from the site, transferring him to the outskirts of the community, on the road leading to the municipality of Segovia, where they killed him with fifteen gunshot wounds.

Alleged responsables: Unknown



NOVEMBER 21, 2021


MARCOS FIDEL CAMAYO GUETIO

Former governor of the Las Delicias resguardo Bueno Aires, Cauca

Marcos Fidel Camayo Guetio was an indigenous leader of the resguardo Las Delicias located in the rural area of Buenos Aires, Cauca. In 2014 he was the political coordinator of the Çxhab Wala Kiwe [Indigenous] Health system and in 2004 and 2010, he was governor of the resguardo.

He was executed during the afternoon of November 21 while he was in a parcel of land, in the La Cabaña sector. Armed men on a motorcycle arrived at the place and shot several times, causing the wounds that led to his death.

Alleged responsables: Unknown



NOVEMBER 23, 2021**NANCY YANETH MEJÍA ARAQUE****Activist in the Women's Network of ASCAMCAT
Tibú, Norte de Santander**


Nancy Yaneth Mejía Araque, 41 years old, was a member of the Women's Network of the Catatumbo Peasant Association -ASCAMCAT.

She was murdered on November 23. The events took place in the village of Palmeras near La Gabarra township in Tibú, Norte de Santander. According to neighbors in the area, after an argument between the couple, the activist was attacked twice with a 22-caliber shotgun by her husband, who later took his own life.

**Alleged responsables: Other****NOVEMBER 24, 2021****JUANA PANESSO DUMASÁ****Traditional medic, Antumiadó indigenous
community
Lloró, Choco**

Juana Panesso Dumasá, 46 years old, was a traditional medic of the Antumiadó indigenous community.

On November 24, the leader's corpse was handed over to the Indigenous Guard, after having been kidnapped and held captive three days earlier by an armed group. It is believed that the murder was a retali-



ation since Juana was accused of causing the death, by lightning, of a person from another indigenous community.

The event generated fear in the population to which the medic belonged, and 13 families were displaced to Las Toldas, another indigenous community located on the road leading from Quibdó, Chocó, to Medellín, Antioquia.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

NOVEMBER 24, 2021
JOHN ALEXANDER SIERRA
Farmer leader
Tuluá, Valle del Cauca

John Alexander Sierra, 26 years old, was a peasant leader in the rural area of La Marina, Tuluá. He was known for his critical and decisive spirit in denouncing situations of injustice and promoting community production initiatives.



He was murdered on November 24 when he was in the village of Alejandría Baja, La Moralia, municipality of Tuluá. Armed men shot him. It is known that he had not received any threats prior to the murder.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

NOVEMBER 25, 2021**ALBERT MEJÍA PORTILLO****Peasant leader****Tamalameque, Cesar**

Albert Mejía Portillo, 31 years old, was a peasant leader who promoted the land recovery process of El Silencio in the rural area of Tamalameque.

On Thursday morning, November 25, the leader was murdered while he was on his way through the Tutumito village to the El Silencio farm, where he had a parcel of land. He was approached by two men who shot him. It is known that in August of the same year, the leader received death threats from landowners and illegal armed groups.

**Alleged responsables: Unknown****DECEMBER 1, 2021****JHON MARIO GARCÍA GUANGA****Indigenous guard, Gran Rosario Reservation****Tumaco, Nariño**

Jhon Mario García Guanga was an indigenous guard of the Gran Rosario Reservation of the Awá people in Tumaco, Nariño.


He was murdered on December 1 in the afternoon. While he was with his wife in the La Guayacana sector, armed men approached them and forced the leader into a pick-up truck. In response to the kidnapping, community members began searching for him, but one hour later, they found his lifeless body in the Pinde sector on the road leading to Tumaco.

**Alleged responsables: Unknown**

DECEMBER 7, 2021

CRISTINA ISABEL CANTILLO

**Director of the Human Quality Foundation
Santa Marta, Magdalena**



Cristina Isabel Cantillo was the director of the Human Quality Foundation, a promoter of enforceability processes for the rights of trans women, persons deprived of liberty and young people.

She was murdered on December 7 while she was on the terrace of her home located in the Ondas del Caribe neighborhood. Two men on a motorcycle showed up and took three shots at her.


The leader had been the victim of several threats and attempts on her life. Despite this, in the days prior to the murder, a police accompaniment scheme she had been counting on for the protection of her integrity was withdrawn.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

DECEMBER 10, 2021

FREDY PESTANA HERRERA

**President of the Cocomanorte Community
Council
Acandí, Chocó**



Fredy Pestana Herrera was president of the Community Council of the Acandí River Basin and Northern Coastal Zone -Cocomanorte-. He was a former councilman of Acandí and a recognized leader for his work as an advocate for the Afro-descendant community and for his support

of land restitution processes for victims of the armed conflict. In the community council he coordinated the Río Muerto (*Dead River*) ecological trail, through which migrants on their way to Panama normally travel.

He was assassinated by mechanical asphyxiation, apparently in the early morning of December 10 in a rural area of Acandí.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

DECEMBER 17, 2021

HUBER VELÁSQUEZ

**Peasant Overseer of Apartadó
Apartadó, Antioquía**

Huber Velásquez was a peasant overseer in Apartadó. He had denounced acts of corruption in the paving project of the road between Apartadó and the village of San José, pointing out delays in its execution, damage to nearby houses and the lack of interest of the municipal administration in solving these irregularities.



On Friday, December 17, he was murdered in the village of La Balsa in the township of San José de Apartadó. The events occurred at his place of residence, where armed individuals arrived and shot him several times. These events caused the forced displacement of his family.

Alleged responsables: Paramilitary

DECEMBER 19, 2021

ARNUBIA YUNDA CUETIA

Indigenous Communicator

Miranda, Cauca



Arnubia Yunda Cuetia, 36 years old, was a mother of four children, recognized for being a cheerful, charismatic woman, dedicated to community work. She was an indigenous communicator, member of Hilo Mujer del Tejido Familia (Women's Thread of the Family Weave) and of the Cxab Wala Quiwe territorial communication tulpas of the Association of Indigenous Chapters of Northern Cauca – ACIN.

On December 19, she was found dead in her place of residence located in the village of El Cabildo, in the municipality of Miranda, with several stab wounds. Her partner was also wounded and was taken to a hospital in Miranda under the custody of the Indigenous Guard, for allegedly being responsible for the femicide.

Alleged responsables: Other

DECEMBER 23, 2021

WILMAR ASCANIO ANGARITA

JAC President of Alto Cañabraval Village

San Pablo, Bolívar



Wilmar Ascanio Angarita, 45 years old, was president of the Alto Cañabraval Community Action Board, he led infrastructure and sports processes with the community in the rural area of the San Pablo municipality.

On the morning of December 23, he was murdered while he was in a restaurant located on Rudas Avenue in La Libertad neighborhood, he was shot several times by an armed man on a motorcycle.

Alleged responsables: ELN

DECEMBER 23, 2021
GUSTAVO OROZCO RAMÍREZ
JAC President, San Perucho Village
Andes, Antioquia

Gustavo Orozco Ramírez, 58 years old, was president of the Community Action Board of the San Perucho village. He was also a recognized community project manager in the Quebrada Arriba township.



On Thursday, December 23, he was murdered while he was gathered with his family and community, praying the Christmas novena. Armed men on a motorcycle arrived at the place and attacked him with firearms.

Alleged responsables: Unknown

DECEMBER 27, 2021

JAVIER ESNAIDER CASTILLO ORTIZ

**Member of the Changó music group
Barbacoas, Nariño**

Javier Esnaider Castillo Ortiz, 24 years old, was a cultural manager, member of the Changó music group, interpreter, dynamizer and researcher. He participated in the Petronio Álvarez Festival representing the Pacific region of Nariño. He promoted the preservation of the traditions and cultural heritage of the region.



On December 27 at night, armed men approached him while he was in a public establishment located in San Pablo, central area of Barbacoas, shooting life away from him.


Alleged responsables: FARC dissidents

DECEMBER 31, 2021

MARÍA DEL CARMEN MOLINA IMBACHÍ

**JAC Secretary for the Buenos Aires township
San Pedro, Valle del Cauca**

María del Carmen Molina Imbachí, 31 years old, was secretary of the Buenos Aires Community Action Board in the municipality of San Pedro. She was the mother of two girls, born in the department of Huila.



She was murdered on the night of December 31. While she was celebrating with her family, members of FARC dissidents came to her home and took her to a public place where they shot her in front of her family and community members.

Alleged responsables: FARC dissidents

ACT ONE

THE SHAPE OF THE SHADOWS



According to DANE's Coexistence and Citizen Security Survey, the perception of insecurity in the country in 2021 stood at 44%, which means an increase of 5% in relation to the previous year. Women are the ones who perceive insecurity the most, with 45.5%. Meanwhile, in the municipal capitals, 48.8% perceive insecurity, which indicates that practically half of the inhabitants of the most populated areas of the country do not feel safe in the place where they live and carry out their work¹.

Added to the above is the increase in the homicide rate during 2021, the highest in the last 7 years. According to the annual report of the Police, 13,709 people lost their lives violently during the period, that is, a homicide rate of 26.8% per 100 thousand inhabitants, very similar to that recorded in 2014².

Although the increase in homicides in large cities is a fact that fuels general

discontent about the management of security in the country, there is another equally worrisome indicator related to the increase in collective displacements, confinements of the population, massacres, forced recruitment, homicides of reincorporated persons and social leaders that do not stop and that take place mainly in rural areas and remote places.

As a result of this panorama, humanitarian crises that were thought to be a thing of the past have reappeared, which also indicate that the armed conflict continues but with a different configuration that is specific to the nature of today's illegal armed groups and the different territorial interests.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), between January and November 2021, forced displacement in the country increased by 62% and the number of displaced persons by 196% compared to the same period last year, with children, followed by women, being the most affected segments of the population³.

¹ El Espectador Newspaper. November 5, 2021. These are the cities in Colombia with the highest perception of insecurity. Available at: <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia/estas-son-las-ciudades-de-colombia-con-mayor-percepcion-de-inseguridad/>

² Infobae. January 9, 2022. Colombia recorded the highest homicide rate in the last seven years in 2021. Available at: <https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2022/01/09/colombia-registro-en-2021-la-tasa-de-homicidios-mas-alta-de-los-ultimos-siete-anos/>

³ OCHA. December 30, 2021. Colombia: Humanitarian Impact and Trends between January and November 2021 (up to December 30, 2021). Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-impacto-y-tendencias-humanitarias-entre-enero-y-noviembre-de-2021-30-de>

Likewise, they report that at least 57,700 people were subjected to confinement, which represents an increase of 43% in relation to 2020; a similar number faced restrictions to mobility and access to goods and services. In both cases, ethnic peoples, indigenous (78%) and Afro-descendants (18%), are the most affected. On the other hand, at least 378 people were victims of explosive devices between January and October 2021. 54% of those affected are civilians, predominantly from the departments of Northern Santander, Cauca and Chocó, Nariño and Antioquia⁴.

On the other hand, the Information System of the Somos Defensores Program recorded 139 murders against human rights defenders, a figure that while representing a decrease of 30% in relation to the previous period, it remains very high and demonstrates the lack of guarantees they face to carry out their work.

One of the most intense humanitarian crises during 2021 was in the department of Chocó. Between August and December 2021 the Ombudsman's Office issued 5 alerts involving some of its municipalities: 016-21 incorporating Medio Atrato, 020-21 on Istmina and Medio San Juan, 024-2 Litoral de San Juan, 027-21 Condoto and Novita and 029-21 San José del Palmar.

The one referring to the municipality of Litoral de San Juan, for example, allows us to see common features that are repeated in other territories. i) Territorial disputes between different armed actors and associated interests of various kinds, with a significant weight of those related to illegal economies. ii) The commission of serious violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. iii) Low state response to the risks warned by the Ombudsman's Office.

Let's take a closer look at this alert: (i) in 2019 through alert 025, the Early Warning System identified as possible risks massacres, forced disappearances, selective or multiple configuration homicides, massive and individual forced displacements, armed confrontations with interposition of civilian population, accidents by MAP, MUSE and AEI, perpetration of cruel and inhumane acts as a consequence of the intention of alleged members of the self-styled FARC's 30th Front to dispute the hegemonic control exercised until now by the ELN in the territory of Litoral de San Juan for interests related to arms trafficking, logging, illegal mining, cocaine routes and transit of troops to Valle del Cauca; ii) in 2020, through an ombudsman's report, the risk was ratified and the low and limited state response to the risk was noted; iii) the risk intensified during 2021 as a consequence of the decision of the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) to dispute the hegemonic control of the ELN after the rupture of an existing agreement, which presents a scenario of combats very similar to the one indicated in the Early Imminence Alert No. 020-21 for Medio San Juan and Istmina and with

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ FIDH. November 2021. Colombia: Foretold deaths. Diagnosis on the prevention of homicides of vulnerable population (2018-2020). Available at: https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_rapport_muertes_anunciadas_def_web.pdf

which the control of land and fluvial routes is sought in an important portion of the territory that fundamentally affects indigenous communities and Afro-descendant community councils, who have been subjected to long periods of confinement.

In the report presented by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) with the support of the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective (CAJAR) and the Somos Defensores Program: Colombia: foretold deaths, it is noted how in 130 early warnings of the 196 issued between 2018 and 2020 at least one murder occurred after the issuance of the alert. This means that there is a 66.3% consummation risk⁶.

This data is conclusive in terms of i) how the government strategy to address the persistent and systematic violence against defenders and social leaders, framed in the so-called peace with legality -used as a strategy to ignore important tools of the Peace Agreement- failed. ii) How the issuance of Early Warnings as a prevention mechanism is useless if it is not accompanied by an adequate and articulated state response aimed at addressing the risk, coordinating the rapid reaction and state response to prevent its consummation, a function that corresponds to the Intersectoral Commission for the Rapid Response of Early Warnings (CIPRAT) led by the Ministry of the Interior.

While it is true that the recurrence of humanitarian crises in different armed conflict hotspots in the country during 2021 is predominantly due to the confrontations between the different illegal armed groups, their territorial disputes and, in some cases, the breakdown of pre-existing tactical and strategic alliances between them, this does not exclude state responsibility and, more particularly, governmental responsibility for action or omission.

In this panorama there are factors that cannot be overlooked when looking at the reconfiguration of the conflict in the last 3 years and the increase in its intensity during 2021, such as: 1) the lack of political will to comprehensively implement the Peace Agreement; 2) the insistence on continuing with the Plan for Timely Action (PAO) as a strategy to address the violence affecting communities and their leadership, despite multiple criticisms and scarce results; 3) the alliances, in some cases and, in others, the collusion of illegal armed groups with members of the security forces and other actors; 4) the lack of a policy to dismantle organized crime structures that would reveal the organized apparatuses of power and interests behind them, limiting itself to the development of actions against targets considered of high value; 5) the prevailing impunity in the face of Human Rights and IHL violations that occur in the country; and in particular, aggressions committed against human rights defenders; and 6) the refusal to resume the negotiating table with the ELN.

⁶ Response to PSD's right of petition to the Ministry of Defense, Director of Human Rights and IHL, No. RS20220219016748. February 18, 2022.

The 'Horus of Freedom 3.0' Plan, which continued in force during 2021 as a response to the critical situation, is based on joint military operations aimed at strengthening military and police presence in the territory with a view to contributing to institutional control by the State. According to the Ministry of Defense, within this framework, the military forces issued the *Social Leaders Plan 00009075 of 2021 and the National Army's Permanent Directive 000045 of 2020*⁶. Although the content of both the plan and the directive is unknown, it is foreseeable that they are framed within the priority of raising the cost of the criminal organizations' leaders who threaten or attack human rights defenders, as foreseen in the Security and Defense Policy, and which main actions are i) campaigns to make the so-called cartel of the most wanted visible in the media, ii) offering rewards against them, iii) actions of the Elite Corps of the Police in coordination with the Attorney General's Office.

According to the first human rights report of the Ministry of Defense corresponding to 2021, its strategy shows as results the affectation of 8 criminal and delinquent structures (Gulf Clan, Pelusos, Caparros, GAO-r Jorge Briceño, GAO-r E-40, GAO-r E-6, Los Monos and Los Ronda), with the materialization of 136 captures of their members⁷. On the other hand, 37

leaders of these structures have been neutralized: 7 at the national level and 30 at the regional level⁸ and the criminal investigation of the Elite Corps has been strengthened with 220 investigators and 14 permanent commissions in the country: Antioquia, Arauca, Cauca, Caquetá, Córdoba, Chocó, Huila, Meta, Magdalena, Nariño, Putumayo, Sur de Bolívar, Norte de Santander and Valle del Cauca⁹.

However, for the Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP), the government's security policy has failed to curb violence and, on the contrary, in some cases it has generated the conditions for it to increase. Specifically, it points out how action against high-value targets has been disconnected from the protection of communities and has contributed to the fragmentation of these structures by stimulating competition among them. In this way, the effectiveness of the high value targeting strategy is challenged by the succession of leaders and recycling of organizations¹⁰.

An illustrative example of this is the arrest of alias Otoniel in October 2021, considered the maximum leader of the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) and announced by President Duque as the end of this illegal armed organization. So far this

⁷ Human Rights and National Defense Observatory. February 2022. Human Rights Report 2022. Available at: <https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/Prensa/Documentos/InformeDDHH2022.pdf?fbclid=I->

wAR1NbTHX-y7v4OFMtfD4nSxQ2amzHvPf2cgMtXS9yIlylm8HIF1Vf64Kz_I

⁸ Op.cit. Response of the Ministry of Defense to a right of petition.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ FIP. August 9, 2021. Duque's five tasks to stop the increase in homicides. Available at: <https://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/2034>

has not been the case; on the contrary, the AGC continue to exercise dominance in areas under their control, maintain disputes with other actors in several regions of the country, as well as their strategy of territorial expansion. Ultimately, their arrest, which, by the way, raises many questions as to whether it was really a capture or a surrender, does not constitute a strike against the successor structure of the paramilitary project of the AUC with the greatest strength and presence in the country, but rather a media coup aimed at trying to boost the credibility of the government.

Now, beyond the capture of Otoniel, it is important to highlight the change in the behavior of his structure that had been observed previously in regions where he exercised a significant dominance such as Urabá and Bajo Cauca in Antioquia, apparently oriented to retake the way of acting of the former United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), showing unity of command, military organization, troop movements and the use of uniforms with distinctive armbands, thus revealing a behavior framed within a logic of counterinsurgent action.

It is still premature to establish if, with Otoniel behind bars, the internal disputes over leadership will end up splintering the CGA or, on the contrary, they will continue to strengthen in a unified manner. What is certain is that in one way or another, the important role they play in the reconfiguration of the conflict with a variable territorial geometry is undeniable and, therefore, their capacity to generate damage to communities is

maintained, along with an increasing risk for those who work in defense of peace and human rights, and the capacity to unleash new humanitarian crises to the extent that they continue their expansion plan and, as a result, clashes with other armed structures multiply.

Several confrontations with this armed structure were observed during 2021, which caused serious damage to the communities: with the ELN in part of Chocó, with the Caparrapos (although weakened) and post-FARC structures in southern Córdoba, also with post-FARC structures in southern Bolívar, with the Western Coordinating Command (post-FARC) in the Telembí Triangle in alliance with the new Marquetalia (post-FARC) and other actors in confrontation, and in Catatumbo in alliance with various groups seeking to dispute the ELN's control.

The concentration of public force capabilities focused on attacking armed criminal structures, as another important component of the Defense and Security Policy, has generated a militarization of the territories that has not translated into greater protection for the communities and their leaders, nor has it slowed down the growth and development of the different post-Peace Agreement armed structures, whether paramilitary or guerrilla. On the contrary, serious human rights violations persist in different territories, in fact, in some cases they are so serious that they are generating humanitarian crises; the same happens with the persistence of aggressions against human rights defenders.

Not infrequently, their presence, far from providing peace of mind, generates greater anxiety and fear; In Arauca, for example, human rights organizations point out how the civil-military actions carried out contributed to the fact that several young people were considered collaborators of the armed groups, turning them into military targets. On the other hand, the bombing of camps in which minors forcibly recruited have been killed, ignoring the precautionary principle, a pillar of International Humanitarian Law, generates greater distrust and rejection by the affected communities. The bombing of Morichal in Guainía or that of the Litoral de San Juan in Chocó, are part of the military operations in which minors were killed in 2021. According to a report by Medicina Legal, 26 minors between 12 and 17 years old died in military actions carried out between August 2018 and November 30, 2021¹¹.

An Indepaz report up to September 2021 lists the existing illegal armed groups as follows: 22 narco-paramilitary structures operating in 291 municipalities; 30 post-FARC structures divided into 3 large groups: South-eastern Bloc, Second Marquetalia and Western Coordinating Command, in addition to 2 structures with a tendency to co-optation by others: Oliver Sinisterra and United Guerrillas of the Pacific and 2 more in the process of articulation (Front 4 and 24), with ac-

tivity in 123 municipalities; in addition to 8 ELN war fronts with activity in 211 municipalities¹².

All these structures have expanded the coverage of their activities in new municipalities and, according to the same report, there are at least 27 emerging criminal gangs that act as outsourcers of large groups. In relation to criminal gangs, it is important to note the relevance in some areas of one, with Venezuelan origin, called the *Aragua Train*, recognized by the management of a broad "portfolio of criminal services" with transnational coverage and that during 2021 was operating in the departments of Arauca and Nariño, according to the Somos Defensores Program.

According to the information provided by the Ministry of Defense to the Program, a strengthening of the force position in prioritized areas was expressed in 2021 as follows:

- Catatumbo with the activation of FUDRA 3.
- In Cauca with FUDRA 4 and the Specific Command of Cauca CE-CAU.
- In Bajo Cauca with the Aquiles Task Force.
- In Nariño with the Hercules Task Force.
- In Southern Bolivar with the Marte Task Force.

¹¹ Cambio Magazine. February 6, 2022. 26 children killed in bombings. Available at: <https://cambiocolombia.com/articulo/conflicto/26-ninos-muertos-en-bombardeos>

¹² Indepaz. September 2021. The hotspots of the conflict in Colombia. Report on the presence of armed groups. Available at: <https://indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/INFORME-DE-GRUPOS-2021.pdf>

- In Chocó with the Titan Task Force¹³.

In this regard, it is important to highlight how in these prioritized areas, human rights violations and aggressions against human rights defenders show a worrisome balance. For example, in September alone, 187 Wounaan indigenous families were displaced to other places in Chocó, as well as 547 families from the communities of Unión Chocó, San Cristóbal, Puerto Olave (Istmina), Unión Wounaan and La Lerma (Medio San Juan); both the displaced and the receiving communities have suffered confinement¹⁴. On the other hand, the department of Cauca is considered the territory where the highest number of massacres were perpetrated in 2021¹⁵. In addition, in November, the Truth Commission launched an SOS for Bajo Cauca after highlighting the humanitarian crisis in what is described by human rights organizations as a territorial rearrangement plan between the illegal armed groups, whose confrontational dy-

namics attempt against the community processes¹⁶.

The latest report of the Secretary General to the United Nations Security Council on the implementation of the Peace Agreement in Colombia indicates that since its signing, the most violent actions perpetrated by the illegal armed structures are concentrated in 30 municipalities located in 12 departments, of which 27 are part of the PDETs and the special peace constituencies¹⁷. The above demonstrates how the lack of a comprehensive implementation of the Peace Agreement continues to increase the victimization of the communities that suffered the most for decades from the rigors of the armed conflict, and neither militarization nor actions aimed at high-value objectives have contributed to reversing it.

Meanwhile, we continue to wait for the design of the policy to dismantle paramilitarism and criminal groups assigned to the National Commission for Security Guarantees (CNGS) created by the Peace Agreement for that purpose and which proper functioning has been hindered by the current government, as has been pointed out in previous reports. Even, the Spe-

¹³ Response to PSD's right of petition to the Ministry of Defense, Director of Human Rights and IHL, No. RS20220219016748. February 18, 2022.

¹⁴ OCHA. September 30, 2021. Humanitarian Situation Alert: Displacement and confinement of indigenous communities in the municipalities of Istmina and Medio San Juan (Chocó). Available at: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/colombia/document/alerta-de-situaci%C3%B3n-humanitaria-desplazamiento-y-confinamiento-de-0>

¹⁵ Routes of Conflict. S.f. Terror persists in Colombia: 86 massacres and 296 victims so far in 2021. Available at: <https://rutasdelconflicto.com/especiales/masacres2021>

¹⁶ Hacemos Memoria. November 10, 2021. The Truth Commission launches an SOS for Bajo Cauca. Available at: <https://hacemosmemoria.org/2021/11/10/la-comision-de-la-verdad-lanzo-un-s-o-s-por-el-bajo-cauca/>

¹⁷ UN. December 27, 2021. Report of the Secretary General. United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. Available at: https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/informe_sp_n2139927.pdf

cial Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) two months after the beginning of 2022, ordered the High Commissioner for Peace to activate the competence of the Commission and the Procurator General's Office to initiate disciplinary investigations to those concerned, considering that after 5 years of the Commission's creation, a dismantling plan for criminal structures has not been adopted¹⁸.

Likewise, we are still waiting for convincing results from the Special Investigation Unit, also created by the Peace Agreement, to contribute from the investigation and prosecution to the dismantling of such structures, unveiling the complex power structures that feed their persistence and actions.

Recent media revelations about the links of high-ranking military commanders with criminal structures in Cauca and Nariño demonstrate that these types of alliances are not a thing of the past and that, on the contrary, they are still in force and contribute to the strengthening and expansion of these structures and, therefore, to a reconfiguration of the conflict that tends to worsen day by day.

On February 11, 2022, the Cambio magazine, in alliance with Noticias UNO, revealed how General Jorge Hernando Herrera, who was until then commander of the VI Brigade,

in a meeting with commanders of the 29th Brigade of the National Army, admitted having relations with the structure known as *Los Pocillos*, in the framework of the strategy to neutralize the post-agreement structure led by Gentil Duarte. This alliance would be justified, according to his words, for being in front of a *popular and prolonged war*¹⁹, a basic concept in the structure of the counterinsurgency doctrine that has inspired the actions of the Colombian armed forces and for which the end justifies the means.

A few days later, the media also published information about an investigation underway in the Attorney General's Office, which relates the alliance between the criminal organization known as *La Cordillera*, which operates in Nariño as a structure of the AGC, and military commanders, including the retired General Leonardo Alfonso Barrero Gordillo, former commander of the Armed Forces, who is known in the criminal structure under the alias of *El Padrino*²⁰.

It is paradoxical that Barrero Gordillo, after his departure from the Armed Forces, was appointed by the cur-

¹⁸ JEP. March 1, 2022. 018 Communication, JEP orders the government to implement the Security Guarantees Commission and adopt the Plan to dismantle criminal organizations.

¹⁹ Cambio Magazine. February 11, 2022. "This is f**king war": General acknowledges alliance with drug traffickers to confront FARC dissidents. Available at: <https://cambio colombia.com/articulo/conflicto/esta-es-la-puta-guerra-general-reconoce-alianza-con-narcotraficantes-para>

²⁰ Espectador newspaper. February 15, 2022. Former commander of the Military Forces is said to be part of the Gulf Clan tentacle. Available at: <https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/excomandante-de-las-fuerzas-militares-seria-par-te-de-tentaculo-del-clan-del-golfo/>

rent government as director of the Timely Action Plan for the Prevention and Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Social Leaders, Community Leaders and Journalists (PAO), ignoring the call of human rights platforms that at the time warned about the lack of suitability of Barrero Gordillo to hold this position, taking into account the accusations against him in cases of extrajudicial executions committed during his command of the XVI Brigade, the deviation of the course of investigations in this regard and acts of corruption within the institution²¹.

The worrisome reconfiguration of the conflict which the country is currently facing, even though it involves particular variables to be taken into account in the actions of the illegal armed structures, remains unchanged in terms of the high degree of risk and victimization of the communities, different social expressions present in the territories and their leaderships, while the government response repeats old recipes and the power apparatuses behind these illegal armed structures remain unscathed in defense of their interests and economic projects.

Democratic participation at continuous risk

The dynamics of conflict reconfiguration not only generate devastating effects for those who live in the territories, but also for society as a whole. One of the permanent concerns in the face of the persistence of the conflict has to do with participation. Democratic expansion and overcoming exclusion gaps for political participation is an important pillar of the Peace Agreement. However, given the increase in violence in a large part of the country, fear is a shadow that haunts these spaces.

In territories where there is dispute or control by armed groups, it is not easy to be part of community discussion spaces and, much less, to assume responsibility in the midst of participation scenarios with greater visibility. This is the case of the Community Action Boards, a figure that has existed in the country since 1958 and that has played a fundamental role in organizing communities and managing the overcoming of their needs.

In Colombia there are about 63,153 Community Action Boards (JAC) located in rural and urban areas. This significant number makes them the majority form of community organization in the country. It is precisely the recognition and value given to them by the communities that attracts the attention of different illegal groups, who sometimes seek to co-opt them by force for their own interests.

This has discouraged participation in the election process to serve on their boards of directors, especially in ru-

²¹ Human Rights Platforms. January 29, 2019. General (R) Leonardo Barrero, director of the PAO, is not a suitable person to hold this position. Available at: <https://movimientodevictimas.org/el-general-r-leonardo-barrero-director-del-pao-no-es-una-persona-idonea-para-ocupar-este-cargo/>

ral areas. Due to the COVID-19 health emergency, the elections that were to be held in April 2020 were postponed and finally took place on November 28, 2021²², in a complex context due to the dynamics of violence, as mentioned above.

In fact, the Ombudsman's Office warned about two factors that put the process at risk, one is the discouragement of participation due to the lack of guarantees for this type of leadership and two, the possibility of coercion in the nomination of candidates by armed groups to strengthen control in the territory²³. These warnings are not minor, as they make evident the negative impact that the manipulation of armed groups has on these organizational processes, which translates in the long term into a danger for the communities, and the permanent risks faced by community leaderships, which according to our Information System, is one of the most attacked sectors. The national government itself agrees with this reading. According to the diagno-

sis made in the Conpes 4063, during the year 2020, homicides were mostly concentrated against community leaders (64%)²⁴.

According to our Information System, from the signing of the Peace Agreement until 2021, **404** aggressions against them were registered, which is equivalent to 17% of the total documented violent acts. After the elections, in some territories, such as the department of Arauca, it is known that many community leaders who were elected as directors of their JACs would not be willing to take office due to the risk that the position entails.

The election scenario of the Special Transitory Peace Circumscriptions held on March 13, 2022, was also complex and worrisome for the victims who aspired to reach them. The elections took place after a long road of blockades and maneuvers from the governing party and their implementation was only possible through a judicial decision in August 2021²⁵.

Thanks to this decision, 403 male and female candidates from 167 municipalities in Colombia aspired to 16

²² El Espectador newspaper. November 14, 2021. Election of Community Action Boards (JAC), under scrutiny by the Procurator General's Office. Available at:

<https://www.elespectador.com/politica/eleccion-de-juntas-de-accion-comunal-jac-bajo-lupa-de-la-procuraduria/>

²³ Ombudsman's Office. November 29, 2021. Ombudsman's Office warns about risks in the process of elections of community action boards. Available at:

<https://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/comunicados/10585/Defensor%C3%A1Da-advierte-preocupaci%C3%B3n-por-riesgos-en-proceso-de-elecciones-de-juntas-de-acci%C3%B3n-comunal-JAC-Defensor%C3%ADa.htm>

²⁴ National Planning Department, DNP. December 6, 2021. Public Policy on Guarantees and Respect for the Work of Human Rights Defense and Social Leadership. Conpes 4063. P. 34. Available at: <https://www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES/documentos-conpes>

²⁵ Legal Scope. August 26, 2021. Government enacted legislative act that creates 16 peace seats. Available at: <https://www.ambitojuridico.com/noticias/constitucional/gobierno-promulgo-acto-legislativo-que-crea-16-curules-de-paz>

seats in the House of Representatives on behalf of the victims of the armed conflict. However, the process was not easy and, as in the JAC elections, people faced multiple risks determined mainly by the reconfiguration of the armed conflict. The threat was high, according to the MOE, of the 167 municipalities that make up the constituencies, 86.8% were at risk due to factors of violence²⁶.

Recently, the IFP published a report in which it warned about the risks faced by candidates for peace seats, including restrictions on political participation due to the presence of armed actors, both for candidates and for the civilian population who wanted to exercise their right to vote, the control of armed groups, the stigmatization of candidates and leaders who have promoted the Peace Agreement, and the cancellation of elections due to public order situations²⁷. In addition to this, the co-optation by political clans and non-compliance with advance payments to finance campaigns led several candidates to request the postponement of the elections²⁸ and

others to resign. This is the case of the 17 candidates from Cesar, Guajira and Magdalena, corresponding to CITREP 12, who resigned their aspirations just before the elections, due to lack of guarantees from the State, and due to threats and harassment in areas controlled by Paramilitary and ex-Paramilitary²⁹.

Similarly, the Ombudsman's Office published Early Alert No. 004 of 2022 on Electoral Risks, in which it called attention to the different threat factors that were being created in the territories and that were hindering the participation of the communities in the different electoral contests of March 13, but also in those of May 29 and June 19. The Alert warned about four hypotheses that should be addressed by the authorities: (i) social control exercised by illegal armed groups, (ii) the dispute between illegal armed groups for territorial control and strategic corridors, (iii) threats against social leaders and candidates whose proposals go against hegemonic local powers and, (iv) continuity of the internal armed conflict, with a strong influence of drug trafficking. Consequently, it identified 79 municipalities at extreme risk, 195 at high risk, 186 at medium risk and 61 at low

²⁶ MOE. January 24, 2022. 58% of the municipalities of the Special Transitory Peace Circumscriptions present some level of electoral risk. Available at:

<https://www.moe.org.co/el-58-de-los-municipios-de-las-circunscripciones-transitorias-especiales-de-paz-presentan-algun-nivel-de-riesgo-electoral/>

²⁷ IFP. February 2022. The Evil Hour of the Peace Seats? Risk scenarios and priority actions. Available at:

https://ideaspaz.org/media/website/IFP_MalaHoraCurulesPaz_FinalV1.pdf

²⁸ El Espectador newspaper. February 24, 2022. Candidates for peace seats request postponement of elections due to lack of guarantees. Available at: <https://www.>

[elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/curules-de-paz-candidatos-piden-aplazar-elecciones-por-falta-de-garantias/](https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/curules-de-paz-candidatos-piden-aplazar-elecciones-por-falta-de-garantias/)

²⁹ El Tiempo newspaper. March 10, 2021. Due to lack of guarantees, candidates decline to run for peace seats in the Caribbean. Available at:

<https://www.eltiempo.com/elecciones-2022/actualidad-electoral/por-falta-de-garantias-declinan-candidatos-a-curules-de-paz-en-el-caribe-657354>

risk³⁰. Among the different particular risks he announced, those related to the victims of the armed conflict who aspire to the Special Territorial Peace Constituencies are of concern, both because of the potential politicization and co-optation by traditional parties and perpetrators, as well as because of the difficulties and obstacles for voting mobilization.

These risks were evident on election day, as was later reported by the European Union Electoral Observation Mission (EOM), which for the first time monitored the elections in Colombia. In their report they pointed out several irregularities that occurred in this process, such as the security plans for the candidates that the government failed to deploy in time or sufficiently, the inequality in the resources for the campaigns since in many cases the disbursements to which they were entitled were not made, the possible illicit financing of several campaigns that were of great importance and the profile of some candidates with questions about their status as victims or that they were proxies of political parties³¹.

This last issue lies within the most sensitive ones, since in several territories there had already been advance warnings of the possibility that candidates who did not meet the profile and did not represent the victim population would be nominated. Unfortunately, on Sunday, March 13, several of the seats were left in the hands of these people. According to Rutas del Conflicto (Conflict Routes), at least 6 out of the 16 seats were elected by people who do not represent the victims³², among them, Jorge Tovar son of former paramilitary leader Jorge 40, María Janeth Sabogal and Haiver Rincón close to a traditional politician in Tolima, James Hermenegildo Mosquera close to a political clan from Chocó and who was declared a victim of the conflict only a couple of months before the elections, Leonor Palencia who was accused of receiving support from traditional parties and of buying votes, and Jhon Fredy Núñez accused of being close to convicted para-politicians.

Although people who have worked for years for the defense of their territory and the victims of the armed conflict were elected for other seats, it is regrettable that situations such as those mentioned above have arisen, as they go against what was agreed upon in the Peace Agreement, which sought to give the victims a voice and a vote in a scenario such as the Con-

³⁰ Ombudsman's Office. Early Warning 004-2022. Warning document for the 2022 electoral process. February 18, 2022. Available at: <https://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/noticias/10752/Conozca-la-Alerta-Temprana-N%C2%B0004-de-2022-Alerta-Temprana-Defensor%C3%ADas-riesgo-electoral-Elecciones-2022.htm>

³¹ El Espectador newspaper. March 15, 2022. European Observation Mission warns about vote buying and peace seats. Available at: [https://www.elespectador.com/politica/elecciones-colombia-2022/mision-de-ob-](https://www.elespectador.com/politica/elecciones-colombia-2022/mision-de-ob)

[servacion-europea-alerta-sobre-compra-de-votos-y-curules-de-paz/](https://www.observacion-europea-alerta-sobre-compra-de-votos-y-curules-de-paz/)

³² Conflict Routes. Those elected who landed the seats that should be for the victims. Available at: <https://rutasdelconflicto.com/notas/los-elegidos-quedaron-las-curules-deberian-ser-las-victimas>

gress of the Republic. The old and bad practices of politics managed to infiltrate this process, when it was an opportunity for the people most affected by the war in Colombia.

With this type of situation, participation is put at risk and trust in democratic processes is fractured, as it leaves a permanent message of corruption and co-optation of the traditional parties in the representation scenarios. Another example of this is the election of the Youth Councils, a space that was opened in 2021. Perhaps due to ignorance of the process,

these elections held on December 5 were marked by low participation, since less than 15% of young people between ages 14 and 28 who were eligible to vote exercised their right; in addition, the most voted lists corresponded to those of traditional parties such as the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, Cambio Radical, the U Party and the Democratic Center³³. With this, other visions of the country and of politics on the part of young people continue to be on the sidelines, maintaining deep social gaps in terms of political participation.

³³ Portfolio. December 5, 2021. Apathy marks election of first Youth Councils. Available at: <https://www.portafolio.co/economia/gobierno/elecciones-consejos-de-juventud-2021-marcadas-por-la-apatia-559329>

ACT TWO

THE ABSURD



Conpes 4063: a revamped PAO

On August 18, 2018, days after taking office as president of Colombia, Iván Duque pledged to create a public policy for the protection of human rights defenders, directors, and social leaders. Until then, it seemed that the president was unaware that there was already a regulatory, legal, and political framework to generate human security guarantees for these people, contained in the Peace Agreement signed in 2016.

In November 2018, the Ministry of the Interior, headed by Nancy Patricia Gutiérrez, publicly presented the “initial installment” of its protection policy for social leaders and other sectors: the Plan of Timely Action (PAO)³⁴. To the surprise of those of us who frequently analyze the issue, we found that Duque’s Plan went against what was being worked on in the country: it ignored what was established in the Peace Agreement, its approach was militaristic and centralized and, therefore, it went backwards in terms of human secu-

rity to guarantee the exercise of the defense of human rights. In short, it took us back years in the debate between physical protection and guarantees. Despite the objections and suggestions of the human rights platforms, the government continued with its PAO without listening to any opinion.

At the end of January 2019, the Ministry of Interior gave the coordination of the PAO to General (R) Leonardo Barrero. Faced with such a decision, where the national government’s policy for the protection of human rights defenders and social leaders was led by a former military officer, human rights platforms reacted forcefully with the following arguments: one, giving a military officer the management of a policy traditionally led by civilian authorities was outrageous and an undeniable step backward. Two, the retired military high command had criminal investigations for corruption and human rights violations to his credit³⁵. Three, he was not a man trusted by the social organizations for their protection, since he had a history of stigmatization against them.

³⁴ The Timely Action Plan was discussed extensively in the 2018 Annual Report “A Clockwork Orange” of the Somos Defensores Program. Pages. 60 et seq. Available at.: <https://somosdefensores.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/informe-somos-defensores-2019-espanol-web.pdf>

³⁵ El Espectador newspaper. January 29, 2019. Questioning of General Barrero, the general appointed to protect social leaders. Available at: <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/los-cuestionamientos-al-general-barrero-el-designado-para-proteger-a-lideres-sociales-articulo/>

The government, instead of listening to the objections, defended General Barrero and said that he was not the coordinator of the PAO, but a connection between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense³⁶. Today, three years later, the retired high-ranking military commander is once again being questioned by the media, as mentioned in the previous chapter, given the investigation by the Attorney General's Office where he is being held responsible for his possible alliance with the AGC and, particularly, with the territorial organization "La Cordillera" in which he was known by the alias of "El Padrino" (*The Godfather*)³⁷.

However, the debate on the relevance of the OAP continued and the national government itself insisted on arguing that this was not a public policy, but a plan to face the moment and, therefore, it was still promising to build a global public policy. In the meantime, the Ministry of the Interior presented the HR platforms and other organizational spaces with a process of dialogue to build this policy, which was accepted. Nevertheless, there were more disagreements and dissensions and all was left in the attempt; the

organizations had to suspend their participation for several reasons: for not sharing the creation of a Conpes document that, among other things, was an imposition from the beginning by the Ministry of the Interior, since it would not have the scope to stop the criminality against these people, besides ignoring the contents of the Peace Agreement on this matter³⁸. Likewise, it was not understood how a government intended to carry out a human rights policy with the platforms and social movement, while in real time it continued to stigmatize the latter, criminalizing social protest, and bombing places where minors were present.

On December 6, 2021, three and a half years later, the government finally published its public policy for the protection of human rights defenders, through Conpes 4063 *Public Policy on Guarantees and Respect for the Work of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leadership*³⁹. In other words, it took Iván Duque's administration the whole period to build a tool like this for the protection of people at risk. But beyond the time it took, it is necessary to analyze its nature and scope to know if the public policy to

³⁶ Caracol Radio. January 29, 2019. Government defends controversial appointment of General Barrero. Available at: https://caracol.com.co/radio/2019/01/30/nacional/1548809951_369994.html

³⁷ El País newspaper. February 25, 2022. Preliminary investigation opened against General (r) Barrero for ties to the Gulf Clan. Available at: <https://www.elpais.com.co/judicial/abren-investigacion-preliminar-contra-general-r-barrero-por-nexos-con-el-clan-del-golfo.html>

³⁸ This episode was also recounted in the 2019 Annual Report "The Blindness" of the Somos Defensores Program. Pp. 50 et seq. Available at: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jYXd8GjrDjOERYTOJG5g-DA4A55UEqYVN/view>

³⁹ National Planning Department, DNP. December 6, 2021. Public Policy on Guarantees and Respect for Human Rights Defense Work and Social Leadership. Conpes 4063. Available at: <https://www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES/documentos-conpes>

guarantee life was actually built and if this instrument is adequate for those objectives.

A Conpes is a document created by the National Council for Economic and Social Policy, an advisory and consultative body of the national government to make viable the different policies, programs, projects, initiatives, and others of the Executive order, both nationally and territorially. The Conpes since its creation, through Law 19 of 1958, with subsequent modifications and developments such as Law 152 of 1994 "Organic Law of the Development Plan" and several decrees⁴⁰, Conpes has been exclusively dedicated to economic and social policy issues, as evidenced by the countless documents published since then⁴¹; yet none of them has addressed situations of violence, criminality or public order, such as the one proposed by the current government for the protection of the integrity of human rights defenders.

Since 2009, the Human Rights platforms have been discussing, within the framework of the National Table of Guarantees⁴², the design of a pub-

lic policy to guarantee the exercise of the defense of Human Rights in the country. To this end, a broad and inclusive methodology was developed, covering aspects such as prevention, protection, and investigation, but also the debate on the urgent need to dismantle paramilitarism and organized crime, determining factors in violence against human rights defenders, as shown by many social investigations, among them, the one carried out by several organizations and platforms for Human Rights, collected in the document *What are the patterns?*⁴³. However, none of this is reflected in the Conpes.

In the Final Agreement of 2016 for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace, an important package of mechanisms and legal and political instruments for the care of defenders and social leaders was incorporated, from a focus on human security guarantees, as it has been extensively analyzed in previous reports of the Somos Defensores Program, among them *Piedra en el zapato*⁴⁴ (*A Stone in the Shoe*). However, the Conpes 4063, which title is broad in scope:

⁴⁰ National Planning Department. DNP. The National Council for Economic and Social Policy, CONPES. Available at: <https://www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES/Paginas/conpes.aspx>

⁴¹ Seer: <https://www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES/documentos-conpes/Paginas/documentos-conpes.aspx>

⁴² The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which has been an important partner in the process, provided a valuable synthesis of the meaning and content of the Table. See: file:///C:/Users/pc/Downloads/UNDP_Co_PAZ_Publica-

ciones_ResumenGarantias_Dec1_2019_Isintesis%20(1).pdf

⁴³ Colombian Commission of Jurists and others. *What are the patterns? Murders of social leaders during the post-Agreement*. Bogotá, December 2018.

⁴⁴ Somos Defensores Program. Annual Report 2017. April 2018. P. 15 et seq. Available at: https://somosdefensores.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/INFORME-SOMOS-DEFENSORES-2017-ANUAL_ESPAN%CC%83OL.pdf

Public Policy of Guarantees and Respect for the Work of Human Rights Defense and Social Leadership, ignores this important advance, and opens the door to a superficial action plan full of common places that relies on physical, material, and individual protection, but, above all, part of the military security approach, defended by the government of Iván Duque. On the contrary, the Peace Agreement appeals to the concept of human security built over the years by the United Nations, according to which, security transcends personal or physical protection against a threat to cover a series of freedoms that contribute to mitigate the vulnerability of people, which entails several securities such as: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, political, among others. In other words, to have a security centered on human beings and with human dignity as its horizon⁴⁵.

It doesn't attack structural problems

The Conpes 4063 document devotes a large part of its 89 pages to two aspects: on the one hand, it lists all the antecedents in terms of regulations and processes dedicated to creating policies for the protection of human rights defenders, including the Final Peace Agreement. On the other

hand, it makes a broad diagnosis of the critical situation of these people in the last decade, for which it relies on many sources, including those of non-governmental organizations. Undoubtedly, it synthesizes well the broad spectrum of existing national and international regulations on human rights protection and the diagnosis is an accurate analysis in the characterization of the different affectations to defenders, the territories with the highest number of aggressions, the types of leadership most impacted and possible perpetrators. But basically, these two aspects are evidenced as instrumental in the Conpes, because, at the time of implementing the Action Plan, they are not reflected and remain as simple statements in the document.

The diagnosis is undoubtedly broad, at least 44% of the document is dedicated to it, it also makes a good analysis of the institutional problems in fulfilling the mission of guaranteeing the lives of human rights defenders. However, it does not consider the role of the Colombian State in the responsibility for the aggressions by action or omission. At no time, during the entire 10 years of the national context, does it mention its degree of commitment to the advancement of this problem. It limits the responsibility for the aggressions to third parties and individuals, especially those related to drug trafficking and illegal mining, without accounting for the role of the State as regulator of conflicts, the monopoly of force, its obligation to guarantee the lives of citizens, to lead policies aimed at closing the dynamics of violence and to advance in the search for peace. In this sense, it

⁴⁵ Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIDH). Human Security in Latin America. Available at: https://www.iidh.ed.cr/multic/default_12.aspx?contentidoid=-8c1a302f-f00e-4f67-b3e6-8a3979cf15cd&Portal=IIDHSeguridad

does not review the precarious role of the Attorney General's Office in the investigation and disciplining of public officials who have not fulfilled their duties. But it also repeats the narrative of the Attorney General's Office in relation to the investigations and the supposed high level of clarification, but without evidencing that the problem continues to grow despite this. It does not mention the role of the security forces and their inability to contain the violence against human rights defenders, as well as the levels of corruption of high-level military commanders.

Nor does it recognize paramilitarism as a determining phenomenon in the attack on defenders and social leaders and in the maintenance of highly vulnerable contexts for the exercise of their work. This ignorance is a structural limitation to address the problem and its fundamental solutions, such as criminal investigations, the disciplining of public officials, the treatment of corruption both in the territories and at the national level, and the fulfillment of the mandate of the National Commission of Security Guarantees created just for the dismantling of paramilitarism, among others.

The document recognizes weaknesses in governmental and state institutions to carry out the mission of guaranteeing the lives of human rights defenders. It also considers that there are too many norms, often repetitive, and that there is irrationality in their implementation, for which reason they are supposed to be organized, rationalized, and evaluated to know their impact. Paradoxically,

the government does the exact opposite: it published the Timely Action Plan through Decree 2137 of 2018 and now creates Conpes 4063. Likewise, it leaves aside what has been achieved in the Peace Agreement, which, as it has been widely stated in the pages of other reports from the Somos Defensores Program, have a binding force of law, greater scope and is systemic in terms of guarantees. For example, the high value of the National Commission of Security Guarantees disappears from the institutional scenario, without having fulfilled its mission of creating public policy for the dismantling of paramilitarism and organized crime.

The National Protection Unit is endorsed as the ideal institution to face the growing situation of selective violence, without doubting for a minute its mission value, since it is an institution that after a decade of functions continues to increase its budget, but the problem is only getting bigger instead of decreasing. However, its policy is essentially the same: physical, material, and individual protection.

It would also be assumed that, with a more important policy, the PAO's Intersectoral Commission would be superseded by a stronger one; however, according to the Conpes, this Commission will continue to coordinate the new Action Plan.

Stigmatization

For the human rights movement, paramilitarism and the use of illegal instruments by the military forces have been determining factors in the

violence against human rights defenders. Stigmatization is also a factor. Therefore, one of the objectives of the National Guarantees Process was to overcome this problem, which comes mainly from the Colombian State, and particularly from some governments. Well, both the Conpes and the PAO have the objective of overcoming stigmatization, however, the analysis is very different from that of the human rights movement.

According to the National Government's view, stigmatization is a worrying phenomenon that must be overcome. But at no time does it consider that the stigmatization comes from government and state officials themselves, as has been documented for some time. On the contrary, government officials limit the problem to the fact that it affects the leaders' trust in their communities and reduce the causes to cultural predispositions and generalized polarization. With such a precarious reading of the phenomenon, it is not possible to have appropriate policies to overcome it.

It should be recalled that high-ranking civilian and military officials have pointed to these people as part of the armed conflict and thus have naturalized the attacks against them. During the administration of Iván Duque they have also done so, which is analyzed in the pages of previous reports of the Somos Defensores Program. Here there is undoubtedly an important distance between the reading of civil society and the government, which is reflected in an Action Plan that will not take adequate measures, as it is limited to promoting plans of respect and culture to generate favorable en-

vironments for the exercise of the defense of HR, without mentioning the contexts of high armed conflict, organized crime and corruption by the institutions of the Colombian government and State, determining elements in selective violence.

Additionally, it is important to add how in the framework of the PAO the objective of a social activation campaign of recognition that was proposed in the framework of a project called strengthening guarantees for the exercise of social leadership and defense of human rights at the national level has not been fulfilled either, which is proposed as complementary to the campaign called #LíderEsColombia which, as pointed out by the Somos Defensores Program in its 2020 report, had a very low impact. According to the Ministry of the Interior, its communication pieces are being developed and will now be endorsed to the CONPES activities plan⁴⁶.

In addition to the above, there is a line of action (number seven) to strengthen human rights organizations and defenders. This point is problematic, because although there are weaknesses in many organizations, this is not the main reason why they are attacked since many leaders belonging to robust organizations with the capacity to mobilize are frequently violated. This is the case of the Indigenous Councils Association

⁴⁶ Ministry of the Interior. Response to the right of petition made by the Somos Defensores Program. Ref: OFI2022-6093-DDH-2400, dated March 24, 2022.

of Northern Cauca (ACIN), the Community Action Boards and Asojuntas, the National Agrarian Coordinator, among many others. In other words, this analysis of organizational weakness and social leadership as a cause for their aggression is an argument that diverts the gaze from the real reasons why they are assassinated and attacked in the territories and, in addition, leaves a merely instrumental paternalistic flavor.

In this regard, it is also necessary to refer again to what has been done in the framework of the PAO, in which the Ministry of the Interior highlights the training on: human rights, protection route, Early Warnings, social dialogue and criminal protection for human rights defenders carried out through an agreement between the entity and ESAP in 2021⁴⁷. Reaffirming once again that the lines of action proposed in CONPES are more oriented to give continuity to the PAO as a legacy of the government than to provide guarantees for human rights defenders.

Policies with no social participation

According to the precepts of the construction of public policy, especially in highly sensitive issues for society, in this case violence against human rights defenders, the participation of society is fundamental given the degree of knowledge of the situations to be overcome and their consequent

opinions. The construction of the PAO was done without the participation of society, or at least its opinion, even though the HRD platforms sent their opinions to the Ministry of the Interior as soon as they became aware of the preliminary text, but these were disregarded.

The Ministry of the Interior, aware that the PAO lacks participation, in September last year created Decree 1138 of 2021 with which it reformed Decree 2137 of 2018 that gave life to the PAO. The reform focused on creating three new bodies to the Inter-institutional Committee: (i) Social Committee of the PAO for the prevention and promotion of human rights of HR defenders, social and community leaders and journalists; (ii) Operational Committee of the PAO for the protection and immediate reaction to violations of the rights to life, liberty, security and integrity of human rights defenders, social and community leaders and journalists; and, (iii) the Inter-institutional Committee for monitoring the murders of human rights defenders; and (iv) the Inter-institutional Committee for monitoring homicides against human rights defenders⁴⁸.

This addition to the Timely Action Plan undoubtedly has two perverse effects. On the one hand, it directs the participation of society from the institutional framework, placing thematic, temporal, numerical and selec-

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ National Planning Department, DNP. Public Policy on Guarantees and Respect for the Work of Human Rights Defense and Social Leadership. Pages. 74 to 84.

tive limits to participation, and instrumentalizing it to simulate interest in the opinion of the communities and organizations. On the other hand, it closes or supplants already existing spaces such as the National Roundtable of Guarantees, the dialogue with the Human Rights Commission of the Agrarian, Ethnic and Popular Summit and many others that were born from the authentic feeling of participation, direct democracy or social mobilizations. These targeted forms of “participation” included in the PAO are called “social dialogue” that do not necessarily imply taking into account the opinion of those convened. These ways of viewing social participation are incorporated in an identical manner in Conpes 4063 and do not guarantee an incident participation of the organizations in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the policy of guarantees for human rights defenders, as it corresponds to the creation of a public policy with a human rights approach.

Although, according to the Ministry of the Interior, the PAO’s Social Committee has already held four sessions, which have been substantially oriented towards the presentation, approval, and review of an action plan for such Committee⁴⁹, it is not known who its members on the part of the social organizations are.

Figures: a pretext for not moving forward

The analysis of the statistics on attacks against human rights defenders has an important place in the document; however, the lack of harmony in the registration of figures is used as an excuse to justify the progress of the policy for protection and guarantees. In this sense, it ignores the fact that there is a consensus gained at the national and international level on the concept of human rights defenders and then states that many cases of aggression cannot be verified because there is no “standard” of the concept among the entities responsible for the issue⁵⁰. This is absolutely not presentable. Likewise, he adds that the absence of a single official institution that monitors and analyzes the figures in a unified manner prevents a rigorous and homogeneous reading of the phenomenon. With these two arguments, it justifies why the authorities are not able to make progress in the timely prevention of aggressions⁵¹.

In other words, the diagnosis is limited to the formal, to the figures, or rather, to the problem of the figures, but ignores structural violence and focuses only on direct violence, as if the Colombian State were oblivious to a phenomenon that has been dragging on for a long time. Undoubtedly, this deficiency in the reading of the role of

⁴⁹ Ministry of the Interior. Response to the right of petition made by the Somos Defensores Program. Ref: OFI2022-6093-DDH-2400, dated March 24, 2022.

⁵⁰ National Planning Department, DNP. Public Policy on Guarantees and Respect for the Work of Human Rights Defense and Social Leadership. Pages. 37 and 38.

⁵¹ Ibid.

the State and the work of the institutions is clearly reflected in the precariousness of the proposed Action Plan.

In relation to community leaderships, which the Ministry of the Interior so much praises in different spaces, it is noteworthy that the government puts as a reference or antecedent to highlight the Conpes 3955 of 2019 *Strategy for the strengthening of community action in Colombia*, which has programs aimed at the protection of community leaders, with a budget of 90,000 billion pesos, which has been executed in 71.5%⁵². However, in the diagnosis presented in the same document it is recognized that community leaders continue to be the most affected by socio-political violence, since between 2016 and 2020 30% of homicides have been against leaders of Community Action Boards, occupying the first place⁵³. Consequently, the Conpes 3955 is not the best indicator of the effectiveness of the Conpes for the protection of defenders.

A policy for the future

Publishing the policy to confront one of the country's most sensitive problems a few months before the end of a four-year term makes no sense. If the national government had been genuinely interested in curbing selective violence from the beginning, it would have implemented point 3.4

of the Peace Agreement. However, it created the PAO as a gimmick to curb national and international political and media pressure but, above all, to involve the safety of human rights defenders in its security and defense model, with a repressive and militaristic approach, very contrary to the human security approach established in the peace process. But since the commitment was to bring out a "real public policy" and the PAO was only a "starter", it finally published the Conpes with a major problem, it will not be implemented in this administration but executed by a future government between 2022 and 2026. Actually, there is no understanding of how a policy with the imprint of this government is intended to be implemented by another one.

Thus, the Conpes is more than a public policy, it is a project for the future with seven lines of action as recommendations. These are: 1. Implement strategies to improve the quality of information for the analysis of the context, the follow-up of aggressions and evidence-based decision making (with nine actions). 2. Strengthen the institutional response capacity and the joint action of the State, for the intervention of the causes of violence and aggressions (with five actions). 3. Conduct an evaluation of the regulations and programs for prevention and protection (with two actions). 4. Strengthen the Prevention and Alert System for Rapid Reaction and timely response for individual and collective protection (with nine actions). 5. Promote environments free of stigmatization for the work of human rights defense (with five actions). 6. Promote actions to restore the social fab-

⁵² National Planning Department, DNP. Public Policy on Guarantees and Respect for the Work of Human Rights Defense and Social Leadership. Page 24.

⁵³ Ibid. Pages 33 and 34.

ric of human rights defenders (with three actions). Generate capacities for the free exercise of the defense of human rights (with six actions). All of them involve ministries such as Interior, Defense, Agriculture, Justice, Environment, as well as the Human Rights Counseling Office, the Presidential Counseling Office for Women, the National Planning Department, the National Planning Unit.

On the other hand, a detailed review of the objectives of the Conpes document and its lines of action reveals that they are essentially the same as those proposed by the PAO three and a half years ago, but expanded in terms of diagnosis, background, institutions involved and proposed tasks. This is doubly regrettable since they used the entire presidential term to simulate a public policy for protection when in reality, it is a revamped Plan of Opportune Action (PAO).

In broad terms: the Conpes is not the public policy required for guarantees for the exercise of the defense of human rights; it is not designed to stop violence and criminality against human rights defenders; it is an expanded and revamped version of the Plan of Opportune Action and it holds it as the pillar of the protection policy; it is not a policy focused on guarantees, but on physical and material protection; it does not incorporate a human rights approach and ignored privileged spaces of participation for its construction, such as the National Table of Guarantees.

The Conpes document recognizes weaknesses of the government and state institutions to carry out the

mission of guaranteeing the lives of human rights defenders. It also considers that there are too many norms, often repetitive, and that there is irrationality when implementing them, for which it considers that they must be organized, rationalized, and evaluated to know their impacts (this was already said by the PAO). Paradoxically, the government does the opposite, it published the Timely Action Plan through Decree 2137 of 2018 and now creates Conpes 4063.

It would also be assumed that with a generous public policy, the Intersectoral Commission of the PAO would be overtaken by one of greater significance; however, according to the Conpes, it is still this Commission that coordinates the new Action Plan. In this sense, with the Conpes there is nothing different from the PAO, it is simply a simulation of a broader policy.

Within the Conpes, the National Protection Unit (UNP) is endorsed as the ideal institution to address the growing situation of violence against human rights defenders and, therefore, it should be strengthened. Nonetheless, a question arises here: after a decade of UNP functions, is it not necessary to evaluate why the phenomenon of violence against human rights defenders continues to grow despite the billions of pesos invested in physical and material protection? In other words, the risks are increasing instead of decreasing. It is also important to analyze the various reports of corruption problems within the institution.

In conclusion, we have a Conpes that will not stop criminality against

defenders and social leaders, and the protection that will continue to be provided is the same as always, focused on physical, material, and individual protection, meaning that there is no policy of guarantees in its broadest conception. It is a Plan of Opportune Action prolonged in time, with no substantive variations. Undoubtedly, it is a document far inferior to the framework of human security guarantees contemplated in the 2016 Peace Agreement that is intended to be shown with a broader scope. It is certainly a comprehensive document in terms of diagnosis but limited to the partial vision of the National Government regarding the problem of violence against human rights defenders and endorsed to the next government.

Reforms that go backwards in prevention and protection

On September 23, 2021, Decree 1139 was issued, which modifies those articles of Decree 1066 of 2015 that refer to the Program for the Prevention and Protection of the rights to life, liberty, integrity and security of persons, groups, and communities, assumed by the UNP. The modifications were of different nature, explained below.

The first change is the addition of a paragraph (Article 2.4.1.2.3) that specifies the case in which the protection measures for the beneficiary of the Program may be extended to his or her nuclear family. Regarding the measures for the family unit, it is stated that they may only be extended if the risk of the protected person

also covers the family unit and if the respective committee (CERREM) recommends it. This provision ignores the fact that the risk faced by those who defend human rights extends to their family members, and that the perpetrators use intimidation, threats and aggression against spouses, children, parents and other relatives to stop their work. The paragraph makes the stipulation that if there is an extraordinary or extreme level of risk and a causal link between this level and the activity of the protected person, the committee may recommend or assign measures to strengthen the protected person's scheme.

A second change is related to the protection of former and current public servants. The first modification in this matter (numeral 11 of Article 2.4.1.2.6) extends the coverage to former presidents and their families, former vice presidents and their families, ministers, attorneys general, procurators general, comptrollers general, national ombudsmen, senators and representatives to the Chamber, governors, magistrates of the high courts and mayors. The protection of persons who held these positions was in the hands of the National Police and this extension gives rise to the creation (Article 2.4.1.2.36A) of the Committee for Risk Evaluation and Recommendation of Measures (CERREM) for former and current public servants. The physical resources of the measures assigned to mayors (modification of paragraph 4 of article 2.4.1.2.7) will be assumed by the corporation to which they belong (mayors' offices), except for sixth category municipalities that demonstrate that they do not have the corresponding budget.

A third set of modifications is in the area of entities and instances involved in the protection strategy, as well as in the composition of CERREM. The Military Forces enter as a new entity (modification of article 2.4.1.1.2.26) in the strategy apart from the Ministry of Defense and the National Police, which already had a seat in the Committee. This provision emerges from the militaristic approach that impregnates all policies related to protection and guarantees for social organizations and communities living in conflict zones, inaugurated with its Defense and Security Policy.

The new composition of CERREM (modification of article 2.4.1.2. 36) seeks to raise the level of coordination between entities, changing the director of the Human Rights Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for the minister, who together with the vice minister for Policies and International Affairs of the Ministry of Defense (this replaces the coordinator of the Human Rights Office of the National Police General Inspectorate), the Presidential advisor for Human Rights, the director of the Special Administrative Unit for Attention and Integral Reparation to Victims and the director of Protection and Special Services of the National Police, make up the Committee with the right to speak and vote. However, experience indicates that CERREM sessions are only attended by delegates from these institutions and rarely, if ever, by the heads of these institutions.

There are several modifications that point to an increase in the director's decision-making power and discretion: i) The first of these (numeral 1

of article 2.4.1.2.28) establishes priority in the processing of protection requests that demonstrate the seriousness and imminence of the risk; a priority that is more in the hands of the director's concept than in the analysis of the Technical Risk Analysis Body (CTAR), since the previous study carried out by the Preliminary Assessment Group (GVP) no longer exists. ii) The second (paragraph 1 of the same article) reaffirms the authority of the head of the institution to exceptionally link other persons to the Program (it is not understood if they are not part of the populations covered by the UNP), in cases of extreme gravity and urgency. This discretion is extended with the existence of the CERREM of public servants and former public servants (paragraph 1 of Article 2.4.1.1.2.37). iii) A third modification (paragraph 3 of Article 2.4.1.1.2.46) indicates that the director may exceptionally interrupt the termination of protection measures, the grounds for which are listed throughout the article. The interruption is justified "in order to avoid irreparable damage and in the interest of safeguarding the right to life, integrity, liberty and personal safety of the protected person" and must be informed by means of a motivated administrative act. The possibility of the exceptional interruption by the director could be interpreted as a protection of the rights of the protected person in the face of the arbitrary decisions of suspension or termination that the Unit has issued on multiple occasions through CERREM. However, this is a gray area in which it is unknown what criteria the director will use to exercise this power and whether he will do so in order to favor other populations under

protection rather than defenders and social leaders. In addition, it personalizes the power to revoke an administrative decision and puts the individual vision of the Director in conflict with the collective vision of the Committee, in which several entities and agencies participate. It is, therefore, a double-edged sword that does not imply a guarantee for the protected persons, considering the other modifications contained in the Decree.

Another set of reforms concerns the proper use of protection measures. An air of austerity is perceived in these provisions. The definition of 'Promotion of the use of Protection Measures' (numeral 26 of Article 2.4.1.2.3), which did not exist before, inaugurates a series of actions "aimed at raising awareness, stimulating and training the protected persons on the importance of the rational use, management and conservation of the protection measures, as well as compliance with the commitments acquired and other recommendations of the protection, self-security and self-protection measures, with the purpose of optimizing them."

Several elements that adjust all the procedures to these conditions (paragraph 18 of article 2.4.1.2.28, paragraph 7 of article 2.4.1.2.38, paragraph 7 of article 2.4.1.2.38C, and paragraph 9 of article 2.4.1.2.40) are unfolded therefrom. An additional modification to the protégé's commitments (paragraph 7 of Article 2.4.1.2.48) specifies the deadlines for reporting, in writing, on the land and air travel planned for the protection scheme, in addition to subjecting them to the Program's budget availability.

It can be stated that the most favorable reforms for protected defenders are those that separate the routes, procedures, and instances of collective protection from the rest of the pre-existing provisions. Such reforms are the inclusion of Decree 2078 of 2017 (Route of collective protection of the rights to life, integrity, freedom and personal security of groups and communities) within the present 1139 of 2021, with some adjustments. First, the creation of the Technical Body for Risk Analysis - Collective Protection Route (CTARC) (modification of Article 2.4.1.1.2.33). Then, the inclusion of all the regulation of collective protection measures (article 2.4.1.5.5), among which the new conformation of the Committee for Risk Assessment and Recommendation of Collective Protection Measures (CERREM Collective) (article 2.4.1.5.11), reflecting the new ordinary CERREM, stands out.

However, the collective protection route has some drawbacks. For example, the new one-year duration of the measures, which can be extended if new events occur that change the risk, with the uncertainty that implies a re-evaluation which considers that these are not sufficient to extend the state protection (paragraph 3 of article 2.4.1.5.5). Also, the Unit's responsibilities that establish the restriction to implement measures that correspond to other national and territorial entities (paragraph of Article 2.4.1.5. 10); this is where the experience of the organizations and communities shows major stumbling blocks, because when collective measures have been agreed with the UNP that require the participation of other entities, understanding protection as a coordinated

and comprehensive action from the State, there are no tools to ensure compliance with these commitments external to the Unit beyond the monitoring team to be formed by the Human Rights Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior (Article 2.4.1.5.6), which seldom effectively compels the entities.

Lack of knowledge of the measures for comprehensive protection

April 18, 2022 marks the fourth anniversary of the issuance of Decree 660/18, which aims to define and adopt comprehensive protection measures for organizations and communities in the territories, including leaders, directors, representatives and activists of social, popular, ethnic, women's, gender, environmental, community, LGBTI and human rights organizations in the territories. The development of this program is under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior.

In these four years of issuance, the developments of this Decree have not been sufficient and clear, despite being one of the instruments created by the Peace Agreement for comprehensive and collective protection; this in contrast to the surprising progress in the implementation of the PAO Intersectoral Commission, as mentioned in this report, this slowdown in the progress of the 660 has generated limitations for the strategic articulation of protection programs.

According to the fifth report of the Comptroller General of the Repub-

lic⁵⁴ on the execution of resources and compliance with the goals of the peace component of the Multiannual Investment Plan (November 2016 to March 31, 2021) "the lack of information and figures do not allow for a permanent follow-up and balance on the compliance with these goals of the final agreement", this refers to point 3.3 (security guarantees) and of course to Decree 660.

This report of the Comptroller's Office states in the risks that "there is no evidence of results rendered in the monitoring systems such as SII-PO⁵⁵, of the national government, and SIRECI⁵⁶ of the CGR, with respect to the goals "Significant reduction of criminal organizations" and "Significant reduction of cases of threats, harassment and murder of members of social organizations" which have no information.

Regarding the comprehensive security and protection program for communities and organizations mentioned above, Decree 660/2018 and

⁵⁴ Comptroller's Office. Post-conflict reports. Available at: https://www.contraloria.gov.co/resultados/informes/informes-posconflicto/-/document_library/impz/view_file/993251?_com_liferay_document_library_web_portlet_DLPortlet_INSTANCE_impz_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.contraloria.gov.co%2Fresultados%2Finformes%2Finformes-posconflicto%3Fp_p_id%3D-com_liferay_document_library_web_portlet_DLPortlet_INSTANCE_impz%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview

⁵⁵ Integrated post-conflict information system.

⁵⁶ GCR Electronic Account Submission System and Reports.

Decree 2078 of 2017 contain actions that seek to strengthen collective protection. The above represents a shift from individual and reactive protection only by the UNP, to collective protection with central participation of regional authorities and rights defending organizations.

While the two decrees address the same issue, the approach is very different. Decree 660 of 2018 gives competence to mayors and governors, and makes them responsible for public policy actions that protect organizations that defend human rights. In this set of measures, the direct participation of organizations and populations is central, from risk analysis to the taking and implementation of protection measures. In contrast, Decree 2078 of 2017 continues to grant competence only to the central level: the Ministry of the Interior, UNP and CERREM Collective. This results in the establishment of a single action route that responds to standardized risks, without the participation of the organizations and based on case-by-case evaluation with no consideration of the context where the organizations at risk are located.

In addition, this set of measures does not foresee articulation with the prevention measures of the Early Warning System or with those established in the same territories on the occasion of Decree 660 of 2018. In this sense, it is important to articulate both the instances that have always been at the forefront of protection coordination and that are part of the central level such as the UNP with the instance that is chosen from the territories to

carry out the protection route, without leaving aside the variety of measures, from the two decrees, material and immaterial protection.

Regarding Decree 660 of 2018, it is necessary to warn that **there is no information about compliance with the measures aimed at acting against stigmatization and criminalization in communities and populations**, established in articles 2.4.1.1.7.2.6, 2.4.1.1.7.2.7, 2.4.1.7.2.8 and 2.4.1.7.2.9 of this regulatory compendium. In fact, this program does not have a technical file in SIPO.

In short, although some actions have been carried out, to date there is no program or action plan against the stigmatization and criminalization of social leaders and human rights defenders that ensures the implementation of measures at the national and territorial levels. The only measure that has shown concrete results is the National Pact, which focuses on electoral leadership, but not on the daily defense of rights in the country. In other words, the level of implementation of measures that seek to comply with the obligation to respect the right to defend rights, is low.

Another prevention measure contained in Decree 660 of 2018, are the Community Peace and Coexistence Promoters, on which **PGN stated there is no significant progress, as there is no budget for the program**. The only thing that has been done to carry out this program are seminars on reconciliation and coexistence. There is no information on the support to the Denouncement Activity of

Human Rights Organizations in the Territories.

Finally, it is relevant to warn that there is no information regarding the actions to carry out the provisions of Decree 660 of 2017 sic {8} and Decree 2078 of 2017. In fact, in the SIPO there is no follow-up technical sheet on this issue.

As for the subject of collective protection, one of the most emphasized issues in the Final Peace Agreement, it is noted that there is no information on implementation and, with the little information available, it can be affirmed that the adoption of collective protection schemes and with differential ethnic approaches is very low. Furthermore, that there is no information on the actions that both governors and mayors as well as the National Government carry out to materialize what is contained in the two decrees created in the Agreement: decree 660 of 2017 and decree 2078 of 2017. Protection activities continue to focus on the UNP⁵⁷.

In this regard, it is illustrative what is stated in the tenth report of the international verification component:

As noted by the TS (technical secretariat) in previous reports, especially in Point 2, progress in the implementation of this Program has been slow and with limited progress, which has not allowed meeting the objective established in the F.A. Despite this, the

TS highlights that the Technical Committee has prioritized an intervention with the reincorporation population located in the municipality of Algeciras, Huila, within the framework of the Program in the components of prevention, protection, and security measures.

As an advance to this prioritization, in December 2020, the Preventive Risk Management team of the Ministry of the Interior held the first workshop for the implementation of Decree 660 and the Comprehensive Prevention and Protection Plan for the population in the process of reincorporation in Algeciras (Ministry of the Interior, December 16, 2020)⁵⁸.

According to information provided to the TS by the Ministry of the Interior (File OFI2021-26893-DDH-2400), as of the closing date of this report, the following had been accomplished: (i) a diagnostic workshop to identify risks and protocols for the actions of ex-combatants; (ii) a workshop to identify and formulate measures and protocols for action; and (iii) a meeting to agree on measures with the assistance of national, departmental and municipal entities of Huila.

As a result of these activities, the Huila Governor's Office decided to adopt the Prevention Plan through the Subcommittee for Prevention, Protection and Non-Repetition Guarantees of the department⁵⁹.

⁵⁷ DEJUSTICIA: SUBJECT: Amicuscuriae in the protection case file T-8018193 AC regarding violence against social leaders. Bogota, October 5, 2021.

⁵⁸ Technical Secretariat of the International Verification Component CINEP/PPP-CER-AC. October 2021. Tenth verification report on the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement in Colombia. P. 152

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Likewise, the SIPO⁶⁰ database has been consulted in order to establish the progress made regarding Decree

660, and according to code C-256 this is what was reported: the entity did not register any progress.

Pillar:
3.1. Security guarantees and fight against criminal behavior and organizations

Strategy:
All

Code	Name	Responsible	Achievement	Detail
C-403	National Commission of Guarantees, created and functioning	Office of the High Commissioner for Peace	0,00 %	
C-249	Integral protection program for the members of the new political party, implemented	Presidential Counselor's Office for Stabilization and Consolidation	0,00 %	-
C-256	Comprehensive security and protection program for communities, leaders, directors, representatives and activists of social, popular, ethnic, women's and gender organizations, implemented	Ministry of the Interior	0,00 %	-
			Entity did not register any progress	
C-401	Strategic Security and Safety Plan, developed and in operation	Presidential Counselor's Office for Stabilization and Consolidation	0,00 %	-

The same finding is obtained when searching in open media, as well as in the official website of the Ministry of the Interior, there is no information in this regard to support progress for this report.

Setting aside the above, on December 10, 2021, the President of the Republic Iván Duque launched the public policy for the protection of social leaders in our country. The announcement was made by the head of state at the ceremony to commemorate International Human Rights Day at the headquarters of the Ombudsman's Office, where he presented a balance of the Government's work in this area. "Today, on this day, we are launching a CONPES document (4063) with a State vision, which does not have the

timelessness of simply being reduced to a period of government, but sets the long-term directions", said the President⁶¹.

Even more significant than the lack of interest in an agile implementation of the Integral Security and Protection Program for Communities and Organizations enshrined in Decree 660 is that, throughout the 97 pages of the Conpes, there is not a single mention of it, not even in the background and justification part, which leads us to the conclusion that the government of legality once again cheated the communities, the social and human rights organizations, the Final Peace

⁶⁰ Integrated Post-Conflict Information System. Available at: <https://siipo.dnp.gov.co/estrategia/3/16>

⁶¹ EFE Agency. December 11, 2021. Duque launches public policy to protect social leaders in Colombia. Available at: <https://www.efe.com/efe/america/politica/duque-lanza-una-politica-publica-para-proteger-a-lideres-sociales-de-colombia/20000035-4695617>

Agreement, the country and the international community.

Once again, it is clear that the modifications established in the state protection program are designed more for the sake of austerity than for the effectiveness of the measures. Although the consecration of the Collective CERREM is positive to the extent that it establishes a differentiated

route for individual and collective protection within the UNP, the lack of implementation of 660, and even of information about it, demonstrates the absence of political will to advance in a new paradigm of protection that goes beyond individual and physical measures and that allows for a more participatory and collective definition of these measures.



THIRD ACT

WHAT'S BEHIND
THE CURTAIN?

In previous reports, the Somos Defensores Program has referred to the loss of autonomy and independence of control and investigation bodies as a determining factor in the deterioration of democracy and loss of public confidence in the performance of the Ombudsman's Office, the Attorney General's Office and the Procurator General's Office, in a context of increasing aggressions against defenders and the multiplication of humanitarian crisis situations. The loss of confidence in these institutions contributes to reinforce the silence of communities and social organizations in the territories and their leadership, to the detriment of their rights and to the benefit of armed actors and the dynamics they seek to impose.

During 2021 the control and investigation entities continued to remain in the shadow of the executive, disfiguring, from behind the scenes, their respective mandates in favor of the promotion and protection of human rights and investigation of criminal conducts that affect the realization of such rights. This situation was particularly evident and outrageous during the mobilization days of the National Strike in which their silence contrasted with the deafening noise of the ESMAD attacks against the demonstrators.

Despite this, for the preparation of this report, the Somos Defensores Program sent petition rights to each

of these institutions basically to inquire about the balance that the control entities (Ombudsman's Office and Prosecutor's Office) make on the government strategy to address the aggressions against defenders, basically focused on the PAO. Also to the Attorney General's Office, to obtain information on investigative advances aimed at determining the material and intellectual perpetrators of the aggressions, especially those related to murders, attacks and threats.

As it is well known, the strength of the ombudsman does not lie in his coercive power for the defense, prevention, and protection of human rights, but in his capacity of influence derived from the credibility of the person who holds the position. Colombian doctrine has defined it as a *moral magistracy* whose capacity of influence is exercised based on a strong symbolic charge sustained by its credibility. In this regard, and paraphrasing what Professor Rodrigo Uprimny said some years ago, just as an orchestra conductor cannot continue to be a conductor if he has lost his hearing ability, neither can an ombudsman be one who loses the respect and credibility of the citizens⁶². Disturbingly, neither the

⁶² Uprimny, R., Dejusticia. The Ombudsman (DP) is institutionally a paradoxical official because he fulfills a transcendental function, but lacks coercive power.

current ombudsman Carlos Camargo has shown any interest in exercising this moral magistracy, nor does he have the credibility to hold the position.

The Somos Defensores Program, thinking precisely about the weight that the exercise of this moral authority can hold before the authorities and, above all, before the executive in relation to the questioned governmental strategy materialized in the PAO, wanted to know what the ombudsman's assessment of this strategy is. The response was conspicuous by its absence, and it consisted of referring the matter to the Ministry of the Interior in its capacity as head of the PAO's⁶³ Social Committee. In other words, the ombudsman in such a worrying context of aggressions against human rights defenders has nothing to say about the effectiveness of the government strategy that has been implemented.

However, it is noteworthy that the Ombudsman's Office did submit observations, clarifications, and comments on the CONPES proposal on the Policy of Guarantees and respect for the work of human rights defenders, in which it is possible to perceive subtle questioning of the government's management in this area.

First, the Ombudsman's Office expressed its disagreement with the figures, pointing out that the CONPES

document did not consider *the data and analyses prepared by the Ombudsman's Office that are relevant to the understanding of the phenomenon in question*⁶⁴.

Secondly, it should be noted that the Ombudsman's Office suggested the warning documents issued by the entity for 744 municipalities or municipalized areas of the country should be noted, *some of which have had (...) up to 25 warnings issued in succession due to the lack of adequate risk management*. In this order of ideas, without expressly saying so, the Ombudsman's Office is recognizing the lack of a timely and effective response by CIPRAT to the identified risks⁶⁵. It also clarifies, referring again to the contents of the CONPES, that it is not the function of the CIPRAT to classify the recommendations issued by the Ombudsman's Office, but as a space for coordination and articulation for the state response, it is responsible for *formulating the plans, strategies, programs and/or projects of action in the territory that allow dissuading and/or mitigating the risks identified*⁶⁶.

Thirdly, the Ombudsman's Office warns that the actions of a public policy of guarantees should not be concentrated in those territories where a greater number of aggressions against human rights defenders are focused, which could be the risk involved in the figure of *special zones of guarantees* proposed in the

Available at: <https://www.dejusticia.org/column/defensoria-y-magistratura-moral/>

⁶³ Response to the PSD's right of petition to the Ombudsman's Office. File 20220040401046741. February 22, 2022.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

CONPES, but should be carried out effectively throughout the national territory and, therefore, targeting should not be used as an exclusionary mechanism but as a mechanism for strengthening specific capacities of the territory⁶⁷.

Finally, their comments are also remarkable for their exhortation to consider existing normative instruments derived from the Peace Agreement that were totally ignored in the formulation of CONPES.

It should be noted that the contributions of the Ombudsman's Office were not taken into account in the final CONPES document, and we did not hear the Ombudsman's voice in this regard.

Meanwhile, the management of the Procurator General's Office, headed by Margarita Cabello, regarding violence against human rights defenders does not reflect a commitment in accordance with the seriousness of the situation, neither in terms of disciplinary nor preventive functions; nor has the voice of the Procurator General been heard, demanding diligent action by public officials in this situation.

According to the Procurator General's Office, based on data from its Mission Information System (SIM), there are 517 cases of human rights violations against human rights defenders, divided into disciplinary, intervention and preventive cases, registered between 2008 and 2021. However, 84%

of these cases are inactive and only 16% are active⁶⁸.

There are 14 active disciplinary cases, most of them in Valle del Cauca with 8 cases, followed by Antioquia with 2 cases and Sucre, Boyacá, Cundinamarca and Norte de Santander with 1 case each. The majority of these (8) are under investigation and the others have a decision to cite them to a hearing and preliminary investigation. Of this kind, 106 investigations are inactive, however, the decision for which they are in this status is not very clear, most are in the archives and only a couple have been acquitted.

As for the intervention processes, only one active case is in the "registration of conclusion" stage and the remaining five appear as "completed case", without further information on the decision or on the investigations themselves. In relation to the prevention processes, which are the majority of those registered in the Information System of the Procurator General's Office, it is found that 322 are inactive and 69 are active, the latter are in offices in different territories throughout the country and their subject is the final agreement for the termination of the conflict; civil matters; territorial and decentralized sector matters; human rights; and prevention, protection, attention, assistance and comprehensive reparation to the victims.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Response to PSD's right of petition to the Procurator General's Office. File E-2022-034924. January 28, 2022.

Unfortunately, these data leave many doubts, especially due to the high number of inactive investigations and the reason why they are in this status. It would be important to clarify this information, since these are investigations of public officials involved in aggressions against human rights defenders.

As of the closing of this report, the Somos Defensores Program did not receive answers regarding initiatives undertaken by PGN during 2021 in relation to the situation of aggressions against human rights defenders, nor if they have carried out any type of follow-up on the measures adopted to respond to the early warnings issued in relation to the risks for human rights defenders.

As far as the Attorney General's Office is concerned, the information it provides raises more concerns than certainties. The Strategic Plan 2020-2024 of the FGN includes as an objective to increase the clarification of crimes affecting human rights defenders, for which 2 measures have been adopted: i) prioritized investigation projects, with 13 defined by the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) in small regions or municipalities where attacks against defenders or reincorporated persons are the responsibility of a criminal organization; ii) designation of regional prosecutors of the SIU in territories of greater victimization⁶⁹.

In relation to the 13 investigation projects prioritized by the SIU and that refer to criminal structures responsible for harming defenders and reincorporated persons, 38.5% report a percentage of clarification of 100% and the rest a percentage of clarification higher than 80%. However, it is not explained what the parameters are for determining these percentages of clarification, nor whether they use indicators that contribute to determine whether the actions carried out contributed to the dismantling of the criminal organization as such, bearing in mind the three dimensions of the phenomenon that the Attorney General's Office itself points out: armed structure, financial structure and mechanisms of control of the population. Nevertheless, for the FGN, its actions have indeed contributed through strategic impacts to the dismantling of such structures, affecting their finances and support networks⁷⁰.

About the murders of human rights defenders, the FGN reports progress in the clarification of 68.59%, equivalent to 286 cases out of a universe of 417 over which it has jurisdiction and covering the period from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2020⁷¹. Yet, when indicating the number of cases that have been sentenced, 89 cases are mentioned, which is equivalent to an actual clarification universe of only 21.34%, which although it represents a percentage growth in relation to the previous year of just over 5%, it is still very low compared to the high number of murders.

⁶⁹ Response to PSD's right of petition to the Attorney General's Office. File No. 2022000000801.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

Despite the multiple questionings that the prosecutor has received regarding the way in which the clarification figures are presented to the public opinion, he continues to do it in the same way. Recently it was Yesid Reyes, a renowned university professor, who in an opinion column reminded the prosecutor that “a crime can be considered solved when a judge issues a definitive decision in which he affirms the existence of a punishable act and the responsibility of someone for it”⁷². Two additional considerations in this regard have to do with: i) how the Attorney General’s Office does not provide information on the type of responsibilities attributed in the cases that are indicated with sentences, whether they cover only the responsibility of the material authors or also incorporate intellectual authors; ii) what are the criminal types that support the responsibility of the perpetrators.

Regarding threats, in 2021 the Prosecutor issued Resolution 0-0775, *which adopts a national working group for the prioritization, support and immediate response to the investigation of threats against human rights defenders*. The Attorney General’s Office highlights that this resolution strengthens the existing national working group on threats, creates a mechanism for coordination with the

prosecutors stationed in the sectional directorates and adopts measures for early intervention in response to complaints of threats. Despite this, the quantitative data provided by the Prosecutor’s Office itself leave much to be desired in terms of results that contribute to overcoming the high impunity that characterizes threats. According to these data between 2018 and 2022 there are 2 cases with sentences and 7 cases in the trial stage, out of a universe of denouncements for threats during that period, reaching the 5.552⁷³.

About the investigations on attacks against human rights defenders, which have progressively increased, the Office of the Public Prosecutor is currently undergoing an *exhaustive review of the matter* and, therefore, is unable to provide any information on the subject at this time⁷⁴.

As long as the investigative and control agencies continue to be more concerned with supporting the government than with complying with their constitutional and legal obligations, human rights defenders will continue to be abandoned to their fate, facing high risks in the exercise of their work, which far from decreasing, are increasingly on the rise.

⁷² Reyes. Y., El Espectador newspaper. March 22, 2022. The Figures of the Attorney General’s Office. Available at: <https://www.elespectador.com/opinion/columnistas/yesid-reyes-alvarado/las-cifras-de-la-fiscalia/>

⁷³ Response to PSD’s right of petition to the Attorney General’s Office. File No. 2022000000801.

⁷⁴ Ibid.



ACT FOUR

DARKNESS

Information System on Aggressions against Human Rights
Defenders in Colombia
—SIADDHH—

2021 will be remembered as the year of the great National Strike, of the “social outburst”, of rage and indignation and unprecedented mobilizations, of strength and courage; third year of the government of Iván Duque that closed with only 22% approval⁷⁵ and second of the COVID-19 pandemic, a period of marked inequality where social discontent was manifested in the cities and was pushed to the limit by hunger, unemployment, the conflict that worsened throughout the country, the multiple arbitrary acts committed and the growing government corruption.

While the idea that Colombia is a country that guarantees rights was being portrayed internationally, the reality in the territories showed the opposite to be true. 2021 was the most violent in the twelve years of existence of the Information System on Aggressions against Human Rights Defenders in Colombia -SIADDHH-, in which a total of **996** individual aggressions were registered against **933** people⁷⁶ whose work is the exer-

cise of the defense of human rights through different types of leadership such as activists or human rights defenders, indigenous, community, peasant, youth, victims, environmental, LGBTI, women, academic, among others.

Aggressions in 2021 presented an increase of 3% in relation to 2020, with 27 more events, in which not only individual rights or rights related to life and personal integrity were violated, but also affected collective processes. This means that an average of 2.7 violent acts against human rights defenders occurred every day.

The months with the highest number of aggressions were May (168), April (104), August (90), July (89) and January (88). With these figures, the second quarter of the year (April - June) was the one with the highest number of acts against human rights defenders with a total of 325 cases; this coincides with the period of greatest activity of the National Strike, in the midst of which acts of generalized violence were committed against demonstrators that also affected human rights defenders and social leaders. In number of aggressions, the third quarter (July - September) follows with 239 acts, October - December with 220 and January - March with 212. In the third quarter, violence was focused on persecution and stigmatization that led to an increase in other types of aggressions such as threats

⁷⁵ El Tiempo newspaper. January 7, 2022. Most Colombians do not approve Duque's administration, according to new poll. Available at: <https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/ivan-duque-mayoria-de-colombianos-no-aprueba-su-gestion-encuesta-invamer-643619>

⁷⁶ The number of attacks is higher than the number of people assaulted, because on several occasions the same person was the victim of more than one violent act.

and judicial proceedings, a situation that is usually reiterative in periods

following high-intensity social mobilizations.

Aggressions by type of violence

Types of individual aggressions	2020	2021
Threats	604	665
Murders	199	139
Attacks	79	93
Arbitrary Detentions	30	52
Judicializations	28	16
Forced disappearances	25	16
Information thefts	4	13
Sexual violence	0	2
Total of aggressions	969	996

Of the total number of aggressions, 66.7% are threats, 13.9% are murders, 9.3% are attacks, 5.2% are arbitrary detentions, 1.6% are judicializations, 1.6% are forced disappearances, 1.3% are information thefts and 0.2% are sexual aggressions.

Compared to 2020, murders showed a decrease equivalent to 30%, with 60 fewer incidents. However, it is still very high and to them the attacks which increased by 18% (14 more cases) must be added, approaching the hundred of facts, which means that it is the highest record in this type of fact since 2010.


Judicializations registered a decrease of 43% (12 fewer cases). In contrast, arbitrary detentions increased by 73% (22 more cases). In relation to forced disappearances there was a decrease

of 36% (9 fewer cases), in this regard it is important to mention that during the year several attempted disappearances were thwarted thanks to the immediate actions of other people who, in situations such as those presented during the National Strike, advanced in immediate search exercises, even in actions of pursuit of unidentified vehicles in which the defenders were taken, allowing their rescue and preventing their disappearance.

With all this, the concern lies in the increase in other types of aggressions such as threats, which grew by 10% (61 more cases) and remain as the most used form of aggression with the aim of intimidating and decimating the work of defending human rights, a fact that often leads to other violations such as forced displacement of the defender and his or her

family. As for information thefts, these increased by 225% (9 more cases), a worrying fact because the stolen items contain information considered sensitive to the processes of which human rights defenders are part and that even expose other people, victims, and organizational processes.

Finally, there is sexual violence with 2 cases, an aggression that had not been recorded since 2016 and that in 2021 occurred during the National Strike, both cases allegedly committed by the security forces, specifically by members of the ESMAD.



Aggressions by gender


Of the 996 assaults recorded during the year, 274 attacks (27.5%) occurred against women and 722 (72.5%) against men. In the case of men, the increase is 10% (71 more acts). And in the case of women, the increase is 14% (33 more incidents). Among these aggressions are 4 femicides and 2 sexual aggressions.

The increase in aggressions against female human rights defenders co-


incides with the general increase in aggressions against women in the context of the pandemic, showing that homes are not the safest environment for the lives of women. However, the excessive violence exercised in the framework of the mobilizations of the National Strike shows a break in this aspect that has to do with aggressions in the public space and in which the public forces appear as the presumed responsible party.

56.6% of the aggressions (155 facts) against women occurred during the first semester of the year and 43.4% (119 facts) in the second semester. The highest figure corresponds to the most dynamic period of the National Strike, in which 60 aggressions were allegedly committed by the security forces, including the 2 sexual aggressions recorded.

The three most recurrent aggressions against women during the period were threats (202), murders (24) and attacks (21). Of the 202 threats, 68 occurred in the second quarter, where 50 were against women human rights defenders, again coinciding with the strongest period of mobilizations in midst of the National Strike where female defenders played a very active and preponderant role.



Areas of aggression




During 2021, the SIADDHH of the Somos Defensores Program recorded aggressions in 27 departments and the Capital District, that is, attacks against human rights defenders occurred in 85% of the national territory. The ten departments with the highest number of incidents were Cauca (245), Valle del Cauca (154), Capital District (91), Antioquia (61), Magdalena (43), Bolívar (42), Norte de Santander (36), Santander (28), Nariño (26) and La Guajira (25). In sum, aggressions in these places correspond to 751 cases equivalent to 75.4% of the total registered during the year, which represents an increase of 1% for the highest risk areas.

The trend of the last 5 years remains, with which the department of Cauca is the most dangerous territory for defenders, that also presents a progressive increase in violent acts as shown by the figures: there were 153 attacks in 2018, 237 in 2019, 193 in 2020 and 245 in 2021. In recent years there has been an escalation of the armed conflict in this territory in which the increased presence of different post-FARC groups and their disputes for control have led to multiple aggressions against communities and their leaders, especially indigenous people. For 2021, the municipalities in the north and west of the department

continue to be the most affected, paradoxically, if we bear in mind this reality of reconfiguration of the conflict and therefore the strong presence of armed organizations, the alleged perpetrator with the greatest responsibility corresponds to unknown [persons or criminal organizations] with 26% of the total number of aggressions.

Another department with a worrying increase is Valle del Cauca, where the number of aggressions increased from 43 in 2020 to 145 in 2021, which represents an increase of 237% (102 more acts). Given the intensity of the National Strike and the violence of the state response in this region, it becomes clear that the increase in aggressions against defenders is directly associated with this situation.

It is noteworthy that for the first time since 2010, three aggressions were documented in San Andrés and Providencia, a department that seemed to be outside the dynamics of selective violence against defenders. A possible explanation for this situation is that after Hurricane Iota hit on November 19, 2020, multiple leaderships became visible when facing actions seeking solutions for the affected population in the face of the government's inaction to respond to the emergency.




President Iván Duque's policy aimed at implementing the so-called "Peace with Legality" and the Strategic Zones of Integral Intervention -ZEII- incorrectly called Future Zones, has proven to be far from providing security guarantees for human rights defenders. The Somos Defensores Program, through the SIADDHH, documented 84 cases that occurred in areas of the 7 departments located within the 5 zones declared as ZEII, which is equivalent to 21% of the national territory and represents 8.4% of the total aggressions committed in the period and distributed as follows: 35 threats, 26 murders, 14 attacks, 4 arbitrary detentions, 3 forced disappearances and 2 judicializations. 29 incidents occurred in municipalities in the area known

as Bajo Cauca and south of Córdoba, 20 in Catatumbo, 15 in Arauca, 13 in Nariño's Pacific region and 7 in Chiribiquete and surrounding National Natural Parks.

In 4 zones (Arauca, Nariño Pacific region, Catatumbo and Nearby National Natural Parks) the most frequent perpetrator corresponds to those unidentified, contrary to Bajo Cauca where paramilitary groups such as Los Caparrapos and the AGC are the most frequent alleged perpetrators (14 cases). The other events in the 5 zones are distributed among post-FARC organizations, the security forces, the ELN and "others" who are responsible for femicides.

Future Zones

Types of aggressions against Human Rights Defenders - 2021



According to a study by National Parks⁷⁷, the areas at greatest risk from deforestation are located within the Future Zones, “In 15 of the 59 National Parks, threats associated with deforestation and illicit crops such as coca were recorded. The parks with the most deterioration are Catatumbo Bari, located in the northeastern Andes, Paramillo and Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, located in the Caribbean, and Tinigua and Macarena, in the Orinoco” noting that “Catatumbo Bari National Park represents 15.5% of the country’s illicit crops”. The National Parks are areas of the country where the armed conflict and violence are worsening with each passing day, disputes between the different armed actors are permanent, illicit economies are predominant and the implementation of the Peace Agreement has not made significant progress.

On the other hand, the strikes against the leaders of armed groups in some of these zones, which concentrate the greatest number of armed groups during 2021, did not represent per se a change in the dynamics of the conflict and, therefore, an improvement in the conditions in which human rights defenders carry out their work. For example, the killing of alias Borojó (Anderson Perlaza Caicedo), a member of the United Guerrillas of the Pacific in Nariño, had no impact on the de-escalation of the conflict, nor has the “capture” of alias Otoniel in Antioquia led to a decrease in the

actions of the AGC; neither have the killings of post-FARC commanders on the border with Venezuela contributed to decimating the conflict in that area. Thus, it is evident that the ZELs framed in the policy of peace with legality have not been effective in these remote regions of the country and, therefore, defenders continue to face the onslaught of an armed conflict in which the armed structures and their commanders are constantly changing and transforming.

Aggressions by type of leadership


In relation to the types of leadership, human rights activists, or defenders⁷⁸ top the list of people attacked with 246 cases, with a notable increase of 62% (94 more incidents than in 2020). Most of these aggressions occurred within the framework of the National Strike, where human rights defense collectives did their work of accompaniment, verification and active defense during mobilization processes, a fact that put them in the sights of both the security forces, unknown actors and even the investigating entity. This sector is followed by indigenous leadership, which presented a 17% decrease with 41 fewer incidents compared to 2020, although the department of Cauca continues to be the region of greatest aggression against this type of leadership due to

⁷⁷ <https://www.larepublica.co/economia/de-los-59-parques-nacionales-naturales-del-pais-49-tienen-amenazas-en-sus-ecosistemas-3223677>

⁷⁸ This category refers to people who contribute to the promotion, respect, and protection of human rights through organizations, social processes or independent actions.

the strength of their work in defense of their territory, their autonomy and exercise of self-government. In third place is community leadership, which presented an increase of 24% with 37 more incidents compared to the previous year. This leadership corresponds to those who are part of non-institutionalized organizational processes that dedicate their work to the defense of rights. In this category are located the communicators who are part of alternative media that in moments such as those experienced during the National Strike, played a key role in the transmission of information in real time, which is why they also became the target of attacks.

The increase in aggressions to youth sector leaderships raised since the first semester of 2020 remains; in fact, during 2021, 40 attacks were registered, 27 more than the previous year, equivalent to an increase of 208%. This situation is associated, on the one hand, to their leadership in the mobilizations within the framework of the National Strike, but also to the momentum that their own organizational processes have been taking and that represent the beginning of an important process of generational change in the social movement.




Attacks against victims' leaders also showed a significant increase with 88 incidents, 47 more than the previous year, equivalent to an increase of 115%. It is necessary to highlight the behavior of violence in this case

because several of its leaders were emerging as candidates for the Special Transitory Peace Circumscriptions or supporting such candidacies from their organizations, which could have influenced the increase in such ag-

gressions. This demonstrates once again the link between electoral situa-

tions and aggressions against human rights defenders in the territories.

Alleged responsible



The 996 aggressions against human rights defenders documented during 2021 had as alleged perpetrators, in the first place, unknown actors, with a participation of 40% (9 events more than in 2020), these are people who do not carry any type of emblem or distinctive that could link them to any legal or illegal armed actor, who hide their faces and identity but do fulfill their objective of attacking social leaderships, making it impossible to identify the plausible motivations of the act and, therefore, making it more difficult to clarify the facts. They were allegedly responsible for 82 murders, 232 threats, 65 attacks, 1 arbitrary detention, 12 forced disappearances and 5 information thefts. The practice of outsourcing services to *mutant* criminal gangs by illegal armed groups in the territories is a determining factor in the increase of this category of alleged perpetrator.

In second place are the paramilitary groups or successor organizations to paramilitarism, with 23% of the aggressions, including 21 murders, 205 threats and 6 attacks. Among the groups involved are the Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles), the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, the Caparrapos, the AUC, La Constru and the Mexican Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARM), whose actions are more closely linked to drug trafficking and operate in Chocó.

In third place is the public force that went from 53 aggressions in 2020 to 206 in 2021, with a notable increase of 289% (153 more actions), 76 of them attributed to the Mobile Anti-Riot Squad (ESMAD) attached to the National Police, allegedly responsi-

ble also for the 2 sexual aggressions recorded and which in 2021 violently repressed the mobilizations and collective actions carried out in the framework of the National Strike.

Then the different post-FARC structures appear as the alleged perpetrators of 95 aggressions: 18 murders, 70 threats, 4 attacks and 3 forced disappearances. With these groups, it is important to emphasize that their names and structures change according to the alliances and regions of operation, a fact that to some extent makes monitoring difficult, and yet, the Western Coordinating Command (CCO), the Dagoberto Ramos and Jaime Martínez mobile columns, the Carlos Patiño Front (with major operations in western and northern Cauca, allegedly responsible for the aggressions against the indigenous peoples and, specifically, against their traditional authorities) continue to operate strongly, the Adán Izquierdo (with actions in Valle del Cauca), the 5th and 37th Fronts (with presence in Antioquia and southern Córdoba), the Second Marquetalia (both in the southwest and on the eastern border, department of Meta), the Comandos de la Frontera - Ejército Bolivariano (CDF - EB) (in Putumayo), the Oliver Sinisterra front or the Contadores (in Nariño), among others.

In fifth place are the State institutions. This category includes state entities or persons belonging to state entities. In 2021 they were allegedly responsible for 38 acts, 13 more than in 2020, representing an increase of 52%. For this period, the Attorney General's Office, the National Protection Unit, the Minister of Defense and a parliamentary


(belonging to the Democratic Center) were identified as allegedly responsible for aggressions against social leaders. It is important to mention that the Attorney General's Office, as the entity in charge of the investigations, acted in 17 arbitrary detentions, 14 judicializations and 2 threats. 29 of these actions were committed in the second half of the year, several of them, such as arbitrary detentions and prosecutions, are interpreted as a *side effect* of the mobilizations in the framework of the National Strike, going from actions of direct violence to those of persecution.

As for the National Protection Unit (UNP), the entity in charge of the material protection of those whose lives and integrity are at risk, it is especially noteworthy that it is involved in the aggressions represented in threatening actions of harassment, as well as illegal eavesdropping through the elements used to provide protection.

On the other hand, the ELN is allegedly responsible for 24 aggressions, a decrease of 47% in relation to 2020 when 45 acts were registered. The cases for which they are allegedly responsible are 9 murders, 13 threats, 1 attack and 1 forced disappearance.

Finally, there is the register of *others*, which refers to civilians who are not part of any illegal armed group or State entity. In this year the actions of this perpetrator had an increase of 33% in aggressions and correspond to femicides (4 cases).

This multiplicity of actors, some that remain and others that are changing, permanently stalk the people who work in the defense of human rights in the territories and make their work even more complex, demonstrating once again the State's inability to guarantee it.



Murders

Although in 2021 there was a 30% reduction in murders, from 199 events in 2020 to 139 in 2021, the persistence of this aggression is still worrying, taking into account that since 2017 murders have not fallen below the hundred cases and they fluctuate according to the behavior of the year.


This decrease may have several explanations, among them is the lifting of restrictive measures established by COVID-19, which allowed greater mobility of defenders, making it difficult in some cases to locate them in places of permanence such as their homes, as it happened in 2020, and led to multiple murders in their places of residence. In the first quarter of 2021 the figures pointed to a representative decrease, however, except for February and March, the occurrence of murders per month ranged between 9 and 19 events.

January was the month with the highest number of murders with 19 cases, followed by July with 16, May with

15, June and October with 13 each, April, September and November with 11 each, August with 10, December with 9, March with 6 and, finally, February with 5 cases. Thus, 49% of the murders were committed in the first half of the year and 51% in the second half.

Of the 139 murders, 83% (115 events) were committed against men. On the other hand, 17% (24 events) involved women, that is, 4% more than in 2020; among them, there are 4 femicides, meaning murders committed against women because they are women, which occurred in their homes or surrounding areas, allegedly committed by civilians not linked to armed groups; 2 of them took place during the first quarter and the other 2 during the fourth quarter; two of the victims were peasant women leaders and two were indigenous women leaders. These events highlight the generalized gender-based violence against women and the vulnerability that is increased by the fact of leading processes in favor of their territories and communities.

**Number of murders by gender
SIADDHH figures January - December 2021**




Regarding other factors that appear around the murders of human rights defenders, it was found that 113 were perpetrated with a firearm, 10 with white weapon, 2 by mechanical asphyxiation, 3 with antipersonnel mines, in 3 cases both white weapon and firearm were used, in 1 case white weapon and blunt object were used, and in 7 cases it was not possible to determine the type of weapon employed.

In 8 cases the bodies showed signs of torture, 18 murders were carried out with cruelty, that is, excessive cruelty represented in the number of impacts against the bodies; 13 had a period of prior disappearance, in 31 incidents other people were affected and it should be noted that 5 of the victims had a protective measure from the National Protection Unit, which casts doubt on the effectiveness of individ-

ual and physical measures to ensure the safety of the leaders.

As for murders in the form of attempts or attacks, considered as aggressions against life and physical integrity, 93 cases were recorded, that is, an increase of 18% in relation to the previous year; in 35% of them (33 events) there were physical injuries. In these cases, it is presumed de facto the intention to put an end to the life of human rights defenders, since the consequences would be fatal, in fact, there were cases where the injuries suffered could not be overcome and after periods of medical attention and critical conditions, the leaders died. The months with the highest number of incidents were May (23 incidents), September (13 incidents), October (11 incidents) and August (10 incidents).


Murders by department



According to the SIADDHH registry, the murders took place in 21 departments and in the Capital District, that is, in 64% of the national territory. The territories where the highest number of murders occur is maintained year after year, thus in 2021 in the first place appears Antioquia (23 cases) and Cauca (22 cases), the latter presenting a decrease of 58% in this type of aggression. They are followed by Valle del Cauca (18 cases), with an increase of 50%; Nariño (11 cases), with a decrease of 50%; Putumayo (9 cases), with a decrease of 40%; and

Chocó (9 cases), with a decrease of 31%.

With these data, the southwest, composed by the departments of Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Nariño and Putumayo, would remain as the area where more leaders were murdered during 2020 with a total of 60 incidents. In addition, the appearance of Antioquia in the first place is highlighted, which may be due to the resurgence of the dynamics of the armed conflict in areas such as Bajo Cauca and the north of the department.



The municipalities with the highest number of murders are Cali, Valle del Cauca (6 events); Tumaco, Nariño (5 events); Cáceres, Antioquia (3 events); Dabeiba, Antioquia (3 events); Argeña, Cauca (3 events); Santa Marta, Magdalena (3 events); Cúcuta, Norte de Santander (3 events); Buenaventura,

Valle del Cauca (3 events) and Tuluá, Valle del Cauca (3 events).

It is also worth noting that 26 murders were perpetrated in municipalities located in areas corresponding to the 5 Future Zones, as shown in the following table.

Bajo Cauca and Southern Córdoba		
Antioquia	Anorí	1
Antioquia	Cáceres	3
Antioquia	Caucasia	1
Antioquia	Remedios	1
Antioquia	Tarazá	1
Antioquia	Ituango	1
Antioquia	Zaragoza	1
Córdoba	Montelíbano	1
Córdoba	Tierralta	1
Catatumbo		
Norte de Santander	El Carmen	1
Norte de Santander	Hacarí	1
Norte de Santander	Sardinata	1
Norte de Santander	Tibú	1
Nariño Pacific Area		
Nariño	Barbacoas	1
Nariño	Magüí Payán	1
Nariño	Tumaco	5
Chiribiquete and Surrounding Natural National Parks		
Caquetá	Cartagena del Chairá	1
Meta	La Macarena	1
Arauca		
Arauca	Fortul	1
Arauca	Saravena	1

The 3 Future Zones with the highest number of murders of human rights defenders are listed below.

First, Bajo Cauca and Southern Córdoba (11 events), which also correspond to a zone with a high presence of legal and illegal armed groups, such as the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), which dominate this

border zone between Antioquia and Córdoba. After the “capture” of alias Otoniel, the violence in this zone did not diminish as promised by the government; on the contrary, it has been strengthened by successors such as alias “Chiquito Malo” who is committed to continuing the drug trafficking business and maintaining control in the territory under his command.

The pacific region of Nariño (7 events) is in second place, a territory in which there are known territorial disputes between various armed groups, in addition to the presence of illicit economies. The presence of illegal armed actors is widespread, including the ELN, the AGC and several post-FARC groups such as the Southwestern Alfonso Cano Bloc, the Oliver Sinistera Front, the Contadores, the United Guerrillas of the Pacific and the Second Marquetalia.


The third place is occupied by the Catatumbo Future Zone, where it is important to note that the crisis is worsening over time due to the ELN’s dispute for power with different armed groups. The migration of Venezuelan citizens to Colombia continues and the actions of the security forces have been strengthened. In addition, Norte de Santander became the department with the largest area of illicit crops with “40,116 ha, which represents 28% of the national net area, the municipality with the greatest affectation is Tibú, with 19,334 ha, representing 13% of the national total”⁷⁹.

⁷⁹ OCHA. October 8, 2021. Humanitarian advisory team. departmental briefing. Norte de Santander. Available at: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operation>

Murders by type of leadership

About the leaderships with the highest number of murders, the first place is shared by two profiles, the members of the Community Action Boards and indigenous leaderships, who were victims of 33 murders each. In the case of communal leaders, 3 murders occurred against women and 30 against men, 23 of whom were working in rural areas and 10 in urban areas. Among the indigenous leaders murdered were 10 women, two of them victims of femicide, and 23 men.

In second place are community leaders with 21 murders, followed by peasant leaders with 18 murders, including two femicides. Afro-descendant leaders are next with 8 murders; the latter, added to the murders of indigenous leaders, account for 29% of the total, which shows that ethnic leaders are highly vulnerable as they carry out their actions, in most cases, in rural areas and in defense of the territory.



Alleged responsible for the murders

In the 139 cases documented by SIADDHH, 59% (82 cases) are pre-

sumed to be the responsibility of unknown actors, followed by those committed by paramilitary groups with a participation of 15% (21 cases), FARC dissidents would be responsible for 13% (18 cases), ELN guerrillas would have a participation of 6% (9 cases), 4% (5 cases) would be the responsibility of the security forces and 3% (4 cases) "others" would appear as the


tions/colombia/document/briefing-departamental-norte-de-santander-enero-junio-2021

presumed responsible parties, corresponding to civilians accountable for the femicides.

The number of murders attributed to paramilitary groups decreased by 30% compared to 2020, mostly in Antioquia; 8 cases occurred in places where the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia have a strong presence. Something similar occurred in Chocó and Norte de Santander, where this group is attributed with 3 murders in each department.

As for the alleged responsibility of post-FARC groups, they are in third place, although there has been a 28% decrease in the number of incidents for which they are allegedly responsible.

As in previous periods, the increase in the record of unknown alleged perpetrators continues to be of concern due to the negative impact this situation has on overcoming impunity for such conduct, which has historically been very high.



Individual threats

During 2021 the SIADDHH verified 665 threats, making it the highest record of threats since 2010, surpassing 2020 by 10% (61 more events). This means that during the year, human

rights defenders were threatened at a rate of 1.8 times per day.


Threats continue to be the most recurrent aggression aimed at intimidating leaders and causing them to cease or reduce their activities, which

weakens the social and community processes to which they belong. The most affected leaders were human rights defenders (187 incidents), community leaders (142 incidents), indigenous leaders (139 incidents) and victims' leaders (78 incidents).

Threats by department

The events occurred in 27 departments and in the Capital District, that

is, in 85% of the national territory. The departments where the highest number of threats occurred are Cauca (184), Valle del Cauca (89), Capital District (74), Bolívar (38), Magdalena (37), Antioquia (30), Norte de Santander (23), Santander (19), Atlántico (17), La Guajira (16), Cundinamarca (15), Huila (14), Nariño (12), Cesar (11), Sucre (11) and Tolima (11).




The increase in the department of Cauca is 47%, which corresponds to 59 more incidents compared to 2020. Meanwhile, Valle del Cauca is the territory with the highest increase with 345%, i.e., 69 more incidents than in 2020. On the other hand, the Capital District, which is in third place, had a decrease of 35% with 40 fewer incidents than in 2020. The significant increase in threats in Valle del Cauca coincides with the violence perpetrated in the framework of the National Strike, during which the social movement in this department was very active.

Types of Threat

The forms in which threats occurred during 2021 were diverse and, in

many cases, they happened in more than one way in the same event. Thus, the most recurrent threat was harassment with 210 cases, understood as intimidating acts of persecution, surveillance through people or elements, visits, photographs, threatening signs with weapons or gestures, among others. This is followed by pamphlets (204 cases), text messages (86 cases), e-mail or social networks (66 cases), calls (49 cases), explosive material (10 cases), and murder of a family member of the leadership (4 cases). This last one is very worrying as a threatening event as it denotes that the close circle is also exposed to risk, in addition, it had a 300% increase from one case in 2020 to 4 in 2021. Finally, in 36 cases, the means by which the threat was made, remain unidentified.



With these figures, it is worth noting that a large number of threats were accompanied by beatings with blunt objects (51 incidents), signs of torture (14 incidents) and damage to material goods (11 incidents), and also, due to the threats, the displacement of the leaders in order to preserve their lives and integrity (37 incidents). In 65 cases (blows with blunt objects and signs of torture) there was physical injury, which means that the threat was accompanied by an aggression that compromised physical integrity by hurting the victim's body.


Although during 2021 harassment through the different modalities used such as persecution, surveillance, taking photographs of people, homes or workplaces, frightening gestures with or without weapons, among others, became the most frequent form of threat, especially in the second quarter, a period coinciding with the National Strike, pamphlets remain as one of the preferred modalities when threatening, since it implies a low risk for those who carry out the aggression and at the same time has a great capacity to intimidate and deactivate processes.

In the cases of threats registered in this period by SIADDH, the alleged perpetrators appear in the following order: Unknowns (232 cases), Para-

military (205 cases), security forces (138 cases), FARC dissidents (70 cases), ELN (13 cases) and State entities (7 cases).

It is important to emphasize the participation of the public forces in this type of aggression, which far from guaranteeing the life, honor and property of citizens, were allegedly responsible for a large number of threats, in fact, there is an increase of 431%, from 26 incidents in 2020 to 138 in 2021. This shows why the public force has increasingly lost legitimacy and explains society's demand for an effective reform of the National Police, which is presumed to be the body in charge of protecting and settling conflicts with a view to guaranteeing daily coexistence on a daily basis.

As for the 205 acts in which Paramilitary groups are presumed to be responsible, the Black Eagles are the alleged perpetrators in 77, the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia in 76, the Black Eagles-Capital Block in 16, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 14, the Black Eagles-Southern Block in 7, the Caparrapos in 3, the Mexican Revolutionary Armed Forces -FARM- in 3, and 9 of them were attributed to paramilitary groups of which the structure is unknown.



Balance of the figures

In general, what the figures show, beyond the count of incidents, is the growth of aggressions against human rights defenders, since 2010 when the SIADDHH registry started. In that first year a total of 174 cases were confirmed, then, in the first five years it went to 626, then it rose to 844 in 2019 and in 2021 we have closed with 996 cases, undoubtedly the highest number of aggressions since the creation of SIADDHH. In 12 years, a total of 7,099 aggressions have been registered, thousands of lives affected by selective and systematic violence, which is a sign of the ineffectiveness of the State to provide due guarantees for the exercise of the legitimate work of defending human rights, despite trying to show the opposite with paper public policies and actions such as militarization that contribute to increase the risks in the territories.

Although 2021 was characterized by the high number of aggressions, it was also marked by the strength of civil society and the expression of weariness in the face of all forms of inequality and forms of violence, including selective violence, an unprecedented situation in which human rights defenders and social leaders played a very important role as mobilizers of collective discontent and overseers of respect for human rights in the mobilizations. This exposed them much more, as evidenced by the figures, especially in front of the public forces, but also showed that society is not indifferent to the social and political crisis, and that it demands an immediate and profound change to finally and definitively stop the violence that has affected the lives of people who only seek to defend the rights of their communities and social sectors.

TYPE	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	TOTAL
THREATS	109	140	202	209	488	539	317	370	583	628	604	655	4189
MURDERS	32	49	69	78	55	63	80	106	155	124	199	139	1010
ATTACKS	21	20	50	39	41	35	49	50	34	52	79	93	470
DETENTIONS	11	23	26	22	23	26	17	23	4	29	30	52	234
DISAPPEREANCES	0	6	5	1	1	3	2	0	4	3	25	16	50
JUDICIALIZATIONS	1	1	1	10	8	8	9	9	19	1	28	16	95
SEXUAL VIOLENCE	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	2
INFORMATION THEFT	0	0	3	7	10	8	6	2	6	7	4	13	53
TOTAL	174	239	357	366	626	682	481	560	805	844	969	996	7099

CONCLUSIONS

The human rights situation in the territories continued to worsen during 2021, and with it, the panorama of violence against human rights defenders. Colombia continues to be an extremely unsafe country for the defense of human rights, with an average of 2 aggressions committed every day against defenders or social leaders, according to data recorded by the Somos Defensores Program.

An alarming sign of the degree of the deterioration of the situation in some territories, is the humanitarian crises being suffered by the populations in several areas of the country, which recall dark times already experienced in recent times.

Faced with this alarming situation, the government's response to the situation raises serious questions and the government's strategy, embodied in the Plan of Opportune Action (Plan de Acción Oportuna -PAO-), is the object of multiple criticisms.

The PAO is essentially anchored in the old recipe of militarization that has not produced the expected results and, on the contrary, contributes to increase the risk of communities and organizations in some cases.

Progress towards the dismantling of criminal organizations implicated in the humanitarian crises in different areas of the country and the attacks on human rights defenders has had few results, even though the media continually reports on the important

hits on their leaders. Actions focused on criminal organizations considered of high value, on the one hand, do not automatically lead to the destruction of such structures, an example of this is the capture or surrender of alias Otoniel and, on the other hand, such actions are not developed considering the security and protection of the communities and organizations in the territories where they are developed.

The lack of progress in dismantling criminal structures places the country, despite the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2016, in a reconfiguration of the armed conflict that involves a variable geometry on a territorial scale and mutations and alliances between the different armed structures that make it difficult to monitor, but with the effect that they continue to grow and consolidate in different territories, generating violence and victimization of organizations, communities and their leaders.

The issuance of CONPES 4063 in December 2021, despite being labeled as the *Public Policy of Guarantees and Respect for the Work of Human Rights Defense and Social Leadership*, in practice is not such, since it is not aimed at providing full guarantees for the exercise of the work of human rights defense, it does not address the criminality that generates violence against human rights defenders, it maintains the paradigm of individual and physical protection and it did not include the effective participation of

social organizations and human rights defenders in its construction.

Faced with this situation of deterioration of the human rights situation in the territories and aggressions against defenders, the lack of due diligence in their actions by the Procurator General's Office, the Ombudsman's Office and the Attorney General's Office has been latent during the period, thus increasing the vulnerability of organizations and communities in the territories and contributing to their silencing.

With no progress in the dismantling of criminal organizations, without oversight bodies that raise their voices on behalf of communities and organizations at risk and judicial investigations that advance towards

determining the responsibilities of the material and intellectual authors, accomplices and accessories, not only of the murders, but also of other crimes committed against defenders, the situation of violence against them will not only persist but, unfortunately, will continue to increase.

In view of the seriousness of this situation, the Constitutional Court's current review of several accumulated rights of petition on the defense of human rights constitutes an important window of opportunity so that, through the declaration of an unconstitutional state of affairs, the structural reforms that are required can be oriented and the path of a comprehensive implementation of the Peace Agreement can be resumed.

Human Rights defenders murdered during 2021 -SIADDHH-

No.	DATE	DEPARTMENT OF THE INCI- DENT	MUNICIPALITY OF THE INCIDENT	NAME OF THE VICTIM	ORGANIZATION TO WHICH THEY BELONGED	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP
1	1/01/2021	Meta	Puerto Gaitán	Gerardo León	Ethno-educator and member of the Colombian Federation of Educators (Fecode).	Educational Leadership	Educational Leadership
2	7/01/2021	Antioquia	Cáceres	Edwin Antonio Indaburo	Peasant and Community Leader	Peasant Leadership	Peasant Leadership
3	10/01/2021	Antioquia	Ituango	Luis Alfredo García Chavarria	Member of the Peasant's Association of Ituango (ASCIT) and member of the Community Action Board of La Cuatro village.	Peasant Leadership	Peasant Leadership
4	11/01/2021	Valle del Cauca	Tuluá	Gonzalo Cardona Molina	Member of ProAves Foundation	Environment Leadership	Environment Leadership
5	13/01/2021	Arauca	Saravena	José Grasisquiere Toro Ledesma	Coordinator of the conciliation committee of Los Naranjos Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
6	15/01/2021	Antioquia	Yondó	José Robinson Quino Bonilla	President of the Community Action Board of the Caño Bonito village and PNIS member.	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership
7	15/01/2021	Córdoba	La Apartada	Fredman Herazo Patilla	Cultural and social promoter of San Basilio de Palenque, Bolívar.	Afro-Descendant Leadership	Afro-descendant Leadership
8	16/01/2021	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta	William Antonio Rodríguez Martínez	Manager of the Banco de Arena aqueduct and environmental defender	Community Leadership	Community Leadership
9	19/01/2021	Antioquia	Cáceres	Linda Díaz Romero	Member of the Association of Peasants and Agriculturists of Villa San Roque.	Peasant Leadership	Peasant Leadership
10	20/01/2021	Risaralda	Pereira	José Abadía Parra	Coordinator of the land restitution roundtable and member of the Nuevo Amanecer Foundation.	Victims Leadership	Victims Leadership
11	21/01/2021	Risaralda	Dosquebradas	Janeth Zapata	Community leader of the Bombay 3 neighborhood. Member of the Community Action Board of Commune 9.	Community Leadership	Community Leadership

12	23/01/2021	Valle del Cauca	Cali	Julian Sneider Muñoz	Member of the social collective Prisoneros de la Esperanza (Prisoners of Hope).	Youth Leadership	Youth Leadership	Youth Leadership
13	24/01/2021	Valle del Cauca	Buga	Carlos Erid González Cortés	Community leader. Former councilman of the municipality of Buga.	Community Leadership	Community Leadership	Community Leadership
14	27/01/2021	Cauca	Argelia	Fermiliano Meneses	Councilman of Argelia and leader of ASOCOMUNAL	Community Leadership	Community Leadership	Community Leadership
15	27/01/2021	Cesar	Valledupar	Yobani Carranza Castillo	Environmental advocate in Rincón Hondo, Chiriguana	Environment Leadership	Environment Leadership	Environment Leadership
16	28/01/2021	Huila	San Agustín	Arcenio Quinayas Ruiz	"Treasurer of the Community Action Board of Los Andes village, in Los Cauchos township.	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership
17	29/01/2021	Antioquia	Yarumal	José Miguel Barrientos Uribe	Coordinator of the Works Committee of the Community Action Board of La Zorra, Ochali township.	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership
18	31/01/2021	Antioquia	Tarazá	Remberto Arrieta Bohórquez	Member of PNIS and of the Community Action Board of the La Primavera village.	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership
19	31/01/2021	Arauca	Arauca	Samuel Alfonso Moreno Macualo	Youth and Community leader	Youth Leadership	Youth Leadership	Youth Leadership
20	2/02/2021	Cauca	Corinto	Yordan Eduardo Guetio Medina	Youth leader of the Association of Peasant Workers of the Corinto municipality. Member of the Community Action Board of the San Luis Arriba village.	Youth Leadership	Youth Leadership	Youth Leadership
21	14/02/2021	Antioquia	Cáceres	Orlando Manuel Chimá	Indigenous leader of the Los Almentros reservation, Piamonte village.	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
22	17/02/2021	Chocó	Bagadó	Alejandro Manugama Cheche	Traditional guard and medic of the Tahamý Resguardo, Alto Andágueda	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
23	21/02/2021	Nariño	Tumaco	Marcos Paí	Former governor of the Awá indigenous reservation of La Brava	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
24	24/02/2021	Nariño	Tumaco	John Albeiro Paí Pascal	Piguambi Palangala Chapter prosecutor	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership

25	1/03/2021	Sucre	San Onofre	Jaime Enrique Basilio	Sheriff of the Libertad indigenous chapter, of the Zenú ethnic group	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
26	3/03/2021	Nariño	Cumbal	Carmen Ofelia Cumbalaza	Ancestral medic in the El Gran Cumbal indigenous reservation	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
27	17/03/2021	Putumayo	Orito	María Bernardina Juajibioy	Mayor of the Camentzá Biyá Chapter	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
28	28/03/2021	Nariño	Tumaco	José Santos López	Former governor and indigenous Awá leader of the Panalero community, El Gran Sabalo reservation.	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
29	29/03/2021	Valle del Cauca	Florida	Carlos Alberto Vidal	President of the Workers' Union of Castilla Cosecha (SINTRACCOS)	Union Leadership	Union Leadership	Union Leadership
30	30/03/2021	La Guajira	Uribia	Aura Esther García Peñaalver	Wayuu traditional authority of the Arronschy community	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
31	5/04/2021	Antioquia	Anorí	Arlax Albeiro Hoyos Zapata	Peasant Association of Northern Antioquia (ASGNA). PSG Member	Peasant Leadership	Peasant Leadership	Peasant Leadership
32	6/04/2021	Antioquia	Dabeiba	Rafael Domicó Carupia	Jaibana and cultural promoter of the Embera Eyábita indigenous community of Amparrado Pajalito	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
33	10/04/2021	Chocó	Nuquí	Yarley Margarito Salas	Environmental defender and community guide of the La Batea tourism group	Environment Leadership	Environment Leadership	Environment Leadership
34	10/04/2021	Chocó	Nuquí	José Riaccos	Member of the Los Riscasles Community Council.	Community Leader	Community Leader	Community Leader
35	10/04/2021	cauca	Miranda	Horacio Andrés Moreno	Social movement Sueños Diversos (Diverse Dreams)	LGTBI Leadership	LGTBI Leadership	LGTBI Leadership
36	14/04/2021	Antioquia	Caucasia	Luis Octavio Gutiérrez Montes	Manager of the Caucaasia Hospital.	Human Rights Defender	Human Rights Defender	Human Rights Defender
37	14/04/2021	Meta	La Macarena	Juan Carlos Aguirre	President of the Community Action Board of the Nuevo Milenio Village	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership

38	18/04/2021	Magdalena	Santa Marta	Francisco Giacometto Gómez	Founder and militant of the Patriotic Union, student leader in the department of Magdalena and member of the Communist Youth (JUCO).	Human Rights Activist
39	18/04/2021	Santander	Bucaramanga	Justiniano Torres García	Prosecutor of the Balcones de Kennedy Community Action Board	Commune Leadership
40	20/04/2021	Cauca	Caldono	Sandra Liliana Peña	Governor of the La Laguna reservation	Indigenous Leadership
41	28/04/2021	Caldas	Aguadas	Wilson de Jesús López Cifuentes	Leader of the return process of the El Congal village, in Samaná.	Commune Leadership
42	1/05/2021	Putumayo	San Miguel	Duver Yovani Laguna	Rural educator at the school in the Las Lomas village.	Community Leadership
43	2/05/2021	Antioquia	San Luis	Juan David García Naranjo	Promoter of the National Strike in eastern Antioquia	Community Leadership
44	3/05/2021	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Beatriz Moreno Mosquera	Educator, former president and representative of the Sole Union of Education Workers of Valle del Cauca (SUTEV).	Union Leadership
45	6/05/2021	Antioquia	Medellín	Mauricio Valencia Sánchez	Director of Nuestra Tierra Corporation.	Environmental Leader
46	11/05/2021	Risaralda	Pereira	Lucas Villa	Activist and promoter of the National Strike	Human Rights Activist
47	14/05/2021	Antioquia	Medellín	Felipe Andrés Pérez Pérez	Member of the SINATRINAL Board of Directors, Environmental section.	Union Leader
48	15/05/2021	Valle del Cauca	Jamundí	Geovanny Cabezas Cruz	Indigenous guard of the Las Pilas community	Indigenous Leadership
49	15/05/2021	Nariño	Leiva	Wilber Torres Cifuentes	Member of the Campesino, Black, Youth and Transport Communities of the Nariño Western Cordillera (CCAN-JOTRAN).	Peasant Leadership
50	22/05/2021	Arauca	Arauca	José Manuel Caballero	President of the Community Action Board of the Primero de Mayo Neighborhood	Commune Leadership

51	24/05/2021	Valle del Cauca	Cali	Sir Armando Álvarez	Assistant manager of the health network ESE east of Cali	Community Leadership	Community Leadership
52	26/05/2021	Cauca	Patia	Yefer Edison Oliveros Daza	President of the Community Action Board, La Floresta neighborhood.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
53	28/05/2021	Bolívar	Cantagallo	Jair Adán Roldán Morales	Member of the Peasant Association of the Cimitarra River Valley (ACVC).	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader
54	28/05/2021	Valle del Cauca	Cali	Sebastián Jancanmijoy Jansasoy	Member of Juventud Rebelde, musician and artist, follower of ancestral wisdom.	Youth Leadership	Youth Leadership
55	28/05/2021	Valle del Cauca	Cali	Luis Fernando del Castillo	Leader of sports processes in the Aguablanca district.	Youth Leader	Youth Leader
56	30/05/2021	Putumayo	Villagarzón	Jordany Rosero Estrella	Promoter of the National Strike. Student leader.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
57	4/06/2021	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao	Juan David Guegue Trochez	Authority of the Munchique Los Tigres reservation	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
58	5/06/2021	Valle del Cauca	Tuluá	José Alonso Valencia	Peace signatory, president of the Community Action Board of the La Moralia township.	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership
59	7/06/2021	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao	Beatriz Helena Cano Uribe	Indigenous social communicator, broadcaster of the community radio station Payumat Radio and member of the Association of Indigenous Chapters of Northern Cauca.	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
60	9/06/2021	Arauca	Fortul	Danilo Galindo	Conciliator in equity of the Center for Citizen Coexistence of Fortul.	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
61	9/06/2021	Cauca	Corinto	Argenis Yatacué	Educator, ancestral authority of the Nasa people, member of the Regional Indigenous Council Sat We'sx and the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC).	Indigenous Leadership	Indigenous Leadership
62	12/06/2021	Cundinamarca	Bogotá	Luciana Moscoso	Member of the Trans Community Network	LGTBI Leadership	LGTBI Leadership
63	13/06/2021	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Harold Ángulo Vencé	Urban music singer and community rights advocate, known as "Junior Jein".	Afro-Descendant Leadership	Afro-descendant Leadership

64	14/06/2021	Putumayo	Valle del Guamuez	José William Mayoral Castillo	Cultural manager, president of the Community Action Board of the La Esmeralda neighborhood and member of the MAIS party.	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership	Commune Leadership
65	18/06/2021	Norte de Santander	Ocaña	Dagoberto Bayona Santiago	Teacher at the Agricultural Institute of the Catatumbo Region.	Community Leader	Community Leader	Community Leader
66	20/06/2021	Antioquia	Dabeiba	Ángel Miro Cartagena	Member of the Motor Team of the Territorially Focused Development Program (PDET) and of the Community Association of High Quality Coffee Producers of Dabeiba (Aprocad).	Peasant Leadership	Peasant Leadership	Peasant Leadership
67	20/06/2021	Antioquia	Copacabana	Diana María Iaramillo Henao	Community leader of the Cinco Estrellas de la Gabriela neighborhood, municipality of Bello.	Community Leadership	Community Leadership	Community Leadership
68	26/06/2021	Nariño	Magüi Payán	Daniilo Torres	Legal representative of the Manos Unidas Community Council on the Patia River	Afro-Descendant Leadership	Afro-Descendant Leadership	Afro-Descendant Leadership
69	27/06/2021	Caquetá	Cartagena del Chairá	Yoni Alejandro Chala Hueje	Fiscal of the Los Comuneros Village Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
70	1/07/2021	Chocó	Alto Baudó	Luis Picasio Carampaima	Member of the Embera Dohidá indigenous community, Catrú reservation.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
71	3/07/2021	Caquetá	Florencia	Fernando Vela	Animalist and ecologist.	Environmental Leader	Environmental Leader	Environmental Leader
72	3/07/2021	Córdoba	Tierralta	José Gregorio Lúquez	Member of the Peasant Association, the PNIS and the Community Action Board of La Chica, Diamante in Córdoba.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
73	4/07/2021	Norte de Santander	Hacarí	Nelson Galván Ascanio	Delegate of the Association of San José del Tarra's Community Action Boards	Communal Leader	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
74	5/07/2021	Antioquia	Dabeiba	Higinio Bailarín	Indigenous guard of the Embera Eyabida community, Amparádo Medio.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
75	7/07/2021	Huila	Neiva	Derly Pastrana Yara	Coordinator of Huila's Departmental Victims' Board.	Victims Leader	Victims Leader	Victims Leader


76	10/07/2021	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta	Gertrudis Hernandez Leal	Founder of the Palmarito Women's Association.	Women's Leader	Women's Leader
77	13/07/2021	Atlántico	Sabanalarga	Alexander Enrique Escobar Molina	Former president of the Nuevo Amanecer Community Action Board, Aguachica, Cesar.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
78	14/07/2021	Cauca	Morales	Yeisi Campo	Former president of the El Playón Community Action Board and member of La Fortaleza Community Council.	Afro-descendant leader	Afro-descendant leader
79	14/07/2021	Valle del Cauca	Cali	Oscar Ivan Suárez Riascos	Municipal Councilor of Commune 15 for the period 2020 - 2023	Community Leader	Community Leader
80	18/07/2021	Antioquia	Yolombó	Luis Hernando Castrillón Molina	Treasurer of La Cruz village Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
81	21/07/2021	Magdalena	Santa Marta	Juana Iris Ramirez Martinez	Secretary of the Community Action Board of the Luis R. Calvo neighborhood.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
82	23/07/2021	Caquetá	La Montañita	Jose Vianey Gaviria Hoyos	Prosecutor of the La Virgen neighborhood JAC. Vice-president of the La Unión Peneya Communal Center.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
83	25/07/2021	Norte de Santander	El Carmen	Jean Carlos Rodriguez Díaz	President of Las Águilas Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
84	26/07/2021	Bolívar	Montecristo	Oswaldo de Jesús Pérez Navarro	President of the Mina Piñó Community Action Board and leader of the Agronomic Federation of Southern Bolívar.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
85	31/07/2021	Nariño	Ricaurte	Elias Pai Guanga	Former Awá Governor.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
86	5/08/2021	Putumayo	Sibundoy	Miguel Muchavisoy	Taita and traditional doctor of the Kamentza Biya Indigenous Chapter.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
87	9/08/2021	Antioquia	San Andrés de Cuerquia	Francisco Javier Posada Posada	President of the Montebello Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
88	11/08/2021	Meta	Fuente de Oro	Carlos Freddy Londoño Bautista	Teacher at the educational institution El Progreso. Alternate delegate of the Association of Meta Educators (ADEM).	Community Leader	Community Leader

89	19/08/2021	Nariño	Cumbitara	Nerio Fernando Rodríguez	Social, political and communal leader.	Afro-descendant Leader	Afro-descendant Leader
90	21/08/2021	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta	Eliecer Sánchez Cáceres	Vice President of La Punta Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
91	22/08/2021	Cauca	Caldono	Jhon Jairo Chocué	Indigenous communicator and Nasa broadcaster.	Community Leader	Community Leader
92	23/08/2021	Cauca	Popayán	Esteban Mosquera Iglesias	Youth Leader, journalist in alternative media.	Community Leader	Community Leader
93	24/08/2021	Antioquia	Zaragoza	Maíron Javier Chaverra Mosquera	Zaragoza City Councilman. Co-founder of the movement "Gacero lazo agua para Zaragoza" ("Water for Zaragoza movement"). Consultant and advisor to the Indigenous Organization of Antioquia (OIA).	Community Leader	Community Leader
94	25/08/2021	Cauca	Cajibío	Jesús Albeiro Gutiérrez	Member of the CNA.	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader
95	29/08/2021	Meta	El Castillo	María Dorfenis López Córdón	Member of the Caño Lindo Community Action Board and of the Independent Agricultural Workers Union of Meta (SINTRAGRIM).	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
96	1/09/2021	Cauca	Inzá	Juan Daniel Quintero Lizcano	Member of the Inzá Tierradentro Peasant Association (ACIT).	Youth Leader	Youth Leader
97	10/09/2021	Meta	Lejanías	Marco Tulio Gutiérrez Mendoza	Secretary of the Albania village Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
98	16/09/2021	Chocó	Acandí	Efrén Antonio Bailarín Carupia	Former governor and indigenous guard of the Chidima Tolo reservation, Embera Eyabida people.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
99	19/09/2021	Valle del Cauca	Tuluá	Marcos Efraín Montaño Escobar	Freelance journalist.	Human Rights Defender	Human Rights Defender
100	20/09/2021	Chocó	Carmen del Darién	Dilio Bailarín	Indigenous Leader, Alto Guayabal reservation.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
101	22/09/2021	Bolívar	Morales	Martín Bayona	President of La Cuchilla Community Action Board. Pro-motor of the PDET motor group.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader

102	22/09/2021	Cauca	Jamhaló	Ilia Pilcué Yule	Traditional medic of the Nasa people.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
103	30/09/2021	Putumayo	Puerto Leguizamo	Apolinar Rivero	Peasant Leader. Member of the Lorencito Community Action Board. Leader of crop substitution processes.	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader
104	30/09/2021	Putumayo	Puerto Leguizamo	Henry Perea Montaño	Member of the Afromayo community council.	Afro-descendant Leader	Afro-descendant Leader	Afro-descendant Leader
105	30/09/2021	Bogotá D.C	Bogotá	Jaime Cuadrado	Social and political leader of the Patriotic Union, defender of community, environmental and animal rights.	Community Leader	Community Leader	Community Leader
106	30/09/2021	Nariño	Tumaco	John Alberto Pascal Pascal	Coordinator of the indigenous guard of the Awá El Gran Sahalo reservation, Panelero community.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
107	2/10/2021	Cauca	Argelia	Hildo Gutierrez Gómez	Member of the Mirofondo village Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
108	5/10/2021	La Guajira	Maicao	Osvaldo Enrique Hernández Zúñiga	Delegate of the Erika Beatriz Neighborhood Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
109	5/10/2021	Putumayo	Puerto Caicedo	Jorge Antonio Loaiza	Vice-president of the Alca village, Perla Amazónica Peasant Reserve Zone (ZRCPA).	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader
110	11/10/2021	Valle del Cauca	Ansermanuevo	Wenny Geraldine Luisa Forero Gómez	Activist, territorial defender and cultural promoter.	Community Leader	Community Leader	Community Leader
111	16/10/2021	Chocó	Litoral del San Juan	Omar Cárdenas Lozano	Member of the Cimarrona Guard.	Afro-descendant Leader	Afro-descendant Leader	Afro-descendant Leader
112	17/10/2021	Valle del Cauca	Cali	Victor Orlando Mosquera	Member of the Ethnic Vegetable Garden Return to the Fields.	Community Leader	Community Leader	Community Leader
113	18/10/2021	Cauca	La Vega	Luis Alfonso Narváez Escobar	Former indigenous governor, coordinator of the Victims' Table and vice-governor of the Santa Barbara Chapter	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
114	18/10/2021	Cauca	Argelia	Efrén España	Co-founder of the Algerian Peasant Workers Association (ASCAMTA).	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader
115	19/10/2021	Cauca	Cajibío	Rogelio López Figueroa	Member of the Association of Peasant Workers of Cajibío, Anzorc, Puproc, Marcha Patriótica, COCCAM and PNIS.	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader

116	19/10/2021	Norte de Santander	Sardinata	Luis Efraín Sánchez Balaguera	President of the Paramillo Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
117	21/10/2021	Antioquia	San Rafael	Santiago Guarín	Rapper and activist in the Rio Churimo Libre collective.	Environmental Leader	Environmental Leader	Environmental Leader
118	23/10/2021	Cauca	Morales	Nazaria Calambás Tunubalá	Former indigenous mayor of the Guambia reservation, Misak people.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
119	25/10/2021	Cauca	Buenos Aires	Noel Corsini Zúñiga	Member of the National Coordinator of Coca, Poppy and Marijuana Growers (Coccam).	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader
120	2/11/2021	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Edinson Valenzuela Cuana	Sports and culture coordinator of the Raposo River Community Council.	Community Leader	Community Leader	Community Leader
121	3/11/2021	Putumayo	Orito	Victor López Gómez	Coordinator of the Indigenous Guard, Watsal Pa council of the Awá people.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
122	8/11/2021	Santander	Puerto Wilches	Robinson Jiménez Bautista	President of the Drillers Association of Santander and sub-director of Sindical Workers Union (USO).	Union Leader	Union Leader	Union Leader
123	8/11/2021	Córdoba	Montelíbano	Luis Alberto Ramos Bertel	President of the San Antonio Community Action Board and member of the Peasant Association of Southern Córdoba (ASCUCOR).	Communal Leader	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
124	9/11/2021	Caquetá	La Montañita	Willington Hernández	President of the El Centro Neighborhood Community Action Board, Unión Peneya.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
125	18/11/2021	Antioquia	Remedios	Hermes Antonio Monsalve	Candidate to the presidency of the Carriazo town Community Action Board.	Community Leader	Community Leader	Community Leader
126	21/11/2021	Cauca	Buenos Aires	Marcos Fidel Camayo Guetio	Former political coordinator of the ACIN Cauca 2014 health network. Former Governor 2004 and 2014.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
127	23/11/2021	Norte de Santander	Tibú	Nancy Yaneth Mejía Araque	Activist in the Women's Network of the Catatumbo Peasant Association.	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader
128	24/11/2021	Valle del Cauca	Tuluá	John Alexander Sierra	Peasant Leader.	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader

129	24/11/2021	Chocó	Lloró	Juana Panesso Dumasá	Traditional doctor of the Antiumiadó indigenous community.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
130	25/11/2021	Cesar	Tamalameque	Albert Mejía Portillo	Leader of the El Silencio lands recovery process.	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader
131	1/12/2021	Nariño	Tumaco	Jhon Mario García Guanga	Indigenous guard of the Gran Rosario reservation.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
132	7/12/2021	Magdalena	Santa Marta	Cristina Isabel Cantillo	Director of the Human Quality Foundation.	LGTBI Leader	LGTBI Leader
133	10/12/2021	Chocó	Acandí	Fredy Pestana Herrera	President of the Acandí River Basin and Northern Coastal Zone Community Council (Cocomanorte).	Afro-descendant Leader	Afro-descendant Leader
134	17/12/2021	Antioquia	Apartadó	Huber Velásquez	Peasant overseer of Apartadó.	Peasant Leader	Peasant Leader
135	19/12/2021	Cauca	Miranda	Arnubia Yunda Cuetia	Indigenous communicator, member of Hilo Mujer del Tejido Familia ("Woman Thread of the Family Weave") and the Cxab Wala Quiwe territorial communication tulpas of ACIN.	Indigenous Leader	Indigenous Leader
136	23/12/2021	Bolívar	San Pablo	Wilmar Ascanio Angarita	President of the Community Action Board of Alto Caña-braval.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
137	23/12/2021	Antioquia	Andes	Gustavo Orozco Ramirez	President of the San Perucho Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader
138	27/12/2021	Nariño	Barbacoas	Javier Esneider Castillo Ortiz	Cultural Manager and member of the Chango group.	Community Leader	Community Leader
139	3/12/2021	Valle del Cauca	San Pedro	Maria del Carmen Molina Imbachi	Secretary of the Buenos Aires town Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Communal Leader



**PROGRAMA
SOMOS DEFENSORES**
PROGRAMA NO GOBIERNO FEDERAL DE PROTECCIÓN A
DEFENSORES DE DERECHOS HUMANOS