

CLOCKWORK ORANGE



Annual report 2018

Information System on Attacks against Human Rights Defenders in Colombia - ISAAHRD -



**PROGRAMA
SOMOS DEFENSORES**
PROGRAMA NO GUBERNAMENTAL DE PROTECCIÓN A
DEFENSORES DE DERECHOS HUMANOS



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The Somos Defensores (*We Are Defenders*) Program, is a protection area that seeks to develop a comprehensive proposal to prevent aggression and protect the lives of people at risk due to their work as human rights defenders, when they protect the interests of social groups and communities affected by violence in Colombia. The Somos Defensores program is formed by:



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INTRODUCTION

Unfortunately, as usual in recent years, we must begin this report by highlighting the critical situation of violence against human rights defenders in the country. 2018 was, without a doubt, the worst year for defenders, this is shown by the data, since we recorded the highest aggression figures that have been presented since the beginning of our Information System in 2009. That is, not counting the amount of cases that for different reasons are not included, since we start from accepting the existence of underreporting, which means that the level of violence is much higher than we can imagine.

Although the Peace Agreement with the FARC guerrillas and the Government's dialogues with the ELN posed a historic opportunity for the construction of peace in the country, the political context has given some highly feared turns, which have made the situation of violence even more complex and that have sought to corner social organizations and their leaders in different territories.

The flaws in the implementation of the agreements, the abrupt end of the dialogues and the absence of comprehensive measures that intervene in the circles of violence, among other issues, have triggered an escalation of the armed conflict in which many more armed groups have appeared on the scene with different interests, but with a common need, that of adhering territories to their power, and with them, their populations. Faced

with these facts, it is impossible not to feel what is expressed in many sectors, that we have gone back in time in terms of security and that the peace process was only a short oasis from which we left abruptly, especially when the change in government took place.

Despite the evident crisis of human rights and the urgent need for intervention to protect the lives of everyone, and in particular, human rights defenders, the current Government of Iván Duque has opted to take opposing positions to its duty to offer guarantees and has left aside the difficult situation that defenders are going through; dedicating his efforts, instead, to putting other issues at the center, such as the orange economy.

Hence, this report is called ***A Clockwork Orange***, because the Government has shown to us in these months that the orange is priority, because it even crosses the entire National Development Plan, but instead has shown that this marked interest in the economy and its placing in public opinion is a way of omitting and disappearing much more important current issues, such as peace. Therefore, the orange appears in the center, but behind it speeches arise, such as the denial of the existence of the armed conflict, the ignorance of the systematic nature of violence against defenders, the non-recognition of the existence of many more armed groups and that these are not only linked to drug trafficking, the in-

sistence of the District Attorney's Office that it has increased the solution for cases of murders of defenders when it is not true and everything is a rhetorical and mediatic game, the non-implementation of the measures agreed upon with the previous Government and within the framework of the Peace Agreement to generate guarantees of security in the territories, among many other aspects that seem to indicate that Iván Duque is ruling in front of the economy and showing his back to peace.

Given this situation, we have considered it necessary to analyze the way in which the Government is unfolding and its responses to specific aspects such as the security guarantees of human rights defenders. In this sense, the report is divided into four axes; the first chapter raises some issues about the change of government and the changes in peace and security that have occurred with the arrival of Iván Duque. This, in relation to the escalation of the armed conflict in the country and the evident omission of the seriousness of the situation of defenders in all territories, focusing the Government's efforts on an issue such as the orange economy and leaving aside the duty of the State to protect life and guarantee rights.

The second chapter is a recount of the situation of human rights defenders during 2018, in a difficult context, the emergence of multiple armed actors and in territories where society has been left at the mercy of territorial disputes, due to the low capacity of the State to cover spaces left by the demobilized FARC guerrillas and to dismantle existing structures and prevent the emergence of new

groups; all this has contributed to the fact that, as it has been said, this has been the worst year in human rights matters for defenders in Colombia.

In the third chapter, an analysis of government policies is carried out, especially regarding protection. The progress made with the previous Government is mentioned, and thanks to the Peace Agreement, which has now been stopped and replaced by less effective plans such as the PAO, which are unaware of the reality of the territories and the need for structural intervention; In addition, the speech that the District Attorney's Office has offered regarding the aggressions against human rights defenders is highlighted, since it has presented small advances in the cases as large percentages of clarification; but it also highlights the work of other State entities such as the Office of the Public Defender and Ombudsman, which have shown concern about the situation of violence against defenders and have tried to generate actions to make the risks visible and build prevention strategies.

Finally, this report includes the analysis of data from the Information System on Attacks against Human Rights Defenders in Colombia -SIADDHH-, as a result of the monitoring and verification of cases that took place throughout 2018 and that provide an approach to the reality of the country in terms of life affectation and rights of defenders. An analysis of the volume of murders and other aggressions that the System managed to collect, makes it possible to highlight the difficult context in which these activists must work on a daily basis, acknowledging, in addition, that it can

be much more complex than what is herein posed.

But in the middle of this difficult panorama it is worth highlighting the resistances and hopeful proposals of the civil population and social organizations. The demonstrations that filled the streets during 2018 show that people are not static, that there are many reflections and bets to make demands to the Government and the State. Social mobilization increased considerably during this year and there was a massive response to calls in which collective rights were defended, demonstrating that although the panorama generates concerns, it remains to recognize social resistance as the moral reserve of citizens who defend the way of peace, as a way to transform the country and take it to a non-violence stage.

Lastly, we would like to extend our thanks to all the people and the organizations that surround the work we do in the SIADDHH, especially to the Popular Research and Education Center -CINEP-, to the Colombia Europe United States Coordination -CCEEU-, to the Indigenous Organization of Colombia -ONIC-, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia -OAC-NUDH-. In addition, we want to recognize the Royal Embassy of Norway in Colombia for its constant political and financial support, and the international cooperation agencies DIAKONIA Sweden, MISEREOR Germany and Terres des Hommes - Schweiz, your support is essential for our work and for the preparation of this report.

IN MEMORY OF MURDERED HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

During the second half of 2018, 82 human rights defenders were murdered in Colombia. Although those who extinguished their lives sought to silence their voices, they are more alive than ever. We remember their names and the resistances they advanced for their communities and territories.



1/07/2018

CAMILO VALDERRAMA

Coordinator of public works of JAC
(Community Action Boards), village Brussel
San Vicente del Caguan, Caquetá

Camilo was a community leader and coordinator of public works for the Community Action Board.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

02/07/2018

LEONEDIS ALEISER SIERRA ORTIZ

Dignitary of the JAC of San Agustín Bajo,
corregimiento of El Guáimaro
Tarazá, Antioquia

As a community leader he focused his leadership in managing processes of substitution of crops for illicit use, in addition to participating in civic strikes and supporting the community.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown





2/07/2018

DAVID MEJÍA PRIETO

Farmer and former president of the JAC of the Virgen del Carmen settlement in the Peneya Union Montañita, Caquetá

David had been president of the Community Action Board in midst of a context of illegal drug trafficking and mining, and he was a renowned farmer in the region.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

3/07/2018
LUIS CUARTO BARRIOS MACHADO
President of the Citizen Control Oversight Palmar de Varela, Atlántico

In his work as a community leader, Luis served as president of the Municipal Association of Community Boards and was part of the Movement Outraged against Electricaribe. He publicly denounced problems of corruption, crime and microtrafficking, which is why he received death threats that he made known to the Ombudsman's Office and the District Attorney's Office in May. On June 27, 2018, he filled out the form of the National Protection Unit requesting protection measures, but did not receive a response.



Alleged Responsible: Unknown



3/07/2018

FELICINDA SANTAMARÍA MOSQUERA
Community Action Board President, Virgen
del Carmen neighborhood, commune 2
Quibdó, Chocó

Felicinda was a recognized leader, president of the Community Action Board of the Virgen del Carmen neighborhood of Quibdó. Her leadership focused on demanding the guarantee of fundamental rights in her neighborhood, and she also opposed the presence of micro-trafficking, extortion and violence gangs in her community.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

3/07/2018

MARGARITA ESTUPIÑÁN
JAC President, El Recreo neighborhood,
Vaquería village
Tumaco, Nariño

She also served as community and social leader, and was also president of the Community Action Board of the El Recreo neighborhood and supported the Human Colombia campaign. She was threatened by criminal gangs due to her work on several occasions.



Alleged Responsible: FARC Dissidence



4/07/2018

ANCIZAR CIFUENTES VARGAS
Social leader, land claimant
Chaparral, Tolima

He belonged to the Organization of Victims of the Armed Conflict, managed the restitution of properties and had managed to get the Land Unit to return the Gualara farm, where, together with 22 families that were victims of the conflict, he was carrying out productive projects.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

5/07/2018

JOSÉ FERNANDO JARAMILLO OQUENDO
Conciliator of the Pascuita JAC
Ituango, Antioquia

José was a conciliator of the Community Action Board, opposed to forced eradication and the implementation of the National Comprehensive Program for the Replacement of Illicit Use Crops (PNIS). The community affirms that in the area, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia have carried out acts that violate people who claim and demand the guarantee of human rights in the region.



Alleged Responsible: Unknown



6/07/2018

ALEXANDER CASTELLANO TRIANA
JAC President
Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá

Alexander was a community leader, vice president of the Peasant Association for Environmental Protection and president of the Community Action Board.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

7/07/2018

CARLOS ALBERTO RUIZ RESTREPO
Environmental Leader
Cali, Valle del Cauca

As an environmental defender he focused on the protection of the Farallones de Cali National Natural Park, one of the most important and oldest protected areas nationwide. In addition, he denoun-



ced illegal mining and private companies that did not properly dispose of toxic waste.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



16/07/2018

ROBERT EMIRO JARABA ARROYO

**Peasant Leader
Caucasia, Antioquia**

Robert, dedicated 15 years of his life to the Sintramineros - Cerromatoso union. He strengthened the education of the operators managing training with the National Service of Learning (Sena) until February 2018. Later, he assumed the leadership of land restitution processes. On August 2nd 2018, Jesús Ramírez, a member of 'Los Caparrapos', was captured as responsible for the leader's murder.

Alleged Responsible: Paramilitary

16/07/2018

EDGAR ACOSTA BARAHONA

**Vice President of JAC, Llano Lindo village
Tauramena, Casanare**

Edgar was vice president of the Community Action Board of the Llano Lindo village.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



16/07/2018

LUIS EDUARDO DAGUA CONDA
Peasant leader and founder
of El Carmelo village
Caloto, Cauca

He was a peasant leader, coordinator of the elderly in the area and member of the Community Action Board of the village. In addition, he was a member of the Association of Workers Pro-Constitution Zones of the Peasant Reservations of Caloto (ASTRAZONACAL), a division of the Unitary Agricultural Trade Union Federation (FENSUAGRO CUT), and a member of the Popular Unity Process of the Colombian Southwest (PUPSOC) and the Social and Politic Coordination Cauca Patriotic March.



Alleged Responsible: Unknown

17/07/2018

IBES TRUJILLO CONTRERAS
Afro-descendant leader
Suárez, Cauca



Afro-descendant leader, member of the Popular Unity Process of the Colombian Southwest (PUPSOC), attorney of the Cuenca River Timba Marilópez Community Council, manager of the community company Brisas del Río Agua Blanca Audacia, he also participated in the constitution of the Afro National Coordination (Conapro).

Alleged Responsible: FARC Dissidence

18/07/2018**HORACIO TRIANA PARRA****President of JAC, village El Carmen
Otanche, Boyacá**

Horacio was the communal leader of the Betania compound, recognized for defending the Serranía de las Quinchas Natural Park. His work focused on the prevention of the presence of criminal gangs in the area, in addition, he was president of the Community Action Board.

**Alleged Responsible: Unknown****20/07/2018****JOSÉ OSVALDO TAQUEZ****President of JAC
Orito, Putumayo**

He was president of the Community Action Board of the El Remolino village. His leadership focused on the implementation of the National Comprehensive Program for the Replacement of Illicit Use Crops (PNIS). He also denounced the presence of armed groups in the area. He received threats against his life.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown**21/07/2018****KEVIN JULIÁN LEÓN****Hotbed of the Heroes and Heroines of Love
Corporation
Medellín, Antioquia**

Youth leader, recognized and admired for his social work. He belonged to the hotbed of the Heroes and Heroines of Love Corporation.

**Alleged Responsible: Unknown**



23/07/2018

LIBARDO MORENO

**President of JAC and administrator
of the aqueduct of the Las Pilas village,
township of Villacolombia.
Jamundí, Valle del Cauca**

He was known for his leadership in rural issues, defender of water, environment and life; administrator of the aqueduct of Villacolombia; member of the Community Action Board and promoter of the Green (political) Party.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

25/07/2018

FABIÁN ROSALES NIÑO

**President of JAC,
corregimiento San Faustino
Cúcuta, Norte de Santander**

Fabián worked as a farmer and president of the Community Action Board of La Sabana village of the San Faustino Township. In addition, he was a member of the Federation of Community Action Boards (Fedecomunal), a member of the San Faus Peace Organization and the Association of Victims of Dispossession and Land Abandonment of Norte de Santander.



Alleged Responsible: Unknown



25/07/2018

LUIS GABRIEL GÓMEZ


**Principal of the Educational Institution
Bajo Lorenzo
Puerto Asís, Putumayo**

Educational Leader, principal of an educational institution in his village, there he worked with dedication and commitment.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

30/07/2018**RAÚL BUITRAGO PERDOMO****Member of JAC, inspection La Fragua
San José del Fragua, Caquetá**

Raúl belonged to the Community Action Board and stood out as a mediator between the JAC presidents and the community, within the framework of the Territorial Development Plan PEDET.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown**1/08/2018****VALENTÍN RÚA TEZADA****Community broadcaster
Suárez, Cauca**

Leader and announcer. He had been working for 15 years on the Salvajina Estéreo radio station, and through this mean he was making known the community's issues and needs.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown**4/08/2018****ALFREDO ALONSO RUIZ HIGUITA****Peasant Leader
Tarazá, Antioquia**

Peasant leader of the National Comprehensive Program to Replace Crops of Illicit Use (PNIS). He was the Coordinator of the Work Committee of the Community Action Board in his village, charge which he resigned to due to several threats.

Alleged Responsible: Paramilitary



4/08/2018

HERNÁN DARÍO CHAVARRÍA
Member Association of Barequeros
Committees of North Antioquia
(ASOCBARE-NA)
La Unión, Antioquia

Hernán was known as a community leader and founder of the Association of Barequeros Committees of North Antioquia (ASOCBARE-NA).

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

7/08/2018
JOSÉ URIEL RODRÍGUEZ
Peasant Leader
Peasant Workers Association of Cajibío (ATCC)
Cajibío, Cauca

The peasant leader José Uriel Rodríguez was part of the Peasant Workers Association of Cajibío (ATCC), which is a division of FENSUAGRO. He also participated in the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Crops for Illicit Use (PNIS).



Alleged Responsible: Unknown



8/08/2018
JOSÉ EDGARDO BENAVIDES
Attorney of the Community Action Board, El
Cedro village
San Miguel, Putumayo

José was a social and fiscal leader of the Community Action Board of El Cedro village.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

9/08/2018**ALEJANDRO JACANAMUJOY****President of La Paz village JAC
Puerto Leguizamo, Putumayo**

He was president of the Community Action Board. His leadership focused on promoting the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Crops for Illicit Use (PNIS) and its implementation. He opposed the presence of illegal armed groups, drug trafficking and illegal mining.

**Alleged Responsible: Unknown****10/08/2018****EMILIANO TRÓCHEZ YONDA****Indigenous Leader
Santander de Quilichao, Cauca**

Emiliano was an indigenous leader. Former governor of the Guadualito Reservation and former counselor of the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca -ACIN-. Recognized for his commitment to the training of young people and children.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown**15/08/2018****JOSÉ VICENTE GARCÍA AMARILES****Representative of those Affected by Antipersonnel Mines in the Municipal
Board of Victims
Valdivia, Antioquia**

José was a victim leader, initially displaced and expropriated twice. In 2008, he became handicapped due to an antipersonnel mine. He was a member of the



Municipal Victims Bureau, his leadership focused on the right to reparation and non-repetition. He also acted as an intermediary between the community and local authorities.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



18/08/2018

LUIS ALBERTO RIVAS GÓMEZ

Member of the Afro-Colombian National Authority (Anafro) and of the Black Communities Process (PCN)
Turbo, Antioquia

In his leadership, he was a community spokesperson, member of the Afro-Colombian National Authority (Anafro) and of the Process of Black Communities in the region.

Alleged Responsible: Paramilitary

19/08/2018

HOLMES ALBERTO NISCUE

Member of the Awá indigenous reservation of Gran Rosario
Tumaco, Nariño

Leader of the Awá indigenous reservation of Gran Rosario. He sought the protection of the community against the violence that hits the territory of Gran Rosario. Apparently he had already received threats, so he had minimal security measures on the part of the National Protection Unit.



Alleged Responsible: FARC Dissidence



19/08/2018

MARCO TULIO GRAJALES LONDOÑO
Community leader
Armenia, Quindío

As a social leader, he promoted activities for the welfare of the community, and denounced crime and micro-trafficking, for which he had received threats.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

20/08/2018

HUVER HOYOS RENGIFO
Peasant and Indigenous Process of Almaguer
(PROCAMINA)
Almaguer, Cauca

Peasant leader and member of the Peasant and Indigenous Process of Almaguer (PROCAMINA).

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



21/08/2018

FABIOLA FAJARDO AYALA
Member of the Resistance to Mining Movement in El Carmen de Chucurí
Simacota, Santander

Treasurer of the Community Action Board, member of the Resistance to Mining Movement in El Carmen de Chucurí and leader in the defense of the territory against mining and fracking.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



24/08/2018

JOSÉ ENRIQUE MONSALVE
President of the JAC of the San Antonio
village, San José de Uré
Tarazá, Antioquia

José Enrique was president of the Community Action Board of San Antonio, Córdoba. Leader of the process of substitution of crops for illicit use and affiliated with the Association of Peasant Workers of Bajo Cauca (ASOCBAC).



Alleged Responsible: Paramilitary

24/8/2018

MARY FLORELIA CANA MEZA
Founder of the Chapter Nasa Nuevo
Despertar de Dagua
El Tambo, Cauca



She was recognized for her social leadership, and she was also the founder of the Chapter Nasa Nuevo Despertar de Dagua.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

27/08/2018

HÉCTOR FABIO MONTOYA ORJUELA
Community Leader
Florencia, Caquetá

Héctor Fabio was a community leader, creator of the National Humanitarian Foundation for Displaced Persons and Victims Nuevo Amanecer (New Dawn) of Cartago. He apparently lived in a farm in Caquetá because of the threats he had received.



Alleged Responsible: Unknown



29/08/2018

JAMES CELEDONIO ESCOBAR MONTENEGRO
Member of the Village Board
of Miras Palmas
Tumaco, Nariño

James was a community and social leader of the Alto Mira and Frontera communities (CCAMF), where families develop productive projects to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

Alleged Responsible: FARC Dissidence

31/08/2018

OLIVER HERRERA CAMACHO
Member of the Environmental Peasant
Association Losada Guayabero (ASCAL-G)
San Juan de Lozada, Meta

Community leader, member of the Environmental Peasant Association Losada Guayabero (ASCAL-G) and he had been president of the Community Action Board. He was recognized in the community for his social and environmental leadership qualities.



Alleged Responsible: FARC Dissidence



02/09/2018

AMPARO FABIOLA RODRÍGUEZ MUCHAVISoy
Teacher and Indigenous leader belonging
to the Camëntsa council
Villagarzón, Putumayo

Amparo was an indigenous leader, a member of the Camëntsa people and a teacher at the Alto Sardinias school, at the Ñami Tuna Educational Rural Center.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

2/09/2018

ALIRIO ANTONIO ARENAS GÓMEZ

**Member of the Municipal Council Alternative
Indigenous and Social Movement (MAIS)
Ocaña, Norte de Santander**

Political and social leader. President of the Convention Council by the MAIS party, founder of the Movement in Catatumbo, member of Movement for the Popular Constituent (MCP), president of the Board of San Isidro in the Miraflores district of the municipality of Convención and treasurer of the National Association of Peasants.



Alleged Responsible: Unknown

3/09/2018

NORBERTO ALONSO GUTIÉRREZ

**President of the La Envidia village JAC and
member of PNIS
Tarazá, Antioquia**

President of the Community Action Board and member of the National Comprehensive Program of Substitution of Illicit Use Crops (PNIS) of Tarazá.



Alleged Responsible: Paramilitary

9/09/2018

LEIDY JULIETH CORREA VALLE

**Secretary of JAC
Peque, Antioquia**

Defender of Human Rights and secretary of the Community Action Board of the Guayabal village. Her leadership focused on promoting the empowerment of young people.



Alleged Responsible: Unknown



24/09/2018

HOVER ALEXANDER ORREGO

Social leader

El Dovio, Valle del Cauca

He supported the PNIS land restitution process. He had received threats that he denounced before the National Protection Unit, without being offered any measures.

Alleged Responsible: ELN

24/09/2018

EDIXON PANCHÉ

Social leader

El Dovio, Valle del Cauca

Edixon was a social leader recognized by the community, who was working on the process of land restitution PNIS.

Alleged Responsible: ELN



25/09/2018

WILSON CHAUSTRE PARADA

President of the Casa de Zinc JAC

Pueblo Bello, Cesar

President of the Community Action Board. He had apparently been threatened for his work as a leader.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



26/09/2018

HERMINIO DOVIGAMA LEIVA
Emberá indigenous leader
Orito, Putumayo

Indigenous leader Jaibaná of the Alto Orito Reservation.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



27/09/2018

ALIPIO SALAZAR ÁVILES
President of the Vaticano village JAC
Baraya, Huila

Alipio was the president of the Community Action Board of the Vaticano Village in the municipality of Baraya, Huila.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



6/10/2018

JAIME ALIRIO BECERRA CHINDOY
ARMANDO MUTUMBAJOY MUCHAVISÓY
ELKIN FARID SIGINDOY CHINDOY
Mocoa, Putumayo

They belonged to the Minor Osococha Chapter of the Yunguillo Reservation. In previous years they were sheriffs of the Chapter governor.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown





8/10/2018

OTTO VALENZUELA

**JAC Attorney, Frontera Village
Puerto Asís, Putumayo**

Otto was a member of the ADISPA assemblies and a public attorney of the Community Action Board of the Frontera village. Promoter of the National Comprehensive Program for the Replacement of Illicit Use Crops (PNIS).

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

9/10/2018

ÓSCAR ANÍBAL ESPAÑA

**Vice President of JAC, El Recreo village
Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá**

Oscar was vice president of the Community Action Board of El Recreo village in the municipality of Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



12/10/2018

ÓSCAR ADOLFO QUENÁN TORO

**Member of the Nueva Albania village JAC
San Miguel, Putumayo**

Oscar was a communal and fiscal leader of the Community Action Board of the Nueva Albania village.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



13/10/2018
DIOSELÍ NORIEGA
JAC President of La Laguna village
Convención, Norte de Santander

Dioselí was a communal defender and president of the Community Action Board of La Laguna.

Alleged Responsible: ELN



22/10/2018
CARLOS TRUJILLO PAZ
Community leader
Rosas, Cauca

As a community leader, Carlos promoted in his municipality activities of cultural, social and sports kind, for the benefit of the entire community.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



22/10/2018
JULIÁN DE JESÚS AREIZA MORENO
Member of JAC
Briceño, Antioquia

Julian was a member of the Community Action Board and a leader in the substitution of illicit crops.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown





31/10/2018

ELADIO DE JESÚS POSSO ESPINOSA
Treasurer of the Community Action Board
of El Triunfo village
Tarazá, Antioquia

Eladio was the treasurer of the El Triunfo Community Action Board and member of the National Comprehensive Program for the Replacement of Illicit Use Crops (PNIS).

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

02/11/2018

JAVIER ANCIZAR FERNÁNDEZ MUÑOZ
Union leader and teacher
Suárez, Cauca

Javier was member of the Association of Educational Institutes and Workers of Cauca Union (Asoinca), and he also worked as a teacher at the Francisco Antonio Rada Educational Institution.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



4/11/2018

EDILBERTO CRISTANCHO NIÑO
Union leader
Villavicencio, Meta

Union leader of the labor formalization process and Union growth in the Eastern Plains by SINTRAIMAGRA, Villavicencio sectional. He was a palm worker from Manuelita Oils.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



4/11/2018

YESSICA VIVIANA CARABALI

**Member of the Community Action Board,
Santa Catalina village
Buenos Aires, Cauca**

Yessica was an afrodescendant defender, member of the Cerro Teta Community Council and member of the Community Action Board, well known for her work in defense of the rights of black communities in the area.



Alleged Responsible: Unknown

8/11/2018

CARLOS ALBERTO BARÓN

**President of the Community Action Board of
the Tunjaque village
La Calera, Cundinamarca**

Carlos was president of the Community Action Board of the Tunjaque village.



Alleged Responsible: Unknown

8/11/2018

LUIS TARAZONA SALAMANCA

**Attorney of the Miramontes JAC
Tibú, Norte de Santander**

Attorney of the Community Action Board of Miramontes. Coordinator of the Ascamcat village committee and he worked as artisanal miner.



Alleged Responsible: Unknown



11/11/2018

HÉCTOR FABIO ALMARIO

**President of the Getsemaní village JAC
La Macarena, Meta**

Community and social leader. President of the Community Action Board, he worked in the process of replace of crops for illicit use.

Alleged Responsible: FARC Dissidence

11/11/2018
ÁLVARO PAUL GÓMEZ GARZÓN
**Member of the San Alfonso village JAC
Balboa, Cauca**

Álvaro was a member of the Community Action Board, a member of the National Association of Peasant Reservation Areas (ANZORC), he belonged to the Popular Unity Process of the Colombian Southwest (PUPSOC) and the Social Coordination and Political Patriotic March of Cauca.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



17/11/2018

JOSÉ ANTONIO YULE RIVERA

**Member of El Carmelo village JAC
Corinto, Cauca**

President of the Community Action Board, member of the Association of Workers Pro-Constitution Zones of Peasant Reservations of Caloto (ASTRAZONACAL), the Popular Unity Process of the Colombian Southwest (PUPSOC) and the Social Coordination and Political Patriotic March of Cauca.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

23/11/2018
SERAFÍN DÍAZ
Indigenous Leader
Riosucio, Caldas

Serafin was a farmer, musician and indigenous leader of the San Lorenzo reservation.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



23/11/2018
CÉSAR AUGUSTO DÍAZ
Indigenous Leader
Riosucio, Caldas

César was a teacher and coordinator of the Educational Institution in the San Lorenzo Reservation.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



23/11/2018
EDILMA ROSA CUEVAS
Secretary of JAC, village of Agualasal
Cúcuta, Norte de Santander

Edilma was secretary of the Community Action Board. She had received threats due to her work.

Alleged Responsible: EPL





27/11/2018

GLADIS RIVERA CHAMPEÑO
President of JAC, village La Laguna
Toribío, Cauca

Gladis was president of the Community Action Board of the village of La Laguna.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

MAURICIO LÓPEZ CORTINA
President of the Apure JAC
Plato, Magdalena

Mauricio was president of the Apure Community Action Board.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



29/11/2018

JOSÉ ANTONIO NAVAS
Member of the El Libano village JAC
Tibú, Norte de Santander

He was a directive member of the Community Action Board, member of the village committee, the Peasant Guard, the project to replace illicit crops, ASCAM-CAT and the Patriotic March.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



2/12/2018

HÉCTOR RAMIRO GARCÍA

**Founder of one of the first Awá reservations
Ricaurte, Nariño**

Héctor was a recognized leader who helped in the founding of the UNIPA and CAMAWARI organizations, work valued by the indigenous organizations of Cauca.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



2/12/2018

BRAULIO ARTURO GARCÍA GUANGA

**Indigenous Leader
Ricaurte, Nariño**

Braulio was indigenous leader, alternate governor during 2018 and elected for 2019 for the Palmar Imbí Reservation.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



7/12/2018

EDWIN DAGUA IPIA

**Indigenous Governor of the
Huellas reservation
Caloto, Cauca**

Edwin, 28 years old, was an indigenous leader, Sa't We'sx Authority. His work focused on the defense of Mother Earth and the responsibility of motivating self-education in young people as a mean of resistance and permanence in the territory.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown





9/12/2018

GILBERTO ANTONIO ZULUAGA RAMÍREZ
Member of the Association of Peasant Workers of the Peasant Reservation Zones of Corinto (ASTRA-ZONAC)
Corinto, Cauca

Gilberto was a community leader, member of the Association of Peasant Workers of the Peasant Reservation Zones of Corinto (ASTRA-ZONAC), also belonged to the Peasant Guard and the Social Coordination and Policy of the Patriotic March.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

11/12/2018

GILBERTO ACOSTA CASTRO
Member of ADESPROPAZ
Villavicencio, Meta

Gilberto was a social leader and member of the Association of Peasant Women Providers of Peace -ADESPROPAZ-. He used to accompany land claim processes. He had been threatened several times.



Alleged Responsible: Unknown



15/12/2018

ESTEBAN ROMERO NUÑEZ
President of the village JAC of La Chorrera and alternate spokesperson of the Tumaco Community Council, Nariño

Esteban was president of the Community Action Board and alternate spokesperson of the Community Council.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown

16/12/2018
HENRY ARTURO GONZÁLEZ
Union leader
Vegachí, Antioquia

Union leader and teacher in the Rural Educational Institution Alfredo Gómez.


Alleged Responsible: Unknown



18/12/2018
JESÚS IGNACIO GÓMEZ ÁVILA
Environmental leader
San Vicente del Caguán, Caquetá

Jesús Ignacio was a Environmental leader, focused on the popular consultation on environmental exploitation of the region.

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



27/12/2018
JAVIER ENRIQUE TAPIAS TABAREZ
Member of JAC, Vereda Oco Abajo
Tarazá, Antioquia

Javier was a dignitary of the Community Action Board, member of the Peasant Association of Bajo Cauca (Asobac) and the National Comprehensive Program of Substitution of Crops for Illicit Use (PNIS).

Alleged Responsible: Unknown



31/12/2018

LUIS ÁNGEL PEÑA

**Attorney of Los Naranjos village JAC
La Macarena, Meta**

Luis Ángel was a well-known leader and attorney of the Community Action Board of Los Naranjos.

Alleged Responsible: ELN





Chapter 1

No peace, no life: Oranges!

During the past six years more than ever, the country has been torn between war and peace. The opening for the dialogues with the demobilized FARC guerrillas marked a turning point in the Colombian reality, due to the possibility of talking about peace for the first time after the end of the failed dialogues with this group during the government of Andrés Pastrana in 2002. Finally, after a decade, the word peace once again started to look like a possibility that, despite all the oppositions expressed during the four years of dialogues, seemed to have materialized at the end of 2016 with the signing of the Peace Agreement.

However, after the signing process, far from becoming a reality, peace seems to become inaccurate and elusive. Despite the great achievement that involved the disarmament and demobilization of almost 12,000 combatants¹, the handing over of territories that for decades were occupied by this armed group and a radical decrease in the violence figures, the effective implementation of the agreement has been limited by the radical opposition of some political sectors, by the crises that accompanied the

whole process, by the government's failure to comply with several of its commitments² and, fundamentally, by the low capacities and wills of the State to cover the territories and settle historical commitments with its inhabitants.

This overview, critical for peace, became more serious as the end of the government of Juan Manuel Santos approached, for there was fear that it could jeopardize the future of the implementation of the agreements arranged with the Farc and the continuity of the dialogues with the ELN that began during the first months of 2017. With peace at the middle of a campaign strategy, these fears became concrete with the appearance of the different candidacies. Quickly the position of the candidates in relation to the agreements and the peace process took shape and the threat became increasingly real.

The appearance of Iván Duque in the presidential candidacies with a high favorability reinforced this possibility, for not only did he represent the perpetuation of the traditional political class that has governed Colombia for decades, but also the risk of making

¹ El Colombiano. (November 22, 2017). The first Year of peace in figures. Retrieved from <http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/acuerdos-de-gobierno-y-farc/el-primer-ano-de-la-paz-en-cifras-GE7745778>

² By the 30th of May 2018, 18 months after the start of implementation, only 21% of the agreed measures had been completed. https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/284864/informe_2_instituto_kroc_final_with_logos.pdf

unviable any attempt to build peace. In the debates, this position became evident and his ideas became an amplifier of the position of his political godfather, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, one of the greatest opponents to the peace processes between the government of outgoing Juan Manuel Santos and the guerrillas.

His election became a reality and a few months later he took office with a conciliatory speech in which he called for the construction of a great national pact, words that were quickly anchored to the moment in which they were pronounced, since as of his first day of government, Polarization has been the protagonist, a role that it had since the electoral campaigns, which became a good thermometer to measure the fragmentation of Colombian society. The country remained divided into different pieces with a theme at the center of this polarization: Peace.

Despite the transitional context, in which there were high demands for the implementation of the agreements signed with the FARC, with substantive issues aggravating the situation such as the growth of armed groups in the country and the permanence and intensification of violence in the country against social leaders, the government defined completely different issues as priorities.

On August 7, 2018, while the new government was beginning, 97 human rights defenders had been murdered in the country³, 591 cases of

aggression against their lives were reported and there was an increase of violence in all the country's territories, with the emergence of new armed groups, the strengthening of existing ones and the disputes between these actors caused by their intention to add to their domination, the areas abandoned by the guerrillas after their demobilization. In the midst of all these movements the civilian population emerged; social organizations and international community that demanded the new president with the same voice, to look at their situation of risk, to protect them from a growing violence that every day added up the loss of lives.

Although in his inaugural address, Iván Duque mentioned a couple of times the murders of leaders and the need to protect their lives⁴, reality soon showed that the strengthening and implementation of policies to guarantee the protection of their rights were no priority. Instead, during the first weeks some proposals came out, which not only did not consider this serious situation, but affected the well-being of all Colombians, especially because of its impact on the economy, such as the proposal to tax a large part of basic consumption products.

³ Data corresponding to murders 2018. SIADDH of the Somos Defensores Program.

⁴ Presidency of the Republic. (August 7, 2018). The Pact for COLOMBIA / Inaugural Speech of the President of the República, Iván Duque Márquez. Retrieved from <https://id.presidencia.gov.co/Paginas/prensa/2018/El-Pacto-por-COLOMBIA-Discurso-de-Posesion-del-Presidente-de-la-Republica-Ivan-Duque-Marquez.aspx>

Thus, a government with bad omens began, promising the continuation of the type of policy that has historically governed the country, the resurgence of the situation of insecurity in the territories, and the absence of effective measures for the protection of the people who work in the defense of rights from the different regions. Instead, what was in the center from the first moment was the private companies and the orange economy; business above life as a reflection of the government's priorities and as a way to divert attention from fundamental issues.

With no qualms, as of his first day of the government, a reference was made to a "pact for entrepreneurship" that aims, according to President Iván Duque, "to make entrepreneurship the basis of our economic and social development"⁵. This pact can be clearly seen in the National Development Plan 2018-2022 and part of the idea that the social structure of the country has changed and that there are now fewer poor people and more are now part of the middle class⁶.

With this idea as a basis, the proposals on economic matters have focused on supporting companies to strengthen their progress and, ac-

cording to the logic of the government, to contribute to the generation of employment and the improvement of the quality of life of Colombians, starting from giving benefits to entrepreneurs and contributing to economic growth.

The success of this triad raised by the government between the State, employers and workers is doubtful, especially when it is considered as a pact for equity that, although it is wielded as the end, does not necessarily have the same results for all the actors involved. The tax benefits they want to give the companies can help them to have more available resources, but there is no assurance that they will commit to creating new jobs or improving working conditions.

Contrary to what is proposed, what can be generated with these benefits is that the State collects less taxes, which could be allocated to collective goods and services, and that deepens the social and economic gap in the country⁷, with a small part of the population that is receiving more and more incomes from the poorest part of society thus maintaining their condition and stopping them from seeing the reflection of the reduction of taxes in the improvement of their well-being.

Within these measures, one of the proposals that has had the strongest

⁵ <https://id.presidencia.gov.co/Paginas/prensa/2018/EI-Pacto-por-COLOMBIA-Discurso-de-Posesion-del-Presidente-de-la-Republica-Ivan-Duque-Marquez.aspx>

⁶ The Empty Chair. (November 19, 2018). In his plan, Duque places companies and oranges as center pieces. Retrieved from <https://lasillavacia.com/en-su-plan-duque-pone-las-empresas-y-las-naranjas-en-el-centro-68924>

⁷ Portafolio. (January 29, 2018). Less taxes for companies. More and better Jobs? Retrieved from <https://www.portafolio.co/economia/impuestos/menores-impuestos-para-las-empresas-mas-y-mejores-empleos-513703>

attention and that has been placed as one of the flags of the government's plans, is the orange economy. A great bet is made by creative companies with cultural and technological initiatives to promote their development and seek to contribute to economic growth; in this way, this type of activities will benefit from a tax framework built to favor their development and the creation of new companies that are linked to this sector.

But this strategy goes beyond incentives and credits for companies in the cultural industry and a commitment to economic growth, it is really a line that crosses the entire National Development Plan and that hides in each proposal of the government as a strategy of orange development. In this way, it does not really aim only at the productive part, but it reveals with pretensions to cross the cultural and social affairs, so much so that the government's commitment to "squeeze the orange" is reflected in many aspects such as the creation of the Vice Ministry of the Industria Naranja (Orange Industry), of the National Council of the Orange Economy, the Orange Law, the Pact for the Culture and the Orange Economy, the orange youth, among other matters that show a marked interest of the government for linking the different strategies to this bet for "the orange".

The cultural and the economic are issues that necessarily must make progress, however, it is not comprehensible that so many efforts are concentrated in a strategy of this style in the midst of a context of a human rights crisis, when different sectors are making constant demands to make the need to protect life the cen-

ter of public opinion and government policies, in the face of the difficult humanitarian situation that exists in different regions, and when there is an urgent need to create strategies to improve the conditions in rural areas.

In the face of a post-agreement scenario, the emphasis should be on protecting peace, putting efforts in the guarantees for the fulfillment of the agreements that were reached with the demobilized FARC guerrilla and to stop the consequences that have resulted from the reconfiguration of the armed conflict. But, contrary to the need to protect life, the current government has decided to give priority to the orange economy and put it in public opinion as a cover, thus hiding behind it these issues, which should be a priority.

While Iván Duque decides to look elsewhere, in the different regions of the country dozens of human rights defenders pay with their lives for his indifference. New armed groups have been created, drug trafficking has been strengthened, the conflict has escalated due to the dispute between the different armed actors for winning over and consolidating territories and the civil population remains in the midst of everything, and among them, the leaders who, despite the complex security situation and the lack of guarantees on the part of the State to exercise their leadership, continue to work for the collective rights of their communities.

Since the beginning of the peace process between the Colombian State and the Farc, the alarms were already on about the situation of violence experienced by the human rights

defenders and about the imminence of the increase of the aggressions against them, as the process and the agreements would be finalized. Unfortunately, these fears turned out to be true, as shown by the figures recorded by our Information System on Attacks against Human Rights Defenders (SIADDHH), which listed the following cases of violent actions against leaders: 2013, 366; 2014, 626; 2015, 682; 2016, 481; 2017, 560.

With the departure of the FARC as an actor in the armed conflict, there is a reconfiguration of war in the territories, with disputes about taking over strategic regions, taking advantage of the departure of this guerrilla group from the stage of war. Hence the deterioration of security conditions throughout the country, especially in rural areas, which are closely related to the aggressions against people with leadership in the regions, since in the strategy of the armed groups to control the territories rises the need to exercise control over the population⁸ and especially over the people who have recognition in their communities.

With this reality and because of the behavior of the figures in previous years, it was feared that during 2018 violence against social leaders would continue to increase, especially because of the scene that rose after the

presidential and legislative elections, which posed a deepening in the polarization of the country and a reordering of political and armed powers in the regions. However, the levels of violence against human rights defenders were unexpected. Never before had the SIADDHH registered aggression figures as high as those that occurred during 2018, with 805 cases of violence among which 155 murders are listed, which means an increase in attacks of 43.75% in relation to 2017.

Undoubtedly, this has been the worst year in terms of human rights for the social leaders of our country, the level of violence against them has no precedents and, in addition to the peace agreements, this can be related to the deepening of extractivism in the territories, but also with the electoral dynamics. It is possible to show that the months in which they suffered the highest number of attacks correspond to May when the first round was made, and June, the month in which the second round took place; In addition, July also highlights, after the results of the presidential elections were known, and August, just when Ivan Duque took office as president.

To say also that, despite the evidence of systematic violence against human rights defenders, both the government of Juan Manuel Santos⁹, and

⁸ Semana Magazine. (March 10, 2018). Incomplete Peace: The return of Violence to the areas that the Farc abandoned. Retrieved from <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/la-paz-incompleta-el-regreso-de-la-violencia-a-las-zonas-que-dejaron-las-farc/585700>

⁹ W Radio. (July 9, 2018). No systematicity in the deaths of social leaders: Juan Carlos Restrepo. Retrieved from <http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/no-hay-sistematicidad-en-las-muertes-de-lideres-sociales-juan-carlos-restrepo/20180709/nota/3771597.aspx>

the new one of Iván Duque¹⁰, deny this situation, protected by the statements of the Attorney General¹¹, and despite of the calls of attention of the civil society and of international organisms like the Organization of the United Nations (UN) to establish urgent measures before the systematicity of the murders¹².

Added to this, as the different non-governmental organizations of the country have warned, the concern for the militarist orientation of the new government's strategy¹³ included in the Plan of Timely Action, PAO - analyzed below - that centralizes the solution in the Military Forces and in its strengthening in the territories, particularly in the Strategic Zones of Com-

prehensive Intervention (ZEII), spaces where they will act in an important way. In addition to this controversial approach, it is also warned about how the PAO starts to ignore in its proposals, that violence against human rights defenders is a structural issue of the State and a result of the complexity of the armed conflict, leaving aside the responsibility of state agents and focusing only on particular actors. In addition to this, it also ignores the strategies planned during the government of Juan Manuel Santos, particularly the contributions from the Peace Agreement, as discussed below, and within them, the approach of the participation of civil society in the design of the policies¹⁴.

Just as a prelude, to say that the PAO comes up as a reduced and simplistic version of the National Commission of Security Guarantees, created in the previous government after the signing of the Peace Agreement with the Farc (Decree law 154 of 2017) and which objective is to formulate and evaluate the Plan of Permanent Action Against Criminal Organizations (PAPCOC), in order to design strategies to combat criminal organizations that put peace at risk and to protect social and political leaders¹⁵.

¹⁰ El Espectador. (September 19, 2018). Governments of Santos and Duque agree that the murder of social leaders is not systematic. Recovered from <https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/gobiernos-de-santos-y-duque-coinciden-asesinato-de-lideres-sociales-no-es-sistemico-articulo-813250>

¹¹ El Universal. (December 8, 2016). The District Attorney says there is no systematicity in the murders of Human Rights Defenders. Recovered from <https://www.eluniversal.com.co/colombia/bogota/fiscal-dice-que-no-hay-sistematicidad-en-asesinatos-de-defensores-de-ddhh-241980-NWEU350638>

¹² El País. (October 10, 2018). UN calls for measures against murders in Colombia and more help for former guerrilla members <https://www.elpais.com.co/colombia/onu-pide-medidas-ante-asesinatos-en-colombia-y-mas-ayuda-para-exguerrilleros.html>

¹³ Semana Rural. (February 7, 2019). PAO to protect social leaders: Reissuance of democratic security? Recovered from <https://semanarural.com/web/articulo/pao-para-protger-a-lideres-sociales-y-seguridad-democratica/815>

¹⁴ Verdad Abierta. (November 22, 2018). Who will the Timely Action Plan for human rights defenders protect? Recovered from <https://verdadabierta.com/quien-protegera-plan-accion-oportuna-defensores-derechos-humanos/>

¹⁵ Presidency of the Republic of Colombia. (February 26, 2017). National Commission of Security Guarantees. Recovered from <http://www.garantiasdeseguridad.gov.co/cngs/Paginas/cngs.aspx>

Now, not only does PAO ignore the work that was being carried out - as it will become evident later - and the importance of guaranteeing peace in the territories to eradicate violence against defenders, but it also excludes civil society as a fundamental element in the construction of policies of this type. Instead, it prefers to generate strategies that, with the excuse of security, create the conditions for the militarization of the different regions in which the social leaders suffer aggression, under the old and useless formula of fighting war with more war, a measure with which it continues to prioritize physical protection and ignores the importance of creating guarantees.

So, while the new government began its mandate looking towards another side of the region, human rights de-

fenders continue to pay with their assassinations, threats and other types of aggressions, the inability or unwillingness of the State to reach the territories and make its integral presence, with effective measures to contribute to the construction of peace and protect the lives of the population. Only a few months have passed since the beginning of the new government, but from now on a difficult environment is emerging for social leadership throughout the country, and particularly in the territories where it was promised to advance in the post-armed conflict. Denying the existence of the armed conflict and its victims, equals sending a hopeless message to its inhabitants, which can aggravate the security situation and that takes us farther away from the possibility of building peace.



Chapter 2

Subtracting lives...adding figures

Human rights defenders in Colombia continue to wage a double struggle, on the one hand, the work to defend the interests of their communities and, on the other, a constant and solitary struggle to evade the threats that come to them all the time and preserve their lives. They live this every day, from different regions of the country and in the middle of an almost total solitude, due to the incipient presence of the State in many territories and the absence of guarantees for the exercise of leadership in the face of multiple threats.

Proof of this is the sad overview that 2018 left us, year in which we have recorded unprecedented figures. 805 people received some type of aggression and, among them, one of the most worrying data are the murders, with a total of 155 registered cases, the highest figures of violation of the leaders rights that have been registered in the Information System on Assaults against Human Rights Defenders -SIADDHH- of the Somos Defensores Program. This, without counting the information that we do not manage to register, since we start from the recognition of the existence of an underreporting due to the high amount of aggressions and, in many cases, the absence of complaints.

This situation is closely related to the reality of the country. From the official beginning of the dialogues between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC guerrilla, the secu-

rity situation in the territories and the dynamics of the armed conflict began to change, and these changes became deeper as progress was made in the process. From many sectors it was assumed that the possible demobilization of the guerrillas would be a challenge for the State, as it required him to arrive with all its institutions to places historically occupied by this armed group and with a low state presence, to provide welfare and stop possible actions of other actors in the conflict. However, a positive view prevailed with the decrease in homicides throughout the country during the peace process, and with the announcement of reaching the lowest homicide rate in 30 years¹⁶. The peace effect showed its best face, but meanwhile other rhythms were felt in the territories.

The State was not able to take advantage of the historic opportunity that was offered with the demobilization of the FARC, and myopia to make decisions and look beyond the center of the country again plunged the population into a crisis, especially in the rural areas, where quickly different groups appeared to impose their power or dispute it to other armed ac-

¹⁶ El Colombiano. (December 26, 2017). Homicide rate in Colombia during 2017 was the lowest in 30 years. Retrieved from <https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/tasa-de-homicidios-en-colombia-bajo-en-2017-GX7918080>

tors. The actions by the government were not enough and the implementation of the peace agreements was slow and ineffective. Although there were commitments to defuse the violence and bet on the construction of peace, the interests of the other actors in the armed conflict were stronger and faster and strengthened their strategies to dispute the two essential elements in the war: territory and population.

Undoubtedly, the Peace Agreement was a turning point in Colombia, it could have led to different results, but in its place, the bad decisions generated the conditions to fuel the war and allow its escalation. A key aspect in the relationship between agreements and the escalation of the armed conflict is the issue of land, point 1 of the Agreement called Integral Rural Reform. In Colombia, violence has been closely linked to the land issue¹⁷, especially in rural areas, which is why it was considered a fundamental issue to resolve in the peace building process. Despite its importance, it has been one of the most complex aspects; according to information from the Kroc Institute, by May of 2018, the implementation of this topic had one of the lowest levels of the entire Agreement, since only 2% had been completed and 50% of the measures had not yet begun¹⁸.

The development of this point would be a great step forward to solve issues that have been pending for decades, since it would imply that, among other things, social development and improvement of rural infrastructure will be generated, to reduce poverty and improve levels of well-being, matters that, added to the dismantling of criminal structures in the territories (as it is proposed by the National Commission of Security Guarantees), could break the cycle of violence that continues to try and silence human rights defenders and taking their lives.

In fact, the figures of the SIADDHH show the relationship between this situation and violence against social leaders, because the defense of land and territory appears as one of the causes that is most attempted to be silenced by different actors, which is reflected in the records of aggressions against indigenous people, peasants, Afro-Colombians and community leaders in rural areas. It has also become complex to exercise leadership around the substitution of illicit crops, in 2018 peasant and communal leaders related to this issue were murdered. Precisely this issue is part of point 4 of the Agreement, which created the National Comprehensive Program for the Replacement of Crops of Illicit Use (PNIS), which has had many difficulties to function due to the slowness of its implemen-

¹⁷ Revista Semana. (November 25, 2010). "Access to land has been the axis of the armed conflict." Recovered from <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-acceso-tierra-ha-sido-eje-del-conflicto-armado/125048-3>

¹⁸ Kroc Institute for Peace Internacional studies. (2018). Second report on the

effective status of implementation of the Peace Agreement in Colombia, December 2016 - May 2018. Retrieved from https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/284864/informe_2_instituto_kroc_final_with_logos.pdf

tation and the safety conditions in the territories¹⁹, situation that has exposed leaders to armed actors from the different places where PNIS is developed; these have seen the opportunity to increase crops such as coca and to take advantage of the payments received by the peasants, granted by the government, through extortion.

It is undeniable that the manner in which the implementation of the agreements has taken place has generated serious effects in the territories, the tardiness of its execution and the State's inability to deploy all its faculties over regions where it has historically had a weak presence, left populations exposed and lonely, facing on their own account the interests of the actors who saw the power gaps as an opportunity to dispute over some regions and develop their strategies on them.

In these disputes, human rights defenders acquire a major role, due to the recognition and legitimacy in their communities and the importance of their voice to denounce violations and claim collective rights. For that reason they become targets of the armed actors who try to silence the struggles of the populations through the silencing of their leaders; this is compounded by the interest of unarmed actors, who by relation or omission contrib-

ute to generate the conditions for this to happen.

Hence, the reconfiguration of the armed groups and the escalation of the conflict during 2018 have left such serious consequences to the rights of the social leaders, affectations that have reached almost the entire national territory because, according to the figures of the SIAD-DHH, aggression was recorded in 28 of the 32 departments of Colombia, that is, human rights defenders are at high risk to perform their work in more than 87% of the country.

The zones where the aggressions occur converge in the fact that they show a high complexity and in several characteristics: They have illicit crops or constitute drug trafficking routes, there are paramilitary groups, they are militarized zones, there are strong social processes, there are extractive activities such as mining, they are areas close to the former Transitional Zones of Normalization -ZVTN- or the Territorial Training and Reintegration Spaces -ETCR- (created to concentrate the members of the Farc during the process of abandonment of weapons and reincorporation to the society), and they are prioritized regions for the implementation of Development Programs with Territorial Approach -PDET-²⁰ (which was considered in point 1 of the Peace Agreement on Comprehensive Rural Reform).

¹⁹ Semana Sostenible. (November 12, 2018). The entanglements of the National Program of Substitution of Illicit Crops. Recovered from <https://sostenibilidad.semana.com/impacto/articulo/los-enredos-del-programa-nacional-de-sustitucion-de-cultivos-ilicitos/42349>

²⁰ Ascamcat, CINEP/PPP, Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), Confederation of Communal Action, Colombia United States Coordination, Institute of Political Studies and International Relations

These great complexities of the territories where violations against the lives of human rights defenders take place, are closely related to issues already mentioned, such as the problems linked to the land, the slow and poor implementation of peace agreements and the proliferation of armed groups that have adapted to the new contexts of war to compete for territories and power. These situations are what have led to the continued aggression and loss of lives of leaders in departments that have always been marked by violence, the most worrisome of them being Cauca, followed in numbers by Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, Bogotá, Cesar, Norte de Santander and Nariño. The increase in violence in these and other departments is alarming, as is the occurrence of aggressions in areas that during 2017 disappeared from the map of violence against human rights defenders.

What the 2018 figures show is that social organizations, communities and leaders are now exposed to transformations in the strategies and disposition of armed groups, which focus on territorial interests²¹ tied to the control of certain strategic points and the adherence of other areas that may be useful for the same purposes. The disarming of the FARC guerrillas

greatly influenced the change of this scenario and marked the reconfiguration of an internal armed conflict, which has always been in movement, but which is now at a complex stage due to the political conditions of the country and the withdrawal of many areas from one of the armed actors with greater capacity and control within the irregular armed groups that existed at the time of their demobilization.

The abandonment of the FARC weaponry represented a great movement in the territories, as they withdrew with all their equipment, which was not only armed, from 242 municipalities²² throughout the country, places that the state institutions did not reach but that did start to be occupied by other structures such as the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, Los Puntilleros, La Cordillera, La Construy, Los Pachencas, Los Caparapos, Los Pachely, Los Rastrojos, Libertadores del Nordeste Presente, Los Caqueteños Southeast Block, Clan Isaza, Los Botallones and the Paracas of Magdalena Medio, Los Costeños, United Forces of the Pacific, the Oliver Sinesterra Front, Peasant Revolutionary Movement, Los de Pija, Los de Juvenal, Western Joint Command New Sixth Front, Special Antiparamilitarism Front 36, National Guerrilla Resistance People, Rearmados Front 48, Rearmados Front 33, the United Guer-

(IEPRI), Ríos vivos Movement, Somos Defensores, National University of Colombia. (2019).

What are the patterns? Assassinations of social leaders in the post-agreement. Bogotá, Colombia.

²¹ Indepaz. (2018). Focused armed conflicts. Report on illegal armed groups Colombia 2017-2018. Bogotá, Colombia.

²² Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (Peace and Reconciliation Foundation). How is peace going? P 6 https://fundacionpazyreconci-my.sharepoint.com/personal/andres_narvaez_pares_com_co/Documents/INFORME.pdf

rillas of the Pacific²³, EPL or Pelusos and ELN. It is likely for the list to be much longer, taking into account the dizzying way in which the reconfiguration and movement of the groups in the territories is taking place.

It is unpredictable what can happen in the future in the different regions with the presence of these groups. We already know of alliances, disputes, creation of new groups and various strategies that are emerging in this transition scenario. When considering this scenario, there is fear that during this year the violence will be much more complex than in 2018, especially considering the position of the current government before the escalation of the war and even its position of not acknowledging the existence of an armed conflict. On the part of the government of Iván Duque there is a failure to develop what was agreed in the Peace Agreement with the FARC, and there is little will to generate policies (or continue the existing ones) to intervene in the affected territories in an integral manner, not with military plans that it is what has been sold as the only way out to generate security in the territories and protect the lives of human rights defenders.

It is inadmissible that with the knowledge of the difficult situation that the leaders are living in the whole country, the current government continues to ignore the urgent need to act and to protect the life of the communities and their defenders, fulfilling with it a duty of the State; also pointing out that only

a couple of armed groups are responsible, a strategy that serves the interests of the government and that blurs the complexity of what really happens in the territories. It is not possible that people who lead struggles in their communities and defend the rights of many have to live in fear of losing their lives, clinging only to a bulletproof vest, an escort or a car that are the only “protection” that the state offers them. Social leaders in Colombia need real guarantees to carry out their work, they are the voices of their communities and we cannot continue to attend a strategy of silencing, which has taken the lives of hundreds of women and men. President Ivan Duque has argued that he cannot guarantee the lives of all the social leaders of the country because they are too many, but, in reality, what he should do is ask himself why there are so many.

Resistance against despair

With no room for doubt, the year that has just ended was very difficult, both for social organizations and human rights defenders as for the entire population of the country in general. Violence took 12,458 people²⁴, from society, according to figures from the Attorney General’s Office, and among this exorbitant number more than 155 were social leaders. Behind each number there is a life, a thought, a resistance, a voice that vanished and

²³ <http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ConflictosArmadosFocalizados-Indepaz-4.pdf>

²⁴ El Tiempo. (January 13, 2019). After 5 years remaining low, homicides raised in 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/delitos/indice-de-homicidios-crece-en-colombia-en-el-2018-313930>

that has not only left a deep damage in the families that they are no longer part of or their communities, it also hurts the country, our future and democracy.

Hence that, as a society we have left 2018 with the aftermath of a violence that is escalating again, but at the same time, paradoxically and fortunately, we have reached a new year resisting to give up hope. This is demonstrated by the large number of social mobilizations that occurred throughout the year, motivated by different issues. In spite of the difficult situations that came to surface, the society decided to raise its voice, manifest itself, take on the streets and show its nonconformity, so much so that there was an increase in social mobilization²⁵.

From the beginning of the year, with the way in which the electoral environment was shaped, a polarization in society quickly became evident. This marked to a large extent the way in which the speeches, demands and manifestations of the different sectors were expressed. Precisely, one way in which this was articulated was in the different expressions of support or opposition to the candidates for the presidency of the country, especially by the voices that asked for a change, so that the same political class to which we have been subject-

ed for decades would not continue to rule.

With this background, and the improvement in the security conditions in the territories after the FARC demobilization some issues were generated, such as one of the highest electoral participation that has been seen in the last decades for the first round (53,36%) and very close results in the second round that gave the presidency to Ivan Duque²⁶. Despite the polarization and the fact that the abstentionism was a protagonist in the second round, the fact that there was no significant difference between the results of both candidates is a gain for democracy, because it allows to show the participation of more sectors of different political inclinations in the electoral contest.

The anti-corruption consultation conducted in August was also another important moment for citizen participation. Millions of people declared with their votes the need for change, supporting this popular initiative that sought to toughen sanctions against the corrupt. Although the consultation did not happen because it did not exceed the electoral threshold²⁷, it was transcendent that it was a few

²⁵ Semana Magazine. (November 24, 2018). Why has the social mobilization increased in this government? Recovered from <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/la-movilizacion-social-ha-aumentado-en-lo-que-va-del-gobierno-actual/592050>

²⁶ National Registry of Civil Status. Results 2018 elections president and vice president. (June 17, 2018). Recovered from https://elecciones1.registraduria.gov.co/pre_pres_2018/resultados/2html/resultados.html

²⁷ El País. (August 27, 2018). The anti-corruption consultation in Colombia does not exceed (it is close, though) the threshold to be approved. Recovered from https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/08/26/colombia/1535315276_191058.html

votes away from being approved, in addition, that almost twelve million people have decided to go to the polls shows an interest of a large part of the population that demands a transformation in the ways in which the country has been administered. Although this opportunity to convert the mandates of the consultation into law and to advance in the fight against corruption was wasted, it was very important that the issue was under discussion and that there was a will to bet on the change.

Parallel to this initiative, another discussion was taking place in the country and mobilization became a requirement. This time it was higher education students who joined the budget deficit of public universities, to demand from the incoming government greater resources to improve infrastructure and guarantee the functioning of these institutions²⁸. Since 1992 the financing of public education was tied to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which stagnated its budget, but contrary to that, the 32 public universities did grow, which gradually lead these institutions to a crisis that manifested itself in multiple cuts and that threatened to jeopardize their existence.

This was understood by students from public universities, private universities, teachers, unions, social organizations and society in general,

who for more than two months demonstrated and took over the streets. With all this effort in December was achieved that the government added 4.5 billion pesos to the budget for this four-year period²⁹, an issue that, while it does not solve the problems of public universities, it does represent a significant achievement for the country and for the student movement that showed signs of unity and solidity, not seen in Colombia for many years.

In the midst of all the demonstrations that took place in 2018, another important moment was when, faced with the wave of murders of human rights defenders in the country, the society decided to express its rejection towards the increase in violence through a *velatón* (a vigil night) that was organized on July 6, led by social organizations and joined by thousands of people with demonstrations in cities around the world and throughout the country³⁰. The assistance to all the seedlings was massive, squares were filled with the voices of people who asked for the end of the violence against the social leaders. The message reached millions and it was possible to make visible the serious situa-

²⁸ El Tiempo. (October 9, 2018). The worries that lead to the universities strike this Wednesday. Recovered from <https://www.eltiempo.com/vida/educacion/razones-del-paro-de-estudiantes-y-profesores-de-universidades-publicas-278998>

²⁹ Semana Magazine. (December 14, 2018). After 64 days of national strike: There is an agreement between the students and the National Government. Recovered from <https://www.semana.com/educacion/articulo/estudiantes-y-gobierno-firman-acuerdo-por-la-educacion-superior-publica/594751>

³⁰ El Tiempo. (July 6, 2018). In more than 50 cities, the 'velatón' was lived for the murder of leaders. Recovered from <https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/velaton-por-muerte-de-lideres-sociales-se-vivio-en-mas-de-50-ciudades-240452>

tion that the defenders live, who, daily, from their territories, are the voices of their communities and defend collective rights. Through this it has been achieved that more and more sectors join the same call, so that the government supplies guarantees and their leaderships can be exercised with no fear of losing their lives.

Although there is a general feeling about a setback in matter of rights with the arrival of the new government, a large part of the society has refused to being limited to just be

spectators of their omissions or harmful decisions, on the contrary, social organizations and society in general have been strengthened by the need to be heard to avoid the advancement of harmful policies or to demand the protection of their lives, territories and rights. With a complex panorama for 2019, due to the resurgence of violence and the positions of a government that affect a large part of the population, including social leaders, it remains to cling on social resistance as an alternative to transform the country.



Chapter 3

Orange Protection

The subjects that most evidenced the change of government on August 7, 2018, were human rights and peace, as mentioned above. Given that these were matters of interest and prominence on the outgoing Government's agenda, the announcements of the new Government were highly expected, especially those regarding peace. The change was evident from the very inauguration speech, where it became clear that the peace agenda was not only unimportant, but inconvenient for the country. This 180 degree turn immediately generated an adverse panorama for the protection and guarantees in the continuity of the peace pact with the FARC, but also for the social leaderships that have been seriously affected in the framework of the post-agreement.

A first indicator of this change was the exclusion from governmental narrative of words such as peace, armed conflict, victims, guarantees, reparation, human rights, social protest. In relation to the critical situation due to the increase in assassinations of the social leadership, the Government avoided pronouncing on the matter until the international community, the media and social pressure led them to accept an audience with the Board for Life in Apartadó, already mentioned, led by the Attorney General, Fernando Carrillo, on August 23,

where he signed a Pact for Life. Therein, he committed to advance in the construction of a public policy for the protection of social leaders. By then, the human rights platforms had been insisting on resuming the dialogue with the National Government to give continuity to the agendas progressed on with the previous mandate, which main objective is the construction of the public policy of guarantees for the free exercise of the defense of human rights and overcoming crime against social leadership. That search was not achieved during the first months of the government, despite timid approaches, which did not go past beyond formal greetings.

In November, the Government formally presented its Plan of Early Action -PAO- for prevention and protection for human rights defenders, social and community leaders and journalists. A few days before, by facilitation of the international community, the Minister of Interior presented the draft to the human rights platforms for their knowledge and recommendations. They studied it and developed a document with suggestions and concerns. The Ministry did not consider them, as if no suggestions were made. One more indicator of the lack of participatory approach of the new Government, a point that we return to later.

The orange stain on the Peace Agreements

Within the peace talks between the National Government and the FARC, one of the greatest concerns was undoubtedly the guarantee of the right to life and physical integrity. But not only of future former combatants, but also of social leaders given the degree of criminalization they suffer. Consequently, legal instruments and political instances with “teeth” were designed to face the protection situation and security guarantees in the different contexts. Within the main figures are:

Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of the Policy, SISEP (Decree Law 895 of 2017); the *National Commission of Security Guarantees, CNGS* (Decree Law 154 of 2017); the *Special Investigation Unit* (Decree Law 898 of 2017); the *Elite Corps of the National Police for Peace* (June 2017) and the *Comprehensive Security and Protection Program for Communities and Organizations in the Territories*, (Decree 660 of 2018). To this is added the Protocol for the coordination of actions of respect and guarantee for peaceful protest, known as “Social Protest Protocol”, which was reached between social platforms and human rights with the Ministry of the Interior (Resolution 1190 of 2018).

Although all of these instruments do not structurally solve the problem of endemic violence against social leaders, nor will they avoid 100% of the attacks against former members of the FARC, their systemic implementation would help to prevent many of them, especially the politic processes emerged from the peace agree-

ments, vulnerable rural communities located right in the middle of zones of implementation of the agreements and abandonment of weapons, and social leaders committed to the process. But in addition to that, the route for the synergic and coordinated action of the Government and State was designed, in order to attack the root of organized crime and move towards the culture of prevention and guarantees of human security, integrated in all these instruments.

However, the Government of Iván Duque ignored these instruments from the beginning, and although it convened the CNGS, forced by the pressure of society and international community, in practice he denatured and stripped of its original mandate and objective, which is to create a public policy for the clearance of organized crime and to follow it up. Currently the CNGS is a minor commission, subordinated to the PAO, a consultative body, without clear functions, convened in accordance with media and short-term needs. For now, the PAO is not more than that, a plan, which does not yet have the binding nature that the CNGS does, in addition to an important political status. Today, in any case, the CNGS is merely a chimera, far from the essence for which it was built: Dismantling the criminality that attacks human rights defenders.

The Integral System for the Exercise of the Policy is not even mentioned in the recitals of Decree 2137 that creates the Timely Plan of Action, although it has similar functions and a greater scope than this Plan, such as inter-institutional coordination in matters of protection and guarantees.

The SISEP has not been convened yet and, surely, it will never be.

The Special Investigations Unit was created for the *dismantling of criminal organizations and conducts responsible for homicides and massacres that attempt against human rights defenders, social movements or political movements, or that attack or threaten people who participate in the implementation of the agreements and the construction of peace*. However, the original essence of this Unit, embodied in Resolution 2903 of 2016 of the Attorney's Office, changed when the Attorney General interfered and managed to have President Juan Manuel Santos modify these scopes and mandates and give them to his office. In principle, the Unit would depend on the Vice Prosecutor's Office, it would be independent and count on autonomous work and research teams; they would establish their methodologies and lines of investigation and, most importantly, it would not depend on the Attorney General, as it was finally from the second Decree of 2017 "... the Special Investigation Unit is created within the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation ...".

The Unit has a gray performance, it is in charge of investigating the cases of assassinations of human rights defenders since 2015 and backwards, that is, those that are not prioritized, and even though its director Martha Yaneth Mancera warns that they do work in context and with diligence, the results will surely be given little by little, but without contextual results that allow the identification of the criminal organizations responsible for the murders and much less their ma-

terial authors. That is to say, the objective for which it was created, which is the dismantling of the organizations and criminal conducts responsible for the homicides and massacres, is far from being fulfilled.

Today, little action is known from the Elite Body of the Police for Peace, created to support the agreements and consisting of 1,088 men selected among the best of the institution, to articulate with other entities such as the UNP in the framework of protection for human rights defenders and the Attorney General's Office, with at least 120 experts in criminal investigation and 40 analysts, in the search to dismantle the criminal groups that affect these activists³¹.

Regarding the Comprehensive Program of Security and Protection for Communities and Organizations in the Territories, created by the Ministry of Interior through Decree 660 of April 2018, it seems to not exist, although it contains the route for integral and collective protection, and its content was consulted with sectors of society.

Together, these political, legal and administrative dispositions seek to transform the approach of human rights, security and protection that the Colombian State has been defending so far. However, this effort, which is the result of many years of work by the hu-

³¹ Colombia National Police. (June 16, 2017). The Elite Corps for Peace is launched, with 1088 police officers. Recovered from <https://www.policia.gov.co/noticia/1088-policias-se-pone-marcha-cuerpo-elite-paz>

man rights movement, today vanishes in the face of the setback suffered by these approaches since the Government of Iván Duque started.

Timely Plan of Action (*Plan de Acción Oportuna*) – PAO

By the end of August 2018, President Iván Duque signed the *Pact for Life and Protection of Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders*³², in which several commitments were assumed by the Executive, such as designing a public policy for prevention and protection, speeding up the program of collective security and protection measures and also for female leaders, restructuring the National Protection Unit and finally, to guarantee the operation of the National Commission of Security Guarantees; in addition, reference is made to continue working on the issue from institutions such as the Prosecutor General's Office, the Ombudsman and the Attorney General of the Nation.

This agreement was finalized in November last year with the issuance of Decree 2137, by means of which the *Commission of the Plan of Action for human rights defenders, social leaders, community leaders and journalists*

-PAO- was created, which, according to the Government, seeks to generate the conditions to protect life and prevent aggression³³. Although at first sight this strategy would show the Government's willingness to confront the situation of selective violence, the reality is that the plan is insufficient, because it does not consider the dismantling of armed groups in the territories, the structural fight against organized crime and the improvement of the well-being of the communities, which are situations that feed the cycle of violence; on the contrary, the PAO uses old formulas from a coercive approach

One of the greatest fears regarding the arrival of a government opposed to the peace process, was precisely the risk of losing the effort of several years of agreement with the oldest and largest guerrilla in the country, to finally close the armed conflict. Within those risks, were all the issues referred to above. However, the Government of Iván Duque, from the beginning disregarded what was achieved. In the face of the national and international pressure, they launched what they consider should be the route of protection to social leaders with the Timely Plan of Action - PAO.

This document, which in the first instance was presented as a plan that

³² Ministry of Interior. (August 23, 2018). Pact for Life and Protection of Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders. Recovered from <https://www.mininterior.gov.co/sala-de-prensa/noticias/pacto-por-la-vida-y-la-proteccion-de-los-lideres-sociales-y-las-personas-defensoras-de-derechos-humanos>

³³ Government of Colombia (2018). Timely action plan for prevention and protection for human rights defenders, social and community leaders and journalists. Recovered from https://www.mininterior.gov.co/sites/default/files/plan_de_accion_oportuna_de_prevenccion_y_proteccion_0.pdf

seeks to create public policy for the protection of human rights defenders, has three components: “1) **Articulation and institutional reengineering.** Through this axis, it is intended to respond to the existence of multiple spaces and norms, without an adequate articulation and / or tool to effectively deal with the problem. 2) **Strategic action in the territory.** Through this axis, the focalized nature of the problem is addressed in certain municipalities of the country with particular criminal environments and affected by the lack of adequate institutional response to their needs. 3) **Communications and training strategy;** this axis responds to the need for a campaign to counteract the stigmatization of the status of leader and the action of the State in the guarantees it provides for the exercise of defense of rights, as well as to make known the existing offer of protection and self-protection programs”. And it is assumed that from these three components will come out the design of public policy³⁴.

Seen from a general level, this plan is plausible and generates calm, since it indicates that the National Government is in fact tuned to the problem and poses effective tools to attack the problem. However, by analyzing each component in detail and associating it with the exercise of governance and

speeches of senior officials responsible for the policy of protection and human rights, we have many concerns and the feeling to be 10 years back in these matters.

- **Military security focus and ZEII**

Unlike the human security approach contemplated in the normative provisions already discussed, the PAO replaced this concept with the one of defense (military) and protection to social leaders, journalists and trade unionists. That is to say, we return to the character of physical, military or police protection, leaving aside the possibility of building guarantees for the free exercise of the defense of human rights. Without a doubt, it is a regrettable reversal.

Thus, the tradition of the management of human rights is broken from a civil and political vision, which although it remains in the hands of the Ministry of Interior, its approach is military. Thus, since the PAO began to be developed, it is common to see military and former military personnel at the head of meetings, calls and advising teams for the Plan in the territories. This situation is rejected by the human rights movement, considering that the policy should have a humanistic approach and led by political and civil authorities, as it has been done since the creation of the human rights directorate of the Ministry of Interior. In January, the human rights platforms denounced the seriousness of having former Colonel Leonardo Barrero as head of the PAO, as the Minister of Interior had presented him, which is why they had to separate him from the Plan and introduce him as an advi-

³⁴ Government of Colombia (2018). Timely action plan for prevention and protection for human rights defenders, social and community leaders and journalists. P. 25. Recovered from https://www.mininterior.gov.co/sites/default/files/plan_de_accion_oportuna_de_preencion_y_proteccion_0.pdf

sor and liaison with the Military Forces. Even without being a director, the question that the Minister of Interior has not been able to answer is why a connection with the Military Forces, if both instances are governmental and work harmoniously.

That military look is also evident in the advisory role and the issuance of recommendations to the National Security Council for the creation of the Strategic Zones of Comprehensive Intervention -ZEII-, and the articulation of the design of the comprehensive policy guidelines for institutional response for the intervention in such areas. It is worth remembering that the ZEII were created by the Government of Iván Duque at the end of 2018, within the framework of the extension of Law 418 of 1997, known as public order. It is a figure similar to those created in the government of Álvaro Uribe, *Special Zones of Consolidation and its Consolidation and Integral Action Centers -CCAI-*, where the military performance and the centralized power of the National Government prevailed, above the constitutional and legal mandate of the territorial civil authorities as Mayors and Governors. It is a re-edition of the democratic security policy, which results of violation of human rights are widely known.

But in the approach of the PAO, the border between the branches of public power is also lost. The Intersectoral Committee that was created through Decree 2137 of 2019 has the function of *coordinating the promotion of investigations, clarification and judicialization of criminal acts against human rights defenders,*

social and community leaders, and journalists in strategic areas of intervention. It would be understood that this is what the District Attorney's Office and its Special Investigation Unit are for, but here the Executive branch intervenes, including the military.

The initial document of the PAO, in its enunciation of regulations already created in the matter of protection, mentions in the first place Law 418 of 1997, known as the law of public order, which indicates the framework of action that the policy of protection to leaders and human rights defenders will have in the Government of Duque. That is to say, what is conceived as a policy of prevention and protection of social leaders is framed in the management of public order and in areas that today are called strategic integral intervention, which in the past were known as rehabilitation and consolidation or red zones. And although the document warns that it will be prioritized in certain municipalities such as Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, Norte de Antioquia (8), Catatumbo (9), Norte del Cauca (10), Pacífico Nariñense (2) and Sur de Córdoba (4), Valle del Cauca (4) and Urabá (2), the Government is taking the PAO everywhere.

The turn of the General Attorney's Office

Since the 1980s, the Colombian human rights movement has been fighting for the State to overcome impunity rates in relation to the murders of human rights defenders, which has

historically gravitated by 95%. However, as a result of the permanent dialogue and political influence of the platforms with the Colombian public institutions and, more recently, within the framework of the National Guarantees Process, the Attorney General's Office decided to "speed up" the investigations of these activists, with positive results in the last three years. The bases were set by the Prosecutor Eduardo Montealegre, who came out with Resolution 1783 of 2015³⁵ creating a special task force to prioritize investigations of serious violations against human rights defenders, mainly indigenous, Afro-descendant, land restitution leaders and even including public officials and other agents related to the subject. This resolution powered recent research at that time, but it was also destined to go forward against threats.

Subsequently, the General Attorney in charge, Jorge Fernando Perdomo Torres, removed Resolution 0011 of 2016, which adopts the concept of human rights defender in the methodological route and criminal investigation in the cases of homicides against these persons and other provisions related to the felony of threats. This Resolution is first and foremost a comprehensive and wide document regarding the value of human rights defenders in society, their decisive relation in the promotion

and protection of human rights and the broad spectrum of profiles that these activists imply, for which it includes the international and national normative framework that gives legal and political support to the work. But it also develops guidelines for prosecutors on the subject of the felony of threats, so that, from this document, the foundations are laid for advancing on a more accurate investigation route³⁶.

These resolutions effectively became a "special" action framework for the District Attorney's Office, accompanied by human rights platforms, from the Subcommittee on Investigations of the National Guarantees Process and supported by the international community³⁷, to expedite hundreds of cases accumulated in the judicial system. However, in July 2016, General Néstor Humberto Martínez was named District Attorney, and the dialogue process was paralyzed. Since then, the Attorney's Office decided to take as a valid source for the figures of the cases to be investigated and to prioritize, those published by the OHCHR, despite the fact that by then there were systems such as the SIAD-

³⁵ Resolution 1783, by means of which a group of special tasks is created to prioritize investigations of serious violations against human rights defenders. Official Gazette No. 49.624. Bogotá, Colombia, September 3, 2015.

³⁶ Resolution 0011, by means of which the concept of human rights defender is determined and the parameters are established for the prosecution of the felony of threats against them. Bogotá, Colombia, July 16, 2016.

³⁷ The National Guarantees Process has been accompanied by the international community since their beginning in 2019, especially the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia -OACNUDH-. Also, by the Swedish and Spanish Embassies.

DHH³⁸, that between 2009 and 2015 registered at least 538 murders of human rights defending persons, and between 2016 and 2018 there were at least 341 cases registered. That is, 879 murders in 9 years.

But a few months after taking office, the District Attorney delivered the results of investigations, noting that there was no systematicity in the investigations: *“There is a multicausality in the origin of the threats, the murders and the affectation to the integrity of these social leaders (...) At the moment there is no systematicity in the affectations...”* ³⁹

• Orange Clarification

With the arrival of Prosecutor Martínez, the era of “historical clarification of investigations” began, where, from a distorted and mediatic turn of the concept of clarification, it is assumed that a case has already been solved measured by the progress in research, for example, that there is allocation, but still missing important advances in the process, the trial and finally the sentence and sanction. This shift is far from the legal conception that considers the clarification as the final stage of an investigation and implies a final judgment (condemnation or acquittal).

In order to understand a little better this new “conceptual framework” and performance of the District Attorney’s Office, we take as reference five media or public expositions where this entity presents figures of prioritized cases, percentages of supposed clarification and the real number of sentences, which are ultimately those that indicate the real percentage of clarification.

In July of 2017, the Prosecutor presented the results for murder investigations against human rights defenders, that he described as historic, since out of 87 prioritized cases, 51.72% were already clarified⁴⁰. However, by that time, the sentences were 5, that is, in real terms, the clarification percentage is **5.74%**. In February 2018, in a formal response from the District Attorney’s Office to the Somos Defensores Program⁴¹, from a universe of 253 cases investigated, it accounted for 39.13% of clarification, that is, 99 cases. However, the number of sentences up to that moment was 10, that is, **3.9%**. In August 2018, the District Attorney pronounced again and announced that out of 183 cases of assassinations corresponding to the years 2016,

³⁸ The Information System on Aggressions against Human Rights Defenders belongs to the Somos Defensores Program.

³⁹ El Universal. (December 8, 2016). The District Attorney says that there is no systematicity in the murders of Human Rights Defenders. Recovered from <https://www.eluniversal.com.co/colombia/bogota/fiscal-dice-que-no-hay-sistematicidad-en-asesinatos-de-defensores-de-ddhh-241980-NWEU350638>

⁴⁰ <https://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/derechos-humanos/resultados-historicos-en-investigaciones-por-homicidios-de-defensores-de-derechos-humanos/>

⁴¹ The Subgroup of Investigations is the space that was designed in the National Guarantees Process to follow up investigations into attacks against human rights defenders. It involves the District Attorney’s Office, State institutions, human rights platforms, community sector, international community (Accompaniment).

2017 and part of 2018, reported by OACNUDH, the clarification remains at 50%⁴². But the number of sentences is 18, representing **9.8%** of clarification. In October 2018, in a meeting of the Sub Group of Investigations⁴³, the District Attorney's Office presented 113 advanced cases in clarification, that is, 53.03%, of a universe of 213 cases. However, until then, the number of sentences was 20, that is, **9.3%** of true clarification. More recently, in February 2019, the District Attorney's Office presented a greater number of cases investigated, 250, in which

there would already be a 54.8%⁴⁴ clarification. This means that at least 137 cases would be investigated, put on trial and sentenced. But it is not true, the number of sentences is 22, equivalent to **8.8%**. It also generates a lot of confusion that in each media outlet the Office of the Prosecutor delivers different figures, sometimes larger and subsequently lower. For example, in January 2019 he spoke of **231** between 2016 and 2018⁴⁵, a fact different from the one mentioned above in this paragraph.

Figures of the Attorney General's Office					
Date	Prioritized	Clarified according to the District Attorney's Office	% Clarified according to the District Attorney's Office	Convictions / Real clarification	% Real clarifications
July 2017	87	45	51,7%	5	5,7%
February 2018	253	99	39,1%	10	4,0%
August 2018	183	90	49,2%	18	9,8%
October 2018	213	113	53,1%	20	9,4%
January 2019	250	137	54,8%	22	8,8%

Produced by The Somos Defensores Program.

⁴² La FM. (August 30, 2018). District Attorney: There is no impunity in cases of murders of social leaders. Recovered from <https://www.lafm.com.co/judicial/fiscal-no-hay-impunidad-en-casos-de-asesinatos-de-lideres-sociales>

⁴³ The Sub Group of Investigations is the entity that was created within the framework of the National Guarantees Process, to follow up on cases of aggression against human rights defenders.

⁴⁴ Attorney Monica Suarez. (February 14, 2019). Conversation space Systematic Crimes against social leaders in Colombia: Frustration and perplexities. Master's Degree in Human Rights. Santo Tomás University, Bogotá.

⁴⁵ Semana Magazine. (January 11, 2019). Néstor Humberto Martínez confirms systematicity in murders of social leaders. Recovered from <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/nelson-humberto-martinez-confirma-sistematicidad-en-asesinato-de-lideres-sociales/597409>

In summary, the effective clarification in the investigations for the murder of human rights defenders in Colombia, has never exceeded 9.8%. The strategy of the District Attorney Néstor Humberto Martínez focused on creating an effective media matrix, to show that huge progress is made to break impunity in the case of murders against social leadership. This objective was achieved, since the National Government found bases on this speech to demonstrate that there was a will to fight against organized crime that affects social leaderships; and it has also had an effect on the international community, which has highlighted and congratulated these advances with the bulging figures from the District Attorney⁴⁶.

As evidenced, the Prosecutor's strategy is more sensationalist than effective, because it generates the idea of a low level of impunity, when in reality it is still around 90%, despite having two great teams for this: the Delegation for Citizen Security and the Special Investigation Unit.

De-politicization of murders

The scope of this handling of figures is not limited to the point of impunity, it transcends the political dimension,

which has achieved to be positioned and to give the contexts of the assassination of social leaders, and that make them look like isolated crimes, unrelated to their social and political work.

Recently, the Minister of Defense, Luis Carlos Villegas, attributed the attack to these activists mainly to "problems of boundaries, infidelities and illicit rents"⁴⁷. Next, Minister Villegas referred to the lack of systematicity and stated: "one of every two assassinations of social leaders has a judicial explanation"⁴⁸. Of course, these statements were supported by the figures of the Attorney General, already mentioned above.

A few months later, District attorney Néstor Humberto Martínez, in a similar sense, centralized the matter on drug trafficking as a phenomenon behind criminality, when he said that the violence that originates the murders of social leaders is the product of the action of "true armies at the service of drug trafficking, which fight over the control of illicit crops"⁴⁹ and he justified this by affirming that

⁴⁶ Legal Affairs (March 6, 2018) The European Union showed concern about attacks and killings of social leaders in the country. Recovered from <https://www.asuntoslegales.com.co/actualidad/union-europea-preocupada-por-ataques-y-asesinatos-a-lideres-sociales-en-el-pais-260655>

⁴⁷ Noticias Uno. (December 16, 2017). The Minister of Defense says that social leaders are murdered due to infidelities and neighbors. Recovered from <https://canal1.com.co/noticias/los-matan-por-borrachos-mindefensa/>

⁴⁸ Noticias Uno. (December 16, 2017). The Minister of Defense says that social leaders are killed because of infidelities and neighbors. Recovered from <https://canal1.com.co/noticias/los-matan-por-borrachos-mindefensa/>

⁴⁹ Colombia 2020. (July 8, 2018). The challenge of protecting social leaders. Recovered from <https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/pais/el-reto-de-proteger-los-lideres-sociales>

in 50% of the cases throughout the country, the material authorship of the murders has been established, which leads to the conclusion that the main perpetrators are **groups dedicated to drug trafficking**⁵⁰.

Faced with this mediatic handling of the figures, the District Attorney's Office also intentionally distorted the results of the investigations in relation to possible material and intellectual authors, in order to generate different contexts. In all the speeches it refers to the ELN and the Gulf Clan⁵¹ as the main responsible for the murders. However, these statements do not respond to the reality shown by the figures, including those of the District Attorney's Office itself.

According to the analysis of the Somos Defensores Program (described in this report), of the alleged perpetrators of murders against human rights defenders during 2018, the ELN would be responsible in 9 cases, that is, 5%. This data coincides with the research carried out by several human rights, social and academic organizations⁵², which demonstrates

that in a universe of 257 murders that occurred between November 24 and July 31, 2018, the ELN would be the author of 8 cases, say, of 3.11%. But the coincidence also occurs with the District Attorney's Office, because, according to its most recent results, this group is responsible for 7% of the cases, in a universe of 250 murders investigated⁵³.

The District Attorney's Office also warns that, of the same universe of cases investigated (250), 30% of the responsibility for the murders corresponds to the Gulf Clan, the ELN and dissidence⁵⁴, for which, it is also not true that the majority corresponds to these groups, as the Attorney General affirms before the media⁵⁵. This statement is similar to the analysis of the Somos Defensores Program in this report, according to which 72% of the murders during 2018 were com-

⁵⁰ Colombia 2020. (July 8, 2018). The challenge of protecting social leaders. Recovered from <https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/pais/el-reto-de-proteger-los-lideres-sociales>

⁵¹ Semana Magazine. (January 11, 2019). Néstor Humberto Martínez confirms systematicity in the murder of social leaders. Recovered from <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/nestor-humberto-martinez-confirma-sistematicidad-en-asesinato-de-lideres-sociales/597409>

⁵² Ascamcat, CINEP / PPP, Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), Confederation of Communal Action, Coordination Colombia United States, Institute of Po-

litical Studies and International Relations (IEPRI), Ríos vivos Movement, Somos Defensores, National University of Colombia. (2019). What are the patterns? Assassinations of social leaders in the post-agreement. Bogotá, Colombia.

⁵³ Attorney Monica Suarez. (February 14, 2019). Conversation space Systematic Crimes against social leaders in Colombia: Frustration and perplexities. Master's Degree in Human Rights. Santo Tomás University, Bogotá.

⁵⁴ Attorney Monica Suarez. (February 14, 2019). Conversation space Systematic Crimes against social leaders in Colombia: Frustration and perplexities. Master's Degree in Human Rights. Santo Tomás University, Bogotá.

⁵⁵ Semana Magazine. (January 11, 2019). Néstor Humberto Martínez confirms systematicity in the murder of social leaders. Recovered from <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/nestor-humberto-martinez-confirma-sistematicidad-en-asesinato-de-lideres-sociales/597409>

mitted by unknown persons and 10% by alleged paramilitaries. In the development of the study, *what are the patterns? Murders of social leaders in the post agreement*, found that out of 257 cases, 118 (45.9%) would not come up with a responsible author⁵⁶. But the District Attorney's Office also contradict themselves through these mediatic claims, because at other times, they state that "in most cases they were perpetrated by local criminal gangs of less than 20 people⁵⁷". Despite this, the District Attorney's Office has managed to generate the mediatic matrix according to which the majority of the murders are committed by the ELN and the Gulf Clan.

At this point, the Attorney General also turns around the concept of systematicity; although he acknowledges it after two years of denial, he

does so under three conceptual novelties: It is active in the sense that these groups, such as the ELN and the Gulf Clan, commit most of the murders, which is above undermined, and that they do so very often; passively, because the majority of victims are community leaders (50%)⁵⁸. But it also rules out the role of State agents in the systematicity, omitting that the Public Force itself have participated in some cases. According to the present report, the Public Force would have a participation in 5% of the murders, that is, 7 cases. A similar situation is presented in the aforementioned study *"What are the patterns? Assassinations of social leaders in the post-agreement"*, which accounts for the alleged participation of the National Police in 3 criminal cases and the National Army⁵⁹ in 11 of them.


⁵⁶ Ascamcat, CINEP / PPP, Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), Confederation of Communal Action, Coordination Colombia United States, Institute of Political Studies and International Relations (IEPRI), Ríos vivos Movement, Somos Defensores, National University of Colombia. (2019). What are the patterns? Assassinations of social leaders in the post-agreement. Bogotá, Colombia.

⁵⁷ Semana Magazine. Social Leaders: Who will be able to protect them? Recovered from <http://especiales.semana.com/lideres-sociales-asesinados/index.html>

⁵⁸ Semana Magazine. (January 11, 2019). Néstor Humberto Martínez confirms sys-

tematicity in the murder of social leaders. Recovered from <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/nestor-humberto-martinez-confirma-sistematicidad-en-asesinato-de-lideres-sociales/597409>

⁵⁹ Ascamcat, CINEP / PPP, Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), Confederation of Communal Action, Coordination Colombia United States, Institute of Political Studies and International Relations (IEPRI), Ríos vivos Movement, Somos Defensores, National University of Colombia. (2019). What are the patterns? Assassinations of social leaders in the post-agreement. Bogotá, Colombia. P. 35.



Alleged Aggressors and number of victims. Source: *What are the patterns? Assassinations of social leaders in the post-agreement.*

These mediatic statements contrast with the Attorney General, Fernando Carrillo, who says: “Here there have been cases of cooptation of state agents by criminal organizations that are eliminating social leaders. Our call is first to the mayors and governors to assume the responsibilities in defense of the life and integrity of the social leaders, and second, to the citizenship to help us investigate, to denounce if there are State officials at any territorial level and agents of the Public Force involved in the assassinations of social leaders”⁶⁰. Then, in the same statement, he notes: “Here are depopulators who are murdering the land leaders, talking about an-

other systematicity is difficult, but I could tell them that according to the Attorney General’s report there is systematicity in the case of the murders of land leaders”⁶¹.

This last aspect mentioned by the Prosecutor is also important, as the District Attorney’s Office often alludes that the motives remain personal and for reasons of opposing drug trafficking, as stated by the person responsible for the Delegation for Public Safety, Luis González: “The main victims have fallen in places where communities fight to banish the culture of illegality. That is, those municipalities with the greatest presence of

⁶⁰ El Nuevo Siglo. (July 14, 2018). There would be official complicity in crimes against leaders. Recovered from <https://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/07-2018-indagan-si-en-crimenes-de-lideres-sociales-hay-complicidad-oficial>

⁶¹ El Nuevo Siglo. (July 14, 2018). There would be official complicity in crimes against leaders. Recovered from <https://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/07-2018-indagan-si-en-crimenes-de-lideres-sociales-hay-complicidad-oficial>

illicit crops, which serve as a drug trafficking route and where illegal mining subsists, register the highest rates⁶².

At this point it is important to note that while this may be true, there is an important degree of depoliticization in the reading by the District Attorney's Office, since it suggests that they are problems of localized gangs, as mentioned above, but marginalized from the political aspect. Precisely, the Peace Agreement signed between the National Government and the FARC, supplied a center in the substitution of crops for illicit use. To do this, the Comprehensive National Program for the Replacement of Illicit Use Crops -PNIS- was created through Decree Law 897 of 2017. According to the analysis of the Somos Defensores Program, out of the 155 murders that occurred in 2018, 19 social leaders would be related to the substitution of crops for illicit use and, within them, 8 had a direct relationship with the PNIS. Here there are two aspects to highlight: one, the substitution of crops is a State policy to the extent that it was included in the Peace Agreement and, as such, it is a political directive where the State responsibility is substantial; two, because it is a State policy, the communities and their leadership should count on guarantees of human security to carry out these tasks, as it was the government's commitment. However, the figures are eloquent and say the opposite, but also show that the motives are political and contextual,

that they are product of the agreement, and not isolated cases without any connection to each other, as dismissed by the District Attorney's Office.

From substitution for development to eradication for legality

The National Comprehensive Program for the Replacement of Illicit Use Crops -PNIS- was created "with the purpose of generating material and intangible conditions of well-being and good living for the populations affected by illicit crops, in particular, for the peasant communities in situation of poverty that currently derive their subsistence from these crops" (Decree - Law 897, 2017).

The program is formed by components focused on the creation of community plans, with which it planned, for the first year, a goal of replacing 50,000 hectares in the most affected areas. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime -UNODC- conducted a count of 51,824 hectares of illicit crops, which were taken as the baseline⁶³.

Faced with this line, the results of the last monitoring report on PNIS by the UNODC show an average of

⁶² Semana Magazine. Social Leaders: Who will be able to protect them? Recovered from <http://especiales.semana.com/lideres-sociales-asesinados/index.html>

⁶³ Figure collected in the first UNODC mission to characterize illicit crops. UNODC. (February 15, 2019). Consolidated Executive Report No. 16 - National Comprehensive Program for the Replacement of Illicit Crops - PNIS. Monitoring and verification of commitments to replace illicit crops.

94% compliance in the voluntary and assisted eradication of the 14 departments and 56 prioritized municipalities (see map). Another outstanding point is that, much against the current government's desire to find in forced eradication the proper way out on the road to the fight against drugs, **voluntary eradication has proven to be much more effective, since only 0.6% of these municipalities have replanting, compared to the 35%⁶⁴ regrowth that forced eradication has left⁶⁵.**

The decisions of the current Government, which have reoriented much of the substitution policy towards logics of fumigation with glyphosate and forced an obliqued eradication, have generated a situation of uncertainty in the communities attached to the PNIS, an aspect that may result in the abandonment of the program, displacement and return to the coca growing activity.

The lack of interest of the institutions responsible for the Program, especially from the Government, to carry out the basic activities of their operation, generates distrust in the communi-

ties involved and may lead to non-compliance with the goals agreed by the PNIS. In addition to this, the upsurge in violence and the persistence of historical factors originated in infrastructure, in the provision of basic goods and generation of development opportunities, suggest that the problem of crop substitution is far from being resolved.

• What about the Defenders?

In this context, it is important to note that the persecution of leaders in substitution zones does not stop. Today, hundreds of women, men, peasants, community leaders and, in general, defenders and representatives of the communities affected by the dynamics of crops for illicit use, have been made visible within the territories thanks to the PNIS. However, their situation of vulnerability has intensified, since by being political subjects with negotiation and persuasive capacity, they become the target of multiple aggressions by armed actors focused on their search for violent territorial domination.


Especially in municipalities of Northeast Antioquia and Bajo Cauca, the great magnitude of the violence that strikes the communities most affected by illicit crops has been demonstrated (see map). The patterns of violence that occur in the territories have as a common denominator the search for the depoliticization of the communities and the instrumentalization of the material needs of the populations, as a mean to guarantee the development of drug trafficking and the territorial control that allows its expansion.

⁶⁴ Dejusticia. (March 12, 2019). Intervention of the Law, Justice and Society Studies Center -Dejusticia- in a public hearing cited by order of January 23, 2019, in pursuit of the Sentence T 236 of 2017. Retrieved from <https://cdn.dejusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Intervenci%C3%B3n-Escrita-Audiencia-Glifosato.pdf>

⁶⁵ UNODC. (February 15, 2019). Consolidated Executive Report No. 16 - National Comprehensive Program for the Replacement of Illicit Crops - PNIS. Monitoring and verification of commitments to replace illicit crops.

But it also worrying and incomprehensible how the State calls on the peasantry to commit to the policy of replacing illicit crops, within the framework of the Peace Agreements, and does not have a protection strat-

egy and guarantees for these people. Out of the 155 murders registered by the SIADDHH, 19 were related to the abovementioned policy, that is, 12.2%.



• What's left for us?

The political context is not favorable. On the part of the Government there is unacknowledgement for the armed conflict and therefore also for each one of the strategies of peace construction that have been bred in the territories. The new measures constitute a threat to the exercise of human rights defenders and social leaders, as they are drifting towards the militarization of the municipalities, the stigmatization of the peasantry as an accomplice to drug trafficking and the delegitimization of community participation spaces such as the ZRCs and the Community Councils where the substitution is a peace articulation project.

Undoubtedly, the long-awaited presence of the State in departments such as Nariño, Norte de Santander, Meta, Antioquia, Putumayo and Cauca where the dynamics of illegality and crime emerge, is today a more worrying than encouraging issue, especially since the exit to the problem of drugs is being sold with the illusion of integrality and not with a range of resources that provides a solution to the structural problem of land and drug trafficking.

It would be worthwhile for the Government of Iván Duque to concentrate on the positive balance that the PNIS has had and to join efforts to strengthen it, in order to consolidate a true development that allows the peasants to enjoy that well-being and good living that historically they are owed.

Prioritization of cases

Another debate with the District Attorney's Office and the human rights movement is related to the universe of cases to be investigated. Given that the Colombian State has not had an information system and did not monitor the situation of defenders (today the Ombudsman's Office does), the figures used by the District Attorney's Office have been taken from the Office of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Human Rights -OACNUDH-. However, civil society organizations have systematized and analyzed information for more than a decade. That means that yes, there are figures, they are unofficial but still; therefore, the universe of murder cases is wide. According to the SIADDHH, between 2010 and 2018, at least 715 murdered human rights defenders have been registered. This means that if the District Attorney's Office were investigating this number of cases and not only those from 2016 onwards, 50% of the supposed clarification would correspond to at least 357 investigations. However, the Attorney General's Office prioritized from 2016 onward, and the Special Investigation Unit, born from the Peace Agreements to support the dismantling of criminal gangs, was given the responsibility of investigating the cases from the year 2015 and backwards.

The abovementioned would also indicate that the District Attorney's Office would have substantive elements for the dismantling of the criminal organizations that attempt against these activists. This is what the for-

mer Minister of Justice, Yesid Reyes, warns, considering that if it is true that 53% of the cases are already clarified, not only should the people who conceived the systemic plan be identified, but it would also be established in which specific crimes they participated, and most importantly, they should be condemned for those events. But if it were true that the District Attorney already managed to imprison the majority of those who devised this extermination plan, why only now did he realize that they are not isolated cases?⁶⁶ There is also the question: Why have these criminal organizations not been dismantled, if that is what the Special Investigation Unit was created for?

At this point it is worth mentioning that, although the figures are not the most important in the crime debate on social leadership in Colombia, they are a necessary indicator to focus attention to it. The National Government and the Attorney General's Office are based on the lowest figures, despite the different sources of information from society organizations and from the Ombudsman's Office itself. That means that criminality is much higher than estimated.

For this reason, the study conducted and published by Dejusticia and Human Rights Data Analysis Group⁶⁷, in

September 2018, deserves a special mention, according to which all the databases, registers, information systems and observatories that monitor the situation of aggression against human rights defenders, we are under-registered, which means that, unfortunately, reality goes beyond accounting

The investigation took as reference the 2016 and 2017 records of the Somos Defensores, Indepaz and Agrarian Summit Program, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, the Ombudsman's Office and the international organization Front Line Defenders, and applied a statistical method that allowed estimating all the cases that were not documented. The result was overwhelming: The magnitude of the problem is greater than that reported by all these entities.

General Prosecutor's Office

The Office of Prosecutor Fernando Carrillo, from the beginning, spoke with concern about the situation of human rights defenders and social leadership, as we have gathered in previous reports of the Somos Defensores Program⁶⁸. One of its first actions was to publish the Directive 002 of July 2017, with which results

⁶⁶ El Espectador. (January 15, 2019). Eureka, attorney. Recovered from <https://www.elespectador.com/opinion/eureka-fiscal-columna-834038>

⁶⁷ Murder of social leaders in Colombia 2016 - 2017: An estimate of the universe. César Rodríguez Garavito, Valentina Rojo. Dejusticia and Human Rights Data Analysis Group. September 2018.

<https://www.dejusticia.org/publication/asesinatos-de-lideres-sociales-en-colombia-en-2016-2017-una-estimacion-del-universo/>

⁶⁸ Stone in the Shoe. Annual report 2017. Somos Defensores Program, 2018. <https://choco.org/documentos/informe-anual-2017-piedra-en-el-zapato.pdf>

of follow-up are expected to the public policy of the Government and also in the disciplinary investigations to public officials who by action and omission contribute to the attacks of the defenders and human rights defenders

During 2018 the Prosecutor installed the Bureau for the protection of life in the municipality of Santander de Quilichao, Cauca, on July 16 and, subsequently, he made a great call for a second meeting of the Board on August 23, in San José de Apartadó, Antioquia, for which he appealed President Iván Duque, by that time, recently sworn into office. There they signed the Pact for life and protection of social leaders and human rights defenders, where the National Government undertook to immediately initiate the construction of the public policy of prevention and comprehensive protection, with the participation of society and preserving all the approaches; to comply with the commitments assumed by the State regarding security, collective protection and the fight against impunity and comprehensive protection programs; modernize and re-engineer the National Protection Unit; and guarantee the functioning of the National Commission of Security Guarantees, CNGS⁶⁹.

But the state entities also assumed commitments. The Office of the Prosecutor will continue to seek clarifi-

cation of the crimes against human rights defenders. The Ombudsman's Office, within the framework of Early Warning 026 of 2018, undertook the task to disseminate the results of the follow-up on attacks on social leaders and hold a defense hearing. Meanwhile, the Prosecutor's Office stressed its responsibility to strengthen its work of preventive monitoring on prevention and protection policies and programs, and to discipline public officials who stigmatize social leaders or who by action or omission affect these activists.

Likewise, the department leaders committed to adopt an Integral Plan of Protection and the Protocol of Protection for Rural Territories. While social organizations will continue participating and doing awareness campaigns.

Subsequently, the Procurator's Office, in alliance with the Ombudsman's Office, held other Tables for the protection of life in Carmen de Bolívar and Cúcuta, Norte de Santander; where, in addition to discussing the need for a preventive policy with local authorities, they added the follow-up to the Early Warning 026 of 2018 by the social leaders issued by the Ombudsman's Office, analyzed below.

It should be said that Attorney Fernando Carrillo has been a critical official of the situation of aggression against human rights defenders and part of his institutional agenda reflects this. However, his main mandate is to discipline public officials who are failing to address this issue, therefore, it is expected that the results of their actions will be conclusive.

⁶⁹ Ministry of Interior. (August 23, 2018). Pact for Life and Protection of Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders. Recovered from <https://www.mininterior.gov.co/sala-de-prensa/noticias/pacto-por-la-vida-y-la-proteccion-de-los-lideres-sociales-y-las-personas-defensoras-de-derechos-humanos>

Ombudsman's Office and Early Warning 026 of 2018

Likewise, since his arrival at the Ombudsman's Office, Carlos Eduardo Negret managed to place on the public agenda the concern for the situation of social leaders in the country, as it has also been included in previous reports of the Somos Defensores Program. Both the early warnings, as their already usual tours through the different territories of the country, especially to marginalized and highly conflictive areas, as well as the monitoring reports on the situation of human rights defenders and media strategies to raise awareness about this regrettable reality, they are part of the central agenda of the Ombudsman's Office.

But perhaps the most significant contribution of the Ombudsman's Office during 2018 was the issuance of the Early Warning 026 of March, same year (one year after the publication of Risk Report 010 of 2017), which warns about the high risk and vulnerability of human rights defenders and their organizations in practically the entire country.

It is a document of great value, not only for its warning power and alert per se, but for its content (71 pages) where there is a true display of national, regional and local contexts, which, with a level of detail in each place, evidence the threatening actors and, therefore, the possibilities that the national and territorial authorities have to fight organized crime. But it also collects and recalls the amount of juridical, political and legal tools available for the Colombian State to prevent attacks on social movements and protect them. It analyzes the figures of aggressions against local activists that precede the Alert, but also refers to the difficulties that victims face when seeking support from the authorities. All of the above makes the Alert a powerful instrument for those who must analyze contexts and take action. That is to say, if the National Government and all the Colombian institutions take a document like this Alert seriously, with certainty, many human sacrifices could be avoided. This reaffirms the judgment that no additional rules are required in Colombia, the problem is that they are not implemented.



282 homicidios de líderes sociales
y defensores de DD.HH.
entre el 01 de enero de 2016 y el 27 de febrero de 2018



Early warning 026-2018. Source: Ombudsman's Office

More recently, as already noted, the alliance with the Procurator's Office and acting together as Public Ministry, the Ombudsman joined the *Bureau for the Protection of Life*, which adds an important weight in the agenda of

prevention, awareness and monitoring to public policy

It would be assumed that from the rest of the National Government and the Colombian State, as the Office of

the Attorney General of the Nation, the work of the Ombudsman would be recognized, converting the figures of attacks on social leaders into official, given that it is a state entity. However, this is not the case, and the OHCHR reports remain *the* source for prioritizing cases.

National Protection Unit, UNP

Within the Pact for Life, already mentioned above, strengthening and re-engineering (as the Government calls it) of the National Protection Unit -UNP- remained as one of the priorities. For this, the director of the UNP, Pablo Elías González, receives support from USAID.

The idea is to turn the UNP into a more robust entity, with a greater capacity for attention and more efficient in its mandate to protect people at high risk of being attacked. Today the UNP has 7,400 protected, of which 4,700 are social leaders, 5,200 protected beneficiaries have escorts, 1,200 are former members of the FARC. But, in addition, it has a staff of 6,600 employees, out of which only 260 are plant personnel⁷⁰. In essence, it is a privatized entity, which contracts practically all its operation with third parties, with 5 areas where rental companies operate and 4 temporary unions. According to its director, given the UNP high level of hiring

to operate, the State would not have the capacity to assume it directly and have a plant of 5,200 workers⁷¹.

With this information, it becomes clear that it is an institution which is growing due to the situation described in this report. During 2018, its general budget was \$ 549,743,000,000 (Resolution 0001 of 2018, National Protection Unit). For 2019 the budget grows to \$ 688,747,241,558 (Resolution 0001 of 2019, National Protection Unit). That is, it grew by 20% and, if the situation continues, as it is the trend, the UNP will also do so. In fact, within the proposed reengineering, it is strengthening it with important resources, as can be seen in both the Pact for Life and the PAO.

With many more elements of analysis that will not be exposed here, but with the clarity that it is an institution that is already quite robust and with a tendency to grow, it can be concluded that the protection policy is wrong and will continue to be so. Going back to stressing on physical protection, as the current Government does, because it will increase the demand for protection and therefore the budget will have to be increased, means that there will be no substantive policies to avoid risk growth, and on the contrary, it will continue with the cruel trick of saving lives with vests, armored cars, escorts, telephones and others, thus perversely prolonging the problem, rather than solving it.

⁷⁰ Information provided by the director Pablo Elías González to the spokespersons of the human rights platforms, in a meeting held on February 21, 2019.

⁷¹ Information provided by the director Pablo Elías González to the spokespersons of the human rights platforms, in a meeting held on February 21, 2019.

The call of the international community

During 2018, the international community also made different pronouncements to draw the attention of the Colombian State to the critical situation that social leaders in the country are facing. Below are some of these and other highlights, such as the visit of the United Nations Special Rapporteur for human rights defenders.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights -CIDH- through two press releases from the first of March 27, urged the Colombian State and Government to take urgent measures to protect human rights defenders and social leaders, since they believe that the high number of crimes against them is of high concern, especially in the framework of the search for peace in which the country currently is⁷². In the second communication letter, on July 19, they again drew concerned attention about the alarming growth of murders and condemned the violence against these people, this time taking into account several sources of information⁷³.

From their part, the Mission of the Organization of American States-MAPP / OAS- to Support the Peace Process in Colombia did the same with a statement issued on July 10, where they expressed their sorrow and repudiated criminality against social leaders, and the affectation also to the set of communal, ethnic and peasant organizations. In addition, they called on the Colombian Government and National State to strengthen protection and investigations to diminish impunity⁷⁴.

The European Union, together with Switzerland and Norway, also expressed concern about the increase in attacks against human rights defenders. They stated: "At this moment it is essential that human rights defenders can make their voices heard and that they can be guaranteed their right to political participation", but also stressed the need to advance in the fight against impunity with rigorous and contextual research⁷⁵.

Countries such as the United States, through their Embassies in Colombia, also called for accelerated investigations into the assassinations and stressed its collaboration with the

⁷² OAS (March 27, 2018). The IACHR urges Colombia to take urgent measures to protect human rights defenders and social leaders. Recovered from <http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2018/065.asp>

⁷³ OAS (March 27, 2018). The IACHR urges Colombia to take urgent measures to protect human rights defenders and social leaders. Recovered from <http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2018/065.asp>

⁷⁴ AECID. (July 10, 2018). MAPP / OEA condemns murders and attacks against social and human rights leaderships in Colombia. Recovered from <https://www.aecid.org.co/index.php?idcategoria=5156>

⁷⁵ Legal affairs (March 6, 2018) The European Union showed concern about the attacks and murders of social leaders in the country. Recovered from <https://www.asuntoslegales.com.co/actualidad/union-europea-preocupada-por-ataques-y-asesinatos-a-lideres-sociales-en-el-pais-2606551>

current Government in “the exchange for better practices”⁷⁶.

Likewise, the former ambassador of Germany in Colombia, Michael Bock, affirmed that, despite the success of the peace process, the situation with the social leaders is today one of the biggest problems in the country⁷⁷.

• Visit of Special Rapporteur Michel Forst

But, undoubtedly, the most important event of the international community in relation to the situation of human rights defenders during 2018 was the visit of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Michel Forst. His visit, in addition to being official, invited by the National Government, was characterized by its duration of 14 days in which he developed an important itinerary through several regions of the country, where he mainly listened to human rights defenders of territorial and basic human rights, and for an extensive statement at the end of his visit on December 3.

In his statement he expressed concern about the situation in Colombia, noting that: “Although the figures are

not uniform, the different sources I received showed a dramatic increase in murders and attacks after the approval of the agreement to this date” and concluded that Colombia is not a safe and conducive environment to carry out the work of defense of human rights. Therefore, he pointed out a series of recommendations addressed to different sectors of both the government and civil society.

One of these recommendations is that, although Colombia is part of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on all forms of discrimination against women (OP CEDAW), it does not recognize articles 8 and 9, which are fundamental to establishing an accounts surrendering process in situations of serious violation.

He also highlighted figures such as the ones from the Somos Defensores Program, a reference from which he called on the Attorney General’s Office to investigate and prosecute cases of murders and attacks against defenders committed prior to the signing of the Peace Agreement⁷⁸.

His final declaration named *Guiding Principles for the elaboration of policies and strategies for the protection of human rights defenders*, in addition to making an extensive tour of the main findings during his visit, points out that the situation found in Colombia is dramatic, comparing it to the one of many other countries that he has visited because of his mandate as Rapporteur.

⁷⁶ The US Embassy in Colombia. (July 9, 2018). Statement on murders of social leaders in Colombia. Recovered from <https://co.usembassy.gov/es/comunicado-sobre-asesinatos-de-lideres-sociales-en-colombia/>

⁷⁷ Caracol Radio. (May 3, 2018). German Ambassador in Colombia described the murder of leaders as very serious. Recovered from http://caracol.com.co/emisora/2018/05/04/armenia/1525385341_411509.html

⁷⁸ UN (2018). Final monitoring statement. P. 14

Well Tuned Media

To finish this journey of context and follow-up on the policy and situation analysis of the aggressions against human rights defenders and the social leadership of the country during 2018, it is fair to acknowledge the role played by the mass media. Throughout the year, in general, the radio, television, internet, including alternative, national, written, and foreign media made a daily record, chronicles, analysis, special reports and campaigns, among others, from different points of view, in the territories, from the pain, but also with the reconstruction of the lives of those who give everything for the rights of their communities.

Undoubtedly, a very important aspect to continue sensitizing the country and pressing the Government and the State to act from the structural and not to follow wrong policies to respond to situations and pressure, thus foolishly prolonging the problem.

Also from the academy, with their teachers, teachers and students, an important work was done to investigate, sensitize and listen more about the importance of social leaderships and about the violence they must live every day in the different territories, reflections that, without a doubt, come to a common conclusion: Violence against human rights defenders must stop.



Annual report 2018

Information System on Attacks against Human Rights Defenders in Colombia - ISAAHRD -

The Information System on Attacks against Human Rights Defenders in Colombia – SIADDHH of the Somos Defensores Program⁷⁹, registered 805 individual assaults, acts represented by threats, attacks, disappearances, detentions, judicial proceedings, information thefts and assassinations during 2018, a situation which endangered not only the integrity of the persons, their families and the processes they were working on, but also the task of denouncing and defending human rights in Colombia.

In 2018, the SIADDHH of the Somos Defensores Program listed a high increase in attacks against human rights defenders, a fact never before registered in our information system; because we went from registering 560 assaults in 2017 to 805 in 2018, that is, there was an increase

of 43.75% in relation to the previous year. To that extent, one of the most worrisome situations is that murder levels increased alarmingly, because in 2017 we registered 106 murders and in 2018 they increased to 155, that is, an increase of 46.22%.

In relation to the occurrence of aggressions in Colombia, it can be affirmed that during 2018 an average of 2.2 people were attacked per day. That situation makes it the year with more attacks recorded by this Information System. The months with the highest number of cases were: July with 119 events, May with 112, August with 109 and June with 77. Following this analysis, the July-September quarter was the period with the most aggressions recorded because in this period of time, 286 occurred.

⁷⁹ This System records information known directly by the Somos Defensores Program and by direct source with the Social Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations that report cases to the

Program. Under no circumstance does the SIADDHH cross information with other similar information systems. The program reports and analyzes only the cases that are sent to them.

Number of attacks per month
ISAAHRD figures, January-December 2018 Period




Attacks by Gender

Regarding issues of gender, out of the 805 cases of individual aggressions that were registered in 2018 by the SIADDHH, 29% were against women and the remaining 71% against men. For this year the proportionality of aggressions by gender increased in relation to the aggressions of women, given that in 2017 the aggressions

were around 26% in relation to 74% of aggressions committed against men. That is, by 2018 the percentage of aggressions against female leaders and human rights defending women increased by 64,3% compared to the previous year. Similar to the history of aggression against women, it is of great concern because in these murders the levels of violence are greater than those committed against men.

Aggressions by gender
ISAAHRD figures, January-December 2018 Period



Aggressions according to the type of violence

As we have already mentioned, the year 2018 is the one with a higher number of cases were recorded by the SIADDHH, for instance, we went from registering 370 threats in 2017 to listing 583 in 2018. Of the total of the aggressions, 0.6% were disappearances, 0.7% were detentions, 0.7% information thefts, 2.3% judicializations, 4.1% attacks, 19.3% murders and 72.4% were individual threats.

Compared to the previous year, the increase in the majority of attacks is evident, although in two of them the figure decreased, as is the case of the attacks, given that in 2017 there

were 50 attacks, while in 2018 there were 34, which means a reduction of 32%. Regarding arbitrary detentions against human rights defenders, they decreased considerably, as they went from 23 to 4 cases registered in 2018.

However, these figures contrast with the increase in other types of aggressions, such as threats that go from 370 in 2017 to 583 in 2018, with an increase of 57.5%,


But the most worrying fact is related to the threat against the most important right, the right to live, which increased in 46.2%, since there is a record of 155 murders in 2018, compared to the 106 from the previous year, that is, 49 cases more than 2017.

Type of Individual Aggressions	2018 Cases	2017 Cases
Threats	583	370
Murders	155	106
Attacks	34	50
Detentions	4	23
Judicializations	19	9
Disappearances	4	0
Information theft	6	2
Total of Individual Aggressions	805	560

Regarding the remaining attacks, they also increased as follows: Cases of judicialization go from 9 in 2017 to 19 cases in 2018; Information thefts

go from 2 to 6 cases in 2018. Unlike the previous year where there were no cases of forced disappearance, in 2018 there are 4 disappearances.

**Percentage According to Type of Aggression
ISAAHRD Figures, Period January-December 2018**




Alleged responsables

According to the Information System of the Somos Defensores Program, out of the 805 attacks registered in 2018, it is presumed, in order of proportion, that 55.5% were committed by paramilitary groups or structures,

33.5% by unknown persons, 5% by dissident groups of the FARC, 4.2% by the public force and 1.8% by the ELN guerrilla. The aforementioned figures evidence that the armed paramilitary groups are the alleged perpetrators with the majority of the attacks recorded by the SIADDHH.


**Agresions according to alleged responsables
ISAAHRD figures, Period January-December 2018**



The number of assaults with allegedly unknown perpetrator remains to be high. In 2018, 270 cases were registered in this category, which may be due to fear or concern from the victims to denounce the possible perpetrators. But it can also be because the perpetrators do not identify with any armed or criminal group or structure, this happens especially in cases of Attacks and Murders.

Regarding the attacks allegedly committed by paramilitary groups, there is

evidence of an increase in their presumed participation in most of the threats, assassinations and attacks, due to the fact that in 2018 the SIAD-DHH registered 447 cases possibly committed by these armed structures. In relation to the previous year, a percentage increase of 2% of the total number of cases was found. That is, in 2017 53% of the attacks were allegedly committed by these criminal groups and in 2018 these very same groups would be responsible for 55% of the cases.



Murder of Human Rights Defenders

During the year 2018 the Program We Are Defenders registered in the Information System 155 murders against human rights defenders, that is, increased by 46.2% more than in 2017, making 2018 the year with the highest number of murders recorded by the SIADDH since its creation.

Although we are aware that there is a sub-registration of information, and that some observatories have figures different from ours, in some cases lower and in some others higher, from the Somos Defensores program we mention 155 murders, which we have been able to confirm with our direct sources, the allied organizations in the regions and with the confirmation of many cases in the field.

Of the 155 murders, 90% were committed against men, 9% against women and 1% against LGBTI people. This increase in murders in 2018 indicates that it was one of the years with the highest number of victimizations and violations of the exercise of defense and social leadership in Colombia. It was a year in which homicides also increased along the country. According to figures from the annual report of the Attorney General's Office⁸⁰ during 2017 there were 12,066 homicides and 12,458

for 2018, thus generating a growth of 3.25% in the levels of murders registered in the country.


During the first quarter of 2018 41 murders took place, in the second quarter we had 32 cases, in the third quarter 49 murders and in the fourth quarter 21 cases. The months with the highest number of murders were May with 12, June with 14 and July with 21 cases – during the presidential election period. The above mentioned means that between the months of May to July of 2018 30.3% of the total murders were recorded.

Assassinations by Department (States)

According to the analysis of the figures, the departments with the highest number of murders were: Cauca, Antioquia, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Valle del Cauca and Caquetá, however, these criminal acts occurred in almost all the departments of the country, since out of the existing 32 departments Colombia, in 26 of them there were cases of murder against leaders and human rights defenders. That is to say that there were murders in 81.2% of the national territory and there was an increase in the number of departments where such murders occurred, since in 2017 they occurred in 24.

⁸⁰ Office of the Attorney General of the Nation (January 11, 2019) The Attorney General's office achieves historical clarification of homicides. Recovered from

<https://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/noticias/fiscalia-logra-historico-esclarecimiento-de-homicidios/>



The departments where there were more murders continue to be still Cauca and Antioquia, with 18 and 14 murders respectively, the same as in 2017. With this, we registered the sixth consecutive year in which these departments head the list of the Information System regarding murders.

The department of Cauca, for example, had a 55.5% increase in murders compared to the previous year, going from 18 in 2017 to 28 in 2018. A similar situation happened with Antioquia that went from 14 to 26 murders, with an increase of 85.7% with respect to the previous year.

As a region, it is the south-west of Colombia that continues to be the most affected by the murders against social leaders, since out of the total murders registered by the SIADDHH in 2018, 41.2% (64) were committed in the departments of Putumayo, Nariño, Cauca, Valle and Chocó, 19 cases more than the year 2017.

Type of leadership of the annihilated defenders

In relation to the types of leadership and profile of the murdered defenders, as in previous years, it is the directors of the Community Action Boards who lead this regrettable list with 63 murders, compared to the 29 cases of the year 2017, which means it had a worrying increase of 117.2%. Out of the 63 murders committed against these communal leaderships, 57 occurred in rural areas and 6 in urban areas.

Type of Leadership of the assassinated defenders	Total
Communal Leaders	63
Indigenous Leaders	24
Community Leaders	24
Peasant Leaders	19
Union Leaders	7
African Colombian Leaders	6
Victims Leaders	3
Educational Leaders	3
Land Restitution Leaders	3
Environmental Leaders	2
LGTBI Leaders	1
Total, Assassinated Leaders	155

Still on the list are Indigenous authorities or leaders with an increase of 100%, since it went from 12 murders in 2017 to 24 in 2018. It is also the year with the highest number of murders of indigenous defenders. In relation to community leaders, 24 murders occurred, 4 more than in 2017. Peasant leaders were also strongly affected in 2018, since there were 19 murders against them, 4 more cases in relation to the previous year.

If we sum the 57 cases of murdered communal leaders, indigenous people, peasants and leaders of land restitution in rural areas, it becomes clear that 66.4% of the 155 murders registered in 2018, were committed in rural areas. This is a behavior similar to the previous year when most of the murders are focused on people dedicated to the defense of land and territory.


Places often disputed over for the control of illicit crops, legal or illegal mining exploitation projects, land restitution processes and in some cases recovery or liberation processes of mother earth, as is the case of indigenous people in the North of Cauca.

Out of these cases, especially those committed against peasant and communal leaders in rural areas, 19 of them are related to people dedicated or linked to the processes or programs to replace illicit crops. Some of them were part of the National Coordinator of Coca Leaf, Marihuana and Poppy Growers, COCCAM. In other cases, they were communal and peasant leaders who opposed the planting and increase of this type of crops in their territories.

Type of murder

In relation to the methods used to end the lives of human rights defenders in 2018, it is evident that out of the 155 registered by the SIADDHH, 5 murders were committed with blows or some blunt object, 13 with a knife and 137 with a firearm.

Of these cases, 7 involved signs of torture, 15 were previously reported as missing, 30 had received some type of threat and 10 cases presented an affection to a third party, that is to say that a family member or a friend was injured or even killed during the facts of the aggression.



In 2018 there were 16 murders against leader women and female human rights defenders, one less than in 2017, but it is still very serious and worrisome, since in 5 cases they could be femicides due to the extreme level of violence.

Among these cases are Diana Luz Romero Mogajes of Puerto Leguizamó, Putumayo, Sandra Yaneth Luna in Tibú, Norte de Santander, María del Carmen Moreno Páez in Arauquita, Arauca, Leidy Juliet Correa in Valle de Peque, Antioquia and Jessica Viviana Carabalí of Buenos, Aires Cauca.

More than 89% of the murders occurred under the modality of hired killers, that is, the crimes were committed by people who were transported on motorcycles and cars in which they intercepted the leaders, causing them to die with a firearm. In this way, the trend of previous years remains the same.

Likewise, the tendency of murders in the places of work, residence, nearby sites or frequented by the victims remain a constant. It means that there is a follow-up, planning and premeditation to commit the crimes, aside of

being an indicator that it is not about random murders, but that the perpetrators knew the routines and the places frequented by the victims.


Alleged responsables of the murders

In relation to the alleged responsibility for the murders committed against human rights defenders, SIADDHH found that the majority of the cases (111) were committed by unknown persons, 16 by paramilitaries, 12 by dissidents or post-demobilized groups of the FARC, 9 by the ELN and 7 by the Public Force.

Faced with the reasons why there are so many cases committed by strangers, it is assumed to be due to fear

from family community members, who fail to denounce the attackers for security reasons, given the complexity of the contexts. The other reason may be related to the fact that most of them are committed by hit men, making it difficult to determine the authorship of the murders.

But the causes may also be due to the reconfiguration of the armed conflict in several regions of the country, motivated by the demobilization of the FARC, and whose territories, controlled in the past by this armed group were retaken by others, including the ELN, the paramilitary groups or the new structures that emerged after the demobilization of the FARC, as is the case of the structure Oliver Sinisterra and Guerrillas United of the Pacific, just to mention a few.



The alleged presence of the EPL in the North of Cauca, and its strengthening in the Catatumbo, the growth

of the Caparrapos in Bajo Cauca, the increase in the criminal actions of the Pachelly in the Aburrá Valley; the re-

organization of the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia in the south of Córdoba and the Urabá Antioqueño, as well as the dynamics of criminal groups in areas of the country in which they had never been, are some of the situations that in principle make it even more difficult to determine the responsibility for the crimes committed against human rights defenders in Colombia.

Alleged responsible	2018	2017
Unknown	111	86
Paramilitary	16	9
Public Force	7	5
ELN	9	3
FARC Dissidence	12	1
Total	155	106

As in previous years, the Public Force continues to be allegedly responsible for several of the murders committed against defenders or social leaders. In 2018 the SIADDHH registered 6 cases possibly committed by the FFMM and one by the National Police, which is the case of the indigenous leader of the Sáliba People, Arnulfo Catimay Blanca. These figures demonstrate that even in a “post-conflict” process and dialogues with the ELN Guerrilla, the public force continued to carry out extrajudicial executions against the defenders in Colombia.

The ELN who despite being in a process of dialogue and negotiation with the national government in Havana, during the year 2018 was allegedly responsible for 9 murders against leaders and human rights defenders, crimes committed in the great major-

ity in the South West of the country, in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca and Chocó, since then casting doubt on their true will for Peace, such thing because they went from being allegedly responsible for 3 murders in 2017 to 7 in 2018, thus increasing in a 133.3% their criminal actions against defenders and social leaders.

For many analysts, 2018 was the year with the highest number of murders against leaders and defenders in the last 10 years, a year in which the exercise of protection of new dependencies and legal provisions should be more organized; such as decree 1066 of 2015 and its program for the protection of people at risk, decree 2078 of December 2017, which establishes a path of collective protection of the rights to life, integrity, freedom and personal safety of groups and communities, the commission of Security Guarantees and Non-repetition of Peace agreements. Even so, more than 155 people, leaders and human rights defenders lost their lives due to acts of violence.


As we have mentioned in previous reports, the protection of the government should not only reside on escorts, cars, vests and mobile phones, but also on the implementation of the routes and collective protection process already defined in the legal instruments. This is also because the levels of protection requests exceed the government’s response capacity.

It is also important for the government and the District Attorney’s office to speed up the processes of investigation of the murders and to avoid distorting the work of murdered defenders relating their cases to only

account adjustments or sentimental problems, also because the Attorney General himself acknowledged at the beginning of 2019, that there is a Sys-

tematic nature in the murders committed against defenders and social leaders.

Individual Threats



As the murders increased in 2018, the threats were the most recurrent type of aggression in this period of time, this is because the SIADDHH registered 583 individual threats, an increase of 57.5% compared to the previous year; the year in which the Information System has registered the most threats since its creation. To that extent, we could say that on average, 1.5 people were threatened per day in Colombia, with a territorial coverage of 25 out of the 32 departments in the country.

Among the forms in which the threats were presented are: the murder of a

relative with 0.3%, emails with 4.1%, text messages with 6.2%, telephone calls with 11.5%, harassment with 14.1% and pamphlets with 63.6% which means that this is still the most common way to threaten or intimidate people who are dedicated to defense or social leadership in Colombia.

In the case of Pamphlets, most of them were allegedly sent by the Paramilitary Águilas Negras group and the Colombian Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces, in many of these pamphlets they not only threatened social leaders but also journalists, politicians and the population in general. As in

previous years and although this type of information is not systematized at the SIADDHH, we learned that pamphlets continued to come out, which also referred to the “social cleansing”, threatening prostitutes, drug addicts, LGBTBI people and guerrilla members among others, with condolence cards.

Type of Threat	Total
Phone call	67
Murder of a Family member	3
Harassment	82
E-mail	24
Text message	36
Pamphlet	371
Total Threats	583

When we talk about harassment we refer to persecution actions, movement of suspicious persons in the places of residence or work of the defenders, threats or verbal and corporal aggressions and intimidation with white weapon or firearms. For the year 2018 the SIADDHH registered an increase in this type of aggression going from 50 to 82 threats of this type of harassment in 2018, that is to say that there was an increase of 64% in relation to the year 2017.


Threats committed with telephone calls also increased in relation to 2017, due to the fact that in 2018 there were

67 threats of this type, while in the previous year there were 50 cases, which represents an increase of 17 more attacks compared to the previous year.

The Departments where the greatest number of threats were registered were: Cauca with 118 cases, the Capital District with 65 cases, Valle del Cauca with 57 cases and Cesar with 29 cases. As in 2017, the department of Cauca continues to be the place with the highest number of assault records, also followed by the Capital District.

In the case of Cauca, the aggressions increased by 32.5% compared to 2017, in the capital district, Bogotá, the trend continues with a small increase of 2 cases in relation to 2017, as it went from 63 to 65 assaults in 2018.

As we had already mentioned, most of the threats registered by the SIADDHH were committed by paramilitary groups or structures, especially the Águilas Negras and the Colombian Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces, however, threats also came from armed structures such as the Pachencas, the Pelusos and Spartans. These paramilitary groups were responsible for 439 threats, that is, 75.3% of the total number of individual threats registered.



As in the previous year, those responsible for most of the threats continue to be the Águilas Negras (*Black Eagles*), with 232 threats, as we have mentioned in previous reports. This is a criminal group that is not recognized and does not exist for the judicial authorities or the public forces, but for more than 11 years they have been committing or sending threats to defenders or social leaders.

Threats that are often dismissed by the authorities or because in some cases they continue arguing that it is a way of self-threatening to be beneficiaries of protection programs, but once again we see that there are no serious advances by the authorities that can confirm or disprove this approach, and meanwhile the number of threats coming from this group continues to grow.

On the other hand, we can see that by 2018 the threats of the Colombian paramilitary self-defense group, called by the government and the public forces as the “Gulf Clan” increased, this armed group was responsible for 171 threats to leaders and defenders; compared to 2017, there was a 70% increase in responsibility for these threats, thus becoming the armed structure with the greatest number of intimidating acts committed against human rights defenders in Colombia.


Other Forms of aggression

In what corresponds to other forms of aggression recorded by the information system, we could say that the attacks decreased. If we compare the figures with 2017 there was a reduc-

tion of 30% because for the year 2018 the SIADDHH reported 34 attacks against defenders and social leaders. Compared to 2017 there was a decrease in detentions of 82%, but on the other hand there was an increase in judicial proceedings with 47.3%

increase in relation to the previous year. The theft of information also increased by 33.3%, and the difference of 2017 with respect to 2018 registered four disappearances, a fact that had not been registered in the previous year.

Areas of Aggression



During 2018, the Information System of the Somos Defensores Program registered aggressions in 28 departments including Bogotá; if we compare the figures with the previous year we see that the threats were increased in two more departments. The situation in Cauca continues to be worrisome as one more year it continues to be the area with the greatest number of aggressions recorded, since there were 153 attacks there in 2018, compared to 2017, there was


an increase of 20.4%. Assaults also increased in the departments of Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, Bogotá, Cesar, Norte de Santander and Nariño.

It is also outstanding that for 2018 there were cases in departments that we had not registered in the previous year, as is the case of Boyacá, Casanare, Cundinamarca and Vichada. We also see that there was a significant increase in attacks perpetrated in departments such as Arauca, Atlántico,

Caquetá, Magdalena, Sucre and especially Huila, which went from registering only one case in 2017 to 23 in 2018, thus reaching an annual increase of 2.200% on the aggressions committed in this department.

The departments which maintained the tendency of aggressions to lead-

ers and defenders were: Chocó with 20 cases, Meta with 15 cases, Santander with 22 cases and Risaralda with 8 cases. On the other hand, the department in which we registered fewer cases in 2018 was Tolima, since in the year 2017 there were 23 cases and in 2018 there were 12 cases, with a 47.8% decrease.



As in previous years, the aggressions are distributed in the regions that have historically been marked by the armed conflict and the dispute over armed territorial control, regions such as the south and the south west, the Urabá and Bajo Cauca regions, the Atlantic coast, the Catatumbo region, the Center Andean region and the coffee area, which does not mean that the rest of the regions do not register cases of aggressions against social leaders. What we see in the other regions is a moderate but constant record.

Balance of the figures

In the last 8 years we see an exponential growth of the aggressions committed against defenders and social leaders in Colombia. Going from recording 174 assaults in 2010 to 805 in 2018. This is due to two factors. The first is during these 8 years organizations and victims have begun to document more aggressions, in the same way they have made the accusations more visible, but on the other side also the reconfiguration of

the conflict has generated our armed structures, which dispute the control of the territories for criminal or illegal ends by putting the civil population in it and the leaders in the middle of the conflict.

We see this situation in areas such as Catatumbo, Nariño, Cauca, Valle, Antioquia and South Córdoba, places where armed confrontations and disputes over the territorial control of these armed groups have increased.

As in the previous **Piedra en el Zapato** (*Stone in the Shoe*) report, we continue to say that the Santos government ended its two terms with a "Red Balance" regarding social defenders and leaders, especially for its last semester of government where there were 523 individual assaults between the months of January-July 2018, assaults of which 94 were murders. But Duque's government did not have a good start either in relation to the protection of human rights defenders because, since its arrival at the Casa de Nariño until December 31, 2018 there were 282 assaults, of which 61 were murders.

Type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Threats	109	140	202	209	488	539	317	370	583	2957
Murders	32	49	69	78	55	63	80	106	155	687
Attacks	21	20	50	39	41	35	49	50	34	339
Detentions	11	23	26	22	23	26	17	23	4	175
Disappearances	0	6	5	1	1	3	2	0	4	22
Judicializations	1	1	1	10	8	8	9	9	19	66
Sexual Violence	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Information Theft	0	0	3	7	10	8	6	2	6	42
Total	174	239	357	366	626	682	481	560	805	4290

Database of defenders murdered in 2018 –SIADDHH–

No.	DATE	DEPARTAMENT	CITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT HE/SHE WAS MEMBER OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
1	06/01/2018	Cauca	Totoró	Alirio Sánchez	Indigenous leader and traditional doctor of the Totoró Indigenous Reservation.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
2	09/01/2018	Putumayo	Puerto Leguizamón	Diana Luz Romero Mogajés	President of Community Action Board of the San Joaquín Village, Township of Pinuña Negro.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
3	17/01/18	Antioquia	Yondó	Victor Manuel Morato	President of the Community Action Board of La Rompida Uno village, of the El Tigre Township.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
4	17/01/18	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta	Jorge Jimmy Gelis	Community leader of the Colinas del Tunal neighborhood in Cúcuta.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
5	18/01/18	Córdoba	San José de Uré	Plinio Pulgarín	President of the Community Action Board of San Pedro, which belongs to the Versalles Township, municipality of San José de Uré.	COMMUNAL LEADER	PARAMILITARY
6	19/01/18	Arauca	Tame	Luis Díaz López	Secretary of the indigenous Chapter El Juliero, of the Betoyé indigenous Town.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	NATIONAL ARMY
7	19/01/18	Arauca	Tame	Miller Díaz López	Prosecutor of the indigenous community of Juliero Betoyé indigenous Town.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	NATIONAL ARMY
8	20/01/18	Antioquia	Cáceres	Berver Victor Velásquez Vitola	Leader of the Citizen Commitment movement and cultural promoter in the region.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
9	22/01/18	Arauca	Saravena	Harley Johanny Mogollón Becerra	ASONALCA Coordinator for district N° 1, he was part of the rural coordination of the Saravena municipality.	PEASANT LEADER	ELN
10	24/01/18	Tolima	Rovira	Jaime Elver Cruz Betancourth	Vice President of the Community Action Board of San Pedro.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
11	25/01/18	Norte de Santander	Chitagá	Miguel Eduardo Parra Rondón	President of the Community Action Board of El Roble.	COMMUNAL LEADER	NATIONAL ARMY
12	26/01/18	Chocó	El Carmen de Atrato	Eleazar Tequira Bitucay	Coordinator of the Indigenous Guard of the Embera Katio del Dieciocho community, member of ASOREWA.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	NATIONAL ARMY

No.	DATE	DEPARTAMENT	CITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT HE/SHE WAS MEMBER OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
13	27/01/18	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Temístocles Machado	Community leader of the Isla de la Paz neighborhood, recognized Social Leader of Buenaventura, promoter of the 2017 Buenaventura Civic Strike.	COMMUNITY LEADER	PARAMILITARY
14	29/01/18	Cauca	López de Micay	Nicomedes Payán Segura	Prosecutor of the Community Council of Black Communities -MAMUNCIA-.	AFRODESCENDING LEADER	UNKNOWN
15	30/01/18	Bolívar	Cantagallo	Nixon Matus Sosa	President of the Community Action Board of the Chaparral village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	PARAMILITARY
16	31/01/18	Córdoba	San José de Uré	Antonio María Vargas Madrid	Treasurer of the Community Action Board of the La Ilusión village, in the jurisdiction of San José de Uré.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
17	01/02/18	Risaralda	Puerto Rico	María Yolanda Maturana	"Defender of natural resources in the border area between the departments of Risaralda and Chocó. Known for reporting illegal mining in the village of Santa Cecilia in Pueblo Rico."	ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
18	03/02/18	Bogotá	Ciudad Bolívar	Diana Patricia Mejía Fonseca	Community mother of the Cantelaria La Nueva neighborhood of Ciudad Bolívar.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
19	05/02/18	Bogotá	Usme	Carlos Eduardo Melo Ramírez	Community leader of the Antonio José de Sucre neighborhood, in Usme.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
20	06/02/18	Meta	Puerto Concordia	Dagoberto Acosta López	Sheriff of the Caño La Sal Indigenous Reservation of the Jiw Indigenous Town.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE
21	06/02/18	Norte de Santander	Tibú	Sandra Yaneth Luna	President of the Community Action Board of the Tutumito Carbonera village, from the Campo Dos Township.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
22	09/02/18	Cauca	Guapi	Jesús Orlando Grueso Obregón	Member of the Ethnic and Popular Movement of the Pacific -MOEP- and of the National Coordinator of Cultivators of Coca, Poppy and Marijuana -COCCAM-.	PEASANT LEADER	ELN
23	09/02/18	Cauca	Guapi	Jhonatan Cundumi Anchino	Member of the Ethnic and Popular Movement of the Pacific -MOEP- and of the National Coordinator of Cultivators of Coca, Poppy and Marijuana -COCCAM-.	PEASANT LEADER	ELN

No.	DATE	DEPARTMENT	CITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT HE/SHE WAS MEMBER OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
24	11/02/18	Norte de Santander	El Tarra	Deiver Quintero Pérez	Sports coordinator of the Community Action Board of El Tarra neighborhood, in the municipality of El Tarra.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
25	17/02/18	Risaralda	Quimbaya	Cristian Camilo Toro Rodas	Community leader recognized for his work of supporting the community in cultural reinventions in Quimbaya.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
26	23/02/18	Cauca	Balboa	Flores Sapuyes Gaviria	Treasurer of the Impulse Committee of COCCAM in La Esperanza village. Member of the Peasant Workers Association of Balboa ASCATBALA.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
27	23/02/18	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta	Juan Emilio Abrian Solano	Member of the Multiactiva Cooperative of the Norte de Santander workers - COOMUTRANORT -.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
28	26/02/18	Santander	Bucaramanga	Cristián Emilio Jaimes Triana	Community leader of the 10 commune in Bucaramanga.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
29	02/03/18	Putumayo	Ortito	Hermisul Larraonda Rendón	President of the Community Action Board for Los Alpes Neighborhood.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
30	05/03/18	Cauca	Caldono	Éider Arley Campo Hurtado	Indigenous Guard, Piyó Chapter and communicator of the Nasa Indigenous Town.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE
31	06/03/18	Córdoba	San José de Uré	Luis Arturo Royet Franco	President of the Community Action Board of the Santa Isabel village, Doradas township.	COMMUNAL LEADER	PARAMILITARY
32	06/03/18	Santander	Cimitarra	Victor Hugo Martínez Barragán	Legal representative of the La Esperanza Peasant Association.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
33	18/03/18	Chocó	Quibúo	Juan Mena Ortiz	President of the Community Action Board of Los Alamos neighborhood, Arrocería sector, Commune 1.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
34	23/03/18	Antioquia	Ituango	José Aníbal Herrera	President of the Community Action Board of the Mesetas de Valdivia village. Speaker of the Municipal Commission of Participative Planning and the Integral National Plan of Substitution of Crops for Illicit Use.	COMMUNAL LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE
35	25/03/18	Antioquia	Cáceres	Victor Alfredo Zabala Oviedo	President of the Community Action Board of the El Rizo village in the municipality of Cáceres, Bajo Cauca. He was part of the illicit crop substitution program.	COMMUNAL LEADER	PARAMILITARY

No.	DATE	DEPARTAMENT	CITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT HE/SHE WAS MEMBER OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
36	25/03/18	Antioquia	Cáceres	Jorge Miguel Polanco Ávila	President of the Community Action Board of the Caño Prieto village, municipality of Cáceres.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
37	25/03/18	Cauca	Caloto	José Wilson Escue Vitoncó	Indigenous Guard of the village of Los Chorros, Huellas Indigenous Reservation, Caloto.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	NATIONAL ARMY
38	27/03/18	Meta	La Macarena	Israel Fajardo	Active leader of the Community Action Board, Brisas de Itavare village.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
39	30/03/18	Meta	Mapiripán	María Magdalena Cruz Rojas	Movement for the substitution of crops in Mapiripán, Brisas del Iteviare's sector, Inspection of Rincón del Indio.	PEASANT LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE
40	30/03/18	Cauca	Corinto	Héctor Janer Latín	Nasa Indigenous leader and Liberator of Mother Earth in Corinto.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
41	30/03/18	Cauca	Rosas	Belisario Benavidez Ordóñez	"Member of the Rosas Victim Board, department of Cauca."	VICTIMS LEADER	UNKNOWN
42	04/04/18	Antioquia	Apartadó	Juana Patricia Cuesta Blandón	He was part of the Apartadó Diversity Network, he helped the LGBTI communities. He had been promoting sex education campaigns.	LGBTI LEADER	UNKNOWN
43	04/04/18	Norte de Santander	San Calixto	Álvaro Bayona Pérez	"He was member of the Peasants Association of Catatumbo ASCAMCAT. Líder del comité veredal de ASCAMCAT de San Calixto."	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
44	08/04/18	Chocó	San José del Palmar	Wilson Arnulfo Quetama Hurtado	Member of the Victims Association of San José del Palmar and the Victims Association of Palmar -ASOVICO-PAL-	VICTIMS LEADER	ELN
45	10/04/18	Chocó	San José del Palmar	Claudio Chávez	Peasant leader in the rural area of the municipality of San José del Palmar.	PEASANT LEADER	ELN
46	20/04/18	Antioquia	Turbo	James Luis Jiménez Estrada	President of the Community Action Board of Cacahual, San Vicente del Congo township.	COMMUNAL LEADER	PARAMILITARY

No.	DATE	DEPARTMENT	CITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT HE/SHE WAS MEMBER OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
47	27/04/18	Arauca	Araquita	María del Carmen Moreno Pérez	President of the Community Action Board of the Caño Rico village, in the rural area of the municipality of Araquita.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
48	06/05/18	Risaralda	Pueblo Rico	Luis Olivier González Guazona.	Indigenous leader of the Embera Chami Unified Reservation.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
49	02/05/18	Antioquia	Medellín	Edwin Albeiro Salazar Cañas	Community leader of the Andalucía neighborhood in Medellín.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
50	13/05/18	Nariño	Tumaco	Jairo Igarito Palacio	Leader and advisor of the Community Action Board of the Celbito village, Uribe Uribe township.	PEASANT LEADER	FARC DISSENT
51	13/05/18	Valle del Cauca	Buga	Gilberto Espinosa Victoria	Union leader, member of the National Union of the Agro-Nourishing System -SINALTRAINAL-.	UNION LEADER	UNKNOWN
52	14/05/18	Cauca	Corinto	Ramón Tiberio Ascue	Indigenous Nasa leader and Liberator of the Mother Earth of the Corinto reservation.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
53	20/05/18	Norte de Santander	Tibú	Miguel Daniel Bautista	Prosecutor of the Community Action Board of the Caño Grande Primavera village, Campo 2 Township.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
54	23/05/18	Valle del Cauca	Andalucía	Cristian Andrés Lozano	Union leader of the National Union of Workers of the Agro-Nourishing System -SINALTRAINAL-.	UNION LEADER	UNKNOWN
55	23/05/18	Valle del Cauca	Andalucía	Luis Eduardo Domínguez Blandón	Union leader of the National Union of Workers of the Agro-Nourishing System -SINALTRAINAL-.	UNION LEADER	UNKNOWN
56	27/05/18	Huila	Argentina	José Gabriel Muñoz Muñoz	Peasant leader of the Las Águilas village, in the municipality of Argentina.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
57	28/05/18	Valle del Cauca	El Dovio	Amílcar Yagari Siagama	Indigenous Guard of the Garrapata Reservation and former governor of that community.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
58	28/05/18	Caquetá	La Montañita	Juvenal Silva Manchola	Community leader of the Miramar village, member of the Community Action Board of Miramar.	COMMUNITY LEADER	NATIONAL ARMY
59	30/05/18	Valle del Cauca	Dagua	Delmayro Reyes González	Social leader and teacher of the educational institution El Palmer, in the municipality of Dagua.	EDUCATIONAL LEADER OR EDUCATOR	UNKNOWN

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60	02/06/18	Córdoba	Tierralta	Orlando Negrete Ramirez	President of the Community Action Board of the El Camu sector, Las Delicias, and citizen overseer of public works.	COMMUNAL LEADER	PARAMILITARY
61	02/06/18	Nariño	Olaya Herrera	Carlos Jimmy Prado Gallardo	Legal representative of the Satinga Joven movement. National delegate of the space for prior consultation of black people, Afro-Colombians, palenqueros y raizales in Nariño. Member of the Association of Community Councils and Ethnic Territorial Organizations ASOCOETNAR.	AFRODESCENDING LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE
62	05/06/18	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta	José Daniel Fino Pineda	Community leader of the 6 Commune, Cúcuta.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
63	10/06/18	Antioquia	Ituango	Francisco José Guerra Guerra	President of the Community Action Board of the El Mandarino de Ituango village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	PARAMILITARY
64	12/06/18	Cauca	La Vega	Holman Mamian	Environmental leader, recognized for having reported cases of illegal mining. He belonged to the Association of Educational Institutes and Workers of Cauca -Asoinca-, Santa Rita Educational Institution, El Ventadero branch.	ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
65	17/06/18	Cesar	Palitas	Yoiner Yesid Velásquez Rodríguez	Former student representative and youth leader of the Torcorama neighborhood.	YOUTH LEADER	UNKNOWN
66	17/06/18	Caquetá	San Vicente del Cagán	Eduardo Herrera	Prosecutor of the Community Action Board of Las Delicias village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE
67	19/06/18	Chichada	Santa Rosalia	Arnulfo Catimay Blanca	Indigenous leader of the Sáliba Town, of the Nueva Esperanza del Tomo Reservation.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	NATIONAL POLICE
68	20/06/18	Caquetá	Florencia	Luis Carlos Cabrera Segura	President of the Community Action Board of the Berlin neighborhood, in sector 4 of the Malvinas east of Florencia.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
69	21/06/18	Antioquia	Ituango	Juan Esteban López Mazo	Leader of the Community Action Board of Camelia Baja. Member of the Association of Coca growers of Ituango.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN

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70	23/06/18	Norte de Santander	Teorama	Héctor Santiago Anteliz	President of the Community Action Board of the village of San José, located in the rural area of the municipality of Teorama.	COMMUNAL LEADER	ELN
71	25/06/18	Antioquia	Ituango	José Abraham García	President of the Community Action Board of the Pascuita village, municipality of Ituango.	COMMUNAL LEADER	PARAMILITARY
72	26/06/18	Cauca	Patía	Jamer Albeiro Idrobo Navia	Peasant leader of the Balboa municipality, member of the Committee of Coca growers of the Joaquina village, with the Association of coca leave, poppy and marijuana growers -COCACAM-.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
73	28/06/18	Cauca	Caloto	Luis Erardo Fernandez Velasco	Former indigenous authority of the Jambaló Reservation. He worked as Khambuesx of the Loma Gruesa village. He was the founder and coordinator of the Youth movement of his village, as well as the coordinator of the sports committee of Loma Gruesa.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
74	01/07/18	Caquetá	San Vicente del Caguan	Camilo Valderrama	Leader of the Community Action Board of the Bruselas village. Public works coordinator of his JAC.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
75	02/07/18	Antioquia	Tarazá	Leonidis Aleiser Sierra Ortiz	Dignitary of the Community Action Board of San Agustín Bajo, El Guáimaro village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
76	02/07/18	Caquetá	Montañita	David Mejía Prieto	Former president of the Community Action Board of the Virgen del Carmen settlement. Peneya Union, in the municipality of La Montañita.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
77	03/07/18	Atlántico	Palmar de Varela	Luis Cuarto Barrios Machado	President of the citizen control oversight of Palmar de Varela.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
78	03/07/18	Chocó	Quibdó	Felicinda Santamaría Mosquera	President of the Community Action Board of the Virgen del Carmen neighborhood, commune 2.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
79	03/07/18	Nariño	Tumaco	Margarita Estupiñán Uscategui	President of the Community Action Board of El Recreo neighborhood, located in the Vaquerío village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE
80	04/07/18	Tolima	Chaparral	Ancizar Cifuentes Vargas	Peasant leader, claimant of the Chaparral lands.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN

No.	DATE	DEPARTAMENT	CITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT HE/SHE WAS MEMBER OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
81	05/07/18	Antioquia	Ituango	José Fernando Jaramillo Oquendo	Conciliator of the Communal Action Board of Pascuita.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
82	06/07/18	Cauquetá	Cartagena del Chairá	Alexander Castellano Triana	President of a Community Action Board of Cartagena del Chairá and vice president of the Peasant Association for Environmental Protection.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
83	07/07/18	Valle del Cauca	Cali	Carlos Alberto Ruiz Restrepo	Environmental leader of the sector, recognized for making constant complaints that revolved around illegal mining in the Farallones.	ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
84	16/07/18	Antioquia	Caucasia	Robert Emiro Jaraba Arroyo	Former trade union leader of SINTRAMINEROS in Cerromatoso and peasant leader of the land claiming process in Caucasia.	PEASANT LEADER	PARAMILITARY
85	16/07/18	Casanare	Tauramena	Edgar Acosta	Vice President of the Community Action Board of the Llano Lindo village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
86	16/07/18	Cauca	Caloto	Luis Eduardo Dagua Comita	Nasa Indigenous. Known for being a peasant leader and founder of the El Carmelo village.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
87	17/07/18	Cauca	Suárez	Ibés Trujillo Contreras	Leader of the Popular Unity Process of the Colombian Southwest - PUPSOC-, prosecutor of the Río Cuenca Timba Mari López Community Council.	AFRODESCENDING LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE
88	18/07/18	Boyacá	Otanche	Horacio Triana Parra	President of the Community Action Board in the El Car-men village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
89	20/07/18	Putumayo	Orito	José Osvaldo Taquez	President of the Community Action Board in the El Re-molino village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
90	21/07/18	Antioquia	Medellín	Kevin Julián León	He worked in a seedbed of the Heroes and Heroines of Love Corporation.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
91	23/07/18	Valle del Cauca	Jamundí	Libardo Moreno	President of the Community Action Board of the Las Pi-las village. Manager of the Las Pilas aqueduct, located in the village of Villacolombia.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN

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92	25/07/18	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta	Fabían Rosales Niño	President of the Community Action Board of the La Sabana village, San Faustino township, Cúcuta.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
93	25/07/18	Putumayo	Puerto Asís	Luis Gabriel Gómez	Community leader and principal of the Bajo Lorenzo Educational Institution, in the Bajo Lorenzo village.	EDUCATIONAL LEADER OR EDUCATOR	UNKNOWN
94	30/07/18	Caquetá	San José del Fragua	Raúl Buitrago Perdomo	Vice President of the Fragueta Community Action Board, also recognized for being an environmental leader.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
95	01/08/18	Cauca	Suárez	Valentín Rúa Tezada	Community leader and broadcaster of the community radio station "Salvajina Stereo".	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
96	04/08/18	Antioquia	Tarazá	Alfredo Alonso Ruiz Higuita	Leader of the Integrated Program of Substitution of crops of illicit Use in Tarazá. He had resigned to be the coordinator of the Work Committee of the Community Action Board of the Aguas Lindas village, due to alleged death threats against him.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
97	04/08/18	Antioquia	La Unión	Hernán Darío Chavarría	Leader of the Association of Barequero Committees of North Antioquia.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
98	07/08/18	Cauca	Cajibío	José Uriel Rodríguez	Member of the Association of Cajibío Peasant Workers - ATCC -, subsidiary of FENSUAGRO Cauca.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
99	08/08/18	Putumayo	San Miguel	José Edgardo Benavides	Attorney of the Community Action Board of the El Cedro village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
100	09/08/18	Putumayo	Puerto Leguízamo	Alejandro Jacanamijoy	President of the Community Action Board of the La Paz village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
101	10/08/18	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao	Emiliano Tróchez Yonda	Former counselor of the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca - ACIN - and former governor of the Indigenous Reservation of Guadalupe.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
102	15/08/18	Antioquia	Valdivia	José Vicente García Amariles	Representative of those affected by antipersonnel mines in the Municipal Board of Victims in Valdivia.	VICTIMS LEADER	UNKNOWN
103	18/08/18	Antioquia	Turbo	Luis Alberto Rivas Gómez	Member of the National Afro-Colombian Authority - Afro-Colombian - and of the Process of Black Communities - PCN -.	AFRODESCENDING LEADER	PARAMILITARY

No.	DATE	DEPARTAMENT	CITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT HE/SHE WAS MEMBER OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
104	19/08/18	Nariño	Tumaco	Holmes Alberto Niscue	Indigenous leader of the Gran Rosario del Pueblo Awá Reservation.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE
105	19/08/18	Quindío	Armenia	Marco Tulio Grajales Londoño	Community leader, recognized for reporting on crime and micro-trafficking in southern Armenia.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
106	20/08/18	Cauca	Almaguer	Huier Hoyos Rengifo	Member of the Peasant and Indigenous Process of Amaguer -PROCAMINA-.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
107	21/08/18	Santander	Simacota	Fabiola Fajardo Ayala	Environmental leader and member of the Resistance to Mining Movement in Carmen del Chucuri.	ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
108	24/08/18	Antioquia	Tarazá	José Enrique Monsalve	President of the Community Action Board of the San Antonio village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	PARAMILITARY
109	24/08/18	Cauca	El Tambo	Mary Florelia Cana Meza	Founder of the "Nuevo Despertar" Nasa Chapter in Dagua Valle.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
110	27/08/18	Caquetá	Florencia	Héctor Fabio Montoya Orjuela	Founder of the National Humanitarian Foundation for Displaced Persons and Victims Nuevo Amanecer in Cartago, Valle del Cauca.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
111	29/08/18	Nariño	Tumaco	James Celedonio Escobar Montenegro	Member of the village Board of Miras Palmas and member of the Board of Directors of the Alto Mira y Frontera Community Council.	COMMUNAL LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE
112	31/08/18	Meta	San Juan de Lozada	Óliver Herrera Camacho	Former president of the Community Action Board of Brisas del Guayabero, member of the Losada Guayabero Environmental Peasant Association ASCAL-6.	PEASANT LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE
113	02/09/18	Putumayo	Villagarzón	Amparo Fabiola Rodríguez Muchavisoy	Teacher and indigenous leader, he belonged to the Camétsa Chapter of Villagarzón.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
114	02/09/18	Norte de Santander	Ocaña	Alirio Antonio Arenas Gómez	President of the Community Action Board of the town of San Isidro.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
115	04/09/18	Antioquia	Tarazá	Norberto Alonso Gutiérrez	President of the Community Action Board of the La Envidia village and member of PNIS.	COMMUNAL LEADER	PARAMILITARY

No.	DATE	DEPARTMENT	CITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT HE/SHE WAS MEMBER OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
116	09/09/18	Antioquia	Peque	Leidy Juliet Correa Valle	Secretary of the Community Action Board of the Guayabal village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
117	24/09/18	Valle del Cauca	El Dovio	Hover Alexander Orrego	Peasant leader who was working on a land restitution process in the municipality of Dovio.	PEASANT LEADER	ELN
118	24/09/18	Valle del Cauca	El Dovio	Edixon Pariché Nisqué	Nasa Indigenous and peasant leader who was working on the process of land restitution in the municipality of El Dovio.	PEASANT LEADER	ELN
119	25/09/18	Cesar	Pueblo Bello	Wilson Chaustre Parada	President of the Communal Action Board of Casa de Zinc in Pueblo Bello.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
120	26/09/18	Putumayo	Orito	Hermínio Dovigama Leiva	Embera and Jaibaná indigenous leader (traditional doctor) of the Alto Orito Reservation.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
121	27/09/18	Huila	Baraya	Alipio Salazar Áviles	President of the Community Action Board of the Vaticano village, in the municipality of Baraya.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
122	06/10/18	Putumayo	Mocoa	Jaime Alirio Becerra Chindoy	Indigenous leader of the Caméntsá people, former minor sheriff of the Minor Chapter of Osococha, in the Yungui-Ilo Reservation.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
123	06/10/18	Putumayo	Mocoa	Elkin Farid Sijindoy Chindoy	Indigenous Leader of the Caméntsá People, former minor sheriff of the Minor Chapter of Osococha, in the Yungui-Ilo Reservation.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
124	06/10/18	Putumayo	Mocoa	Armando Mutumbajoy	Indigenous Leader of the Caméntsá People, former minor sheriff of the Minor Chapter of Osococha, in the Yungui-Ilo Reservation.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
125	08/10/18	Putumayo	Puerto Asís	Otto Valenzuela	Member of the Sustainable Integral Development Association of La Perla Amazónica ADISPA-, prosecutor of the IAC of the Frontera village and promoter of the PNIS in the territory.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
126	09/10/18	Caquetá	Catagena del Chairá	Óscar Aníbal España	Vice President of the Community Action Board of the El Recreo village, in the municipality of Catagena del Chairá.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN

No.	DATE	DEPARTMENT	CITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT HE/SHE WAS MEMBER OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
127	12/10/18	Putumayo	San Miguel	Óscar Adolfo Quenán Toro	Prosecutor of the Community Action Board of the Nueva Albania village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
128	13/10/18	Norte de Santander	Concepción	Diosel Noriega	President of the Community Action Board of the La Laguna village, Cartagenita township.	COMMUNAL LEADER	ELN
129	22/10/18	Cauca	Rosas	Carlos Trujillo Paz	Community leader of the Rosas municipality. He promoted sports, cultural and social activities.	COMMUNITY LEADER	UNKNOWN
130	22/10/18	Antioquia	Briseño	Julían de Jesús Areiza Moreno	Leader of substitution of illicit crops, cultural leader and member of the Community Action Board of the Altos de Chirí village.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
131	31/10/18	Antioquia	Tarazá	Eladio de Jesús Posso Espinosa	Treasurer of the Community Action Board of the El Triunfo village. Member of the PMS.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
132	01/10/18	Cauca	Suárez	Javier Ancizar Fernández Muñoz	Union leader of the Association of Educational Institutes and Workers of Cauca -ASOINCA-, teacher of the Educational Institution Francisco Antonio Rada.	EDUCATIONAL LEADER OR EDUCATOR	UNKNOWN
133	04/11/18	Meta	Villavicencio	Edilberto Cristancho Niño	Leader of the process of labor formalization and union growth in the Llanos Orientales (Eastern Plains) by SIN-TRAINAGRA, Villavicencio branch.	UNION LEADER	UNKNOWN
134	04/11/18	Cauca	Buenos Aires	Yessica Viviana Carabali	Afro-descendant leader, member of the Cerro Teta Community Council and the Santa Catalina village Community Action Board.	AFRODESCENDING LEADER	UNKNOWN
135	08/11/18	Cundinamarca	La Calera	Carlos Alberto Barón	President of the Community Action Board, Tunjuaque village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
136	08/11/18	Norte de Santander	Tibú	Luis Tarazona Salamanca	Prosecutor of the Community Action Board of the Miramontes village, coordinator of the ASCAMCATA village Committee.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
137	11/11/18	Meta	La Macarena	Héctor Fabio Almaino	President of the Community Action Board of the Getsemáni village, he was part of the process of replacing illicit crops.	COMMUNAL LEADER	FARC DISSIDENCE

No.	DATE	DEPARTAMENT	CITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT HE/SHE WAS MEMBER OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
138	11/11/18	Cauca	Balboa	Álvaro Paul Gómez Garzón	Member of the Community Action Board of the San Alfonso village, member of the Peasant Workers' Association of Balboa-ASCATBAL-, branch of the National Union Federation of Agricultural Unions-FENSUAGRO-.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
139	17/11/18	Cauca	Corinto	José Antonio Yule Rivera	Leader of the Community Action Board of the El Carmelo village, member of the Association of Pro-Constitution Workers for Peasant Zones Reservation of Caloto-ASTRAZONACAL-, subsidiary of the Union Federation of Agricultural Unions-FENSUAGRO-.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
140	23/11/18	Caldas	Riosucio	Serafín Díaz	Indigenous leader of the Embera people, of the San Lorenzo Reservation.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
141	23/11/18	Caldas	Riosucio	César Augusto Díaz	Indigenous leader of the Embera people, of the San Lorenzo Reservation.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
142	23/11/18	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta	Edilma Rosa Cuevas	Secretary of the Community Action Board, Aguasalal village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	EPL
143	27/11/18	Cauca	Toribío	Gladis Rivera Champeno	President of the Community Action Board, Aguasalal village.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
144	28/11/18	Magdalena	Plato	Mauricio López Cortina	President of the Apure Community Action Board.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
145	29/11/18	Norte de Santander	Tibú	José Antonio Navas	Director of the Community Action Board of the El Libano village, member of the village committee and the Peasant Guard. He was part of the crop substitution project.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
146	02/12/18	Nariño	Ricaurte	Héctor Ramiro García	Indigenous leader of the Awá People, founder of the Indigenous Organization UNIPA and of CAMAWARI.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
147	02/12/18	Nariño	Ricaurte	Braulio Arturo García Guanga	Elected Indigenous governor for the 2019 period of the Palmar Imbi Reservation, of the Awá People.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN
148	07/12/18	Cauca	Caloto	Edwin Dagua Ipia	Indigenous Governor of the Huellas Reservation of the Nasa People, member of the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca.	INDIGENOUS LEADER	UNKNOWN

No.	DATE	DEPARTMENT	CITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT HE/SHE WAS MEMBER OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
149	09/12/18	Cauca	Corinto	Gilberto Antonio Zuluaga Ramirez	Member of the Association of Peasant Workers of the Rural Zone Reserves of Corinto -ASTRA-ZONAO-, member of the peasant guard.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
150	11/12/18	Meta	Villavicencio	Gilberto Acosta Castro	Member of the Association of Peasant Families Providora de Paz (Peace Provider) -ADESPROPAPZ-.	PEASANT LEADER	UNKNOWN
151	15/12/18	Nariño	Tumaco	Esteban Romero Nuñez	President of the La Chorrera Village Board and alternate member of the community council.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
152	16/12/18	Antioquia	Vegachí	Henry Arturo González	Social leader, teacher of the Rural Educational Institution Alfredo Gómez, El Tigre Township.	EDUCATIONAL LEADER OR EDUCATOR	UNKNOWN
153	18/12/18	Caquetá	San Vicente del Caguan	Jesús Ignacio Gómez Ávila	Environmental leader, recognized for leading the popular consultation on environmental exploitation in San Vicente del Caguan.	ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
154	27/12/18	Antioquia	Tarazá	Javier Enrique Tapias Tabarez	Dignitary of the Oco Abajo village Community Action Board, member of the Peasant Association of Bajo Cauca -Asobac- and PNIS.	COMMUNAL LEADER	UNKNOWN
155	31/12/18	Meta	La Macarena	Luis Ángel Peña	Prosecutor of the Los Naranjos village Community Action Board.	COMMUNAL LEADER	ELN

CONCLUSIONS

- With the arrival of Iván Duque to the presidency, there have been some political twists in the country that have generated expectation and concern on the part of different social sectors. One of the issues of concern is the one that addresses peace; both the implementation of the agreements agreed with the demobilized guerrilla of the FARC and the continuation of the dialogues with the ELN. Since the campaign of the current president showed hesitation in front of this issue, which was still present once the change of Government was performed. There is a great debt with the development of the different points of the Peace Agreement and the interruption of the dialogues with the ELN takes us more and more away from the possibility of getting a negotiated solution to the armed confrontation with this guerrilla; added to this is the lack of acknowledgement of the existence of the armed conflict in the country, which is a denial of the reality that communities live on a daily basis in different territories.
- We have just finished one of the worst years in the field of human rights for defenders in the country, the figures of all the violations of life reached levels never before registered by the SIADDHH. Despite the seriousness of the situation and the demands of the society, social organizations and international community for the Government to generate the necessary measures to protect human rights defenders, the current president has looked elsewhere, he has decided not to give continuity to the plans agreed in the previous Government, such as the National Commission of Security Guarantees, and instead he has designed other measures such as the PAO, which does not offer solutions to dismantle violence in the territories and, in addition, it has a militaristic approach, replicating measures used in the past, such as the democratic security policy.
- Human rights defenders have been left in midst of the escalation of the conflict, the strengthening of drug trafficking and the creation of new armed groups that have forged disputes to obtain or consolidate territories. All this is derived, in part, from the low capacity of the State to occupy the areas left by the FARC guerrillas after their demobilization and the failure to implement effective strategies to intervene in the violence circles. In the midst of this situation, instead of giving priority to the protection of life, the Government has placed the orange economy at the center of its policies, when the most important thing should be to address the context of the human rights crisis in which we currently are.
- The level of impunity in cases of attacks against human rights defenders remains to be shameful. Since the 1980s, the human

rights movement in the country has demanded the cases to be heard and their investigations to be progressed on, in order to determine those responsible for the violations of the lives of the defenders. Although progress has been made in recent years to achieve this, since the arrival of the current Attorney General, the changes that could lead to lower rates of impunity have been slowed down. From the beginning he has dismissed the importance of the situation, and has chosen to use the media to send distorted messages that, apparently, give an account of a “historical clarification” but in reality, these are rhetorical games, because the figures of real clarification are much lower than those that were publicly stated.

- It is and will continue to be a permanent demand, that the Government understands the seriousness of the situation of human rights defenders in Colombia and that it generates measures to protect their lives and rights. Protection measures, such as those offered by the National Protection Unit, are not sufficient; a vest or a security scheme is not the solution for the level of violence that these defenders must face every day in the different areas of the national territory. This type of measures should be transitioned to real guarantees and to an integral intervention of the contexts of violence, so that the civilian population does not continue to pay with their lives the negligence and omissions of the governments in turn.



BULLETPROOF VOICES

Every year in Colombia dozens of human rights defenders lose their lives at the hands of people who seek to extinguish their struggles, and hundreds more are threatened to silence their words. However, every day, and despite the risks, from the different territories the resistance is the leading character.

That is why the need arises to surround them and to focus the attention on those who are threatened, so that many people get to know their ideas and understand that their work and demands are collective and transcend their communities, with a strength that allows them to have Bulletproof Voices.

This is the name of the campaign of the Somos Defensores Program, carried out with the support of Sancho Publicidad and with the participation of artists and media, which takes the stories of 11 human rights defenders who are threatened in Colombia. With different pieces we seek that the voices of these women and men reach the whole world, so that their ideas come to life and we can understand that their daily struggles benefit the whole country.

To learn more about the campaign, visit the website www.somosdefensores.org