

DEFENDERS

ENDGAME?

Semi-annual report January - June 2019

Information System on Attacks against Human Rights Defenders in Colombia - ISAAHRD -



**PROGRAMA
SOMOS DEFENSORES**
PROGRAMA GOBIERNAMENTAL DE PROTECCIÓN A
DEFENSORES DE DERECHOS HUMANOS



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2019

The Somos Defensores (We Are Defenders) Program, is a protection area that seeks to develop a comprehensive proposal to prevent aggression and protect the lives of people at risk due to their work as human rights defenders, when they protect the interests of social groups and communities affected by violence in Colombia.

The Somos Defensores program is formed by:



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MIND

Introduction

The Mind Stone

We travel through the history of this country, consumed by a lethargy situation, thinking that violence is natural, that we have grown through it and therefore belong in it. It dominates our mind. Waking up from that trance, is a must.

During the first year of the government of Iván Duque, one of the most sensitive issues on the national scene has been the permanent crime against human rights defenders and the country's social leadership. The debate is marked by frequent questions such as: Who is behind the attacks, what are the causes and what is the Government doing. The responses from the State and government institutions are diverse and marked by places and measures as common as they are precarious: Increased resources for physical and material protection, awareness campaigns, militarization of territories and government programs to mitigate. However, none of those touches the underlying problem and, therefore, do not offer solutions to face the phenomenon, although it is as old as the violence itself in the country, it has developed into a very worrying situation.

If at this time we compare Colombia to a movie, such could be *Avengers: End game*. This is because we are facing a State that seems to be under the power of *Thanos*¹, who

only with a snap of his fingers tries to return us to the past and not let us out of the chaos, preventing the truth from being known, shutting up half of the country, closing the doors to democracy and emphasizing war and militarization, again. As is the case in the film, this is done to shape society according to the interests of a small group, overcoming collective needs and rights. Meanwhile, the human rights and peace defender society makes huge efforts not to lose what was achieved with the Peace Agreement and prevent new dynamics of violence from being installed in the territories and close once and for all, the armed conflict in the country

Thus, this Report *Defenders: End game?*, parodying the movie *Avengers: End game*, wanted to go beyond the media exercise, to investigate if the official approaches are reaching the bottom of the problem and if the proposed formulas respond to the challenge of overcoming the difficulty or if they continue to go around the branches without touching its root. However, this institutional reading is complex, to the extent that it is done in the midst of a context marked by government ambiguity between pretending to defend the Peace Agreement and deliberately ignoring it from actions directed openly against its very heart. Likewise, to attempt an analysis of the role and responsibility of the State in the critical situation of social leadership is even more

¹ Thanos is a villain from Marvel comics, which appears in the movie *Avengers: End game*. Its purpose is to collect the six gems of infinity, which give him the ability to become the most powerful being in the universe. With these gems, located in a gauntlet, Thanos snaps his fingers and eliminates half of the world's population to install what he considers the ideal order.

complex, since it is necessary to distinguish between identifying the role of senior officials who have a genuine vocation to find solutions to the problem, and those that in their role of power place it at the center for their political profitability.

The report is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, ***One Snap and It's Over***, some of the actions are exposed, actions that this Government has carried out to try and erase with a single blow what others have tried to build with a huge effort, such as the alternative of a different country, and those that it has used to create from the speech of its own version of reality, above the difficult situations that hundreds of communities in the territories are evidently going through. The denial of the armed conflict and the disregard of important provisions of the Peace Agreement between the Government and the demobilized guerrilla of the FARC, are a sample of what is meant to be erased with a single snap, regardless that this could destroy the possibility of overcoming an important part of our conflicts.

The second chapter, ***The Order Through Chaos***, shows how in addition to the fact that key elements of the reality of the country are being ignored, a particular "order" is being imposed by the Government, shaped through its interests, but which is cemented in chaos and, particularly, in the return to measures from the past that were the flag of previous governments. Thus, issues such as the militaristic approach, extrajudicial executions and the old democratic security camouflaged under new names, appear. These actions of the

Government plus the reconfiguration of violence and armed conflict in the territories, leave the feeling that we're returning in time and that little by little chaos is imposed, which destroys all the efforts made by society in recent years in the defense of life and peace.

The third chapter, ***Defenders: Infinite Force***, is a recognition of the indestructible strength of human rights defenders, who despite being in the midst of fear and aggressions, do not stop working for collective rights, even risking their own lives in the process. These struggles have been increasingly evident and they have been joined by various sectors such as politicians, media, international community, organizations and the same society, which have been mobilized permanently and massively during the first semester to condemn the systematic attack of human rights defenders and to demand guarantees to protect their lives.

In the last chapter of the Report, the data analysis of the **Information System on Aggressions against Human Rights Defenders in Colombia –SIADDHH–**, which is based on the cases registered and verified by the Somos Defensores Program, is presented. This time, the results show that at the end of the first half of 2019, a decrease in the statistics of murders against social leaders was evident, which decreased by 23% compared to the first half of 2018; nevertheless, and very unfortunately, violence against these activists, in general, is maintained and has increased; due to strategy changes in in the territories, it is mainly reflected in other types of non-lethal aggressions, such as threats.

In addition, due to the strength that the conflict has achieved in the regions and the electoral landscape, it is feared that the trend will not be maintained and that the figures may increase at the end of 2019, especially those of murders.

Finally, we would like to extend our thanks to all the people and organizations that surround the work we do at SIADDHH, especially to the Center for Popular Research and Education –CINEP–, to the Colombia Europe United States Coordination –CCEEU–, to the Indigenous Orga-

nization of Colombia –ONIC–, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia –OACNUDH–. In addition, we want to acknowledge the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Colombia for its constant political and financial support, and the international cooperation agencies DIAKONIA Sweden, MISEREOR Germany, International Amnesty and Pan Para el mundo (*Bread for the World*). Their support is essential for our work and for the preparation of this report.



SOUL

In Memory

The Soul Stone

For the land, life, peace and rights, hundreds of people have delivered what is most valuable: Their soul. Although many are no longer here, their voices are not extinguished, the struggles persist in the territories.

IN MEMORY OF THE MURDERED HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

During the first half of 2019, 59 human rights defenders were murdered in Colombia. Although those who extinguished their lives sought to silence their voices, they are more alive than ever. We remember their names and the resistances they advanced for their communities and territories.

January 1st, 2019

GILBERTO VALENCIA AGRONO

President of the JAC

(Community Action Board) of Pueblo Nuevo

Suárez, Cauca

Gilberto Valencia, 32, was leader and president of the Community Action Board (JAC for its initials in Spanish) of the Pueblo Nuevo neighborhood in Suárez, Cauca. He was a musician, composer and manager who promoted artistic, cultural and sports initiatives for conflict resolution, social transformation and peace building with the youth of his territory. He led the musical group 'Los Herederos' and socialized the points of the Peace Agreement through the 'Traveling Dialogues for Peace' project. His initiative won the RECON Peace Mobilizers Forum in 2015. He was killed in an act of intolerance when trying to mediate an argument after the popular festivals of his municipality.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

January 1st, 2019

JESÚS ADIER PERAFÁN CORREA

**JAC President of the Valle del Cauca neighborhood
Caicedonia, Valle del Cauca**

Jesús Perafán was a 52-year-old man, leader and citizen overseer of the municipality of Caicedonia, Valle del Cauca. He was president of the Community Action Board of the Valle del Cauca neighborhood of that municipality and was an aspirant to the Council of Caicedonia. He was killed in a grocery store.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

January 4, 2019

WILMER ANTONIO MIRANDA CABRERA

**Member of the La Independencia JAC
Cajibío, Cauca**

Wilmer Miranda was a 34-year-old peasant leader, a member of the La Independencia Community Action Board in Cajibío, Cauca. He was a member of the Association of Peasant Workers of Cajibío –ATCC–, a subsidiary of FENSUAGRO - CUT, of the ANZORC, of the PUPSOC, of the COCCAM, of the Social and Political Coordination of the Patriotic March Cauca, and a member of the PNIS. He was killed when he was going home. The incident occurred in an area with high military presence and illegal armed groups



Alleged responsible: Unknown

January 4, 2019

JOSÉ RAFAEL SOLANO GONZÁLEZ

JAC President of El Jobo

Zaragoza, Antioquia

José Solano was a 60-year-old man, leader and president of the Community Action Board of the El Jobo village of the Palizada district in Zaragoza, Antioquia. He had been displaced from Chochó, Sucre, because of the armed conflict. He was killed with a firearm at his place of residence and on February 14, 2019, the Prosecutor's Office reported on the capture of alleged members of the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia -AGC- and syndicated as material responsible for the murder of José.



Alleged responsible: Paramilitaries

January 5, 2019

MARITZA ISABEL QUIROZ LEIVA

Alternate member in the Table of victims of Santa Marta

Santa Marta, Magdalena

Maritza Quiroz, 60, was a substitute at the Mesa de Víctimas de Santa Marta. His leadership focused on defending the rights of the Afro-descendant community and accompanying victims of displacement (especially women) because of the armed conflict. She received threats in 2018 and the Constitutional Court had requested protective measures for her life and that of other women victims of forced displacement. She was characterized by her courage in complex situations, always fighting for the welfare of the community and her family. She was a staunch supporter of the peace process. She was killed in her home, located in the village of San Isidro in Santa Marta.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

January 6, 2019

WILSON PÉREZ ASCANIO

**Member of the Popular Movement
for the Constituent –MPC-
Hacarí, Norte de Santander**

Wilson Pérez, 34, was a member of the Popular Movement for the Constituent - MPC-. He was a member of the PNIS and worked during 2018 on projects to replace illicit crops. He was attacked in Hararí on January 5 and died at the hospital in Playa de Belén due to the severity of his injuries. The area is in dispute by the ELN, the EPL and Los Rastrojos.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

January 7, 2019

MIGUEL ANTONIO GUTIÉRREZ MARTÍNEZ

**JAC President of La Victoria
Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá**

Miguel Gutiérrez, 40 years old, was leader and president of the Community Action Board of the La Victoria neighborhood in the municipality of Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá. He had received threats in the last six months before his murder, by several illegal armed groups, which he denounced at the time. He was killed at his place of residence. The National Confederation of Community Action rejected the fact. In the area, the capacity of the State is precarious and there are no guarantees of security; In addition, the presence of illegal armed groups such as paramilitaries and micro-trafficking gangs is evident. On January 13, two people were captured, accused of being responsible for the murder. However, there is no clarity about the armed group to which they would belong.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

January 15, 2019

VÍCTOR MANUEL TRUJILLO

Community leader

Montecristo, Bolívar

Víctor Trujillo was a 20-year-old artist, known in the urban genre as 'Victtote'. He was a community leader focused on youth and belonged to the Association of Agroecological and Mining Brotherhoods of Guamocó -AHERAMIGUA-. He was a member of the Board of Directors of the Association and led the manifestations of the Agrarian Strike in 2013. He lived in exile in Ecuador for three months due to security reasons; on his return he received constant threats from the National Liberation Army -ELN- and the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia -AGC-. Despite his situation, he never received protection or guarantees from the State. According to reports, on January 15 he was intercepted at his place of residence, apparently by members of the Guillermo Ariza Front of the ELN, and transferred to the 'El Guamo' village, where he was murdered.



Alleged responsible: ELN


January 24, 2019

SAMUEL ANDRÉS GALLO MAYO

Community leader

El Peñol, Antioquia

Samuel Gallo, was a 37 year old community leader of the El Peñol municipality in Antioquia. He chaired the Municipal Youth Council and was a candidate for the City Council. He was one of the most visible members of the citizen oversight that denounced Mayor Cirilo Henao and other municipal officials for corruption. Two people were captured as alleged responsible for his murder.



Alleged responsible: ELN

January 26, 2019

JOSÉ JAIR OROZCO CALVO

**Member of the Community Housing Board
of the Vista Hermosa urbanization
Cartago, Valle del Cauca**

José Orozco was a 52 year old community social leader. He belonged to the board of the Community Housing Board of the Vista Hermosa urbanization in Cartago, Valle del Cauca. He promoted a plan of urbanization and community housing in the San Fernando neighborhood for the disadvantaged populations. He was murdered at his place of residence.




Alleged responsible: Unknown

January 26, 2019

LEDE MARÍA ORTEGA ORTIZ

**Secretary of the Mundo Nuevo JAC
El Tarra, Norte de Santander**

Lede Ortega was a 32-year-old woman, who served as secretary of the Community Action Board of the Mundo Nuevo village, in the rural área of El Tarra, North of Santander. She was killed in her residence, apparently by her ex-partner. The crime was cataloged as femicide.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

January 29, 2019

DILIO CORPUS GUETIO

**Member of Asocordillera
and the Peasant Guard
Suárez, Cauca**

Dilio Corpus was a 44-year-old indigenous and peasant leader, a member of the Association of Peasant Workers -ASOCORDILLERA-, a subsidiary of Fensuagro de Cauca, and a member of the Peasant Guard. He was president in 2017 of the Committee of Cocaleros of the Playa Rica village that verified the substitution of illicit crops. He was assassinated on the Santa Barbara village in the municipality of Suárez, Cauca, when he was riding his motorcycle. In the region there are four illegal armed groups that dispute the former territories that were controlled by the FARC; there are dissidents of the former FARC, alleged paramilitary groups, ELN and EPL. Indigenous, Afro-descendant and peasant populations remain at constant risk.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

February 3, 2019

ERIC ESNORALDO VIERA PAZ

**Member of the El Palo and Astrazonacal JACs
Caloto, Cauca**

Eric Viera was a 23-year-old man who belonged to the Community Action Board of El Palo village in Caloto, Cauca. He was a member of the Association of Workers in favor of the Constitution of Caloto Peasant Reserve Areas -Astrazonacal-, a subsidiary of Fensuagro - CUT, of the National Association of Peasant Reserve Areas - ANZORC-, of the Popular Unity Process of the Colombian Southwest -PUPSOC-, and of the Social Coordination and Poli-



tical Patriotic March of Cauca. He was a rural worker who defended the peasant reserve areas against the aspirations of large landowners in territories formerly controlled by the FARC.

Alleged responsible: Unknown

February 8, 2019

JOSÉ ALQUÍMEDES MORENO FERRER

**Delegate of the T-25 Los Patios JAC
Tibú, Norte de Santander**

José Moreno was a 34-year-old farmer, former president and delegate of the Community Action Board of the T-25 Los Patios village, in a rural area of the municipality of Tibú, Norte de Santander. He was killed when he was going home. In the region of Catatumbo, there's a convergence of armed groups outside the law which fight to obtain control in the territory, leaving the inhabitants in the middle of the dispute.



Alleged responsible: EPL

February 14, 2019

MARÍA NELLY BERNAL ANDRADE

**Pueblo Pastos Indigenous Guard
Samaniego, Nariño**

María Bernal was a community member and member of the Indigenous Guard of the Pastos people in the La Montaña Town Hall in Samaniego, Nariño. It was a woman who defended the territory. She was killed while on her way home. Luis Eusebio Cadena, governor of the council, declared that they are "very sad about the loss of a member of the council".



Alleged responsible: Unknown

February 16, 2019

QUERUBÍN DE JESÚS ZAPATA ÁVILES

Representative of the Caucasia Municipal Youth Platform

Caucasia, Antioquia

Querubín Zapata was a 27-year-old leader, political activist, recognized for his community work as an advocate for the LGBTBI community and gender diversity. He also worked on projects with the Atlético Nacional team supporter groups. He denounced the confrontations between Caparrapos and Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia -AGC- for territorial control, as well as the actors that sold narcotics in the municipality. He worked with the Semillas de Paz y Progreso (Seeds of Peace and Progress) Foundation and was a representative of the Caucasia Municipal Youth Platform. He led campaigns for the prevention of drug use. He was killed in the Las Brisas neighborhood.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

February 20, 2019

ZAIRA BELLASMÍN PÉREZ HINAJOSA

Community representative,

Los Güires settlement

Arauca, Arauca

Zaira Pérez was a communal spokeswoman for the municipality of Arauca, in Arauca. She had been a candidate in the 2015 elections for mayor for the Local Administrative Board of Commune 1 and had a leadership as a community representative of the Los Güires settlement. She was attacked with a firearm on February 16 in the sector of Los Güires, Cabañas del Río neighborhood. She died in a hospital in Bogotá on the 20th of the same month.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

February 25, 2019

DEMETRIO BARRERA DÍAZ
Indigenous Guard Coordinator
for the Makaguan people
Tame, Arauca

Demetrio Barrera was coordinator of the Indigenous Guard in the Cuiloto 2 community of the Makaguan people, in rural Tame, Arauca. He had been governor of the shelter. He was the brother of the current governor.



Alleged responsible: ELN

February 29, 2019

LILIANA HOLGUÍN
Member of the LGBTI board
Caucasia, Antioquia

Liliana Holguín, 40, was a member of the Caucaasia LGBTI board and a member of the Affirmative Caribbean Toolkit, a network with educational purposes. Her leadership focused on security and self-protection actions to improve the living conditions of activists and prevent forced displacement. She also supported inclusion processes in the municipality. She was massacred by hit men when she was riding her motorcycle on the road to Guáramo - Caucaasia.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

February 25, 2019

JOSÉ FERNEL MANRIQUE VALENCIA

SUTIMAC Union Leader

Bucaramanga, Santander

José Manrique was a 34-year-old Worker's Union leader of the Building Materials Industry –SUTIMAC-. He was part of the Sectional Board of Directors. He worked at Cemex for more than 10 years and was in a situation of physical disability due to a traffic accident. He was executed in his residence.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

February 27, 2019

SONIA ROSERO GONZÁLEZ

Community leader

Puerto Asís, Putumayo

Sonia Rosero was a recognized 45-year-old doctor, a pre-candidate for mayor of Puerto Asís, who had launched a campaign of non-violence against women in the department of Putumayo. While working on an IPS, she was attacked by strangers who shot her seven times. Three days later, she died.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

March 5, 2019

MARCO ANTONIO ROMERO LOZANO

Vice-president of the Campo Alegre JAC

Cumaribo, Vichada

Marco Romero was a 55-year-old man, vice president of the Community Action Board of the Campo Alegre village at the Güerima Inspection in Cumaribo, Vichada.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

March 11, 2019

FRANCISCO JAVIER CERVANTES FLÓREZ

Community leader

Cúcuta, Norte de Santander

Francisco was a 51-year-old man, leader of the Seis Reyes (Six Kings) human settlement, located near the Cúcuta prison. He was characterized by being a leader who sought progress for his neighbors. He had a project to build a school for the inhabitants of the area, given his job as a builder.



Alleged responsible: Unknown


March 14, 2019

ALFONSO CORREA SANDOVAL

President of the La Cabuya JAC

Sácama, Casanare

Alfonso Correa was a 44-year-old social and environmental leader, president of the Community Action Board of La Cabuya village, municipality of Tame, Arauca. He was a member and founder of the Manantiales Environmental Peasant Association -ASOCAM- and a member of the Arauca Peasant Association -ACA-. He worked hand in hand with the Tame Office, offering training in human rights and international humanitarian law. He had been a victim of forced displacement in 1998 due to the massacre of five people committed by 'Los Masetos' and members of the Public Force in the village of La Cabuya. He was killed when he was going to his residence in the village of La Casirva, municipality of Sácama, bordering between Casanare and Arauca.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

March 17, 2019

JHON JAIRO NOSCUÉ TAQUINÁS

Member of the Peasant Guard

Corinto, Cauca

Jhon Noscué, 18, was a member of the Peasant Guard of the control position in the El Tablon sector on the Miravalle village in Corinto. The Pensuagro Cauca peasant organization and the community rejected the act. According to Henry Rojas, a member of the Human Rights Committee of the Farm Reserve Association of Corinto, Jhon was a young active within the community, committed to peasant security. He was killed when he came to a call for help in the middle of a shooting in the sector of La Cancha.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

March 17, 2019

ARGEMIRO LÓPEZ PERTUZ

Peasant Leader

Tumaco, Nariño

Argemiro López, 46, was a recognized leader in the substitution of illicit crops in Tumaco and former president of the Community Action Board of the La Guayacana village, Llorente district, Tumaco municipality, Nariño. He was a member of the Pro-Aqueduct Committee Espriella-Nambí and a youth soccer teacher. Since 2018 he had been recognized and certified by the Nariño Governorate for being linked to the program of substitution of illegal crops and leading it in the municipality. Argemiro had informed the authorities that his life was threatened and he had been granted a security scheme, however, in recent months it had been withdrawn. He was assassinated in his residence and his mother and wife were injured at the scene. His murder caused great consternation between the indigenous and black



communities of the towns of La Guayacana, Llorente and Espriella, where he was widely known for his work.

Alleged responsible: Paramilitaries

March 18, 2019

JOAQUÍN EMILIO JARAMILLO LÓPEZ

Prosecutor of Piedras Blancas JAC

Sonsón, Antioquia

Joaquín Jaramillo was a 63-year-old community leader, who served as Prosecutor of the Community Action Board of the Piedras Blancas village, in the San Miguel district, municipality of Sonsón, Antioquia. He promoted projects of voluntary substitution of illicit crops and worked as a merchant. The leader was murdered at his place of residence.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

March 22, 2019

FREDY YESID CHISCO GARCÍA

Community Leader

Villavicencio, Meta

Fredy Chisco was 49 years old, he was founder of the El Rubí neighborhood, a member of the Community Action Board of the same sector and leader of different neighborhoods of Villavicencio. Among the different actions that he led in favor of El Rubí is the implementation of a dike, the Ecological Reign, the planting of trees and the fight for energy service. He always expressed his dissatisfaction with the lack of support and invasions in his neighborhood by the Mayor's Office. He was killed in his workplace.



Alleged responsible: Unknown


March 25, 2019

EDWIN ANDRÉS GRISALES GALVIS

Cultural leader

Sevilla, Valle del Cauca

Edwin Grisales was a 29-year-old member of the Network of Popular Artists of the Southwest -RAPSO- and the Hip-Hop Network of Sevilla. He was a member of the Patriotic March and the Social Network for Peace. According to the RAPSO, his murder was related to his social, cultural and political activism that bothered sectors that saw his organizational work through art and culture as an obstacle. He was attacked while going home and died in the hospital.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

March 27, 2019

EBEL YONDA RAMOS

Indigenous Leader

Puerto Rico, Caquetá

Ebel Yonda was a Nasa indigenous leader who served as governor in 2010 and in 2016 of the La Gaitana council. The leader and farmer had been forcibly displaced with his entire community by the former FARC to Puerto Rico and Florencia, Caquetá. He was recognized for his work in claiming his community's lands and thanks to the peace process he had gradually returned to work in his territory. He was the only one who was gradually going to the area because the community of La Gaitana, who remains in Florence, has preferred not to return to their lands for security reasons. Ebel was killed by strangers in rural Puerto Rico, Caquetá. His wife is the current governor of the chapter.



Alleged responsible: Unknown


March 28, 2019

ERICK YAMMID TORRES BUITRAGO

Community Leader

Saravena, Arauca

Erick Torres was a youth leader, broadcaster and radio producer of the community radio station Arauquita Stereo. He was killed in a commercial establishment and his assassins left a written note justifying his death. The media said that the fact corresponds with the modus operandi of most of the selective killings in the region of Araucan foothills.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

April 7, 2019

LUCERO JARAMILLO ÁLVAREZ

JAC Secretary of Puerto Valdivia

Curillo, Caquetá

Lucero Jaramillo was secretary of the Puerto Valdivia Community Action Board in the municipality of Curillo, Caquetá. She actively participated in the substitution processes of illicit crops in the department. The Caqueta Network Development and Peace Foundation organization rejected the crime and said that the murders of members of the Community Action Boards are collapsing the organizational process of the region. She was attacked in the La Novia township and died on her way to the Rafael Tovar Poveda Hospital in San José del Fragua.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

April 10, 2019

POLICARPO GUZMÁN MAGE

ASCAMTA member

Argelia, Cauca

Policarpo Guzmán, 53, was a member, founder and first president of the ASCAMTA Farm Workers Association of Algeria, a subsidiary of FENSUAGRO - CUT, ANZORC, PUPSOC and the Cauca Patriotic March Social and Political Coordination. He had been coordinator of the Colombian Southwest Human Rights Network, Francisco Isaías Cifuentes. Years ago he had to necessarily move to Meta, where he worked in defense of human rights. Later he lived in El Naya, where he led youth processes. Weeks before his murder his life was threatened after he denounced the presence of paramilitary groups in the area and requested protection measures from the State. He was murdered when he was going to the Plateado Township.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

April 11, 2019

ANDERSON RAMIRO GÓMEZ HERRERA

Community leader

La Macarena, Meta

Anderson Gomez was a civil engineer and community leader. He worked for the consortium of ART engineers and supported the formulation and presentation of projects of the Community Action Boards of La Macarena on the villages around. He was well known for his travels throughout the rural area for 6 years. He supported and supervised executions of works carried out by the community on



the road from La Macarena to San José del Guaviare. He was supporting the solidarity agreements in the villages of Campo Hermoso and Las Delicias when he was killed. He was intercepted when he returned to La Macarena from work.

Alleged responsible: Unknown

April 12, 2019

AQUILEO MECHECHE BARAGON

Indigenous leader

Riosucio, Chocó

Aquileo Mecheche was a 52-year-old Embera indigenous leader of the Río Chintadó Reserve in Riosucio, Chocó. He was president of the Indigenous Major Cabildo of the Bajo Atrato CAMIZBA - ASOREWA and seven-year principle of the Jagual Indigenous Educational Institution. In 2018 he was one of the leaders of the Chocó Minga, which demanded guarantees of security and dignified life in the territory. Since November 2018, he requested protection from the National Protection Unit -UNP-. In March he suffered threats and harassment by members of the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia - AGC - in the community of El Jagual. He was murdered in his home.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

April 27, 2019

DIOFANOR MONTOYA URREGO

Community leader

Maceo, Antioquia

Diofanor Montoya was a 75 year old farmer and leader. He had worked for 40 years in the Community Action Board of the La Unión village in Maceo, Antioquia. Accompanied social processes with the elderly population. He was executed while working on his property.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 1st, 2019

MIGUEL ÁNGEL ALPALA

Indigenous Leader

Cumbal, Nariño

Miguel Alpala was an indigenous leader of the Gran Cumbal shelter of the people of Los Pastos, known for his defense of human rights. He was an active member of the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia –AICO–, of the Grassroots Justice Commission and of the Law School. He participated in the Sixth Organizational and Integration Minga in the Indigenous Reservation of Colimba, and had been councilor of Cumbal. He was attacked on April 16, 2019 near his home on the Cuai-ca village and transferred to the Ipiales Civil Hospital. On May 1st, he died due to the severity of his injuries.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 2nd, 2019

JOHN SALAS BARRERA

**Member of the Quebrada del Medio JAC
Ituango, Antioquia**

John Salas was a 38-year-old man, member of the Community Action Board of the Quebrada del Medio village in the municipality of Ituango, Antioquia. He worked as a shopkeeper in the rural area and was the leader of the sports committee. His murder occurred in the urban area.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 4, 2019

EDUARDO TORRES MORA

**Vice president of the La Divina Pastora
Community Council
Codazzi, Cesar**

Eduardo Torres was a 70-year-old man, who served as vice president of the La Divina Pastora Community Council, in the Llerasca township, in the municipality of Codazzi, Cesar. He was attacked in his home and died in the hospital.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 7, 2019

DIDIER FERNEY GONZÁLEZ

Member of the Indigenous Guard

Saravena, Arauca

Didier González was a 27-year-old peasant and youth processes leader, delegate of the Regional Youth and Student Association -ASOJER- of the municipality of Fortul, Arauca. He belonged to the Inter-Ethnic, Peasant and Popular Guard of the Middle East. ASOJER is a nonviolence collective, which works for Conscientious Objection to Mandatory Military Service before the Army (and armed groups). He was killed in the vicinity of the Villa Mega Educational Institution in the municipality of Saravena.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 8, 2019

MILTON HERNÁNDEZ

Leader of the Minor Council of the Iscuandé River Basin

Santa Bárbara, Nariño

Milton Hernandez was a 30-year-old man. He was a very active Afro-descendant leader of the Minor Council of the Iscuandé River Basin. Milton Hernández, Carlos Obando and his son Carlos Daniel Obando were detained in an area of the Iscuandé river in the Santa Bárbara municipality by an armed group and taken to an unknown location, as detainees. After more than 24 hours, their bodies were found in the area of Playa Bellavista.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 8, 2019

DANIEL OBANDO ARROYO

**President of the Minor Council
of the Iscuandé River Basin
Santa Bárbara, Nariño**

Daniel Obando was 30 years old, he was president of the Minor Council of the Iscuandé River Basin. He had been a candidate for the Municipal Council of Santa Barbara in 2015 for the Patriotic Union party. Milton Hernández, Carlos Obando and his son Carlos Daniel Obando were retained in an area of the Iscuandé river in the Santa Bárbara municipality by an armed group and taken to an unknown location, as detainees. After more than 24 hours, their bodies were found in the area of Playa Bellavista.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 9, 2019

BELISARIO ARCINIEGAS GARCÍA

**Community leader
Morales, Bolívar**

Belisario Arciniegas was a 38-year-old candidate of the Morales Council for the U Party, after winning the internal consultation of the Party. Before entering politics, he had a community leadership. He was always taking the concerns of the different communities to the entities of the municipality and the department. He was assassinated in the El Progreso Village.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 9, 2019

MAURICIO LEZAMA RENGIFO

Cultural leader and Movie director

Araucuita, Arauca

Mauricio Lezama was a film director. He worked as cultural manager and departmental advisor of Araucan Cinema. He was working on a project about the victims of the armed conflict and was making a short film about the life of Mayo Villareal, social leader and survivor of the genocide against the Patriotic Union -UP-. He was the promoter of the First Border Film Festival and winner of the recognition prize of regional stories granted in 2018 by the Fund for Cinematographic Development. He was murdered in the village of La Esmeralda de Araucuita, while he was performing a casting.



Alleged responsible: FARC Dissidence

May 10, 2019

WILMAR CARVAJALINO

Community leader

Morales, Bolívar

Wilmar Carvajalino was a 48-year-old Community leader from the Micoahumado district in the municipality of Morales, Bolívar. He belonged to the Agricultural and Mining Federation of Southern Bolívar -FEDEAGROMISBOL-, an active organization in the defense of the rights of miners and peasants. He was also a member of the Cootransmic transport cooperative. He was a driver of a FEDEAGROMISBOL vehicle. His killing took place when he was moving in his truck near the village of La Arcadia.



Alleged responsible: ELN


11 de mayo de 2019

LUIS MANUEL SALAMANCA GALINDEZ

Cultural leader

San Agustín, Huila

Luis Salamanca was a 64-year-old anthropologist and educator. He was known for his work as a cultural manager in the San Agustín archaeological park in Huila and his great contributions to the anthropology and archeology fields of southern Huila. He had been one of the founders of the House of Culture in the San Agustín municipality and had several studies published in the ICANH, about archeology in the Bota Caucana area. He was murdered near his home.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 14, 2019

DANIEL EDUARDO ROJAS ZAMBRANO

Indigenous leader

Caloto, Cauca

Daniel Rojas was a 44-year-old indigenous community member, serving as president of the Labor Board in the López Adentro village, of the López Adentro Indigenous Reserve in Caloto, Cauca. He was a member of the Association of Indigenous Chapters of Northern Cauca –ACIN-. His community recognized him as an outstanding social leader, sports promoter with young people, a sturdy companion of the territorial control process with the indigenous guard and authority. He was executed near his house.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 15, 2019

BENEDICTO VALENCIA

Miraflores JAC President

Puerto Rico, Caquetá

Benedicto Valencia was president of the Community Action Board of the Miraflores village, Las Guayas in Puerto Rico, Caquetá. He started in 2008 as a member of the JAC, then he was their secretary and finally became president several times, due to his commitment to the community. He was performing projects related to community roads, school transport and the defense of the territory. He had declared in the Personería of Puerto Rico within the framework of the Victims Law, for being a victim of threats, displacement and forced abandonment of his lands. He was forcibly taken from his home and found dead in San Vicente del Caguán.



Alleged responsible: FARC dissidence


May 16, 2019

AYDALI ORTEGA MARULANDA

President of the Los Hispanos JAC

Vijes, Valle del Cauca

Aydali Ortega was a nursing assistant at the Local Vijes Hospital. She was the president of the Community Action Board of Los Hispanos, El Porvenir township of the Vijes municipality in Valle del Cauca. She worked tirelessly for his community. In 2015, she filed complaints about threats against her and her husband was killed in 2017. She was murdered in rural areas.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 17, 2019

GUILLERMO LEÓN RENGIFO RAMÍREZ

Capitanes JAC President

Balboa, Cauca

Guillermo Rengifo, 31, was president of the Community Action Board of the Capitanes village in the municipality of Balboa, Cauca. He was a farmer and worked as a motorcycle-taxi driver. His life was ended while riding his motorcycle.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 23, 2019

JOSÉ HUGO DELGADO TÉLLEZ

Community leader

La Victoria, Boyacá

José Delgado, 52, was a farmer and community leader. He worked to help the people of the municipality and improve the living conditions of those who needed it most. The mayor of La Victoria rejected the act and said that José was a collaborating farmer who helped the community. He asked for a quick response to clarify this fact.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

May 24, 2019

CONCEPCIÓN CORREDOR

Community Leader

Nunchía, Casanare

Concepción Corredor was a 42-year-old woman, social leader, farmer and manager of women projects. Militant of the Green Alliance party and the Women's Commission. Recognized for having been president of the Community Action Board of La Pradera village. She was violently taken from her home by ELN men and found dead the next day, miles from her residence.



Alleged responsible: ELN

May 30, 2019

LUIS JOAQUÍN TRUJILLO GARCÍA

President of the Quebrada del Sol JAC

Santa Marta, Magdalena

Luis Trujillo was a 52 year old man. For two decades, he was president of the Community Action Board of the Quebrada del Sol village, in the Guachaca district of Santa Marta, Magdalena. He participated in the land seedbeds of the National Land Agency –ANT- in the framework of the construction of social property planning arrangements. He was killed in a nearby village..



Alleged responsible: Unknown

June 1st, 2019

DAGOBERTO ÁLVAREZ

Treasurer of the Miraflores JAC

Playa de Belén, Norte de Santander

Dagoberto Álvarez, 36, served as treasurer of the Community Action Board of the Miraflores village, municipality of Playa de Belén, North of Santander. He had filed a complaint for threats before the Prosecutor's Office, which was referred to the National Protection Unit -UNP- to take security measures. Despite this he got no answer. He was murdered in his home.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

June 6, 2019

JULIÁN ALEXANDER QUIÑONES OÑATE

President of the Guayabal etapa I JAC

Coveñas, Sucre

Julián Quiñones, 31, was the president of the Community Action Board of the Guayabal neighborhood stage I. His community remembers him as a helpful person. He had received threats in recent months as a result of the allegations he filed for alleged irregularities in several unfinished works throughout the municipality. The community leader had security measures by the Police, such as rounds and regular visits to his home. He was attacked in his neighborhood while verifying one of the works.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

June 10, 2019

FREIMAN BAICUÉ

Member of the Peasant Guard

Corinto, Cauca

Freiman Baicué was 45 years old, he was a member of the Peasant Guard of the Peasant Workers Association, Peasant Reserve Zone –ASTRAZONAC– in the municipality of Corinto. He stood out for his active participation in the defense of the territory and the construction of socio-productive projects in the community. He was killed along with peasant leader Uver Ney Villano of ASTRAZONAC.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

June 10, 2019

UVER NEY VILLANO

Member of the Peasant Guard

Corinto, Cauca

Uver Villano was a 31-year-old man, a member of the Peasant Guard of the Campesino Workers Association of the Campesino Reserve Zone –ASTRAZONAC– in the municipality of Corinto. He was recognized for his active participation in the defense of the territory and the construction of socio-productive projects in the community. He had recently participated in the Social Minga for the Defense of Life, the Territory, Democracy, Justice and Peace. He was murdered along with peasant leader Freiman Baicué of ASTRAZONAC.



Alleged responsible: Unknown

June 21, 2019

MARÍA DEL PILAR HURTADO

Community Leader

Córdoba, Tierralta

María del Pilar was a 34-year-old woman, mother of four children, who performed social leadership in a settlement in the Los Robles sector, in the Nueve de Agosto (9th of August) neighborhood in Tierralta, Córdoba. She arrived in this municipality in 2018 from Puerto Tejada, Cauca. In the settlement she was a spokeswoman for the families before the owners of the lands and the mayor's office, suggesting the latter a relocation agreement. Following this leadership, María del Pilar received death threats through a pamphlet, from alleged paramilitary parties which belonged to the Gaitanista Autodefensas de Colombia –AGC–. Days after the threat, strangers who were mobilizing on a motorcycle approached the leader in front of her home and attacked her with a firearm in the presence of one of her children, causing her death.



Alleged responsible: Paramilitaries

June 26, 2019

JOSÉ ARLED MUÑOZ GIRALDO

**Prosecutor of the Afro Unidos
del Pacífico Foundation**

Tuluá, Valle del Cauca

José Muñoz, 54, was the prosecutor of the Pacific United Afro Foundation. He was also a member of the Victims board Tuluá, where he defended the rights of persons with disabilities due to the armed conflict. He had forcibly migrated from Belén de Umbría and Anserma, Risaralda, after being the victim of an attack by the



United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia - AUC-. He had received intimidating calls telling him that he should leave Tuluá and did not file a complaint with the authorities for he feared reprisals. He was attacked while closing a commercial establishment of his property and died in a health center.

Alleged responsible: Unknown



SPACE

One Snap and It's Over

Chapter 1

The Space Stone

There are presences that move in space, they exist in that reality a few years ago and in this one itself. They are powerful, they move with their hatred and damage. They impose on us, a country in which we had already ceased to exist.

Colombia has built its history in the framework of all types of violence, from structural, cultural through direct. The definitive closure of the armed conflict by political means just seeks to stop part of the sources that feed it. The Peace Agreement between the Government of former President Juan Manuel Santos and the former FARC was a momentous step along that path, hence the importance of giving continuity to the implementation of the agreement and maintaining the negotiated exit with the ELN and, of course, finding other ways out of structures outside the law, such as submission to justice for groups associated with paramilitarism and drug trafficking.

It is precisely in this framework of violence that the social and popular leaderships of the country have moved, because defending the rights of their communities implies facing legal and illegal powers and, paradoxically, trying to get their communities out of structural violence, they become victims of direct violence. Hence the immediate relationship between the search for the definitive closure of the armed conflict, with important reforms to close the social injustice gaps, which lead to improving the living conditions of many excluded territories, the guarantees for the exercise of the defense of human rights, and as a consequence, to stop violence against social leaderships.

Consequently, the implementation of the Peace Agreement is an important contribution. First, if progress is made on point one – Integral Rural Reform – it would come closer to touching the gaps of inequality, exclusion and economic marginality in the territories where the armed conflict grew its roots, that is, the structural violence that affects peasant, indigenous and Afro-descendant sectors, especially, where most of the social leaders attacked are from. If point two of the Agreement – political participation – is fulfilled, progress would be made in the expansion of democracy by allowing, on equal terms, that forces other than traditional parties, those emerging from the peace process and those from marginalized territories, access political scenarios and public corporations, spaces that have historically been reserved for traditional parties. With this last point, the passage to cultural violence would be closed, since it contributes to legitimize these political forces and denaturalize violence against them, given the historical stigmatization suffered. This point of the Agreement, like number three – end of the conflict – takes away space from direct violence against social leaderships, leftist parties, political and independent opposition, by creating the legal political framework for the guarantees of human security. Point four – the solution to the problem of illicit drugs – is directed against all three forms of violence

(structural, direct and cultural), because many rural communities are trapped in that illegal economy due to lack of economic opportunities and, consequently, they suffer the daily signaling and the violations imposed by mafia cultures and the passivity or complicity of the State. Point five – agreement on the victims of the conflict– precisely seeks the recognition, redignification and reparation of those who suffered all forms of violence so that they never have to live through it again.

However, with the arrival of Iván Duque (August 2018) and his political party, the Democratic Center into the government, the hope for the Agreement was filled with uncertainty, and since then the context continues its movement among those who defend the implementation of the progress of what was agreed upon the reforms to follow the transition to post-agreement, peace and reconciliation, in addition to the search for complete peace; and those who attack them to prevent their progress and keep the country in the midst of chaos, violence and dispossession. Breaking peace goes beyond a single sentence, it is a commitment to the political spectrum that rules the country today. That is, to maintain the empire of chaos, because the political, social and cultural process that was being built does not suit them.

In this context, back to chaos, which does not favor the exercise of the defense of the human rights in the communities, this chapter of the report *Defenders: Endgame?* offers a look at the juncture of the first half of

2019 and shows how with a “snap”, in the best Thanos² style, the National Government aims to erase the hope of building a calm, fairer and more balanced country, particularly in terms of the perspective of peace, human rights and security guarantees with a human focus.

The “myth” of the armed conflict

During the first semester of this year, Colombia entered into a complex reality, where the contexts of violence and resurgence of armed conflict took center stage. It is true that by signing the peace agreement between the Government and the FARC, tranquility did not automatically reach all the territories, but there were many of them which moved to the post-agreement. It is also a fact that in other areas or regions the entire armed conflict was not closed, and that sort of pause in the search for political negotiation and the definitive refusal of the current government to finish the task begun by its predecessor, became a serious risk that today is a sad reality.

Conditions are currently difficult in most of the territories, and situations of risk have appeared

² Thanos is a villain from Marvel comics, which appears in the movie *Avengers: End game*. Its purpose is to collect the six gems of infinity, which give him the ability to become the most powerful being in the universe. With these gems, located in a gauntlet, Thanos snaps his fingers and eliminates half of the world's population to install what he considers the ideal order.

for communities at such a high intensity that it is suitable to speak of a humanitarian crisis. Several organizations have warned about these risks and about the existence and appearance of dynamics within the armed conflict that have made the situation increasingly complex. The International Committee of the Red Cross -ICRC-, in its annual balance of 2018, points out the difficulties that would be faced in 2019, indicating that the previous year was marked by the strengthening of dynamics by the armed conflict actors, the reorganization of armed groups, the increase of 90% of mass displacements, the increase in victims of antipersonnel mines and explosive devices³ and other actions against the civilian population, that show the difficulties which communities live surrounded by.

The complexity of what happens in Colombia led the ICRC to point out that in the country it is possible to talk about the existence of five armed conflicts, according to the actors involved in the confrontations, these are the ones that are struggled through between the Colombian State and the ELN, the EPL, the AGC and the FARC-EP structures of the former Eastern Bloc that did not accept the peace process, and one

more that confronts the ELN with the EPL⁴. Other external actors that also have interests in the territories and that exercise violence are added to this scenario of organized armed groups.

The feeling shared by many in the face of this situation is that they have returned in time, to live in the territories the same events that marked the late years of the nineties and the beginning of the new century: Civilian population living in fear, confined communities and thousands of displaced. According to the Ombudsman's Office, in the first half of this year there were 35 mass displacements involving 8,223 people, in addition, the confinement of 63 communities was recorded⁵, which affected 14,773 people.

These situations pose an undeniable reality, there is a humanitarian crisis and there are hundreds of harassed and at-risk communities; however, the Government wants to sketch on this situation its own version of the truth, denying what millions of people live on a daily basis. One of the most serious events in this context has been the denial of the existence of an armed conflict with the ELN guerrillas which has taken place under the direction of Francisco Barbosa, Counselor for Human Rights and International

³ ICRC. (March 28, 2019). The most worrying issues for Colombia in 2019. Recovered from <https://www.icrc.org/es/document/lo-que-nos-preocupa-en-colombia-en-2018>

⁴ ICRC. (December 6, 2018). Five armed conflicts in Colombia. What is happening? Recovered from <https://www.icrc.org/es/document/cinco-conflictos-armados-en-colombia-que-esta-pasando>

⁵ Ombudsman's Office. (June 11, 2019). Bulletin about mass displacements and confinements in Colombia. Recovered from <http://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/comunicados/7932/Bolet%C3%ADn-sobre-situaci%C3%B3n-de-desplazamientos-masivos-y-confinamientos-en-Colombia-desplazamientos-masivos-Defensor%C3%ADa.htm>

Relations⁶, who has cataloged this group as a criminal organization, assuring that it does not act under the conditions to be considered as part of an armed conflict and, in the process, closing any possibility of resuming the negotiations that the previous government had initiated. This statement was sustained, even, before the United Nations Organization -UN-, adding that the ELN's actions "are not framed by any ideology, nor does it imply the existence of an internal armed conflict"⁷.

But disregarding the armed conflict on the part of the Government is a general fact, it is part of the institutional speech. This was announced by the *El Espectador* newspaper in July this year, when it revealed the intention of the Iván Duque Government to give the relationship with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia a twist and limit its task in the country⁸. This would

be done, according to the media, by modifying the agreement signed with the UN to erase any mention of internal armed conflict and instead refer only to a "complex situation." To this fact the rumors on the intentions of the Government to withdraw from Colombia several programs of this organization, among them UN Women⁹, would be added.

Disregarding the internal armed conflict is undoubtedly a return to the past, a similar situation occurred during the government of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who refused to acknowledge the conflict and the State's participation in it¹⁰. Reaching that point we already went through brings high risks to the population, it would mean leaving the guerrillas outside the framework of the Geneva Conventions and ignoring the obligations set forth in the International Humanitarian Law for all parts of the conflict, including the State; in addition, it would be a way to justify the departure of organizations from the international community, which for decades have monitored the conflict and provided humanitarian support to the civilian population.

⁶ W Radio. (February 28, 2019). Why does the Government deny the existence of an armed conflict with the ELN? Recovered from <https://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/por-que-el-gobierno-niega-la-existencia-de-un-conflicto-armado-con-el-eln/20190228/nota/3870312.aspx>

⁷ Presidential counseling for human rights and international affairs. (February 27, 2019). Statement by Counselor Francisco Barbosa in the Ordinary Session of the Human Rights Council. Recovered from <http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/Prensa/2019/Paginas/Intervenci%C3%B3n-del-Consejero-Francisco-Barbosa-en-la-Sesi%C3%B3n-Ordinaria-del-Consejo-de-Derechos-Humanos.aspx>

⁸ *El Espectador*. (July 20, 2019). The twist that Duque wants in his relationship with the UN Office of Human Rights. Recovered from [https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/el-giro-que-quiere-duque-](https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/el-giro-que-quiere-duque-en-su-relacion-con-la-oficina-de-ddhh-de-la-onu-articulo-871926)

[en-su-relacion-con-la-oficina-de-ddhh-de-la-onu-articulo-871926](https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/el-giro-que-quiere-duque-en-su-relacion-con-la-oficina-de-ddhh-de-la-onu-articulo-871926)

⁹ *El Espectador*. (May 26, 2019). A not so diplomatic meeting between the Chancellery and the UN. Recovered from <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/politica/un-encuentro-poco-diplomatico-entre-la-cancilleria-y-la-onu-articulo-862657>

¹⁰ *Semana Magazine*. (June 29, 2003). The United Nations reprimands the government for ignoring internal conflict. Recovered from <https://www.semana.com/noticias/articulo/naciones-unidas-llamata-tencion-del-gobierno-desconocer-conflicto-interno/59056-3>

Within this difficult context are the human rights defenders, spokespersons for communities that are caught between the interests of armed and unarmed actors, who, in most cases, are the main recipients of the aggressions. Despite the visibility that violence against defenders has had in recent years, as the permanent attacks against them are undeniable, the Government faces the situation with its own speech about reality, stating that the killing of these activists fell by 32% between August 2018 and May 2019, and emphasizing that 96% of the national territory is free of murders of defenders, as this aggression is focused on less than 50 municipalities¹¹. This narrative has several difficulties: On one hand, it reduces the problem to killings exclusively, which is the most serious risk, yes, but leaves aside other types of aggressions that together generate environments without guarantees for the exercise of the defense of rights humans, including threats, attacks, arbitrary arrests, information theft and prosecutions, which, as analyzed in the last chapter of this Report, grew exponentially in the first half of 2019 throughout the national territory. That is, the problem of persecution cannot only be limited to murders, it is also necessary to identify the other forms of violence and their causes.

In this debate about the effects on a small number of municipalities,

the insistence of the human rights movement is pertinent to the role of state institutions such as the Prosecutor's Office and the Attorney General's Office, in relation to criminal investigations and deconstructing criminal groups, but also disciplinary to civil and military public officials, who because of their permissive attitude possibly contribute to their growth or strengthening, and others who do not fulfill their duty to guarantee the life and physical integrity of defenders and social leaders. If the problem, according to the Government, is limited to a small number of territories, why not solve it?

From a quantitative level of the attack on social leaderships, the Government lightly responds to the situation by taking advantage of the figures analyzed by OHCHR, due to the fact such this institution verifies cases of murders of defenders. However, as supported by Dejusticia investigators, Professor Rodrigo Uprimny and Valentina Roza, the Government's claim that the number of murders has been reduced by 35%, lacks methodological rigor to since i) it is based in a single source; ii) it distorts the methodology of that single source itself; iii) it compares non-comparable periods; iv) ignores the difference between correlation and causation; and v) it ignores the fact that there is an under-registration on the deaths of social leaders, which forces them to work with more complex methodologies¹².

¹¹ Presidential counseling for human rights and international affairs. (2019). Homicide report against social leaders and human rights defenders 2010-2019. Recovered from http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/Prensa/2019/Documents/INFORME%20LDDH%20ACTUALIZADO%202017%20DE%20JULIO_V2.pdf

¹² The Empty Chair (August 10, 2019). Fatal mistakes: About the alleged reduction in assassinations of leaders with

In conclusion, given the seriousness of the situation and national and international pressure, and the Government's refusal to resort to the legal instruments set forth in the Peace Agreement (matter discussed below), many officials want to conceal the reality of Colombia with their own inventions and erase everything that the international community, social organizations and civil society have built for years. This represents a great challenge for the task of all those who work for life and the construction of peace, since being the State responsible for guaranteeing the exercise of defense of human rights, it fails to respond to the constitutional mandate and, on the contrary, constantly shows resistance to advances, at least normative and political, achieved in recent years, to return to the past, in a kind of *déjà vu*.

What Peace Agreement?

The Kroc Institute¹³ is the entity responsible for following up on the 578 commitments that were created for the implementation of the Peace Agreement, which is undoubtedly an

important methodological reference to know its status. According to their third report, published in April 2019, 30 months after signing the Peace Agreement, out of that universe of commitments acquired by the Colombian State, most of them, 408 (71%) have some level of implementation, that is, minimum progress quite subject to the basic aspects of infrastructure, normativity development and FARC reincorporation programs to legal and political life. 23% (123 commitments) have been fully implemented, these are related to the end of the conflict, point three of the Agreement: The demobilization of the FARC and the abandonment of weapons. It is worth to mention, this percentage of compliance is actually the responsibility of the FARC, which demonstrates their respect for the Agreement. In 14% (80 commitments) there is an intermediate fulfillment, that is, they would be on their way to be implemented in the stipulated time. However, the serious thing about this measurement is that 34% have a minimum advance (196) and if this trend continues, they are at risk of not being implemented at all. But the most critical issue still lies in the fact that 29% of the commitments (133) have not started and probably never will. In conclusion, 63% of the total commitments acquired (329) have not yet been started.

Undoubtedly, the above mentioned leaves us with no hope, particularly for the improvement of the contexts where the victimization of social leadership is very high and, in that sense, it is important for the readers of this Report to know in detail the claims of some sub-points of the Final

Duque. Recovered from <https://lasillavacia.com/opinion/errores-fatales-sobre-supuesta-reduccion-asesinatos-lideres-duque-72926>

¹³ Kroc Institute (April 10, 2019). Third report on the implementation of the Peace Agreement: The implementation continues to progress. Recovered from <https://kroc.nd.edu/news-events/news/tercer-informe-sobre-la-implementacion-del-acuerdo-de-paz-la-implementacion-sigue-progresando/>

Peace Agreement, which develop a public policy framework to advance on guarantees for the exercise of social leadership and the defense of human rights, such as sub-point 2.1.2 and 3.4, which have been unacknowledged by the government of Iván Duque, and if some of the instances therein contained have been cited, it is more a question of political pressure than conviction, a pretension that they are taking them into consideration.

Goodbye guaranties, hello chaos

The peace process between the National Government and the demobilized guerrilla of the FARC, was consigned in the Peace Agreement. But to create a real path to the different points (6) included in it, the Implementation Framework Plan (hereinafter PMI) was created, which develops sub-point 6.1.1, and which is considered a public policy tool to instrumentalize everything that was agreed upon. Thus, the PMI became the benchmark for future national governments (3) to include the Peace Agreement in their development plans and thus guarantee their sustainability over time.

The PMI takes each of the six agreements and breaks them down into five parts each. In the first one, it makes a diagnosis of the situation in relation to the right or rights that the point of the Agreement deals with; subsequently, it takes up the objectives of the Agreement, the basis of the right that was negotiated, the proposed goals, the strategies to achieve it and the plans and

programs that must be performed in order to carry them out. This Plan also has as a basis the legal norms that the Government presented to the Congress of the Republic in the process known as FastTrack, but that faced with the large number of obstacles placed by the traditional banks, most of them were excluded via decree laws, issued by the President of the Republic.

But given the importance of the issue of guarantees for the success of the peace process as a whole and the security implications also for social leadership and human rights defenders, this Report analyzes the central aspect related to security guarantees, which transcends the scope of former combatants – incorporated to civil and legal life-to also shelter communities, other political opposition and social sectors and, of course, their leaderships, which is considered in point 3.4 regarding security guarantees and fight against organized crime, which is framed within point 3, *End of the conflict*.

It is not a finished policy, nor legal provisions that are finished and necessarily harmonious with the rest of the ordinary regulations that already exist, in fact there are contradictions between them, but it does identify an approach to touching the root causes of high crime in Colombia.

• Background in security guarantees

Perhaps one of the most sensitive issues to build trust between the parties (Government and guerrillas) and make progress regarding the

dialogues and subsequent reincorporation to civil life, were the guarantees to prevent murder, attacks and other physical aggressions, given the history of high crime against sectors of opposition and guerrillas of the past that demobilized and which militants were not protected by the State, and they were literally, physically exterminated. This is the case of the liberal guerrillas in the 50s who, by taking advantage of an armistice, lost their main leaders, once demobilized. But the recent history is also remembered, the genocide against the Patriotic Union political movement, which was born as a result of a peace agreement between the FARC and the National Government. This political movement was practically finished after the murder of more than three thousand of its militants, where their main territorial and national political leaders fell, including senators, representatives to the House, councilors, deputies, mayors and presidential candidates. But there is also the case of the Esperanza, Paz y Libertad (Hope, Peace and Liberty) political movement, which was born from the Peace Agreement between the Government and the former EPL guerrilla. This movement suffered at least 763 attacks against ex-combatants, out of which around 300 were murders, allegedly committed mostly by the FARC¹⁴.

With these and many more antecedents, the issue of security guarantees was fundamental in the

process and was included in sub-point 3.4 of the Peace Agreement, which is also directly related to point 2, *Political participation: Democratic opening to build peace*. The creation of criminal groups at the service of the political and economic elites of the country to attack these emerging political groups is not only a phantom that threatens, but a reality that takes shape on a daily basis, hence the importance of the point of guarantees to advance on the peace process in general and the reinstatement of ex-combatants, in particular. But 3.4 also relates to point 5, that of victims, since they are so, for having been attacked in the face of a State that not only did not guarantee their rights to be part of the opposition, to dissent or to be different, but they also directly criminalized them.

This programmatic axis of guarantees is transcendental, because in addition to contributing to seal the trust pact between the Government and the FARC, which maximum expression is the definitive closure of the armed conflict, materialized in the definitive cessation of attacks, hostilities and offensive actions by the Public Force, it implies to stop affecting the civilian population in the territories where it takes place. To a large extent, the “end of the conflict” will be successful with the economic and social reintegration of FARC members into legality and security guarantees¹⁵. Analyzed in

¹⁴ Open Truth. (November 21, 2014). EPL extermination in Urabá, crime against humanity? Recovered from <https://verdadabierta.com/exterminio-de-epl-en-uraba-crimen-de-lesa-humanidad/>

¹⁵ FARC and National Government. (2017). Framework Plan for the Implementation of the Final Agreement (PMI). Recovered from [https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%C3%B3micos/3932_Anexo%20B_Plan%20Marco%20de%20Implementaci%C3%B3n%20\(PMI\).pdf](https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%C3%B3micos/3932_Anexo%20B_Plan%20Marco%20de%20Implementaci%C3%B3n%20(PMI).pdf)

detail, sub-point 3.4 of the Agreement, consisting of 13 multidimensional points, has an interesting breakdown of public policies that, if applied in a systemic and effective manner, such as the vocation of a democratic State, would approximate a structural policy to reach the roots of the problem of political violence that affects so many sectors of the country and that would have as a centerpiece, the dismantling of paramilitary groups and other criminal structures. Because of its importance, this Report will only analyze some of them, without discrediting the importance of the rest.

Guarantees, transversal axis for the success of the Peace Agreement

Among the main regulatory provisions that gave life to sub-point 3.4 is the Integral Security System for the Exercise of Policy –SISEP– (developed in sub-point 2.1.2. through Decree Law 895 of 2017), which in sub-point 3.4.7, introduces all the components of security guarantees; on one hand, the regulation of the “prevention and alert system for rapid reaction to the presence, actions and / or activities of the organizations, facts and criminal behaviors that jeopardize the rights of the population and the implementation of the Final Agreement” developed by sub-point 3.4.7.1. and instrumentalized through Decree 2124 of 2017. In addition, the strengthening of the Early Warning System that depends on the Ombudsman’s Office is proposed. The intention was to adapt it to the needs of the armed post-conflict context and that prevention and rapid responses from the State itself were functional to the Peace Agreement.

Within this adjustment, it was established that the Early Warning System must “articulate with the High Level Instance of the Integral Security System for the Exercise of the Policy, the National Commission of Security Guarantees and the Special Investigation Unit for the Dismantling of Criminal Organizations”, established as one of the specific objectives of article 5 of the Decree. What is most important about the Early Warning System, is not only the ability to alert on possible situations of rights violations, but the quick or immediate response of the State itself to avoid the consummation of the facts. Thus, the entity responsible for acting immediately on an alert call is the Ministry of the Interior, which must activate the Intersectoral Commission for the Rapid Response to Early Alerts for Quick Reaction -CIPRAT¹⁶-, which consists of the Ministries of the Interior and Defense, the Military Forces, the National Police, the National Protection Unit, the Special Administrative Unit for the Integral Care and Reparation of Victims, and, as guests, the High Presidential Councils for the Post-Conflict and for Human Rights

Likewise, in sub-section 3.4.7, we find the creation of the High-Level Instance of the Integral Security System for the Exercise of the Policy (sub-point

¹⁶ This Commission already existed, but it was called the Inter-Sectoral Commission for Early Alerts, CIAT, created by Decree 2890 of 2013. However, to adapt it to the Peace Agreement, other functions and institutions were added, so its current name is CIPRAT, which was established in Decree 2124 of 2017, which regulates the Early Warning System, herein analyzed.

3.4.7.2.). The meaning of this instance is to contribute to “create and guarantee a culture of coexistence, tolerance and solidarity that dignifies the exercise of politics and provides guarantees to prevent any form of stigmatization and persecution.” But perhaps, the most interesting thing about this device is the security approach that respects human dignity and humanism highlighted in it, making a qualitative leap, at least in the theoretical framework, and thus overcoming the focus on military security. This will coordinate all other instances and devices created to ensure the prevention, protection and investigations related to the security of ex-combatants, and of the political movement arising from agreements, opposition parties, social organizations and leaderships, and vulnerable communities.

The National Commission for Security Guarantees –CNGS– (which develops sub-point 3.4.3), created via Decree Law 154 of 2017, was left with the mandate of “designing and monitoring public and criminal policy regarding the dismantling of the criminal organizations or behaviors responsible for homicides and massacres, that attempt against human rights defenders, social movements or political movements, or that attack or threaten the persons involved in the implementation of the Agreements and peacebuilding, including criminal organizations that have been named as successors of paramilitarism and its support networks. The Commission will also harmonize these policies to ensure their execution”. It is, perhaps, one of the boldest political and normative instruments created so far, to face

the dismantling of paramilitarism and organized crime. Therefore, perhaps, from the FARC, the human rights movement and left-wing political sectors, a lot of expectation was put into it, to the extent that it was chaired by the President of the Republic and all the heads of the ministries responsible for the matter such as Defense, Interior, Justice, and State institutions, like the Attorney General’s Office, the Prosecutor’s Office and the Ombudsman’s Office, Military Forces, but also civil society delegates, including three experts¹⁷ on paramilitary matters and two on human rights platforms.

The Special Investigation Unit (developed in sub-point 3.4.4), was created by Decree Law 898 of 2017 within the Office of the Attorney General “for the dismantling of criminal organizations and behaviors responsible for homicides and massacres, which attempt against Human rights defenders, social movements or political movements or that attack or threaten people who participate in the implementation of the agreements and the construction of peace, including criminal organizations that have been designated as successors of paramilitarism and its support networks”¹⁸. In view of this criminal

¹⁷ Actually in principle, these three quotas were for the FARC, however, because by the time that the Decree was issued they had not yet demobilized, they had to look for paramilitary experts to represent them; nonetheless, when the FARC was legalized, the decree was no longer modified and those delegates remain the same, except one delegate who resigned.

¹⁸ High Commissioner for Peace. (November 24, 2016). Final agreement for the termi-

investigation instrument, expectation was also created because it complements the purpose of the CNGS very well, since based on the results of its investigations into attacks on human rights defenders and ex-combatants, it would provide substantial information for the construction of the dismantling policy. In fact, in the PMI, this product has four indicators. However, the Attorney General's Office has eclipsed the expected role of this Unit¹⁹. What also causes fear is that the contribution to the dismantling of paramilitarism and organized crime, is not carried out.

The Elite Corps of the National Police for Peace (developed in sub-point 3.4.5) is the instrument created to complement the previous ones and its mission is to make the policies and guidelines against organized crime effective, by giving immediate response to dismantle the criminal organizations responsible for homicides and massacres or that are threatening human rights defenders and social and political leaders²⁰. This police device, at least in theory, is

important, since for the first time, a State security body is committed with a peace approach, as a complement to the Attorney General's Office, the National Protection Unit and other institutions, as an immediate response of the State to dismantle criminal organizations that attack social leaders, politicians and human rights defenders. At the time, the conformation of the Elite Corps was announced with 1,088 men, out of which 120 would be experts in criminal investigation and 40 analysts who would contribute to the investigations of the Attorney General's Office²¹.

With Decree 660 of 2018, the Integral Security and Protection Program for Communities and Organizations in the Territories is created, which develops sub-point 3.4.8, but also instrumentalizes articles 14 and 15 of Decree Law 895 of 2017 (SISEP). It is an ambitious program articulated to several of the devices mentioned before to prevent and protect vulnerable communities and social leaderships. Although it is a new instance, many of its components, approaches and provisions already existed. The novelty lies in the intersectoral relationship with the other State and Government institutions such as the Ombudsman's Office (SAT), Attorney General's Office, National Protection Unit and territorial entities, to achieve its objective. It also has other innovations but,

nation of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace. Recovered from <http://www.altocomisionadopalarapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf>

¹⁹ The Special Investigation Unit in principle was going to concentrate on investigating crimes against social leadership and ex-combatants, however, the first cases were assumed by the Office of Public Safety of the Attorney's Office and the Unit was assigned only the ex-combatants.

²⁰ National Police. (June 16, 2017). With 1088 police officers, the Elite Corps for Peace is launched. Recovered from <https://www.policia.gov.co/noticia/1088-policias-se-pone-marcha-cuerpo-elite-paz>

²¹ National Police. (June 16, 2017). With 1088 police officers, the Elite Corps for Peace is launched. Recovered from <https://www.policia.gov.co/noticia/1088-policias-se-pone-marcha-cuerpo-elite-paz>

in fact, innocuous, such as the creation of community promoters for peace and coexistence, which do not acknowledge the existence of root-based organizations in the communities, which are, by their nature, calls to help resolve conflicts before the absence of the State.

a. The systemic approach of guarantee instruments

Taken together, the previous regulations provide a public policy framework for guarantees in the exercise of the defense of human rights and social and political leadership, as well as a systemic approach, as they are all complementary and compromise the main government and state entities responsible for the prevention, protection and investigation of human rights violations and criminal acts against various sectors. Of course, many of these issues were already developed or at least included in norms prior to the Peace Agreement. However, the innovation is that in the Agreement and the PMI they are associated holistically, with a theoretical framework of human dignity or humanistic approach, on one hand, but they also point to a fundamental issue: The dismantling of paramilitarism and organized crime. This point involves touching regional and national power structures associated with armed conflict, dirty war and criminality, given the functional nature of their economic and political interests. It also implies to deconstruct a thought within the Colombian State that legitimized the violence against social movements, leftist parties and social and popular leaderships, anchored in the National

Security Doctrine and the concept of internal enemy. Moving towards a Doctrine for Peace, which is what has been discussed.

Nevertheless, and precisely because of the high depth involved in implementing these policies embodied in point 3.4 of the Agreement on security guarantees, today a large part of them are paused or not functioning. On one hand, the government of Juan Manuel Santos was not giving them the necessary momentum for the advancement and appropriation by the responsible institutions. In the case of the CNGS, 19 meetings of the human rights subcommittee were actually held and at least 3 full meetings of the Commission chaired by the President himself, however, this had become an accountability and diagnosis body for institutions, but it never took the required step towards its original mandate: To advance in the construction of the policy of dismantling paramilitarism. On the part of the current government of Iván Duque the situation is more critical, who in addition to ignoring this and all other instruments, he pretends he recognizes it and even cited it on January 30, 2019, but then turned it into a minor commission, adviser and consultative of the Plan of Timely Action –PAO– and deprived of all its nature.

The other instances and instruments designed are in worse conditions, as the current government does not mention them and completely ignores them in its government agenda, clearly reflected in the National Development Plan. About the SISEP, the Elite Police Corps and the Protection Program we

never heard again, despite the great needs of the territories.

Likewise, the Implementation Framework Plan –PMI– is filed, as well as Conpes 3932²², created to instrumentalize these policies in order to promote the sustainability of peacebuilding measures carried out between 2017 and 2031²³. In that sense, there will also be no additional resources in these coming years for the development of sub-point 3.4 of the Peace Agreement for the 15-year period that was established.

In conclusion, the country is going through a setback of public policies to attack crime against social and popular leaders in many regions of the country, despite the qualitative leap that occurred with the Peace Agreement. The importance of applying all these regulations synergistically and as a whole takes effect in the debate, given that, as already stated, it was not created only for the demobilization of the FARC but to generate security guarantees for other sectors, actors and spectra of the political and social life of the country, including organizations and social leaders.


Resistance before the snap

Perhaps those who have most sought and pressed for the cessation of violence in Colombia is the organized society, whether in the social movement, human rights or other organizational references. Hence the insistence on participation in peace processes or at least their incidence. In that sense, in the development of the negotiation of the sub-points regarding guarantees, the human rights platforms had an important impact, so in their construction there was not only the intervention of the Government and the FARC, but also of the society, which always saw in the CNGS a powerful instance to help overcome the causes that generate so much violence. Therefore, in the composition of the Commission there is participation of delegates of the human rights platforms and experts in the paramilitary matter.

Now, as already mentioned, given the indifference of the Government with the CNGS and with a spirit to advance in the construction of public policy for dismantling organized crime, the delegates of the society designed a proposal, which is presented below, given the value in the search to generate guarantees for the exercise of the defense of human rights.

²² Conpes 3932, Guidelines for the articulation of the framework plan for the implementation of the final agreement with the instruments of planning, programming and monitoring of public policies of the national and territorial order. June 29, 2018. Bogotá, D.C.

²³ FARC and National Government. (2017). Framework Plan for Implementation of the Final Agreement (PMI). Recovered from [https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%C3%B3micos/3932_Anexo%20B_Plan%20Marco%20de%20Implementaci%C3%B3n%20\(PMI\).pdf](https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%C3%B3micos/3932_Anexo%20B_Plan%20Marco%20de%20Implementaci%C3%B3n%20(PMI).pdf)



Prepared by civil society commissioners.

It is also important to highlight how vital the proposal of the CNGS and its mandate is for the human rights platforms to make progress on the guarantee policy. In that sense, they understand it as a special instance or tool for a context of transition and peace building, as conceived by sociologist and expert Vilma Liliana Franco²⁴.

It is conceived in a different way by the national government and some state entities. For example, evidence in statements given to the media, by Attorney Fernando Carrillo when he asked the CNGS “to strengthen protection of social leaders who are

candidates for regional elections on October 27 ...”²⁵, ignoring their true mission and confusing their work with those of the National Protection Unit –UNP–. On the other hand, the National Government through the Peace Commissioner Miguel Ceballos, goes much further and this is evidenced in this tweet:²⁶

²⁵ El País Newspaper (August 15, 2019). The Prosecutor calls to reinforce protection of social leaders who participate in elections. Recovered from <https://www.elpais.com.co/colombia/procurador-pide-que-se-refuerce-proteccion-a-lideres-sociales-que-participan-en-elecciones.html>

²⁶ El Espectador Newspaper (January 16, 2019). Duque convened a National Guarantees Commission. Recovered from <https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/presidente-duque-convoco-comision-nacional-de-garantias-articulo-834275>

²⁴ Open truth. (July 27, 2018). Bittersweet balance of the National Security Guarantees Commission. Recovered from <https://verdadabierta.com/balance-agridulce-la-comision-nacional-garantias-seguridad/>



In response to @ComisionadoPaz:

"The National Commission of Security Guarantees convened by @IvanDuque for January 30, will coordinate initiatives with the Civil Society and Human Rights platforms to protect the life and integrity of the social leaders along the National Territory".
@ComisionadoPaz

Source: Twitter.

On the other hand, although the CNGS has not advanced in the mission entrusted in the Final Peace Agreement, government officials insist on its success, with statements such as the following:



The High Commissioner for Peace @ceballosarevalo and the Interior Minister @NancyPatricia_G highlighted the progress achieved at the meeting with the National Commission for Security Guarantees led by President @IvanDuque, with attendance from the Civil Society.

Source: Twitter.

It is clear that for the National Government, the CNGS is just one more instance, without any particularity within the context of transition and, therefore, gives it the role of an advisory and consultative commission of the PAO, as noted in the following text enunciated by the Peace Commissioner, Miguel Ceballos, after the CNGS session on January 30:

The meeting of the National Security Guarantees Commission, chaired by the President of the Republic, has just ended. This space is the result of peace agreements and has a special feature: In addition to being chaired by the President of the Republic, the Minister of the Interior, within the attendance were the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Defense, the Attorney General of the Nation, the Prosecutor

of the Nation, the Ombudsman, and there is a very important civil society component. That is the special feature of this Commission.

Within the participants are three civil society experts, chosen during the peace agreements, and the two directors and leaders of the country's largest human rights platforms. These five people are part of a constructive analysis that involves consultation and advice. This is a consultative and advisory body, but it has a special component, and it is the complementarity of the strategy on protection and defense of social leaders, led by the Minister (*we did the undelining*).

The good news for the country is that this space of the National Commission for Security Guarantees will coordinate all actions, with a space that the Minister has been creating and strengthening in the six months of this Government, the Timely Action Plan (PAO) (*we did the undelining*), which the Minister²⁷ will now explain to us.

So if it were not for the civil society commissioners in this space, it would surely not even be called to comply with political and media pressure.

²⁷ Presidency of the Republic. (January 30, 2019). Statement by the High Commissioner for Peace and the Minister of the Interior at the end of the meeting of the National Commission for Security Guarantees. Recovered from <https://id.presidencia.gov.co/Paginas/prensa/2019/190130-Declaracion-Alto-Comisionado-Paz-Ministra-Interior-Comision-Nacional-Garantias-Seguridad.aspx>



TIME

The order through chaos

Chapter 2

The Time Stone

Where are we? Hadn't we been through this before?

Is this a déjà vu? We have gone back in time!

Eliminating what was built and the processes of change in the country has had a very clear intention that is to establish what the Government considers an order, but that has really been founded on a chaos that has consisted, as seen in the previous chapter, in ignoring the reality of the territories, in leaving aside part of what was agreed upon in the Peace Agreement and in hindering the civil society initiatives to advance in the guarantees of security in the territories and in the construction of peace.

In the establishment of that order, proposals and policies offered as novelties have been made, but these are clearly a step back in time, since they are based on approaches applied by previous governments and that do not pose deep solutions for structural problems, such as historical violence and the armed conflict. The communities in the territories have felt as in the last year the contexts have changed and issues such as security give the impression that the past has returned and that it is going through situations that were believed to have been already overcome

Military Forces: Back to the Past?

- **Extra-judicial Executions**

The security and defense policies of the successive governments of Uribe,

far from achieving the objectives they proclaimed, generated several negative results, with repeated violations of human rights being the most serious. They failed to militarily defeat the insurgencies or any armed groups, also to seize effective control of the territory or win “the war on drugs”, which has demonstrated a resounding failure in its militaristic and punitive approach, currently opening an intense international debate. Based on that experience, one could deduce where President Duque’s policy is headed and what the costs would be.

About this possibility there have already been alerts, specifically about the return of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, misnamed “false positives”, which were one of the paradigmatic cases of human rights violations in the period 2002-2010. About the figures of executions in this period there are statistical differences. The lowest record, based on data from the Attorney General’s Office, is around 4,400 young people killed in this way, while victims and human rights organizations have approached the high record of 10,000, as recorded in the recent study of the researcher Omar Rojas Bolaños²⁸.

However, what is most alarming, in addition to the fact that the truth

²⁸ Rojas Bolaños, Omar Eduardo; Benavides Silva, Fabián Leonardo. (2017). Extrajudi-

about this prolonged episode of state crimes is never known nor are the victims fully repaired, is that it might be repeated. There are sufficient reasons to consider it. In mid-May this year, the American newspaper *The New York Times* published a report by the journalist Nicholas Casey, under the headline *The lethality orders of the Colombian army put civilians at risk, according to officials*²⁹ where the existence of a worrying directive is addressed within the Military Forces that requires its units to increase the number of casualties in combat, captures and surrender of members of armed groups, as well as increase the frequency of attacks and operations against their structures.

As it was presented in the report, this guideline was shared with fifty generals and colonels during a meeting in January this year, cited by commander of the Army, Nicacio Martínez. There, they were also given a document entitled *Objective Planning*³⁰, with which they were asked to draw up operational goals for the year 2019, based on the results of 2018, in order to duplicate them.

cial executions in Colombia, 2002-2010. Blind obedience in fictional battlefields. Bogota. University Santo Tomas.

²⁹ New York Times (May 18, 2019). *The orders of lethality of the Colombian army put civilians at risk, according to officials*. Recovered from <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2019/05/18/colombia-ejercito-falsos-positivos/>

³⁰ EEl Tiempo Newspaper. (May 19, 2019). This is the document from the Army that questions the 'New York Times'. Recovered from <https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/esta-es-la-directriz-del-ejercito-que-segun-el-new-york-times-incentivaria-los-falsos-positivos-363776>

This pressure to generate results is highly risky, especially because of the way in which the instructions were generated, since, for example, one of the orders of the directive speaks of "not demanding perfection" and about "launching operations with a 60 or 70% credibility and accuracy", which can surely translate into effects on the civilian population, seen from the perspective of 'collateral damage'. This order, associated with the scheme of incentives or sanctions depending on military results, pays the ground for extrajudicial executions to return, taking into account that several military officers involved in investigations for these cases were recently promoted by President Iván Duque, including Commander of the Army, Nicacio Martínez.

After the publication of that article, a great controversy was created in the country, due to the possibility of generating new episodes of extrajudicial executions. Because of that, a couple of days later, the Army commander, in an interview with the *El Tiempo*³¹ newspaper announced the withdrawal of this directive, because, according to him, people outside the institution misunderstood him. This decision undoubtedly responded to the pressure of public opinion. This is also confirmed by the fact that in the same week President Iván Duque announced the creation of an independent commission to analyze the orders of the Armed

³¹ El Tiempo Newspaper. (May 21, 2019). Army commander talks about the controversial directive. Recovered from <https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/comandante-del-ejercito-habla-sobre-la-polemica-directriz-364530>

Forces, to ensure that the procedures adjust to the norms of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law³².

Despite the seriousness of this fact, the situation did not stop there, months later, the *Semana Magazine*³³ revealed that a persecution ordered by General Nicacio Martínez was being carried out inside the Army, to find those responsible for delivering information to the media about the directive to double the results and the subsequent pressure and threats of which several soldiers were victims with the publication of the *New York Times* report. Due to an investigation by the Attorney General's Office that the *Semana Magazine* learned about, it was revealed that in order to carry out the "hunt" for the people who offered information, a counterintelligence group was created to perform tests on several military members, such as interviews and polygraph.

All these situations reveal a part of what happens within the Military Forces and the scope they may have with their directives, in particular, with the orders of the current commander, which lead to possible

human rights violations and revive the Ghost of extrajudicial executions. With this, the power of the Military Forces and the need to take care of their own interests become evident, especially when it recently came out that General Nicacio Martínez himself prepares a directive for the military personnel who resort to any instance of the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition³⁴, with what he intends to generate a unified narrative, that is, an institutional truth, which represents a risk for the search of truth regarding the armed conflict in the country and it constitutes an affront to the victims who have been long waiting for it.

Democratic Security 2.0.

Several similarities around the security and defense policy of the two presidential terms of Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2006) (2006-2010) and the current government of Iván Duque Márquez can be highlighted.

The first of these is the emphasis on citizen cooperation. In the National Development Plan 2002-2006, entitled *Towards a Community State*, it was stated that the National Government would promote the voluntary cooperation of citizens with the Public Force, establishing a network of one million citizens and a

³² New York Times. (May 25, 2019). Colombia announced that it will review military orders to guarantee human rights. Recovered from <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2019/05/25/colombia-ivan-duque-ejercito/?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fnyt-es>

³³ *Semana magazine*. (August 25, 2019). The general in his maze: The secrets of the hunt that involves the army commander. Recovered from <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/investigacion-sobre-la-caceria-en-el-ejercito-involucra-al-general-nicacio-martinez/629193>

³⁴ El país Newspaper. (August 21, 2019). The Colombian Army prepares a coordinated version about the conflict. Recovered from https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/08/19/colombia/1566244001_904750.html

rewards program³⁵ as a pillar. In the current Defense and Security Policy, the National Government promotes a Civic Participation Network, with a similar approach and based on the principle that citizens are primarily responsible for their own protection³⁶. There is already enough information about the irregularities within those networks of cooperators promoted by Álvaro Uribe, such as their composition by paramilitaries and how these collaborated with the strategy of criminalization and mass judicialization in different parts of the country, especially against the social movement, popular leaders and human rights defenders. Now, President Iván Duque intends to develop a similar project in his policy with the aforementioned network, which, according to the defense minister himself, has rapidly multiplied the number of affiliates³⁷. It is presented as a permanent communication channel between citizens and authorities, in addition to its multi-purpose vocation: It will supposedly serve to confront crime,

to prevent and deal with disasters, for early warnings before potentially dangerous situations, among others.

A second but by no means less important similarity, is the zoning and prioritization of areas of the country to develop military strategies for territorial control and recovery. In the first presidential term of Álvaro Uribe Vélez they received the name of Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones - ZRC - announced for the first time in Decree 2002 of 2002³⁸. This decree justified the declaration and delimitation of these areas, arguing the growth of the actions of criminal organizations, the “mimicry of its members within the civilian population”, the sources of economic support that existed in the places where these organizations operated, the risk and helplessness suffered by some populations, among other reasons. One of the pilot projects that sought to demonstrate the effectiveness of institutional actions in these areas, was the Integral Consolidation Plan of La Macarena –PCIM–, carried out by the Integral Action Coordination Center –CCAI–, with nefarious results for the region and the breach of the main objectives of the Project.

In the presentation of the Comprehensive Intervention Strategic Zones –ZEII–, conceived as the first stage of a process called *From military control to institutional control*

³⁵ National Planning Department. (2003). National Development Plan 2002-2006. Towards a Community State. P. 45. Recovered from <https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/PND/PND.pdf>

³⁶ Ministry of Defence. (January 2019). Defense and Security Policy. For Legality, Entrepreneurship and Equity. P. 58. Recovered from https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/Prensa/Documentos/politica_defensa_seguridad2019.pdf

³⁷ El Colombiano (Newspaper). (February 9, 2019). The name of the network of cooperators is changed, but it is the same. Recovered from <https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/cambian-nombre-a-la-red-de-cooperantes-pero-es-lo-mismo-C110188912>

³⁸ Ministry of Interior. Decree 2002 of 2002. Recovered from http://www.secretariassenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/decreto_2002_2002.html

of the territory, the current National Government sets forth similar reasons to implement them, adding as a novelty that they will also be chosen and delimited based on the reserves and natural resources found there. As in the ZRC, in the ZEII the presence of military units will prevail, although President Iván Duque intends to disassociate from the strategy described in Decree 2002 of 2002, speaking of an accompaniment through the unified action of the State. In the document it is discussed about the provision of essential basic emergency services by the Military Forces, while the minimum security conditions are created so that the public institutions responsible for it can arrive³⁹.

The third meeting point between the security and defense policies of Álvaro Uribe and Iván Duque is about military intelligence. In both cases, strengthening intelligence and unifying policies and actions between agencies is a priority. Through Law 1288 of 2009, the Uribe government fortified intelligence and counterintelligence in its agencies, functions and scope. One of the most outstanding chapters is the one that deals with the creation of the Joint Intelligence Board - JIC - and its nature. A year later, and already during the government of Juan Manuel Santos, the Constitutional Court

declared that law unenforceable and so it perished.

However, Iván Duque intends to revive its spirit, raising the need to strengthen the JIC and adopt, for the first time, the National Intelligence Strategy, a guiding document for the action of these agencies through the National Security Council, for ten years⁴⁰. Although intelligence and its agencies are a fundamental part of the objectives and structure of States, particularly in Colombia, it has been used in the counterinsurgency strategy and framed within the fourth generation wars with the American doctrinal support, producing phenomena such as the interceptions and illegal follow-up to public officials, political leaders and other personalities, popularized under the name of 'chuzadas' (to pinch, which refers to interceptions on mobile or landlines), judicial assemblies to university students, teachers and social leaders, illegal captures and raids, extralimitations of the Military Forces and such organizations of intelligence, whose most iconic case is that of the Administrative Department of Security –DAS–, among others. It should be noted that military intelligence in Colombia has been used illegally and perversely to criminalize social and human rights movements, as stated in the Stop Wars report: Stop the war against

³⁹ Ministry of Defence. (January 2019). Defense and Security Policy. For Legality, Entrepreneurship and Equity. P. 37-38. Recovered from https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/Prensa/Documentos/politica_defensa_deguridad2019.pdf

⁴⁰ Ministry of Defence. (January 2019). Defense and Security Policy. For Legality, Entrepreneurship and Equity. P. 73. Recovered from https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/Prensa/Documentos/politica_defensa_deguridad2019.pdf

defenders of the Somos Defensores Program⁴¹.

In addition to these similarities in security and defense approaches and policies, Álvaro Uribe and Iván Duque have in common the denial of the existence of a social and armed conflict in Colombia, as well as the attribution of the public order alteration to drug trafficking, the insecurity problem and the increase of violent acts. In this way, they deprive the Colombian State of any responsibility (by action or omission) against the criminalization of social leaderships, but, in addition, it only accuses individuals of such violence, as if the State had no national and international legal responsibility to respect, protect and guarantee the physical integrity of citizens, especially those that are most vulnerable.

From PAO to a Conpes

As already stated in previous points, the country has instruments that if applied, there would approximate to face crime against social leadership. The current government argues that there is much dispersion in the existing instruments and has no clarity about which entities are responsible for them, on which it must be rationalized, but instead, he

committed to the PAO and ignores those other instruments, such as it has already been analyzed and will be reiterated later.

On the other hand, while analyzing the various speeches, pronouncements and calls of senior State and Government officials – Like the President, Attorney, Ombudsman, Prosecutor, Minister of the Interior – they all talk about improving protection for these people, but without jumping into the sphere of a robust and binding public policy that goes to the bottom of the problem, which guarantees the exercise of the defense of human rights. Each institution has been concerned with directives and resolutions (*softlaw*), however, they are not binding or compelling, much less demanding, or subject to administrative law. Therefore, this narrow reading and limiting measures by the Government and State, have direct consequences in the human rights approach, and it places human rights defenders as an object of protection and consequently, the policy is directed exclusively to the people who are threatened or vulnerable, but not to the universe of social leaderships with all their diversity, while the opposite is pursued with a guarantee policy that contemplates all these people, not as subjects of rights, whether or not they are at risk, and it vindicates their work as a right per se.

⁴¹ Somos Defensores program. (2017). Stop Wars: Stop the war against defenders. Intelligence in Colombia: The dark side of the Force. Episode II. Recovered from <https://somosdefensores.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/STOP-WARS-EPISODIO-II-Inteligencia-en-Colombia-El-lado-oscuro-de-la-fuerza.pdf>

A sample of the abovementioned is the *Pact for Life* signed in Apartadó, Antioquia, on August 23, 2018. In this pact, the creation of a public policy of protection and prevention was raised. Subsequently, as a development of the same, the National Government,

headed by the Ministry of Interior and the National Planning Department, presented as a “bold” public policy response to address the problem of violence against social leadership, the fulfilment of a Conpes⁴², for which they convened civil society for participatory design. Initially, there are two concerns: Does the fact that a Conpes has economic resources (in fact the National Protection Unit - UNP - already has them) is enough to curb crime against social leadership? But, also, is it an indicator that the Government will continue on the path of *softlaw* public policy, which does not generate structural changes? Hence, in Colombia the phrase “a Conpes is not denied to anybody” is popular, since it is the instrument of the Executive with which difficult situations are “beaten” and which is generally based on budgetary matters.

However, although economic resources are fundamental in public policy, because without them it cannot be instrumentalized, the murder of human rights defenders and social leaders is not necessarily overcome because there is a budget, the UNP is a clear example. The Conpes is another soft measure, “with no teeth”, limited to the Executive branch, which will not have any capacity to transcend

to the bottom of the causes that generate such criminality

No exaggeration meant, designing a Conpes to which resources, goals and indicators are assigned, would not require the participation of society and so many resources in its preparation and, contrary to the arguments of the National Government, nothing guarantees that it will be fulfilled merely on the fact of having indicators and resources, because it is a policy immune to administrative law, which means it does not generate lawsuits. A recent example is Conpes 3932⁴³ created to execute the Framework Plan for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement and that the current Government completely ignored, with no consequences whatsoever.

In summary, consistent with the centralist, militaristic and technocratic position, evidenced in its *National Security Policy* and in the *National Development Plan*, the government of Iván Duque bet from the beginning to an easy way out of the situation of high criminalization against the social leadership in the country.

UNP Reengineering

One of the routes outlined by the PAO was to improve the National

⁴² The National Council of Economic and Social Policy, Conpes (for its initials in Spanish), is an advisory body and coordinator of the Executive branch, and as the name implies, it is the main advisor in the field of economic and social development. Conpes Document 3196 Legal Regime of the National Council of Economic and Social Policy -Conpes- compilation of the Conpes documents period 1998 - 2002. July 31, 2002.

⁴³ National Planning Department. (June 29, 2018). CONPES Document 3932 “Guidelines for the articulation of the Plan Framework for the Implementation of the Final Agreement with the planning, programming and monitoring instruments for public policies of the national and territorial order”.

Protection Unit - UNP - which he called reengineering. This process is an indicator of continuing to focus on strengthening the physical and material protection of threatened persons, which has often been acknowledged as the prolongation of the problem without seeking to solve it:

Protection... **Is limited to devices to protect the physical integrity of the protected person in a given area, but limited to a very small universe** of people given the high budgets required and the complexity of procedures to access them. However, its greatest weakness lies in not attacking the causes of the problem. **All national governments, without exception, have focused their expectations on this aspect, disposing of huge resources.** Today, the National Protection Unit has a budget close to one billion pesos, but without solving the problem⁴⁴.

Today the UNP counts on 2,044 staff plant, of which 76% are for assistance - escort service -, 17% are technicians, 6% professionals, 0.1% advisors and 1% managers⁴⁵. It also has a budget of 688 billion pesos, which is much larger than that of the Interior Ministry itself (486 billion) on

which it depends, and it also doubles the Ministry of Culture, for example⁴⁶.

A 102-page document presents the redesign of the institution that currently manages four major protection programs: 1) General program for the prevention and protection of the rights to life, freedom of integrity, security of persons, groups and communities. 2) Special program of integral protection for leaders, members and survivors of the Patriotic Union and the Colombian Communist Party. 3) Specialized protection program of security and protection. 4) Route of collective protection for the rights to life, integrity, freedom and personal security of groups and communities within the framework of the general protection program.

According to the reengineering proposal, the changes are of a structural and procedural nature, and the main objective is to lighten the processes of attention to the beneficiaries, that is, to reduce the time to respond to the high demand for applications and grant protection measures. According to the institution, protection service is currently provided to 7,434 people⁴⁷. For this, it is also suggested to decentralize territorially, to make use of more and better technology, and to consolidate differential approaches.

⁴⁴ Rural Week (January 13, 2019). Why protection measures for social leaders do not work. Recovered from <https://semanarural.com/web/articulo/por-que-no-funcionan-las-medidas-de-proteccion-para-lideres-sociales/775>

⁴⁵ National Protection Unit. (January 2, 2019). Reengineering of the General Program of Prevention and / or Protection of Competition of the UNP. Page 17. Recovered from <https://www.unp.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/resol-0001-2019.pdf>.

⁴⁶ National Protection Unit. (2019). Resolución No. 001 of 2019. Recovered from <https://www.unp.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/resol-0001-2019.pdf>

⁴⁷ National Protection Unit. (2019). Reengineering of the General Program of Prevention and / or Protection of Competition of the UNP.

Reengineering is broad (26 strategies), however, in general, there are three main axes: On one hand, perhaps the most substantive change is the merger of two instances responsible for the risk study and the taking of measures such as *the Preliminary Assessment Group –GVP– and the Risk Assessment Committee and Recommendation of Measures –CERREM–*, so that the two processes become one and the responses are more agile⁴⁸. On the other, the articulation with other governmental instances and, especially, the coordination with the PAO, to which it will respond mission-wise. Also, a series of projects and internal programs of the UNP to improve the institutional functioning for the improvement of the quality of the service.

This implies, of course, an increase in personnel, which at least in the process of risk assessment and quality control analysts will be 200⁴⁹ (merger GVP and CERREM), but surely, in other units, the extension will also be necessary.

But in general terms and if wanted, in the background, reengineering will not modify the situation of vulnerability in the country, of course, it will improve the attention on people.

But this behavior also corresponds to the Legislative branch, since they

make no pronouncement addressing the phenomenon, as if the maximum forum for the creation of public policy had nothing to do with the solution of the unconstitutional phenomenon, as if it were a matter concerning the Executive branch alone and it should be treated lightly, as described in the previous paragraphs.

The Prosecutor's Office, Many Boards and Little Research

Senior State officials, such as the Prosecutor General's Office, adopt a style of public management in which they are practically assumed as everyday citizens and resign to their public ministry investiture as a body of control and discipline of public officials, that is, the new concept of governance is assumed, as proposed by Darío Martínez Jurado, according to which:

A new government method, public management and administrative action in a neoliberal order, in which the prominence of public powers is reduced, the profiles that differentiate the public from the private are blurred, the hierarchy relations are reduced for the benefit of cooperation relations, informal procedures are promoted and it is about integrating and engaging society in networks for decision-making and monitoring and control of political actions⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ National Protection Unit. (2019). Reengineering of the General Program of Prevention and / or Protection of Competition of the UNP. Page 70.

⁴⁹ National Protection Unit. (2019). Reengineering of the General Program of Prevention and / or Protection of Competition of the UNP. Page 78.

⁵⁰ Martínez, Darío. "The Administrative softlaw and its Judicial Control in Colombia". *Digital Magazine of Administrative Law*, Externado de Colombia University, No. 20, 2018, pp. 289-343. Recovered from <https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/Deradm/article/view/5467/6975>

In that sense, the current Prosecutor Fernando Carrillo has outlined his public policy for the protection of human rights defenders and social leaderships in two main areas: One, Directive 002 of 2017, already referenced in previous reports and the Tables for the campaign Lifetime. These two strategies, however, are far from the mandate of political control that the Public Ministry has to disciplinarily investigate public officials who, by action and omission, have responsibility in the aggressions of which social leaders and human rights defenders in Colombia are victims of.

Although the high official Carrillo has stood out due to his frequent pronouncements in favor of social leaderships and has condemned before the media the permanent attacks that they are victims of, the results of his work are really poor.

Regarding the cases of disciplinary investigation, the Prosecutor General's Office conducts 31 investigations, out of which 26 are in the hands of the Delegate for the Defense of Human Rights and five by regional and provincial Prosecutor's Offices⁵¹. But, in addition to the low number of investigations, most of them (23) are in preliminary investigation, five in investigation and three in complaint evaluation. But even more regrettable is the fact that, out of this universe of investigations, only one has been

initiated under the framework of Directive 002 of 2017, which the Prosecutor launched with great fanfare, for the protection of social leadership in the country. That is, in a little more than 2 years only one investigation has been opened, the rest (30) are old and will surely remain in the state in which they are.

However, the previous statistics are not compensated with the phrase of Prosecutor Carrillo in one of his calls to the Second Bureau for the Protection of Life, according to which *"Colombia claims concrete actions in the fight against impunity. Social leaders demand justice, security guarantees and protection. The country must mobilize in defense of life. Let us prevent barbarism from marking our destiny"*⁵², as if the Prosecutor General's Office were not one of those entities obliged to investigate disciplinarily, to block the passage to impunity and to guarantee the right to life and personal integrity.

With these poor results, the inefficiency of the Prosecutor General's Office to go to the bottom of the problem and contribute to attack the causes that generate high crime against rights activists in their communities becomes evident, such as the role of State agents in national and territorial matters. But it could

⁵¹ Office of the Attorney General of the Nation. (July 24, 2019). Response to the right of petition made by the Somos Defensores Program. P. 3-12.

⁵² Prosecutor General's Office. (August 21, 2018). The Prosecutor general's Office will lead Second Table for the Protection of Life with the company of President Iván Duque. <https://www.procuraduria.gov.co/portal/Segunda-Mesa-Proteccion-Vida-Apartado.news>

also be interpreted as if the control entity considered crime to be a third-party problem, of individuals, and the State has nothing to do, even in its role as the guarantor of rights for its citizens, as the National Government think.

On the other hand, Prosecutor Carrillo has focused part of his agenda for the protection of social leaders at the Table for the Protection of Life, in listening to social organizations in the territories, following up on public policy and carrying out a campaign with the media and civil society (#LideraLaVida) and sensitize society about the importance of the role of social leaders. According to the control body, this strategy is done in the framework of prevention

Although he has carried out many actions of vigilance and exhortation to different public officials for the fulfillment of what is established by the Peace Agreement in different matters, in relation to the issue of guarantees for social leadership, ex-combatants and in general for the exercise of the politics, his role is not evident.

Attorney's Office: A lot of noise and few results

In previous reports of the Somos Defensores Program, the work of the Attorney General's Office regarding the investigation of murders against human rights defenders has been recognized, both the normative efforts (resolutions) and the progress

in the investigations⁵³, which has been product of the commitments acquired by the entity with the human rights platforms in the National Guarantees Process⁵⁴. However, it also insists that the results are not satisfactory and that there is a media strategy of the entity to show a high level of clarification (between 58% and 60%), when the reality is different. Next, some weaknesses that are questioned by civil society:

- **The Universe of investigated cases**

The Attorney's Office, by the time of Néstor Humberto Martínez, decided to prioritize the cases that have occurred since the signing of the Peace Agreement forward, that is, starting in 2016. The previous ones, from 2015 and backwards, he left in the hands of the Special Unit of Research. This new institution born from the Peace Agreement is responsible for investigating all cases of murdered social leaders and FARC ex-combatants, however, the Attorney's Office, in a skillful maneuver, assigned the Unit only the oldest cases, of which no Information is available, and the Citizen Security Unit

⁵³ Somos Defensores Program. (2019). The Orange Clockworks. Recovered from <https://somosdefensores.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/informe-somos-defensores-2019-espanol-web.pdf>

⁵⁴ The National Guarantees Process is a space for dialogue between the National Government and State institutions, and the human rights platforms and social sectors, created in 2019 to search for an exit from the high criminality against defenders and social leadership.

assumed the new ones, from 2016 onwards. It was never known why the Attorney's Office made that decision, unless behind it there was a political opportunism for the media profitability of the issue.

It would be expected that with the important contribution of 7 billion⁵⁵ pesos that the European Union has just made the Special Investigation Unit to help strengthen its mandate to investigate crimes against social leadership, the results will be effective and a contribution to the dismantling of organized crime will be achieved, but also to establish the responsibilities of State agents in that criminality.

• Sources of information

Although there are several sources of information that monitor, follow up and observe the situation of

human rights defenders and social leaderships, including the State and the Ombudsman's Office; The Attorney's Office handles several presentations to show the use of the sources, which confuses and does not specify whether it is true that they are taking into account all of them or only the ones from OHCHR.

The following presentation shows all sources: UN⁵⁶, Agrarian Summit, Patriotic March and Ombudsman's Office with numbers and percentages of clarification of each, however, the analysis of the information is not very well understood, because with another graph, they only inform about the investigations which source is OHCHR⁵⁷.


⁵⁵ Attorney General's Office. (July 8, 2019). The Office of the General Attorney of the Nation and the European Union launch project to support investigations of murders against social leaders. Recovered from <https://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/fiscal-general-de-la-nacion/fiscalia-general-de-la-nacion-y-union-europea-lanzan-proyecto-para-apoyar-investigaciones-de-asesinatos-de-lideres-sociales/>

⁵⁶ It refers to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

⁵⁷ Attorney General's Office. (June 7, 2019). Investigation and Judicialization Strategy for Crimes against Human Rights Defenders. Office of the Deputy Attorney General of the Nation. Report presented to the General Assembly of the human rights platform, Coordination Colombia Europe United States. Bogota.



Infographics provided by the Attorney General's Office



Infographics provided by the Attorney General's Office

In this last graph, as in its communications and responses to requests for information, the Attorney's Office only accounts for investigated cases, which source of information is OHCHR⁵⁸.

• The Clarification

In the previous report of the Somos Defensores Program⁵⁹, a critical and comprehensive analysis was made of how the Prosecutor's Office created a media strategy to show

⁵⁸ Attorney General's Office. (July 22, 2019). Response to the right of petition made by the Somos Defensores Program, signed by the Delegate Attorney.

⁵⁹ Somos Defensores Program. (2019). The Orange Clockworks. Recovered from <https://somosdefensores.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/informe-somos-defensores-2019-espanol-web.pdf>

how quickly they make progress on the clarification of murder cases against social leadership. Today the Prosecutor's Office continues to state that the clarification is 60.21%⁶⁰. These figures, which he shows as an important achievement should be accurate, then it would be above the average of homicide investigations in general, which would be 26.86%⁶¹. However, we insist that the clarification⁶² does not correspond to the argument given by the Attorney's Office, therefore, that percentage of legal truth is not true so far.

The Attorney's Office⁶³ declares that out of 289 cases investigated between January 1, 2016 and July 3, 2019, as a historical fact, it has reached 60.21%

clarification. However, according to the concept already stated, the numbers do not match:

33 cases have a sentence: A figure that would certainly be giving clarification, that is, only **11.41%**; However, the Attorney's Office cannot claim the success of all those cases, because out of the 33 with sentences, **4 are from the indigenous special jurisdiction**, which means that, for sure, the clarification achieved by the Attorney's Office is only **10%**, percentage on which the Attorney's investigation has always gravitated on the cases of defenders. This data is historical, because of it has always happened.

55 cases are in trial: Although it is the last stage of the investigation, the process cannot yet be considered solved. It corresponds to a **19%**.

43 cases with imputation of charges: This is 15%, phase prior to the trial stage, therefore, much less can be said of clarification, more with the questions that exist about the lightness with which many prosecutors come to the formulation of imputation.

40 cases under investigation with arrest warrant: 13.8%, It is too early on the initial stage of the investigation to include it in the concept of clarification.

3 precluded cases: For reasons of the passing of the suspects involved. However, these cases cannot be taken as solved, since the preclusion implies non-termination of the process and, therefore, it will not be known who was responsible.

⁶⁰ Attorney General's Office. (July 22, 2019). Response to the right of petition made by the Somos Defensores Program, signed by the Delegate Attorney.

⁶¹ Attorney General's Office. (April 15, 2019). First trimester: Homicides dropped and the solvability of violent deaths increased. Recovered from <https://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/noticias/primer-trimestre-el-homicidio-cayo-y-el-esclarecimiento-de-muertes-violentas-aumento/>

⁶² Legally, clarification is understood as the culmination of the entire process of investigation, punishment and prosecution of a case with a conviction or acquittal, that is, at least it reaches the legal truth. However, when the process ends with an acquittal, it is not possible to speak of clarification either, since when the person or those who were judged were not responsible, the crime remains in impunity because it is not established who the responsible party or parties are.

⁶³ Attorney General's Office. (July 22, 2019). Response to the right of petition made by the Somos Defensores Program, signed by the Delegate Attorney.

115 cases under investigation stage:

Meaning 39.7% are in the preliminary stage.

Finally, it is unknown if all cases with a sentence are condemnatory or there are some with judgement of acquittal, because if so, we cannot talk about clarification, without having identified those responsible for the fact.

Finally, the Attorney's Office and the Special Investigation Unit⁶⁴ do not account for the percentages on the dismantling of organized crime, as their responsibility indicates. Before an alleged clarity of the entity about who is behind the attack on social leadership, there must be a correspondence.

⁶⁴ Ministry of Justice and Law. Decree Law 898 of May 29, 2017. Recovered from <http://es.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/DECRETO%20898%20DEL%2029%20DE%20MAYO%20DE%202017.pdf>



POWER

Defenders: Infinite Strength

Chapter 3

The Power Stone

Infinite is the strength of all those who fight for life,
who persist in their defense despite the weight of fear. Our greatest power is hope.

In the best style of audiovisual narratives, human rights defenders in Colombia are true fighters for democracy, given the role they play in their communities to curb violence and improve their living conditions. Thus, they perform feats in the contexts where they defend collective rights, many of which end up in heroic results such as curbing land dispossession, diversion of a riverbed, mining exploitation of a wasteland, or making progress in the substitution of Crops for illicit use. But they also end tragically with the murder of those social leaders who opposed corruption, the exploitation of minerals, the imposition of huge crops and extensive livestock, generators of dispossession and displacement, or the direct violence of armed actors.

But despite all these risks in the territories and the volume of attacks on social leadership, as noted in this report, the work of these people for the sake of their communities is unstoppable, and with an infinite force they permanently demonstrate to the Colombian State that in the defense of their territories, they risk even their own lives.

They have fought these several struggles for decades, made invisible, stigmatized and in midst of the State's indifference, of the society itself and of an armed conflict that has extinguished hundreds of lives

along the way. However, due to the intensity of the violence that has hit those leaderships, in recent years, the country stopped ignoring the seriousness of the problem and understood that the thousands of attacks and the hundreds of murders are not something casual, and that throughout Colombia there are still many people at risk for fighting for the rights of their communities that, ultimately, are also our rights, even for those who ignore it.

When the Democratic Center took over the government (August 2018), they did not imagine that a large part of Colombian citizens has changed their vision in the face of war and peace. The impact of the reinstatement of the FARC on civil life led to the construction of important retaining walls in the population, to defend what was reached in the agreements and prevent the return to the past. That is reflected in different spaces and actions. In the Congress of the Republic, for example, the 'Bancada Alternativa por la PAZ' (*Alternative Bench for Peace*) did an important job to prevent progress on the objections presented by the President against the JEP; in the creation of opinion movements such as 'Defendamos La Paz' (*Let's Defend Peace*), from where important actions are carried out for the life of the social leaders, the implementation of the Peace Agreements and the search for continuity of the conversations

with the ELN. From the Senate Peace Commissions and the House of Representatives, who perform their sessions in highly conflictive territories to make political control over the territorial and state governments in front of the protection and guarantees for human rights defenders and communities in general. Citizen mobilizations such as those carried out on July 26 against the murder of social leaders are also indicators of the defense of life and peace. But, in the same measure, from the State institutions the Peace Agreements have been legally defended, as is the case of the Constitutional Court.

During the first semester of 2019, there have been many initiatives with which the issue has been exposed to public opinion and that have called to surround the defenders and make a permanent claim for the guarantee of their rights. The media has played a very important role in this task, they have been in charge of making the issue visible, of going deep into the problem and the lives of those who defend rights, of generating a responsible coverage and of joining the convenings that have been called from different sectors of civil society about events, campaigns and mobilizations, which during this semester have been diverse and massive.

One of the first major mobilizations that took place this year was the Humanitarian Shelter for Life, held between April 28 and May 2 in Bogotá⁶⁵, which called for human rights defenders from across the country, who traveled to the Capital District, settled there for a week and developed an agenda of daily demonstrations

that sought to raise awareness of the risk situation in which communities are in the territories and, in particular, the threats that fall on those who work for the defense of collective rights, in the middle of a proliferation and positioning of various armed groups and the insufficient presence of the State that has had a historical inoperability that is aggravated in times of crisis like the current one, due to the lack of measures to guarantee life and rights.

During the days of the event, the defenders toured the streets of Bogotá, met with the international community, spoke in front of the Congress of the Republic, were spokespersons in front of the media and had a permanent dialogue between social organizations and with the society⁶⁶ to insist on the urgency for violence to cease and that their lives and those of their communities to be respected.

As part of the agenda of the Humanitarian Shelter, a vigil was held on April 29 throughout Colombia and in the main cities of the world⁶⁷,

⁶⁵ El Espectador. (April 23, 2019). Why will a humanitarian shelter be installed for social leaders in Bogotá? Recovered from <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/por-que-se-instalara-un-refugio-humanitario-para-lideres-sociales-en-bogota-articulo-857898>

⁶⁶ El Tiempo. (April 29, 2019). Social leaders from all over the country arrived in Bogotá. Recovered from <https://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/lideres-sociales-de-todo-el-pais-arribaron-a-bogota-354996>

⁶⁷ Peace and Reconciliation Foundation. (April 30, 2019). Velatón por la vida (Vigil For Life) at the Bolívar Square. Recovered from <https://pares.com.co/2019/04/30/velaton-por-la-vida-en-la-plaza-de-bolivar/>

which had a great reception. In this space defenders, social organizations and society in general came together, which in their candlelights, represented the lives of those who have been killed, to remember that their struggles are still present and to highlight the implications that violence has silenced these voices, that they are not only the loss of human lives, but that it has also led, in many occasions, to the destruction of social processes and to the silencing of communities. Undoubtedly, the presence of nearly 3,000 defenders in Bogotá during the days of the event was an opportunity for the situation in the territories to be enunciated in first person and for more citizens to join the call to build peace and guarantees for those who defend collective rights.

One month later, on June 11, human rights defenders were once again a topic of interest in national public opinion, thanks to the initiative of the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, to begin their dialogues for non-repetition with a discussion about the violence of which these activists are victims in Colombia. Under the title *Long live the Male and Female social leaders and human rights defenders*⁶⁸, the dialogue convened government officials, delegates from the international community, politicians, victims and ex-combatants, among other profiles, to speak with social

leaders who were at the center of the discussion.

A necessary and interesting conversation, which was raised as a space for reflection between different sectors of society, to address the reasons why violence against female and social leaders has been so harsh in recent decades, and that despite this situation, silence and omission of society and governments prevail, leaving these people in the territories in almost complete solitude in front of the actors who intimidate and kill them. One of the general conclusions of this space⁶⁹ was the recognition that the matter goes beyond reactive protection measures and complex contexts in which the State has not interfered as it should.

Within the framework of this dialogue, the artist Doris Salcedo performed the work *Quebrantos* at the Bolívar Square in Bogotá, a temporary installation that had the participation of human rights defenders from different territories of the country, who built with glass fragments⁷⁰ the names of 165 defenders killed, as a way to occupy a large space with the presence of those who are no longer there, to reflect on what it means that those lives no longer exist and to

⁶⁸ Commission for the Truth. (June 11, 2019). Long live the Male and Female social leaders and human rights defenders. Recovered from <https://comisiondelaverdad.co/actualidad/noticias/larga-vida-a-los-hombres-y-mujeres-lideres-sociales-y-defensores-de-derechos-humanos>

⁶⁹ El Tiempo. (June 11, 2019). The Truth Commission focuses on murders of social leaders. Recovered from <https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/jep-colombia/comision-de-la-verdad-pone-el-foco-en-asesinatos-de-lideres-sociales-373962>

⁷⁰ El País. (June 10, 2019). 'Quebrantos', Colombia's collective mourning for the murdered leaders. Recovered from https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/06/11/colombia/1560211000_126427.html

make visible from the Capital District of the country what many do not see or have decided to ignore.

To these actions for the rights of defenders, one of the most massive demonstrations has been added, which took place on July 26 in more than 57 cities in Colombia and the world and convened as the March for Life⁷¹. This initiative arose from social organizations in the country at the head of the Defendamos la Paz movement, following the need to mobilize society for the murders and aggressions that continue to occur every week and that seem to be far from stopping.

As an opportunity to attract the attention of more sectors of society, of the international community, but especially of the Government, a massive convocation was made for many territories in Colombia and countries abroad to join this call for one day, with peaceful protests and marches, with the objective of turning eyes on the situation of violence faced by defenders in the country and insisting on the need for the Government to provide guarantees and really commit to building peace in the regions.

There were dozens of organizations and movements that joined this call and thousands of people around the world felt the need to go out and express

themselves. Messages about peace, life and the demand for guarantees for human rights defenders took over public spaces, accompanied by the names and photographs of hundreds of defenders killed, to remember that behind the figures there are actual lives that have absurdly disappeared and that they should remain among us.

All these actions have achieved that many eyes lay on the subject, that more people understand that what happens in the territories is very serious and cannot wait, and the international community to echo the demands of society so they can be heard by the Government. Increasingly, human rights defenders are placed at the center of opinion and their struggles are visible to show that their resistance transcends their nearby communities and territories, as they even defend rights that we benefit from in the cities.

In this context, the multiple campaigns that social organizations, international community and public figures have proposed to convene more voices and to achieve that talking about social leaders becomes a permanent issue and not just a passing issue have also played a very important role. Proposals such as A Leader in My Place⁷², by journalist Daniel Samper; Defendamos la Vida⁷³, the European

⁷¹ El Espectador. (July 26, 2019). They are not alone: the march for social leaders. Recovered from <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/no-estan-solos-la-marcha-por-los-lideres-sociales-articulo-872984>

⁷² KienyKe. (May 13, 2019). Youtubers make visible threatened social leaders. Recovered from <https://www.kienyke.com/noticias/reggaeton-youtubers-un-lider-en-mi-lugar>

⁷³ El Espectador. (June 9, 2019). "Defendamos la Vida" (*Let's Defend Life*), a Euro-

Union in Colombia; Lidera la Vida⁷⁴ (Lead Life), from different State and private entities; Bullets Proof Voices⁷⁵, from the Somos Defensores Program, it has been managed to clearly explain the importance of human rights defenders and join forces in the call for respect for life.

These initiatives are only part of the multiple mobilizations that occur daily throughout the country and in the territories, to convene in the defense of life and ask the Government to assume the responsibility of protecting the communities. From all sectors, this struggle should be permanent, to surround those who have nothing but their voices to defend themselves, because the aggressions against the leaders do not offer truce and despite this they persist and advance for the protection of the rights.

pean Union campaign for social leaders. Recovered from <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/defendamos-la-vida-una-campana-de-la-union-europea-por-los-lideres-sociales-articulo-865054>

⁷⁴ El Colombiano. (August 2, 2019). Lidera la Vida (*Lead Life*), the new bet to protect victims. Recovered from <https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/paz-y-derechos-humanos/lidera-la-vida-idea-para-protger-a-lideres-sociales-GH11345939>

⁷⁵ Somos Defensores. Bulletproof Voices. Recovered from <http://somosdefensores.org/voces/>



REALITY

Semiannual Report 2019

Information System on Attacks against Human Rights Defenders in Colombia

- SIADDHH -

The Reality Stone

Here is our reality, with its fissures and its aching, blunt and hopeless.


To Change it is not just a wish, it is an urgency.

During the first half of 2019, the Information System on Aggressions against Human Rights Defenders in Colombia –SIADDHH– of the Somos Defensores Program⁷⁶ registered a total of **591 attacks**. These actions of violence hindered the work of defense of human rights defenders in the country

According to this figure, it can be said that the first half of 2019 is the period with the most aggressions recorded since the creation of the Information System, ten years

ago. Since then, such number of affectations to the rights of these activists, in one semester alone, had never been identified. To that extent, the approximate increase in the facts compared to the first half of 2018 (397 attacks) was 49%.

While analyzing the occurrence of the events per month, it becomes evident that May 2019 is the month in which there are more attacks with 149 documented cases⁷⁷, followed by February with 117, April with 114, January with 86, June with 75 and March with 50 attacks.



Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program, 2019

⁷⁶ This System records information known directly by the Somos Defensores Program and by direct source with social organizations and non-governmental organizations that report cases to the Program. At no time does SIADDHH cross

information with other similar information systems; it reports and analyzes only the cases that are sent to it.


⁷⁷ During the first half of 2018, May was also the month with the highest number of recorded aggressions.

Attacks by Gender

Regarding aggression by gender, out of the 591 defenders attacked in the first half of 2019, 71% were committed against men and 29% against women.

Although the attacks against men are greater than those committed against

women, it is possible to see that there is an increase in aggression against women in relation to the first half of the previous year. During 2018, 74% of the attacks were directed at men and 26% at women. That is, attacks against women went from 26% in 2018 to 29% in 2019.



Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program, 2019

Aggressions according to the type of violence

The aggressions committed during the analyzed period were: Murders, attacks, threats, arbitrary detentions and information theft. Individual threats increased by 75% and with 477 records, they were the type of aggression with the highest number of cases, followed by murders with 59 cases, attacks with 27, arbitrary

detentions with 22 and theft of sensitive information with 6.

Compared to the previous year, there was a 23% decrease in murder cases, since in 2018, for the same period, 77 cases were recorded and in this half of 2019, there were 59. However, it is important to remember that, since the aggressions against human rights defenders started to be monitored, 2018 has been the

most violent year, which responds to several situations including the electoral scenario (elections of the Congress of the Republic and presidential elections with two rounds) and the context of high polarization by the positions of the presidential candidates (who moved between who supported continuing the peace processes and who questioned them). In these electoral and convulsed environments, violence falls mainly on social leadership. However, this reduction of 23% could vary for the second

half of 2019, due to the electoral context in which we find the regional elections, which will probably trigger disputes in the territories that can lead to an increase in the murders.

Opposed to the decrease in murders, there was a high increase in cases of murder attempts, arbitrary detentions and threats; the attacks increased by 17%, arbitrary detentions by 450% and threats by 75%. Unlike the previous year, for the first half of 2019 there were no cases of prosecutions or disappearances.


Type of Individual Aggression	Number of aggressions January – June 2018	Number of aggressions January – June 2019
Threats	272	477
Murders	77	59
Attempts / Attacks	23	27
Arbitrary detentions	4	22
Prosecutions	11	0
Disappearances	4	0
Information Theft	6	6
Total individual aggressions	397	591

Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019

Alleged Responsibles

As for the alleged perpetrators, of the 591 documented aggression cases, in 53% of them, the responsibility would fall on paramilitary groups, in 28% the perpetrator remains

unknown, 9% on the FARC dissidents, 6% on the ELN and 4% on the Public Force. Thus, as in previous years, paramilitary groups continue to be responsible for the greatest number of attacks against human rights defenders in Colombia.




Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019

The current complexity of the contexts with the reconfiguration of violence and armed conflict must be highlighted. This has led to the appearance of actors in the territories that are yet to be acknowledged, since, in some cases, there is no clear identification of who has committed the aggression, and hence it is common to find the category of “unknown” within the figures.

Consequently, the aggressions allegedly committed by the paramilitary groups have increased by 70%, from 187 in 2018 to 314 in 2019. Among the paramilitary structures allegedly responsible for the cases of aggression against these people are: Gaitanista self-defense groups of Colombia –AGC–, the *Pachencas*, the *Pelusos*, the *Caparros* and the *Águilas Negras* (*Black Eagles*).

With regards to the ELN guerrillas and the FARC dissidents, they also increased their participation in the attacks. The first would have gone from 9 cases in the first half of 2018 to 36 in 2019; and the second, from 24 cases to 54 in the same period.

If the aggressions allegedly committed by the ELN are compared, an increase of 300% can be seen in relation to the same period of the previous year, this is especially evident in the exponential increase in threats and intimidation against social leadership and the defense of human rights committed by this armed group. These figures are indicators of the force that once again took over the conflict of war in several territories, where social leaderships are the first victims; issue that was meant to end with the final closure of sociopolitical violence through peace processes.



Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019

Murder of Human Rights Defenders

As mentioned before, during the first half of 2019, 59 cases of murder against human rights defenders were documented, 23% less than in the same period of 2018.

At this point, it is important to notice a methodological element. The data


herein recorded consists of the murder cases that could be confirmed and documented through direct sources from the Somos Defensores Program, allied organizations and field work directly in the territories where the murders were committed. This means, as we have always noted, that there probably is underreporting in front of other observatories that tell different case universes.

Regarding the affectations of murders by gender, we find that, out of the 59 murders, 83% were against men (49 cases) and 17% against women (10 cases). This evidences a significant increase in murders committed against women, since in the same period of 2018, there were 3 cases.

Murders by department

In regards to the territories where the murders against human rights

defenders occurred, the ones that report the highest number of cases are Cauca (10), Antioquia (7), Arauca (5), Nariño (5), Norte de Santander (5) and Valle Del Cauca (5). The other departments with murder cases are Caquetá (4), Bolívar (3), Casanare (2), Magdalena (2), Meta (2), Boyacá (1), Cesar (1), Chocó (1), Córdoba (1), Huila (1), Putumayo (1), Santander (1), Sucre (1) and Vichada (1).



Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019


Likewise, of the 59 murders committed, 57 were carried out with a firearm and 2 with a white weapon. Taking into account the information documented and confirmed by the Somos Defensores Program, 2 of the murders preceded the disappearance of the person and subsequently the discovery of their lifeless body. 6 cases were brutally committed (more than 5 shots); In addition, one of the persons killed had protective measures at the time of the murder.

Like the previous year, the pattern of affectation to third parties continues to be evident when the crime takes place, although with a lower percentage than in 2018, since this time there were 5 cases. However, this means that it is recurring that a family member, friend or close person is also attacked. To that extent and, as

noted in previous reports, the pattern of involvement with third parties is a situation detected since 2009 and, although the percentage varies, it is a constant fact.

It is important to note that as in previous years, one of the most recurrent modalities for perpetrating the murders is the hitman. Out of the 59 murders documented in the first half of 2019, 57 were committed in this way. In these situations, it is common for several unknown and armed men to break into the person's home, or to be killed in that area or on roads they commonly move on.

It is also important to mention that since the creation of SIADDHH in January 2009 until June 2019, the Somos Defensores Program has registered a total of 746 murders of human rights defenders in Colombia.



Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019

Leaderships affected by the murders

When reviewing the types of leadership with the highest affectation because of the murders, in the first half of 2019 we find that community leadership, with 21 cases, is the most affected; followed by the communal, with 18 cases; the peasant, with 8 cases; the indigenous, with 6 cases; the Afro-Colombian, with 3 cases; and the union, LGTBI and the victims with one case each.

Type of leadership	Number of cases
Community Leader	21
Communal Leader	18
Peasant Leader	8
Indigenous Leader	6
Afrocolombian Leader	3
Union Leader	1
LGTBI Leader	1
Victims Leader	1
Total	59

Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019

As in previous years, this first semester of 2019 presents a pattern in the planning and execution of the murders, this because out of the 59 cases documented by the SIADDHH, 75% were committed in the morning hours or in night hours. This gives indications of a prior follow-up or monitoring of the routines of the murdered persons.

Once again, the alleged perpetrators of the murders against human rights


defenders, for the most part, remain unknown, since 49 of the cases do not know their perpetrator. The killings committed by the paramilitaries were 4, they increased in one case in relation to the previous year; the ELN, on their part, is allegedly responsible for 4 murders, the same amount of 2018. About the FARC dissidents, they are presumed to be responsible for 2 of the cases, that is, there was a reduction in three cases in relation to the previous year. Unlike 2018, for the first half of 2019 no murder was recorded before the SIADDHH with the alleged responsibility of the Public Force..

Alleged Responsible for the murder	January - June 2018	January - June 2019
Unknown	59	49
Paramilitary groups	3	4
Public Force	6	0
ELN	4	4
FARC Dissidents	5	2
Total	77	59

Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019

Individual Threats

For this first semester, the Somos Defensores Program registered 477 individual threats, which represents an increase of 75% in relation to the previous year. It is very worrying to see how intimidation and threats have been become one of the main ways to hinder or prevent the legitimate exercise of leadership and defense of human rights.



Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019

As for those responsible for the threats, between January and June 2019, the paramilitary groups or structures (Caparros, Pelusos, Pachencas, AGC and Black Eagles) are responsible for the largest number with 309, followed by unknown actors with 84 cases, FARC dissidents with 52 and the ELN with 32.

The threats allegedly committed by insurgent structures or groups, such as the FARC dissidents and the ELN, have shown an exponential increase during the last years, since we started reporting 23 cases of the FARC dissidents and 5 of the ELN during the first semester of 2018 and for the same period in 2019 we are registering 52 and 32 cases respectively.


Types of Threat

The types of threats recorded by SIADDHH in this first half of 2019 are pamphlets (256), harassment (78), phone calls (71), emails (9) and text or WhatsApp messages (63 cases). It should be clarified that when referring to harassment we refer to the persecution by strangers, taking pictures, threats or verbal aggressions or the murder of a relative.

Regarding the threats originated from the pamphlets, the Black Eagles and the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia –AGC– are presumably responsible for most of them, with 71 and 106 cases, respectively. As it is recurring in several of the threatening pamphlets, these are not only aimed

at leaders or human rights defenders, journalists, merchants, public offi-

cials, politicians or the general population are also included.




Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019

Aggressions by department

In regards to the attacks by departments, it is found that those who registered the highest number are Cauca (115), Arauca (48), Antioquia (40), Córdoba (34), La Guajira (32), Valle del Cauca (32), Risaralda (25), Santander (23), Bolívar (20) and Chocó (19).


However, these acts of violence took place in at least 28 departments out of the 32 that constitute the Colombian territory. Of these, murders were recorded against human rights defenders in 20 departments, which means that this happened in 70% of the national territory.



Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019

The department of Cauca is the territory with the greatest increase in attacks against human rights defenders, since it went from registering 73 cases in the first half of 2018 to 115 cases in the same period of 2019. It means that it continues to be the most dangerous department for social leadership.

Also, there was an increase in attacks in the departments of Arauca, La Guajira, Risaralda and Bolívar. The region of eastern Colombia (Orinoquía, Llanos Orientales and Amazonía) also had a considerable increase, this is reflected in the departments of Arauca, Casanare, Guaviare, Meta, Vaupés and Vichada.




Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019

In relation to the periodic growth of aggressions by departments, it is remarkable that on average, the trend of aggressions against social leaders in the departments of Atlántico, Boyacá, Caldas, Cesar, Capital District (Bogotá), Huila, Nariño, Norte de Santander and Santander, was maintained.

As stated in previous reports, the aggressions occur in the regions historically marked by the armed conflict and the dispute over the armed territorial control and interests of the great national and transnational capital, such as the Southwest (Nariño, Cauca and Valle del Cauca), the Urabá and Bajo Cauca region (Chocó, Antioquia and Córdoba), the Atlantic Coast (Sucre,

Bolívar, Magdalena, Cesar and La Guajira), the Catatumbo area (North of Santander), and now the region of the Colombian East (Meta, Arauca, Guaviare, Vaupés, Casanare and Vichada). This does not mean that in other regions or departments there are no cases of attacks or acts of violence against human rights defenders.

The cities or municipalities with the highest number of attacks are Santander de Quilichao (32), Riohacha (24), Arauca (19), Saravena (18), Barranquilla (17), Bogotá (16), Pueblo Rico (15) and Puerto Libertador (12). This means that the departments of Cauca and Arauca are the territories with the highest risk for the exercise of the defense of human rights.



Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019


Affected Types of leadership

Regarding the type of leadership, it was found that out of the 591 documented aggressions, 148 cases were committed against indigenous people, 112 against people working in human rights organizations, 80 against community leaderships, 71 against communal, 55 against peasants, 54 against Afro-Colombians, 35 against victim leaders, 15 cases against union leaders, 10 against environmental leaders, 6 against LGBTI leaders and 5 cases against academic or student leaderships.

According to these figures, the most attacked social sector is the indigenous segment, especially in the North of Cauca, for despite inhabiting

their ancestral lands, they got stuck in the middle of the territorial dispute of armed groups (paramilitaries, FARC dissidents and drug trafficking groups) with the passive or omisive view of the Public Force and the State in general, which do not act to prevent the growth of these groups and generate guarantees for the peaceful survival of communities.

In this area, threats and attacks are other aggressions that have grown exponentially, because the indigenous authorities, guards and leaders carry out constant territorial control activities, which intersect with the disputes of armed groups, facts that have led to increased aggression by these groups against indigenous peoples.



Source: SIADDHH - Somos Defensores Program 2019

Database of defenders murdered between January and June, 2019 –SIADDHH–

No.	DATE	DEPARTMENT (STATE)	MUNICIPALITY	VICTIM	ORGANIZATION THAT THEY WERE PART OF	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
1	1/01/2019	Cauca	Suárez	Gilberto Valencia Agrono	President of the Community Action Board of the Pueblo Nuevo neighborhood. Musician, composer and cultural manager.	Communal Leader	Unknown
2	1/01/2019	Valle del Cauca	Caicedonia	Jesús Adier Perafán Correa	President of the Community Action Board of the Valle del Cauca neighborhood and candidate for the Caicedonia Council.	Communal Leader	Unknown
3	4/01/2019	Cauca	Cajibío	Wilmer Antonio Miranda Cabrera	Member of the Association of Peasant Workers of Cajibío –ATCC–, a subsidiary of FENSUAGRO – CUT, of ANZORC, PUPSOC, COCCAM, the Social and Political Coordination of the Patriotic March of Cauca, and a member of the PNIS.	Peasant Leader	Unknown
4	4/01/2019	Antioquia	Zaragoza	José Rafael Solano González	President of the Community Action Board of the Puerto Jobo village.	Communal Leader	Paramilitaries
5	5/01/2019	Magdalena	Santa Marta	Maritza Isabel Quiroz Leiva	Deputy at the Santa Marta Victims Board and leader of Afro-descendant women, victims of displacement.	Victims Leader	Unknown
6	6/01/2019	Norte de Santander	Hacarí	Wilson Pérez Ascanio	Integrante del Movimiento Popular por la Constituyente –MPC–. Miembro del PNIS.	Community Leader	Unknown
7	7/01/2019	Caquetá	Cartagena del Chairá	Miguel Antonio Gutiérrez Martínez	President of the La Victoria neighborhood Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Unknown
8	15/01/2019	Bolívar	Montecristo	Victor Manuel Trujillo	Community leader. Singer of the urban genre.	Community Leader	ELN
9	24/01/2019	Antioquia	El Peñol	Samuel Andrés Gallo Mayo	Community leader. Member of the Municipal Youth Council.	Community Leader	Unknown
10	26/01/2019	Valle del Cauca	Cartago	José Iair Orozco Calvo	Member of the Community Housing Board of the Vista Hermosa housing compound.	Community Leader	Unknown
11	26/01/2019	Norte de Santander	El Tarra	Lede María Ortega Ortiz	Secretary of the Community Action Board of the Mundo Nuevo village.	Communal Leader	Unknown

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12	29/01/2019	Cauca	Suárez	Dilio Corpus Guetio	Member of the Association of the Cordillera Peasant Workers – Asocordillera – and of the Peasant Guard.	Peasant Leader	Unknown
13	3/02/2019	Cauca	Caloto	Eric Esnoraldio Viera Paz	Member of the Community Action Board of the El Palo village and the Association of Pro-Constitution Workers of Caloto Peasant Reserve Areas –ASTRAZONACAL–.	Communal Leader	Unknown
14	8/02/2019	Norte de Santander	Tibú	José Alquímedes Moreno Ferrer	Delegate of the Community Action Board of the T-25 Los Patios village.	Communal Leader	EPL
15	14/02/2019	Nariño	Samaniego	María Nelly Bernal Andrade	Member of the Indigenous Guard of the Pastos People and defender of the La Montaña chapter territory.	Lideresa indígena	Unknown
16	16/02/2019	Antioquia	Caucasia	Querubín de Jesús Zapata Áviles	Representative of the Cauca Municipal Youth Platform. Defender of the LGTBI community and gender diversity.	Community Leader	Unknown
17	20/02/2019	Arauca	Arauca	Zaira Bellasmin Pérez	Community representative of the Los Güirres settlement.	Communitary Leader	Unknown
18	25/02/2019	Arauca	Tame	Demetrio Barrera Díaz	Coordinator of the Indigenous Guard, Cuioto 2 community, of the Makagan People.	Indigenous Leader	ELN
19	25/02/2019	Antioquia	Caucasia	Liliana Holguin	Member of the Cauca LGTBI board and member of the Affirmative Caribbean tools network for training actions.	LGTBI Leader	Unknown
20	25/02/2019	Santander	Bucaramanga	José Fernel Manrique Valencia	Leader of the Sectional Board of Directors of the Construction Materials Industry –SUTIMAC– Single Trade Union of Workers.	Union Leader	Unknown
21	27/02/2019	Putumayo	Puerto Asís	Sonia Rosero González	Leader of the “Non-violence against women Campaign”. Pre-candidate for mayor of Puerto Asís.	Communitary Leader	Unknown
22	5/03/2019	Vichada	Cumaribo	Marco Antonio Romero Lozano	Vice President of the Community Action Board of the Campo Alegre village, inspection of Gülerima.	Communal Leader	Unknown
23	11/03/2019	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta	Francisco Javier Cervantes Florez	Leader of the Six Kings settlement.	Community Leader	Unknown

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24	14/03/2019	Casanare	Sácama	Alfonso Correa Sandoval	President of the Community Action Board of the La Cabuya village, member and founder of the Manantiales Peasant Environmental Association -ASOCAM- and member of the Arauca Peasant Association -ACA-.	Communal Leader	Unknown
25	17/03/2019	Cauca	Corinto	Jhon Jairo Noscué Taquínas	Member of the Peasant Guard of the control post in the sector of El Tablon , Miravalle village.	Peasant Leader	Unknown
26	17/03/2019	Nariño	Tumaco	Argemiro López Pertuz	Leader of substitution of illicit crops in La Guayacana. Member of the Pro-Aqueduct Committee Espriella-Nambi and youth soccer teacher.	Peasant Leader	Paramilitaries
27	18/03/2019	Antioquia	Sonsón	Joaquín Emilio Jaramillo López	Prosecutor of the Community Action Board of the Piedras Blancas village, San Miguel district.	Communal Leader	Unknown
28	22/03/2019	Meta	Villavicencio	Fredy Yesid Chisco García	Founder of the El Rubi neighborhood. Member of the Community Action Board of the same sector and leader of different neighborhoods of Villavicencio.	Community Leader	Unknown
29	25/03/2019	Valle del Cauca	Sevilla	Edwin Andrés Grisales Galvis	Member of the Network of Popular Artists of the Southwest -RAP-SO- and the Hip-Hop Network of Sevilla, Valle. Militant of the Patriotic March and Tejido Social por la Paz (Social Fabric for Peace).	Cultural Leader	Unknown
30	27/03/2019	Caquetá	Puerto Rico	Ebel Yonda Ramos	Indigenous leader of the Nasa people.	Indigenous Leader	Unknown
31	28/03/2019	Arauca	Saravena	Erick Yammid Torres Buitrago	Youth leader, broadcaster and radio producer of the Arauquita Stereo community radio station.	Community Leader	Unknown
32	7/04/2019	Caquetá	Currillo	Lucero Jaramillo Álvarez	Secretary of the Puerto Valdivia Community Action Board.	Communal Leader	Unknown
33	10/04/2019	Cauca	Argelia	Polcarpo Guzmán Mago	Member, founder and first president of the Peasant Workers Association of Argelia -ASCAMTA-.	Peasant Leader	Unknown

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34	11/04/2019	Meta	La Macarena	Anderson Ramiro Gómez Herrera	Advisor of ASOJUNTAS, La Macarena.	Community Leader	Unknown
35	12/04/2019	Chocó	Riosucio	Aquileo Mecheche Baragon	President of the Indigenous Major Chapter of the Low Axis CAMIZ-BA - ASOREWA and principal of the Jagual Indigenous Educational Institution.	Indigenous Leader	Unknown
36	27/04/2019	Antioquia	Maceo	Diofanor Montoya Urrego	Leader of social processes with elderly population.	Community Leader	Unknown
37	1/05/2019	Nariño	Cumbal	Miguel Ángel Alpala	Indigenous leader of the Gran Cumbal shelter of the Los Pastos people. Member of the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia –AICO–, of the Los Pastos people Justice Commission and of the Derecho Propio (Own Law) School.	Indigenous Leader	Unknown
38	2/05/2019	Antioquia	Ituango	John Salas Barrera	Member of the Community Action Board of the Quebrada del Medio village.	Communal Leader	Unknown
39	4/05/2019	Cesar	Cotdazzi	Eduardo Torres Mora	Vice President of the La Divina Pastora Community Council, in the township of Llerasca.	Community Leader	Unknown
40	7/05/2019	Arauca	Saravena	Didier Ferney González	Member of the Inter-Ethnic, Peasant and Popular Guard of the Middle East. Delegate of the Regional Youth and Student Association –ASOJER–.	Peasant Leader	Unknown
41	8/05/2019	Nariño	Santa Bárbara	Milton Hernández	Afro-descending leader of the Minor Council of the Iscuandé River Basin.	Afro Descending Leader	Unknown
42	8/05/2019	Nariño	Santa Bárbara	Daniel Obando Arroyo	Chairman of the Minor Council of the Iscuandé River Basin.	Afro Descending Leader	Unknown
43	9/05/2019	Bolívar	Morales	Belisario Arciniegas García	Community leader of the Micoahumado district.	Community Leader	Unknown
44	9/05/2019	Arauca	Araquita	Mauricio Lezama Rengifo	Film director, cultural manager and departmental film advisor.	Cultural Leader	FARC Dissidence

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45	10/05/2019	Bolívar	Morales	Wilmar José Carvajalino	Member of the Agricultural and Mining Federation of the South Bolívar —FEDEAGROMISBOL—.	Community Leader	ELN
46	11/05/2019	Huila	San Agustín	Luis Manuel Salamanca Galindez	Cultural manager in the San Agustín archaeological park. Founder of the House of Culture of the San Agustín municipality.	Cultural Leader	Unknown
47	14/05/2019	Cauca	Caloto	Daniel Eduardo Rojas Zambrano	President of the Work Board in the Indigenous Reservation of López Atentro. Member of the Association of Indigenous Chapters of the North of Cauca —ACIN—.	Indigenous Leader	Unknown
48	15/05/2019	Cauquetá	Puerto Rico	Benedicto Valencia	President of the Community Action Board of the Miraflores village.	Communal Leader	FARC Dissidence
49	16/05/2019	Valle del Cauca	Vijes	Aydali Ortega Marulanda	President of the Community Action Board of Los Hispanos, El Porvenir township.	Communal Leader	Unknown
50	17/05/2019	Cauca	Balboa	Guillermo León Rengifo Ramírez	President of the Community Action Board of the Capitanes village.	Communal Leader	Unknown
51	23/05/2019	Boyacá	La Victoria	José Hugo Delgado Téllez	Peasant and Community leader.	Community Leader	Unknown
52	24/05/2019	Casanare	Nunchia	Concepción Corredor	Former President of the Community Action Board of La Pradera village. Peasant and manager of projects with women.	Communitary Leader	ELN
53	30/05/2019	Magdalena	Santa Marta	Luis Joaquín Trujillo García	President of the Community Action Board of the Quebrada del Sol village in the Guachaca township.	Communal Leader	Unknown
54	1/06/2019	Norte de Santander	Playa de Belén	Dagoberto Álvarez	Treasurer of the Community Action Board of the Miraflores village.	Communal Leader	Unknown

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55	6/06/2019	Sucre	Coveñas	Julían Alexander Quiriones Oñate	President of the Community Action Board of the Guayabál neighborhood stage I.	Communal Leader	Unknown
56	10/06/2019	Cauca	Corinto	Freiman Baicué	Member of the Peasant Guard of the Association of Peasant Workers, Peasant Reserve Area –ASTRAZONAC–.	Peasant Leader	Unknown
57	10/06/2019	Cauca	Corinto	Uver Ney Villano	Member of the Peasant Guard of the Association of Peasant Workers, Peasant Reserve Area –ASTRAZONAC–.	Peasant Leader	Unknown
58	21/06/2019	Córdoba	Tierralta	María Pilar Hurtado	Leader in settlement of the Los Robles sector, in the Nueve de Agosto (9th of August) neighborhood.	Community Leader	Paramilitaries
59	26/06/2019	Valle del Cauca	Tuluá	José Arled Muñoz Giraldo	Prosecutor of the United Afro of the Pacific Foundation and a member of the Victims' Board.	Afro Descending Leader	Unknown

CONCLUSIONS

1. The National Government and, in general, the Colombian State, agree on a reductionist vision of the criminalization of social leadership. On one hand, they confine it to the problem of drug trafficking and illegal mining, ignoring historical issues associated with disputes over land use and tenure, whether for extensive livestock, agroindustrial crops and all national and transnational investments that require significant social and territorial control.
2. In that same sense, in their speeches and various expressions, they evade the responsibility of the Colombian State in the problem of violence against social leaders, considering that the attacks on these people come from third parties and private groups outside the law. They forget that Colombia has obligations under International Human Rights Law, to respect, protect, prevent and guarantee their lives and physical integrity. Consequently, by action or omission, agents of the State share responsibility for not fulfilling their mandates to avoid the commission of crimes.
3. In accordance with this same narrative, senior State officials publicly refer to the murder of human rights defenders with great concern and make a call to attending the seriousness of the facts; nevertheless, these expressions have little coherence with the results that their institutions give in the matter, which leaves many unanswered questions.
4. The Peace Agreement signed between the Colombian State and the former FARC guerrillas, designed a general public policy framework for security guarantees with important normative and political instruments, for the life of both social leaders and ex-combatants. However, the government of Iván Duque ignored that and decided to present a Timely Action Plan, which is nothing more than that, a Plan, without “teeth” which, in addition, in an untimely way, privileges the militarization of the territories and physical and material protection, which, as it is insisted, does not solve the problem and requires huge economic resources from the budget.
5. The Office of the Attorney General of the Nation insists on showing a high percentage (60%) of clarification in the investigations of murders of social leaders, which, in addition to not being true, as exhibited once again in this report, leaves a big question: Why are such results not reflected with the dismantling of organized crime groups, which on the contrary, ¿are getting stronger in the territories?
6. It is true that the numbers of murders of social leaders fell during the first half of 2019, in relation to the same period of 2018;

however, other aggressions such as threats increased exponentially, without the State, particularly the Attorney's Office, showing results to face its growth.

7. The decrease in the percentage of murders during the first half of 2019 is not necessarily due to government actions such as the Timely Action Plan, in addition, because it resorted to the militarization of the territories and it is proven that this action contributes to greater aggressions. But moreover, it is unfortunate to analyze violence against human rights defenders by looking only at this type of aggression, because, as shown in the report, the Information System of the Somos Defensores Program registered an unprecedented increase in other types of aggressions, which makes it possible to affirm that there is a resurgence of violence against these activists.
8. The reduction of murders, in comparison with the increase of other types of aggressions,

can respond to the change of strategies of the armed actors in the territories and to the reduction of territorial disputes. However, it is feared that the drop in murders will be temporary and that the trend will not keep up until the end of 2019, because, in addition to the electoral contest, violence takes hold in many territories and the first victims are the defenders of human rights.

9. Positively, it is necessary to recognize and value the important role of the mass media, the international community, the social and human rights movement, and society in general. The different actions carried out during the first half of 2019, such as campaigns and mobilizations, have allowed violence against human rights defenders to appear in the first order on the national agenda, and has managed to sensitize the public opinion of Colombia and the world on the serious situation in the territories of those who defend collective rights.