



Transversal 26B # 40A - 86 Bogotá D.C. – Colombia  
Tel: (051) 2814010 / [www.somosdefensores.org](http://www.somosdefensores.org)  
[responsablesistema@somosdefensores.org](mailto:responsablesistema@somosdefensores.org)  
2025

The Somos Defensores (We Are Defenders) Program, is a protection area that seeks to develop a comprehensive proposal to prevent aggression and protect the lives of people at risk due to their work as human rights defenders, when they protect the interests of social groups and communities affected by violence in Colombia.

The Somos Defensores program is formed by:



**This edition was made by the Somos Defensores Program, under the direction of the MINGA Association**

**Editorial and Publishing Coordination**

Astrid Torres and Juan Manuel Quinche

**Research**

Astrid Torres, Juan Manuel Quinche, Nancy Liliانا Villota,  
Juan David González

**SIVeL System**

Vladimir Támara (<https://sivel.sf.net>)

**Design, layout and printing**

Editorial El Búho S.A.S.

**Translation**

Osiris Duarte

**Graphic and conceptual design**

Andrés Fernández Cuy

**ISBN:**

The content of this report holds responsibility to its authors and does not compromise the organizations and institutions that co-finance this publication. This publication is of a cultural, pedagogical nature and its distribution is free. It can be photocopied and reproduced as long as the source is cited. Our 2025 report is possible thanks to the funding provided by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Colombia, the European Union, Global Witness, Misereor and Diakonia.




**The work of the Somos Defensores Program is possible in 2025 thanks to the economic and political support of the Royal Norwegian Embassy and the cooperation agencies Misereor, Diakonia, Global Witness, International Amnesty, Bread for the World and the European Union.**







# Index



<b>Introduction</b> .....	5
---------------------------	---

<b>In memory of the assassinated human rights defenders</b> .....	9
---	---

<b>Chapter 1: More fuel to the fire?</b> .....	81
--	----

<b>Chapter 2: Reheated</b> .....	103
----------------------------------	-----


<b>Chapter 3: Easy Prey</b> .....	123
-----------------------------------	-----

<b>Conclusions</b> .....	149
--------------------------	-----

<b>References</b> .....	152
-------------------------	-----

## **DATA TABLE**

<b>Database of defenders murdered between January and June 2025</b> .....	160
---	-----





# INTRODUCTION

When the first military leadership of the current national government was presented, an announcement that generated great expectation was made: the introduction of the so-called *Human Security Policy*. Five days after taking office, President Gustavo Petro stated that, in this new paradigm, success would lie “in substantially reducing deaths and massacres and substantially increasing people’s freedoms and rights” (2022). These words should be remembered today, not only as an exercise in memory, but also to demand their fulfillment in the humanitarian crises that have arisen in the first half of 2025.

It is also necessary to make a critical assessment of the *Total Peace* policy. Furthermore, when eleven emergency hotspots identified by the Ombudsman’s Office in February this year (Ombudsman’s Office, 2025a) coincide geographically with some of the territories where armed groups that are engaged in dialogue with the national government are present. Or that at some point were part of these processes, as is the case of the National Liberation Army, a group that no longer participates in dialogue scenarios and that considerably increased violence against human rights defenders between January and June 2025, when compared to the victimizations that were also attributed to this guerrilla group in the same period of the previous year.

Indeed, while some spaces for dialogue are opening and closing, the fragmentation of illegal armed groups and the proliferation of confrontations between them continues. In these scenarios of dispute, which during the first half of 2025 took place in some territories where military forces were also increased, most of the acts of violence directed against human rights defenders continue to occur, as evidenced by a large part of the 342 attacks, including the regrettable 78 murders verified during the first half of 2025 by the Information System on Attacks against Human Rights Defenders (SIADDHH) of the Somos Defensores Program.

Compared to the same period last year, selective violence against this population group has intensified: although there was a slight decrease of 27 attacks, there was also a worrying 20% increase in lethal attacks. However, the numbers are once again insufficient to describe the changes in the violence deployed by the aggressors, who seem to have resumed methods of warfare with greater psychosocial impacts. Alongside the increase in certain types of attacks against leaders, such as forced disappearances, are measures adopted by various illegal armed groups, such as the Estado Mayor Central (*Hereafter* EMC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), to terrorize the



civilian population, for example, by displaying the bodies of murdered individuals which cannot be retrieved or given proper funeral rites by the communities. These forms of violence are similar to those used by paramilitaries at the beginning of this century, but must now be understood within more complex scenarios, in which, among other things, (i) surveillance and control mechanisms have been reinforced, such as the issuance of identity cards, confinement, and intrusion into people's digital lives, and (ii) new strategies have been deployed to undermine the organizational structures of communities, such as co-optation.

The identification of these actions in territories where armed actors involved in ongoing dialogue processes are present illustrates a peace policy that has not achieved the expected results. Among other factors, this is due to the absence of agreements enabling the dismantling of these structures, as well as the failure to prevent the perpetration of violent and controlling acts that silence the civilian population, including social leaders. Contrary to expectations, rather than focusing on humanitarian efforts to alleviate the effects of these disputes and the crises they trigger, the government's response has been to strengthen its military presence in different regions of the country.

In some of its actions, the government appears to have adopted the formula used by past administrations, which claimed to guarantee the state's presence by increasing the number of troops and deploying various mili-

tary strategies. It has also made surprising decisions, such as appointing a former Air Force general to head the Ministry of Defense, resuming bombing campaigns, and deploying weapons and military forces in regions experiencing humanitarian crises, such as Catatumbo in the northwest of the country, the Cordillera region in the Nariño department, or the Micay Canyon in the department of Cauca.

The state security forces have a constitutional duty to safeguard a country undergoing a long-standing armed conflict, but government action cannot be reduced to militarization and sporadic interventions that result in seizures and "neutralizations" (such as arrests and so-called combat casualties)<sup>1</sup>. Experience in Colombia shows that this approach carries serious risks and does not guarantee the comprehensive presence of the state in regions that have been permanently at risk. Nor does the profuse issuance of administrative acts aimed at filling the gaps left by the government –as attempted during the Catatumbo crisis earlier this year– nor the passive stance toward the continued existence of entities such as the Security Fronts, which, lacking an updated legal basis, promote hyper-vigilance

---

<sup>1</sup> In any case, it is essential to remember that the use of security forces in contexts where the activities of illegal armed groups are increasing, must respect human rights and international humanitarian law. The content of international standards must be mandatorily observed by the army and the national police.

and citizen control while fostering problematic ties between the security forces, citizens, and private security companies.

Recognizing the adverse context, the Somos Defensores Program presents this report with a very clear message: we cannot resort to ***the same recipe*** used by previous governments. The current scenarios demand more comprehensive strategies, which, among other things, listen to the decisions of communities that, amid these crisis scenarios, resort to self-protection mechanisms and set humanitarian agendas.

The decision to adopt a primarily military approach in recent months does not appear to have been the most appropriate, as evidenced in Chapter 1, entitled *More Fuel to the Fire?* This section discusses the military measures undertaken by the national government in relation to some of the shortcomings of the dialogues within the framework of the total peace policy. This report therefore begins with a critical review of the territorial and situational dialogues that have been held over time, which are referred to as *fragmented peace* or *territorialized peace*. To this end, it reviews the dialogues undertaken with Comuneros del Sur, the 33rd Front of the Senior Management of Blocs and Fronts (EMBF), and the militarization that has taken place in the Micay Canyon, while raising some questions about the national government's approach.

The second chapter, entitled *Reheat-*  
*ed*, analyzes a concept that has ex-

isted for thirty years and continues to require thorough review: the Security Fronts. This section begins by contextualizing how this invention originated, which continues to be presented as a community-based civic organization led by the National Police and aims to improve coexistence and citizen security. It begins by referring to its experience in Bogotá D.C., and then critically reviews its recent expansion to other regions, such as Antioquia and Santander, and to productive guilds that currently support it, such as the Colombian Federation of Cattle Ranchers. The main interest is to warn of the persistence of a figure with considerable legal loopholes, which has expanded geographically without proper monitoring, with the encouragement of retired military personnel, and with the acquiescence of local authorities who in many cases promote its links with private security and surveillance companies. It also aims to expose how these fronts have also been a risk to the defense of human rights and a means of controlling the population, which is at odds with the pursuit of human security.

Chapter 3 is entitled *Easy Prey* and presents the selective violence that was unleashed against those who defend the right to defend rights during the first half of 2025. Based on cases verified by SIADDHH, it describes the regional pattern of attacks, the rights defense sectors and types of leadership that have been most affected, and those allegedly responsible for the acts. This last section highlights the increase in targeted attacks aimed at silencing and intimidating

citizens, such as murders, forced disappearances, and kidnappings. It also examines the pattern of attacks targeting human rights leaders and defenders in different parts of the country, taking a close look at what has happened in some regions that have experienced humanitarian crises during the first half of this year.

Once again, we would like to thank the social organizations, offices, and multilateral agencies that have contributed to the production of reports such as the one presented here, including the Early Warning System of the Ombudsman's Office, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Compromiso Corporation, the Association of Indigenous Councils of Cauca (ACIN), the Development and Peace Foundation (FUNDEPAZ), the Territories for a Dignified Life Foundation, the Sis-

ma Mujer organization, the Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP), the Libertad Legal Corporation (CJL), the Network of Defenders for Dignity and Territory (REDEDTER), the Citizen Agenda for Peace, and the United Friends Youth Home Foundation.

We would also like to extend our gratitude to the cooperation agencies that have supported our work, such as Bread for the World, Misereor, Global Witness, Amnesty International, also the Royal Norwegian Embassy, the European Union, and Diakonia Sweden. Their sustained support over time has enabled the development of the five lines of work of the Somos Defensores Program, the production and dissemination of these periodic publications, and the visibility of the risks faced by human rights defenders in Colombia.



# IN MEMORY OF THE ASSASSINATED HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

During the first half of 2025, targeted violence perpetrated by various actors claimed the lives of 78 human rights defenders in Colombia. From different parts of the country, these individuals contributed to building a more just society and advocated for peace in their communities. We want to begin this report by remembering the names and work of the defenders who were murdered over the first six months of the year. We hope that their memories will live on, and we will continue to demand that their murders do not go unpunished.

**JANUARY 13, 2025**

**DANIEL ESTEBAN RAIGOZA CASTAÑEDA**  
**Teacher at the Normal Superior School**  
**of Turbo (Teacher Training School)**  
**Corregimiento Currulao, Turbo, Antioquia**

Daniel Esteban Raigoza Castañeda was a renowned professor who taught at the Normal Superior School of Turbo, where he stood out in the school community for his commitment and dedication.



On January 10, 2025, Daniel Esteban left his home in Turbo to go to the municipality of Apartadó and meet up with some friends. He never arrived at his destination, and his whereabouts remained unknown. His family and friends launched a search that ended on January 13, when Daniel Esteban's body was found in a remote area of the Currulao district, located in the rural area of Turbo.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**JANUARY 15, 2025**

**MIGUEL ÁNGEL LÓPEZ**

**Humanitarian gravedigger from Tibú  
Rural area of Tibú, Norte de Santander**

Miguel Ángel López was the owner of the San Miguel Funeral Home and a renowned community leader in the municipality of Tibú, Norte de Santander. His work as a gravedigger was highly significant, as it ensured a dignified burial for unidentified bodies that arrived in his municipality after being killed in the context of the violence that has historically affected the Catatumbo region. Miguel Ángel's task was to recover these bodies and gather evidence when they arrived in Tibú, carrying out a role that was recognized throughout the region.



Because of his work, on January 15, 2025, in the midst of the humanitarian crisis resulting from the clashes between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the 33rd Front of the EMBF, Miguel Ángel was murdered along with his wife and six-month-old son. The events took place in a rural area of Tibú and were allegedly committed by members of the 33rd Front, who opened fire on his vehicle. Only his 10-year-old son survived this attack, which was one of the first events that signaled the escalation of the conflict in Catatumbo.

On February 11, 2025, news broke about the capture of Brandon Andrey Cárdenas Sanguino, alias Brandon or Grande, and Luis Felipe Taborda Delgado, alias Dayron Pérez, who were



accused by the Attorney General's Office of participating in and masterminding the murder of Miguel Ángel and his family.

**Alleged responsible parties:  
post-peace agreement groups –  
EMBF, Front 33**

**JANUARY 16, 2025**

**CRUZ EVELIO BAUTISTA PÉREZ**

**Former president of the Community  
Action Board in Hacarí and member  
of the Catatumbo Peasant Unity  
Association (ASUNCAT)**

**Mesitas Village, Hacarí, Norte de Santander**

Cruz Evelio Bautista Pérez, 57, was a well-known community leader in the municipality of Hacarí, Norte de Santander, where he served as president of one of the Community Action Boards. He was also a member of the Catatumbo Peasant Unity Association (ASUNCAT).

Amid escalating violence in the Catatumbo region, Cruz Evelio was allegedly murdered by the ELN on January 16, 2025, in an incident that took place in the village of Mesitas, in the rural area of Hacarí. To date, the details of the incident and the motive for the crime remain unknown.

**Alleged responsible party: ELN**



**JANUARY 16, 2025**

**CARMELO GUERRERO REYES**

**Peasant Guard of the Catatumbo Peasant Unity Association (ASUNCAT), survivor and member of the Patriotic Union Gramales village, Convención, Norte de Santander**

Carmelo Guerrero Reyes was a renowned peasant leader and member of the Patriotic Union, who also served as a member of the Peasant Guard of the Catatumbo Peasant Unity Association (ASUNCAT). He lived in the village of Gramales, located in the rural area of Convención, Norte de Santander.



On January 16, 2025, Carmelo was killed during clashes between the ELN and the 33rd Front of the Gentil Duarte Bloc of the EMBF. The events took place in the Gramales village in the municipality of Convención.

His body remained exposed for several days, as the armed groups did not allow the entry of any funeral services. Faced with this situation, the community of Gramales decided to remove and bury Carmelo's body.

**Alleged responsible party: ELN**

**JANUARY 17, 2025**

**JHONY ALEXANDER CÓRDOBA**

**President of the Terrón Colorado Jeep Drivers' Union**

**Terrón Colorado neighborhood, Comuna 17, Cali, Valle del Cauca**

Jhony Alexander Córdoba was a renowned union leader who served as president of the Jeep drivers' union in the Terrón Colorado neighborhood in northwest Cali. Jhony played a key role in the dialogues between transporters and local authorities, reaching consensus that ensured the continued operation of this type of public transportation for western Cali.

On the morning of January 17, 2025, Jhony was driving his private vehicle through the Terrón Colorado neighborhood, located in Comuna 17, when unknown individuals on motorcycles shot him repeatedly, killing him on the spot.

In a statement, the Mobility Committee, the Ladera Collective, and the Rural Development Council, among others, demanded that local and national authorities produce immediate results in the investigation of Jhony Alexander's murder. They also recognized and praised his work on behalf of transport operators in western Cali. It should be noted that Jhony Alexander had been the victim of extortion in recent months.



**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**JANUARY 17, 2025**

**MILLER OJEDA MUÑOZ**

**Administrator of Block 11 - Las Gardenias Residential Unit**

**Las Gardenias neighborhood, Barranquilla, Atlántico**

Miller Ojeda Muñoz, 49, was a well-known community leader in the Las Gardenias neighborhood, located in southwestern Barranquilla, Atlántico. For nine years, he had been the administrator of one of the apartment complexes in the area where he lived with his wife and their 6- and 18-year-old children. His leadership benefited the young people in the area, whom he accompanied and tried to steer away from the dynamics of violence in the area, for example by encouraging them to return to school, something he achieved in several cases with the support of the district mayor's office. He also promoted community activities, workshops, and meetings to strengthen his community.

On the night of January 17, 2025, Miller was standing on a corner in Las Gardenias when unknown individuals on a motorcycle approached him, shot him repeatedly until causing his death, and left a threatening sign next to his body. The Las Gardenias community expressed its dismay at the murder. At the same time, social media has suggested that those responsible are members of armed groups in the area, given that they opposed Miller's community work.



**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**JANUARY 18, 2025**

**PEDRO MARÍA ROPERO DELGADO**

**Delegate of the Association of Community Action Boards (ASOJUNTAS)**

**Campo Seis**

**Tibú, Norte de Santander**

Pedro María Ropero Delgado was a renowned peasant and community leader in Tibú, Norte de Santander. He served as a delegate for ASOJUNTAS in the village of Campo Seis, located in the rural area of the same municipality, and was part of the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS).

On January 18, 2025, Pedro María was killed by the ELN during clashes between this group and the 33rd Front of EMBF in the town of Tibú. After the events, his body could not be touched initially due to an explicit prohibition by the ELN, which prevented the bodies of those killed from being removed. In this scenario, and in a collective act of resistance, the community removed Pedro María's body hours later and gave him a dignified burial alongside the bodies of those who had also been killed during these clashes.

**Alleged responsible party: ELN**



**JANUARY 20, 2025**

**JAVIER ALEJANDRO VALENCIA**

**Member of the Dance Guys Troupe**

**JUAN DAVID RAMÍREZ RODRÍGUEZ**


**Member of the Dance Guys Troupe**

**Quibdó, Chocó**

Javier Alejandro Valencia, 17, and Juan David Ramírez Rodríguez, 19, were youth and cultural leaders who belonged to the Dance Guys Troupe in the city of Quibdó, Chocó. They were also part of UNICEF's 'Voces de Poder' (*Voices of Power*) project, which seeks to steer young people away from the recruitment dynamics of armed groups operating in the territory.

On the afternoon of January 19, 2025, *Leandro* and *Smith*, as they were known to their friends and family, were reported missing. After hours of searching, their bodies were found in a garbage dump in Quibdó on the morning of January 20. Both showed signs of torture. The Ministry of Culture issued a statement recognizing the leadership of the young men and condemning their forced disappearance and murder.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**JANUARY 20, 2025**

**JOSÉ CARRILLO**

**Member of the Peasant Guard  
Association for Peasant Unity  
in Catatumbo (ASUNCAT)  
Union Baja village, El Tarra,  
Norte de Santander**

José Carrillo was a peace signatory and prominent member of the peasant guard of the Association for Peasant Unity of Catatumbo (ASUNCAT) in the Union Baja village, a rural area of El Tarra, Norte de Santander.

On January 20, 2025, José Carrillo was allegedly murdered by members of the ELN in the Unión Baja village, in the rural area of El Tarra. This incident is part of the violence unleashed by illegal armed actors during the clashes taking place in the Catatumbo region between the ELN and the EMBF's 33rd Front.

**Alleged responsible party: ELN**



**JANUARY 21, 2025**

**PEDRO NEL ANGARITA ASCANIO**

**Vice President, Multiactiva Cooperative  
for Reintegration and Peace  
(REINCORPAZ)**

**San Antonio neighborhood, Teorama,  
Norte de Santander**



Pedro Nel Angarita Ascanio, 38, was a renowned community leader and peace signatory who lived in the municipality of Teorama, Norte de Santander. He served as vice president of the Multiactiva Cooperative for Reintegration and Peace (REINCORPAZ), an organization dedicated to developing productive projects for families of signatories to the Havana agreements.

On January 21, 2025, while working as a garbage and waste collector in the San Antonio neighborhood of Teorama's urban center, he was murdered by members of the ELN, who opened fire on the vehicle in which he was traveling. This incident occurred in the context of clashes between the ELN and the EMBF 33rd Front, which caused the serious humanitarian crisis that began in January 2025 and has profoundly affected the Catatumbo region.

**Alleged responsible party: ELN**



**JANUARY 21, 2025**

**RICARDO CARDONA**

**Justice of the Peace, community conflict mediator, and dialogue promoter**

**in Comuna 20**

**El Cortijo neighborhood, Comuna 20, Cali, Valle del Cauca**



Ricardo Cardona was a renowned community leader who served as a conflict mediator and dialogue promoter in Comuna 20, more specifically in the Siloé neighborhood, located in the city of Cali, Valle del Cauca. Ricardo was a justice of the peace in that commune, where he was highly appreciated for his dedication and commitment to the Siloé community.

On January 21, 2025, Ricardo was in the El Cortijo neighborhood of Comuna 20 when he was attacked with a firearm by unknown individuals. He was immediately taken to the Siloé hospital, where he died from the severity of his injuries. According to his wife's account, before killing him, the attackers told Ricardo, "You know we told you that you couldn't be here". She also claimed that the police had arrested two people, who were possibly the perpetrators, but that they had been released that same night. In response, the police said that they had detained them but had not legalized their arrest, so they had to release them. The Cali Secretariat for Peace and Coexistence issued a statement expressing their sorrow and condemnation of Ricardo's murder.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**JANUARY 25, 2025**

**ORLANDO VESGA BADILLO**

**Communal leader, Girardot neighborhood**

**Girardot neighborhood,**

**Bucaramanga, Santander**

Orlando Vesga Badillo, 57, was a prominent communal leader in the Girardot neighborhood of Bucaramanga, Santander, known for his extensive work with other Community Action Boards in the same city. He owned a tamal factory (steamed corn dough filled with meat or vegetables, wrapped in plantain leaves) that was the source of livelihood for him and his family.

On the afternoon of January 25, 2025, Orlando was with his wife delivering an order of tamales when he was attacked with a knife by an unidentified assailant on a motorcycle, who then fled the scene. Orlando was taken to the Santander University Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**JANUARY 28, 2025**

**JOSÉ ALBEIRO LIZ MUCHICÓN**

**Elder and ancestral sage -The Wala-traditional doctor of the U'sxa**


**Guyumús territory**

**U'sxa Guyumús territory, Páez, Cauca**

José Albeiro Liz Muchicón was a renowned indigenous leader, traditional healer, elder, and ancestral knowledge keeper of the U'sxa Guyumús territory of the Nasa people of Tierradentro, in the municipality of Páez, Cauca. He was renowned in his community for his leadership in strengthening territorial autonomy and organizational processes in the territory.

On the night of January 28, 2024, José Albeiro was murdered in his home by armed men who broke in and attacked him with a firearm while he was resting. Subsequently, the Association of Ancestral Territorial Authorities Nasa Çxhãçxha issued an alert and a statement condemning the incident and calling on the authorities to conduct a thorough investigation to clarify the circumstances of José Albeiro's assassination.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**




**JANUARY 30, 2025**

**UBICAEL LÓPEZ NOGUERA**

**Member of the Community Action Board  
of the Jardín Plateado neighborhood  
La Ceiba village, Argelia, Cauca**

Ubicael López Noguera was a prominent communal leader and member of the Community Action Board of the Jardín Plateado neighborhood, located in the village of El Plateado, in Argelia, Cauca. He was known in his community for his commitment to sports.



On January 30, 2025, Ubicael was with a neighbor in the village of La Ceiba when they were caught in the crossfire of a clash between an unidentified armed group and the National Army. Ubicael and the person he was with were hit by their bullets and died on the spot.

It should be noted that at that time, there was fighting between the EMC Carlos Patiño Front, members of the Second Marquetalia, the ELN, and the National Army.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**FEBRUARY 2, 2025**

**JAMES TOMÁS GUANGA QUELAL**

**Youth leader of the Association  
of Indigenous Traditional Authorities,  
Mayor Awá Council of Ricaurte Camawari  
Ricaurte, Nariño**

James Tomás Guanga Quelal, 25, was a renowned youth and indigenous leader, member of the Association of Indigenous Traditional Authorities, Mayor Awá Council of Ricaurte Camawari, located in the municipality of Ricaurte, in the coastal foothills of the Nariño department. James Tomás was also part of his municipality's mayor's office team.

On February 2, 2025, James Tomás was riding a motorcycle with his wife through the town of Ricaurte when unidentified individuals attacked him with firearms, killing him at the scene. His wife was injured and taken to a medical center.

According to statements by James Tomás's father, this murder was politically motivated, given that, around the time of the incident, elections were to be held to choose a new governor of the Camawari association, which brings together several reserves of the Awá people in Nariño.

**Alleged responsible party:  
Comuneros del Sur  
(a dissident faction of the ELN)**



**FEBRUARY 6, 2025**


**JHON ALBERTO PLAZA LLANO**

**Cultural and sports leader, Community Action Board, Candelillas village Chilví village, Tumaco, Nariño**

Jhon Alberto Plaza Llano was a renowned cultural and sports leader who belonged to the Community Action Board of the Candelillas village, in the rural area of Tumaco, Nariño.

On February 6, 2024, Jhon Alberto was murdered by unknown assailants in the village of Chilví, located on the road between Pasto and Tumaco.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**FEBRUARY 7, 2025**

**JORGE ENRIQUE CANO JARAMILLO**

**Teacher at Roberto López Rural Educational Institution  
Member of the Antioquia Teachers' Association (ADIDA)  
Member of the Colombian Federation of Educators (FECODE)  
Sofía Village, Santo Domingo, Antioquia**

Jorge Enrique Cano Jaramillo was a renowned teacher at the Roberto López Rural Educational Institution, located in the rural area of Santo Domingo, Antioquia. He was a member of the Antioquia Teachers' Association (ADIDA) and an active member of the Colombian Federation of Educators (FECODE). He was 46 years old.



On February 7, 2025, Jorge Enrique was on his way to the school where he worked in the Sofía village, located between the municipalities of San Roque and Cisneros, when he was approached by unknown individuals who shot and killed him. His body was found minutes later by residents who passed by the scene of the crime.

ADIDA issued a statement condemning the murder and calling for a swift investigation to identify those responsible for Jorge Enrique's murder. For his part, the representative of the municipality of Santo Domingo stated that he was not aware of any threats against Jorge Enrique.

### **Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**FEBRUARY 7, 2025**

**AMILCAR MAMBUSCAY TINTINAGUO**  
**Advocate for road improvements,**  
**former member of the Community Action**  
**Board of the Santa Bárbara village**  
**La Laguna Munchique village,**  
**El Tambo, Cauca**

45-year-old Amilcar Mambuscay Tintinaguo was a prominent communal leader who defended the rights of farmers and improved the living conditions of his community. He was president of the Community Action Board of the Santa Bárbara village in El Tambo, Cauca, and worked to promote road improvements in the area.



On February 7, 2025, Amilcar's body was found with gunshot wounds in the village of Laguna Munchique, in the rural area of El Tambo. Those responsible for the crime and the motives behind his murder are unknown.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**FEBRUARY 9, 2025**

**LEONAIRO SAMIR MONTERO PAZ**

**Governor of the Kwe'sx Tata Wala Council  
Planadas Village, Puerto Asís, Putumayo**

Leonairo Samir Montero Paz was a renowned indigenous leader, father of three children, and governor of the Nasa Council of Kwe'sx Tata Wala, located in the rural area of Puerto Asís, in the department of Putumayo.

On February 9, 2025, Leonairo Samir was murdered by a member of the Border Commandos, who attacked him with a firearm as he was leaving his farm with his wife, who was seriously injured in the attack. According to reports, the attacker was lurking around the farm waiting for an opportunity to murder Leonairo.

**Alleged responsible party:  
criminal alliance**





**FEBRUARY 10, 2025**

**ALBERTO QUITUMBO YATACUÉ**

**Member of the Indigenous Guard  
of the Toribío Reserve**

**La Palma Village, Toribío, Cauca**

Alberto Quitumbo Yatacué was a 41-year-old prominent indigenous leader who served as a member of the indigenous guard for the Toribío Reserve in northern Cauca. He was recognized in the reserve for his commitment to community work and the protection of life and territory. Some time ago, he had been wounded while participating in the liberation of land and had received threats from armed groups for his support of the Toribío reserve authorities.

In the early hours of February 10, 2025, Alberto was assassinated by armed men from the EMC Dagoberto Ramos Front, who attacked him with firearms in the La Palma hamlet, located in the rural area of Toribío.

**Alleged responsible party:  
post-peace agreement groups —  
EMC Dagoberto Ramos Front**




**FEBRUARY 18, 2025**

**JACINTO CHOCUÉ**

**Nasa elder and ancestral knowledge holder  
San Vicente village, Páez, Cauca**

Jacinto Chocué was a Nasa elder and ancestral knowledge holder who belonged to the ancestral territory of U'sxa Guyumus, better known as To-goima, located in the rural area of the Belalcázar and Páez municipalities in Cauca.



On the morning of February 18, 2024, Jacinto was murdered by unknown assailants while he was near a stream in the village of San Vicente, where he lived. His neighbors found his body with several gunshot wounds.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**FEBRUARY 18, 2025**

**CÉLIMO CHILIVICO HURTADO BULGARA**

**Traditional doctor of the Wounaan  
indigenous community of Chagpien Medio  
Litoral del San Juan, Chocó**

Célimo Chilivico Hurtado Bulgara was a renowned traditional indigenous doctor belonging to the Wounaan community of Chagpien Medio, located in the municipality of Litoral del San Juan, department of Chocó.



According to information known to the Wounaan Nation Organization of Colombia, Célimo had left the com-

munity in recent days in search of his daughter, who had been recruited by the ELN. For several days, there was no information about his whereabouts, until February 18, 2025, when his body was found floating in the San Juan River with signs of decomposition.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**FEBRUARY 21, 2025**

**HERNÁN AMAYA VELÁSQUEZ**

**Peasant leader and advocate for agrarian reform in Vichada**

**Matagrande village, Cumaribo, Vichada**

Hernán Amaya Velásquez was a renowned peasant leader and peace signatory who defended and promoted agrarian reform in the department of Vichada.

On February 21, 2025, Hernán was working with some colleagues on a plot of land that the National Land Agency had given him four days earlier in the village of Matagrande, in the rural area of Cumaribo, Vichada. Armed men arrived at the property on a motorcycle and attacked those present with weapons, severely injuring Hernán, who died at the scene. The motives for this murder are still unknown.



**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**FEBRUARY 23, 2025**

**LUIS ALIRIO DELGADILLO MUÑOZ**

**President of the Community Action Board  
of the Ciudad Barranquilla neighborhood  
Algeciras, Huila**

Luis Alirio Delgadillo Muñoz was a renowned 61-year-old social and communal leader who served as president of the Community Action Board of the Ciudad Barranquilla neighborhood, located in the urban area of Algeciras, Huila. He was known by the community as 'The Friend of the People' due to his dedication to improving the neighborhood where he lived.

On February 23, 2025, Luis Alirio was entering his home after spending time with some relatives when individuals on motorcycles attacked him with firearms, killing him instantly.

**Alleged responsible party:  
post-peace agreement groups**




**FEBRUARY 24, 2025**

**WILLIAM LEANDRO HERNÁNDEZ MAYORGA**

**Founder of the Familia 545 Collective  
Rap singer**

**Community leader, working to prevent  
violence against children, adolescents,  
and young people in the Usme district -  
El Mochuelo neighborhood, Usme district,  
Bogotá, D.C.**

William Leandro Hernández Mayorga, known in the hip hop world as "Insur-



gente Clandestino" (*Clandestine Insurgent*), was a renowned rap singer and founding member of the Familia 545 collective, which works to promote hip hop culture among children, youth, and adolescents in the Mochuelo neighborhood, located in the Usme district, south of Bogotá, Colombia. This collective originated after the so-called 'social uprising' that took place in 2021, and more specifically, in the context of the demonstrations and gatherings at the Puente de la Dignidad (*Bridge of Dignity*).

On February 24, 2025, William Leandro was murdered in circumstances that are still unclear. According to some accounts, a person close to the collective had a fight with William and attacked him with a knife, causing his death. It should be noted that several criminal gangs are fighting over territory in the area for control of micro-trafficking, and that, in addition, two members of the collective had been murdered in 2024, allegedly because of their membership in this collective, which in recent years has been the target of stigmatization and accusations from members of criminal gangs.

**Alleged responsible party:  
individual perpetrators**

**FEBRUARY 25, 2025**

**JORGE LUIS TERÁN CASTILLO**

**Teacher at the Máximo Mercado  
educational institution in Sabanalarga**

**Member of the Atlántico Educators  
Association**

**John F. Kennedy neighborhood,  
Sabanalarga, Atlántico**



Jorge Luis Terán Castillo, 64, was a renowned teacher in the municipality of Sabanalarga, Atlántico, who worked at the Máximo Mercado educational institution and was a prominent member of the Atlántico Educators Association.

On February 25, 2025, Jorge Luis was killed by two men who attempted to rob him in front of his home in the John F. Kennedy neighborhood of Sabanalarga. When he refused to hand over his cell phone, he was shot and critically injured. He was subsequently taken to a health center, where he succumbed to his injuries.

The Atlantic Coast Educators Association issued statements condemning the murder and calling for protests to demand justice and a swift investigation. On March 6, 2025, one of the individuals responsible for Jorge Luis' murder was captured, although it is not yet known whether he was part of an armed group or acting on his own.

**Alleged responsible party:  
individual perpetrators**

**FEBRUARY 27, 2025**

**LUCERO VELÁSQUEZ**

**Community leader in the village of Curubital  
Curubital village, Herveo, Tolima**

Lucero Velásquez was a well-known community leader in the village of Curubital, located in the rural area of Herveo, in the department of Tolima.

On February 27, 2025, Lucero was with her husband and 13-year-old son on their farm in rural Curubital when an armed man broke into the house, apparently intending to commit a robbery. Startled, he fired several shots at the family, killing Lucero, wounding the child, and striking the husband with the butt of the gun.

The Tolima Police Commander informed that the family had reported the theft of a motorcycle weeks earlier, which was later recovered in the village of Casabianca. The presence of illegal armed groups in the area has been ruled out for the time being, and according to investigations, the killer acted alone.

**Alleged responsible party:  
individual perpetrators**



**FEBRUARY 27, 2025**

**JERÓNIMO MARTÍNEZ BALLESTEROS**

**Former president of the Community**

**Action Board of the Colombiatón**

**neighborhood**

**Flor del Campo neighborhood,**

**Cartagena, Bolívar**

Jerónimo Martínez Ballesteros, 60, was a prominent communal leader in Colombiatón, a neighborhood east of Cartagena where he had lived since its founding. He was known for having been president of the neighborhood's Community Action Board, a position he had left after receiving threats. His neighbors, however, continued to recognize him as an exemplary leader for their community, whose members he advised free of charge so they could access housing.

On February 27, 2025, Jerónimo was riding a motorcycle with a female neighbor towards her home in the Flor del Campo neighborhood, which is next to Colombiatón. At the intersection of La Cordialidad Road and the entrance to the neighborhood, Jerónimo was approached by two men who attacked him with a firearm. The perpetrators fled into the neighborhood, and the community began a pursuit that led to the surrender of two suspects to the authorities.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**





**FEBRUARY 28, 2025**

**José Díaz Castillo**

**Advisor and political leader  
of the Comunes Party**

**Mamatoco, Santa Marta, Magdalena**

José Díaz Castillo was a political advisor to the Comunes Party in the department of Magdalena, known for his long political career in the city of Santa Marta and throughout the region.

On the night of February 28, 2025, José was riding his motorcycle to his home in Santa Marta. As he was traveling through the Mamatoco neighborhood, two men on another motorcycle shot him several times, killing him instantly. Currently, both the motives and those responsible for José's murder are unknown.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**MARCH 1, 2025**

**DAIRO LEÓN ISAZA**

**Community leader Puerto Berrío**

**Puerto Berrío, Antioquia**

On February 12, 2025, the disappearance of 54-year-old Dairo León Isaza, a prominent social and community leader in the municipality of Puerto Berrío, Antioquia, was reported. According to his family, he had planned to travel to the municipality of Yolombó that day but never arrived at his destination, causing concern among his loved ones. There were several versions of his whereabouts, but none of them turned out to be true.

On March 1, 2025, a Facebook video reported Dairo's murder without providing further information about the events. According to the report, Dairo was conducting a citizen oversight process on some public works being carried out in Puerto Berrío and had been denouncing acts of corruption by the mayor.



**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**MARCH 1, 2025**

**EDGAR TUMIÑÁ GEMBUEL**

**Indigenous Guard - Kiwe Thegnas  
in the Nasa Life Plan Project  
Belén neighborhood, Toribío, Cauca**

Edgar Tumiñá Gembuel, 48 years old, was a renowned member of the indigenous guard -Kiwe Thegnas- who accompanied the Nasa Life Plan Project in northern Cauca. He was also a recognized community leader in the village of Pueblo Viejo, within the Toribío reserve, and was recognized for his fight against the recruitment of children and young people by armed groups.

On the night of March 1, 2025, Edgar was in the Belén neighborhood in the municipality of Toribío when he was approached by armed men belonging to the EMC Dagoberto Ramos Front, who attacked him with firearms and caused him serious injuries. Edgar was taken with vital signs to the Toribío hospital, where he eventually died.

It should be noted that Edgar's brother had been the victim of an attack perpetrated by the then Dagoberto Ramos Column in 2019. Similarly, Kiwe Thegnas, another of Edgar's brothers, had been killed in 2014 by the Sixth Front of the then FARC-EP guerrilla group.

**Alleged responsible party:  
post-peace agreement groups -  
EMC Dagoberto Ramos Front**



**MARCH 3, 2025**

**ANA ELCY ARTEAGA CAMILO**

**President of the Community Action Board  
of the Pan de Azúcar village**

**Pan de Azúcar village, Rosas, Cauca**

Ana Elcy Arteaga Camilo was a businesswoman and renowned community leader who served as president of the Community Action Board of the Pan de Azúcar village in the rural area of Rosas, Cauca. She was noted for her commitment and work on behalf of her village community.



On March 3, 2025, Ana Elcy was traveling along the Pan-American Highway between the village of Pan de Azúcar and the district of Párraga to pick up her granddaughter when unknown individuals approached her and attacked her with a firearm. Upon realizing what had happened, some of the residents took her to a local health center and then to Popayán, where she ultimately died from her injuries. The mayor of Rosas issued a statement expressing regret and condemnation of the events surrounding Ana Elcy's death.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**MARCH 3, 2025**

**LORENZO RENTERÍA ARBOLEDA**

**President of the Community Action Board  
in Juradó**

**Former President of the Mojaudó Minor  
Community Council**

**Leader of the Puro Corazón Juradó  
movement**

**Rural area of Juradó, Chocó**



Lorenzo Rentería Arboleda was a prominent leader who served as president of the Community Action Board in the municipality of Juradó, on the northwestern coast of Chocó. He was previously president of the Mojaudó Minor Community Council, leader of the Puro Corazón movement, and a sports administrator in his territory. He was married to the president of the Juradó Municipal Council.

On March 2, 2025, during a fishing trip, Lorenzo was intercepted by members of the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) and forced to attend a meeting. After attending the meeting, his whereabouts were unknown. The next day, his body was found one kilometer from the town center on the banks of the Juradó River. According to sources, there is a strong presence of the AGC and the ELN in the area.

**Alleged responsible party:  
paramilitaries – AGC**

**MARCH 4, 2025**

**DUVÁN ARMANDO LIZCANO SÁNCHEZ**

**Community teacher at the Techo Popular Sports and Arts School**

**La Candelaria District, Bogotá, D.C.**

Duván Armando Lizcano Sánchez was a prominent 24-year-old community leader who worked as a community teacher at the Techo Popular Sports and Arts School in the Kennedy district, in the southwestern part of Bogotá.

On March 1, 2025, someone stabbed Duván with a knife under circumstances that have yet to be clarified. This happened while he was celebrating the birthday of the Santa Fe soccer team, of which he was a fan and a member of one of its fan clubs. The incident took place in the Plazoleta del Rosario, in the heart of Bogotá D.C. Due to the severity of his injuries, Duván was unable to survive and finally passed away on March 4, 2024, in a hospital of that city.

**Alleged responsible party:  
individual perpetrators**



**MARCH 9, 2025**

**JAIME ALONSO GALLEGÓ GÓMEZ**

**Leader of the Northeast Antioquia Mining and Environmental Roundtable**

**Member of the Segovia Human Rights Committee**

**President of the Segovia and Remedios Mining Roundtable**

**President of the organizing committee for the Gigantona carnival and pre-carnival**

**Leader of the Historic Pact**

**El Jabón village, Vegachí, Antioquia**



Jaime Alonso Gallego Gómez, also known as “Mongo,” was a renowned 57-year-old union leader who stood out as one of the founders of the Segovia and Remedios Mining Board, president of the Mining Board of the same municipalities, member of the Segovia Human Rights Committee, president of the organizing committee for the Gigantona carnival and pre-carnival, and leader of the Historic Pact.

On March 3, 2025, Jaime left in the morning accompanied by his escort from the National Protection Unit (UNP) to attend a meeting he had been summoned to by an armed group. Since that date, there had been no news about the location of either of them. In the early hours of Sunday, March 9, the sound of gunshots led a group of soldiers to a road in the El Jabón village, in the rural area of Vegachí. There they found Jaime’s body with several gunshot wounds. The bodyguard who accompanied him was released and arrived on his own at the Yolombó hospital a few hours before Jaime’s body was found.

Jaime's murder took place just one day before the start of the mining strike that was expected to take place in the region, which was ultimately postponed until March 24, 2025. According to President Gustavo Petro, those responsible were members of the Gulf Clan –as the AGC are known in some regions– under the command of alias “Máximo” or “Sebastián,” who was captured and sent to prison on June 25, 2025, following an operation carried out by the security forces.

**Alleged responsible party:  
paramilitaries-AGC**

**MARCH 9, 2025**

**CRISTIAN FERNANDO GUANGA**

**Leader of the Awá Piguambi Palangala  
Indigenous Reserve**

**Former Deputy Governor of the Awá  
Piguambi Palangala Indigenous Reserve  
Llorente Township, Tumaco, Nariño**

Cristian Fernando Guanga was a well-known indigenous leader of the Awá people, who had previously served as deputy governor of the Piguambi Palangala Indigenous Reserve, where he continued to exercise leadership within a community that loved him and recognized his work in defending human rights. He was 24 years old.

On March 9, 2025, Cristian Fernando was murdered by two hooded individuals who were waiting for him at the entrance to the Piguambi Palangala re-





serve, located in the district of Llorente, in the rural area of Tumaco. Upon arriving at the location, the assailants shot Cristian, who died on the spot.

It should be noted that Cristian had been reporting threats against his life since 2023, but the state authorities had not provided him with any protection.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**MARCH 12, 2025**

**NEISAIR RAMOS NAVAS**

**Social and political leader of Guachené**

**Co-founder of the municipality of Guachené**

**El Guabal village, Guachené, Cauca**

Neisair Ramos Navas was a prominent social and political leader in Guachené, a municipality in Cauca that he helped found and where he had served as secretary of government.

On March 12, 2025, Neisair was driving his car through the Metal Bi sector, in the El Guabal village, in the rural area of Guachené, when heavily armed men fired indiscriminately at the vehicle, causing him serious injuries. After the incident, in which a 12-year-old girl also died, he was taken to a health center, where he died shortly thereafter.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**MARCH 13, 2025**

**ISMAEL BORRAY**

**President of the Community  
Action Board of Caño Santo Domingo  
Bajo Caguán Sector,  
Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá**

Ismael Borray, 49, was the president of the Community Action Board and a well-known teacher in the Caño Santo Domingo village, located in the rural area of Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá, where he lived with his wife and daughter. Due to his leadership, Ismael was greatly appreciated by his community.

On March 13, 2025, heavily armed men broke into Ismael's home, forced him outside, and shot him to death in the area known as Bajo Caguán.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**MARCH 14, 2025**

**DIEGO ALEXANDER HERRERA CARRANZA**

**Human Rights Defender**

**Member of the Barrancabermeja Victims'**

**Participation Bureau**

**Kennedy Neighborhood, Comuna 6,  
Barrancabermeja, Santander**



Diego Alexander Herrera Carranza, aged 38, was a well-known activist and human rights defender who was a member of the victims' participation bureau in Barrancabermeja, Santander. He worked to defend the rights of communities affected by the armed conflict and supported the reporting of violent situations and incidents in that area of the Magdalena Medio region.

On March 14, 2025, Diego Alexander was in a commercial establishment in the Kennedy neighborhood, in Comuna 6 of Barrancabermeja, when unknown men entered the premises, shot him several times, and killed him on the spot.

To this date, there is no certainty about the motive for the crime, nor is there any information about those responsible. During January and February, there have been threats via pamphlets against organizations dedicated to the defense of human rights.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**MARCH 14, 2025**


**ERNESTO MUÑOZ CASAMACHÍN**

**Member of the Community Action Board  
of the village of San Miguel**

**Member of the National Association  
of Peasant Reserves (ANZORC)**

**Member of the Popular Unity Process  
of Southwestern Colombia (PUPSOC)**

**Member of the Patriotic March Party  
Asencio Village, La Plata, Huila**



Ernesto Muñoz Casamachín was a prominent peasant leader in the department of Cauca, an active member of the Community Action Board of the San Miguel village, a member of the National Association of Peasant Reserves (ANZORC), the Popular Unity Process of Southwestern Colombia (PUPSOC), and the Patriotic March movement.

On March 13, 2025, Ernesto was detained and taken away by armed men who violently removed him from the village of San Miguel, in the municipality of Inzá, Cauca. It is known that Ernesto was taken to the border of the municipality with La Plata, Huila, where he was finally murdered. His body was found on the morning of March 14 at a site known as Puente Quebrada El Chorreron, in the Asencio village, rural jurisdiction of La Plata. He had nine bullet wounds, six of them in his head.

The Inzá Tierradentro Peasant Association (ACIT) denounced Ernesto's murder in a statement recognizing his leadership. There is still no information about the motives or those responsible for the crime.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**MARCH 16, 2025**

**DIANDRA NATALIA ZAMORA HENAO**

**Youth leader of the Tucán de Caño Giriza reservation**

**Member of the Association of Miraflores Indigenous Authorities**

**Coordinator of the women and family line**

**Association of Traditional Indigenous Authorities of Guaviare (ASATRIMIG)**

**Barranquillita Village, Miraflores, Guaviare**



Diandra Natalia Zamora Henao was a renowned 24-year-old youth leader who belonged to the indigenous community of the Caño Tucán Giriza reserve, located in the rural area of the Miraflores municipality in Guaviare. Diandra was a member of the Association of Indigenous Authorities of Miraflores and was the coordinator of the women and family line of the Association of Traditional Indigenous Authorities of Guaviare (ASATRIMIG). She was also the mother of a 9-year-old child.

On March 14, 2025, Diandra was traveling to the municipality of Miraflores with her sister, brother-in-law, and several other people when the vehicle in which they were traveling was stopped by armed men who identified themselves as members of the First Front of dissidence of the former FARC-EP guerrilla group. At that moment, Diandra was detained and taken to a remote location where she was murdered. After the incident, her body was recovered by the community and taken to the town center.

**Alleged responsible party:  
post-peace agreement groups —  
EMC First Front**

**MARCH 19, 2025**

**LUIS ALFONSO SÁNCHEZ BARRERA**

**Equity Conciliator for the Lejanías  
Community Action Board  
Flor Amarillo, Tame, Arauca**

Luis Alfonso Sánchez Barrera was a renowned social leader, cattle rancher, and farmer who served as an equity conciliator for the Lejanías Community Action Board in the rural area of the Arauquita municipality, Arauca.



On January 19, 2025, members of the ELN kidnapped Luis Alfonso in front of his son, in the village of Puerto Jordán, in the Arauquita jurisdiction. There had been no news of his whereabouts until his body was found on March 19, 2025, in the area known as Flor Amarillo, located on the road from Tame to the city of Arauca.

**Alleged responsible party: ELN**

**MARCH 20, 2025**

**DIANYS VALDERRAMA TUBERQUIA**

**Member of the La Provincia Community Action Board**

**Member of the Provincia y Paz Producers Association (ASOPROVIPA)**

**La Provincia village, Carepa, Antioquia**

Dianys Valderrama Tuberquia was a well-known community leader in the village of La Provincia, in the rural area of Carepa, Antioquia. She was a member of the village Community Action Board and also belonged to the Provincia y Paz Producers Association (ASOPROVIPA). She was 35 years old.

On March 20, 2025, Dianys was murdered in her home by a 14-year-old minor, who stabbed her multiple times with a knife. According to reports, the murderer had mental health issues and told his mother that “a spirit told him” to kill Dianys.

**Alleged responsible party:  
individual perpetrators**



**MARCH 23, 2025**

**DIEGO FERNANDO RUÍZ SOTO**

**Member of the community process  
in Pradera**

**Pradera, Valle del Cauca**

Diego Fernando Ruíz Soto was a prominent member of a community process in the Pradera municipality, south of the Valle del Cauca department.

On March 23, 2025, Diego Fernando was riding his motorcycle on Calle 3, between Carreras 11 and 12, a few meters from the Pradera police station, when armed men approached him to steal his motorcycle. Diego resisted and was fatally shot in the head. Those responsible fled in an unknown direction.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**MARCH 24, 2025**

**WILMER SOLARTE PASCAL**

**Former governor of the Awa Makna  
indigenous council**

**San Miguel, Putumayo**

Wilmer Solarte Pascal was a renowned indigenous leader and former governor of the Awa Makna indigenous council, located in the San Miguel municipality, Putumayo. He worked as a taxi driver.





On March 24, 2025, Wilmer was driving his taxi on the road leading from the La Dorada town center to the Agua Clara village when unknown assailants attacked his vehicle with firearms, murdered him while he was inside.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**MARCH 27, 2025**

**LÁCIDES CASTELLANOS**

**Member of the Valle del Cauca Peasant Organization**

**President of the Tenjo Village Aqueduct  
Tenjo Village, Palmira, Valle del Cauca**

Lácides Castellanos was a renowned social and peasant leader who served as president of the Tenjo Village Aqueduct in the rural area of Palmira, Valle del Cauca. He was also a member of the Valle del Cauca Peasant Organization and a local coffee growers' association.

On March 27, 2025, Lácides was on his farm in the village of Tenjo when armed men broke in and shot him several times, killing him. It should be noted that post-peace agreement groups are present in the area where the events took place, such as the EMC Adán Izquierdo and Yair Bermúdez Fronts, the latter being a dissident faction of the EMC.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**MARCH 28, 2025**

**HERMES RICARDO WILCHEZ**

**Community leader of the Cuatro Veredas sector**


**Cuatro Veredas, Dibulla, La Guajira**

Hermes Ricardo Wilchez, better known as “Barba,” was a prominent community leader in the Cuatro Veredas sector, in the Dibulla municipality of La Guajira. He was 66 years old.

On the afternoon of March 28, 2025, Hermes was working the land in the Cuatro Veredas sector, located in the La Punta de los Remedios village, when a hooded man approached him and, without saying a word, he opened fire, killing him on the spot.

The perpetrators of the murder are unknown, as are the motives for the crime.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**APRIL 2, 2025**

**HEMERSON REINEL PÉREZ**

**Community leader and former councilman of Puerto Wilches**

**Puerto Wilches, Santander**

Hemerson Reinel Pérez was a prominent 45-year-old community leader who served as a councilman in Puerto Wilches, Santander, between 2020 and 2024, specifically as a member of the Alternative Indigenous Social Movement (MAIS) party.



During the night of April 2, 2025, Hemerson Reinel was at the house where he lived with his mother when armed men arrived and shot them, seriously injuring both individuals. Upon noticing the incident, their neighbors transported them by motorcycle to the Edmundo Germán Arias Duarte Hospital, where Hemerson ultimately passed away.

It should be noted that since 2021, Hemerson had received death threats from paramilitaries belonging to the AGC. Likewise, in March, he had been threatened by a group of FARC-EP dissidents through a pamphlet.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**APRIL 6, 2025**

**JAIME ENRIQUE BENÍTEZ**

**President of the Inter-Guild Council  
and the Municipal Peace Council of Tame  
Tame, Arauca**

Jaime Enrique Benítez was a renowned 62-year-old community leader who served as president of the Inter-Guild Council and the Municipal Peace Council in the Tame municipality, Arauca.

The night of April 6, 2025, Jaime Enrique was riding his motorcycle home after attending an event in town. Around 10:30 p.m., hitmen approached him and shot him. Jaime tried to take cover in his home, but he couldn't avoid the bullets and was as-



sassinated. The incident occurred at Calle 13 and Carrera 8, in the heart of downtown Tame.

It should be noted that some sources indicated that Jaime Enrique was being pressured by the National Liberation Army (ELN) to join this armed group.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**APRIL 12, 2025**


**MANUEL BETANCOURT**

**Deputy Governor of the Quillasinga Indigenous Community of Yacuanquer Yacuanquer Main Park, Nariño**

Manuel Betancourt was a renowned Indigenous leader who served as deputy governor and *taita* (spiritual leader) of the Quillasinga Indigenous Community, located in Yacuanquer, Nariño.

On April 12, 2025, during the night, Manuel was in Yacuanquer's main park when unknown individuals approached him and opened fire, killing him instantly. Although several indigenous organizations in the region issued statements condemning and repudiating Manuel's murder, the motives and perpetrators remain unknown to date..

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**APRIL 13, 2025**

**ERIK ANDERSON MENZA PAVÍ**

**Khabuwe'sx authority of the  
San Francisco territory**

**Porvenir village, Toribío, Cauca**

Erik Anderson Menza Paví, 32, was a renowned indigenous leader who served as a Khabuwe'sx authority (indigenous guard) in the San Francisco territory, located in the rural area of Toribío, in the department of Cauca. He was known for his support of social causes in his community.

On April 12, 2025, Erik Anderson was shot and murdered by members of the EMC Dagoberto Ramos Front. The incident took place at a location known as El Asomadero, in the El Porvenir village, where Anderson's body was found next to a road.

**Alleged responsible party:  
post-peace agreement groups —  
EMC Dagoberto Ramos Front**



**APRIL 17, 2025**

**ESTHER JULIA CAMAYO**

**Member of the National Association  
of Peasant Users (ANUC)**

**Mondomo Township,  
Santander de Quilichao, Cauca**

Esther Julia Camayo was a peasant and community leader belonging to the indigenous council of La Concepción. She was also a member of the National Association of Peasant Users (ANUC) and a beneficiary of a rural development project promoted by the Association of Sugarcane Growers of Colombia (ASOCAÑA).



On April 17, 2025, Esther Julia was in the Mondomo township in Santander de Quilichao when an explosive device targeting the town's police station was detonated. The explosion injured several people, including Esther Julia and her daughter, who were seriously wounded. Esther Julia did not survive and died minutes after the incident.

The Ministry of Agriculture and ASOCAÑA issued statements condemning her murder.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**APRIL 19, 2025**

**JOSÉ FRANCISCO ROMERO ZAMUDIO**

**Active member of the Dosquebradas  
Community Action Board**

**Active member of the La Cristalina  
Cattle Committee**

**Peace signatory**

**Caño Negro, Yondó, Antioquia**

José Francisco Romero Zamudio was a prominent member of the Community Action Board of the Dosquebradas village, located in Yondó, Antioquia. He was also a member of the livestock committee of the La Cristalina farm, a signatory to the peace agreement, and the son of a renowned social leader in northeastern Antioquia.

On April 19, 2025, José Francisco was murdered at kilometer 5 of the road leading from Yondó to the Caño Negro village. The incident occurred when members of the AGC attacked him with firearms.

**Alleged responsible party:  
paramilitaries – AGC**



**APRIL 19, 2025**

**ARBEBY MORALES HERNÁNDEZ**

**Conciliator, La Poza village Community Action Board**

**La Poza village, Cantagallo, Bolívar**

Arbey Morales Hernández was a prominent community leader who served as conciliator for the La Poza Village Community Action Board, located in a rural area of the Cantagallo municipality, in Bolívar. He was also known for mediating between the community and the armed groups operating in the region.

On April 19, 2025, Arbey was walking on his farm, located an hour from the village of La Poza, when he was approached and shot dead by members of the AGC, a group that had been targeting him for his alleged links to the ELN and FARC-EP dissidents. Arbey's body was found and recovered by his neighbors and relatives.

**Alleged responsible party:  
paramilitaries — AGC**





**APRIL 26, 2025**

**GUILLERMO ARTURO GALVIZ PLAZAS**

**Former coordinator of the Wildlife  
Care and Assessment Center (CAV)**


**Wildlife researcher and conservationist**

**San Fernando neighborhood,  
Cartagena, Bolívar**

Guillermo Arturo Galviz Plazas, 38 years old, was a renowned wildlife advocate, conservationist, and researcher in Cartagena, capital of the department of Bolívar, who had previously coordinated the Wildlife Care Center (CAV). There, he performed essential work in favor of the conservation and care of local fauna and ecosystems.

On April 26, 2025, Guillermo Arturo was driving his car in the San Fernando neighborhood when he was attacked and killed by an unknown assailant on a motorcycle. The motives for the crime are unknown.

**Alleged responsible party:  
individual perpetrators**




**APRIL 27, 2025**

**WILMER YAIR LÓPEZ SANTANDER**

**Former councilman and political leader  
of Orito**

**Orito, Putumayo**

Wilmer Yair López Santander was a renowned political leader who had served as a councilman for the Orito municipality from 2016 to 2019 and as an official in the mayor's office of the same municipality.



On April 27, 2025, Wilmer Yair was chatting with several people inside an establishment located in the town center of Orito when armed men belonging to the Border Commandos entered the premises and repeatedly fired at people who were allegedly members of another armed group. In the exchange of gunfire, Wilmer Yair was killed, and six other people were wounded. After the attack, the authorities managed to capture two people.

**Alleged responsible party:  
criminal alliances**

**APRIL 28, 2025**

**WALBERTO QUINTERO MEDINA**

**Vice President of the Unitary Workers'**

**Union (CUT) Cesar sub-directorate**

**Executive of the National Union**

**of Agri-Food System Workers**

**(SINALTRAINAL)**

**Sicarare neighborhood, Valledupar, Cesar**

40-year-old Walberto Quintero Medina was a well-known union leader who served as vice president of the Unitary Workers' Union (CUT) in the Cesar sub-directorate and as director of the National Union of Agri-Food System Workers (SINALTRAINAL).

On the night of April 28, 2025, Walberto was chatting with friends in a store located in the Sicarare neighborhood of Valledupar when a hitman approached him and, without mediating a word, shot him several times, leaving him seriously injured. Walberto was immediately taken to a hospital but died hours later.

After the incident, several social and union organizations expressed their condemnation of Walberto's murder. On April 29, 2025, Luis Ángel Armenta Martínez was arrested and accused of being the perpetrator of the attack. However, it is not known whether the accused belongs to any armed group.

**Alleged responsible party:**  
**individual perpetrators**



**MAY 1, 2025**

**LUIS ALBERTO PEÑA**

**Member of the Association for the Constitution of the Peasant Reserve Zone of the Municipality of Miranda Cauca (ASPROZONAC)**

**Member of the Popular Unity Process of Southwestern Colombia (PUPSOC)  
Libertadores neighborhood, Miranda, Cauca**



Luis Alberto Peña, aged 60, was a renowned peasant leader and member of the Association for the Constitution of the Peasant Reserve Zone of the Municipality of Miranda, Cauca (ASPROZONAC) and the Popular Unity Process of Southwestern Colombia (PUPSOC). He was also a political activist for the Patriotic March political party.

On the morning of May 1, 2025, Luis Alberto was using a loudspeaker to call for Labor Day demonstrations in Miranda when he was approached by armed men who shot him several times, causing his death. The incident took place in the Libertadores neighborhood, in the heart of the municipality.

The Francisco Isaías Cifuentes Human Rights Network (REDDHFIC) issued a statement denouncing and condemning Luis Alberto's murder.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**MAY 1, 2025**

**JUAN CARLOS RODRÍGUEZ**

**Auditor for the Community Action Board  
of Circasias**


**Representative of the Chontaduro  
growers' union in San Isidro**

**Rural area of Puerto Caicedo, Putumayo**

Juan Carlos Rodríguez was a prominent community leader who served as auditor for the Community Action Board of the Circasias village, located in the rural area of the Puerto Caicedo municipality, Putumayo, and was also representative of the Puerto Caicedo chontaduro growers' union.

On May 1, 2025, Juan Carlos was murdered by unknown assailants in circumstances that have yet to be clarified.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**




**MAY 1, 2025**

**ÁNGEL ARBEY VALLEJO ROSAS**

**President of the Palmar del Picudito  
Community Action Board**

**Palmar de Picudito village,  
Puerto Caicedo, Putumayo**

Ángel Arbey Vallejo Rosas was president of the Palmar de Picudito Community Action Board, which is in the rural area of Puerto Caicedo, in the department of Putumayo.




On May 1, 2025, Ángel Arbey's body was found with several gunshot wounds inside his residence in Palmar de Picudito. The alleged perpetrators of the murder were members of the Border Commandos.

**Alleged responsible party:**  
**criminal alliances — Border Commandos**

**MAY 7, 2025**  
**JOSÉ JESÚS MONSALVE**  
**President of the Piedritas Community**  
**Action Board**  
**Piedritas village, Tuluá, Valle del Cauca**

José Jesús Monsalve, 56 years old, was a renowned community leader who served as president of the Piedritas Community Action Board, located in the rural area of Tuluá, Valle del Cauca.



On May 7, 2025, José Jesús was at his own business premises located in Piedritas, when unknown individuals attacked him with a firearm. José Jesús was taken to a health center, where he ultimately died from the severity of his injuries. It should be noted that several armed groups are present in the area, such as the EMC Adán Izquierdo column, the 57th Front 'Jair Bermúdez' and criminal structures such as 'La Inmaculada'. To this date, those responsible for the murder and their motives remain unknown.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**MAY 10, 2025**

**TEÓFILO GONZÁLEZ COQUI**

**Indigenous spiritual leader of the  
La Gaitana Inzá council  
El Belén village, Cabildo La Gaitana,  
Inzá, Cauca**

Teófilo González Coqui was a renowned spiritual leader and traditional healer. He belonged to the La Gaitana Inzá indigenous reserve, in the municipality of Inzá, Cauca.

On May 10, 2025, Teófilo was found in his home seriously wounded with a knife but still alive. He was immediately taken to a health center by his neighbors, where he eventually died from the severity of his injuries. The motive for Teófilo's murder appears to have been a neighborhood dispute.

**Alleged responsible party:  
individual perpetrators**




**MAY 11, 2025**

**SIRLEY VANESSA LÓPEZ LOAIZA**

**Leader of the Salem Collective,  
University of Valle — Palmira Campus  
Universidad del Valle Campus,  
Palmira, Valle del Cauca**

Sirley Vanessa López Loaiza, aged 23, was an eighth-semester student of Literary Studies at the University of Valle, Palmira Campus, and an active leader of Salem, a feminist collective she had joined months before her murder.



On May 8, 2025, Sirley Vanessa was with her partner in the cafeteria of the University of Valle, Palmira Campus, when a man identified as Brayan Tovar entered the campus armed with the intention of murdering María José Barrero, a student who had been the killer's partner. When Tovar opened fire, the bullets struck María José and Sirley Vanessa, who were seriously injured. After the attack, Tovar took his own life at the scene. Sirley was taken to the Palma Real clinic in Palmira but died on May 11 due to the severity of her injuries.

**Alleged responsible party:**  
**individual perpetrators — Brayan Tovar**

**MAY 14, 2025**

**WILLIAM ARNULFO MARÍN AMAYA**

**Member of the equity conciliation committee of El Castillo village community action board**

**Puerto Claver village, El Bagre, Antioquia**

William Arnulfo Marín Amaya, age 39, was a well-known leader in the village of El Castillo, located in El Bagre, Antioquia. He was a member of the Community Action Board's equity conciliation committee and was known for his commitment to mediation and conflict resolution within his community. He also encouraged his neighbors to participate in collective issues.

On May 12, 2025, William Arnulfo was summoned to a meeting by members of the AGC in the area known as Puer-





to Claver, where he was shot and killed as soon as he arrived. His body was found on May 14 in a rural area near where he had been summoned.

**Alleged responsible party:  
paramilitaries – AGC**

**MAY 18, 2025**

**ZULEIMA MOSQUERA BELTRÁN**

**President of the Puente Real**

**Community Action Board**

**Community leadership**

**Mondomo district,**

**Santander de Quilichao, Cauca**

Zuleima Mosquera Beltrán, 44, was the president of the Community Action Board of the Puente Real village, in the rural area of Santander de Quilichao, Cauca. She also belonged to a peasant movement in the municipality of Caldono and was involved in the creation of the Peasant Reserve Zone of El Pital in Pescador.

On May 18, 2025, Zuleima was chatting with friends in a public establishment in the Mondomo township when two armed men attacked her with a firearm, causing serious injuries. Zuleima was taken to the Mondomo health center and then to the Francisco de Paula Santander hospital in Santander de Quilichao, where she died hours later. To date, the motives and perpetrators of her murder remain unknown.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**MAY 19, 2025**

**FREDY BALLESTEROS**

**President of the El Milagro village  
community action board  
El Serpentino, Tibú, Norte de Santander**

Fredy Ballesteros was a well-known leader who served as president of the community action board for the El Milagro village in the rural area of Tibú, Norte de Santander.



On May 19, 2025, Fredy was riding his motorcycle on the road leading from the area known as La Serena to El Serpentino, in the rural area of Tibú, when two armed men intercepted him and attacked him with a firearm, killing him on the spot.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**MAY 22, 2025**

**NAWAR JIMÉNEZ**

**Human Rights Defender, Legal  
Representative of the Mariposas  
de la Noche (Butterflies of the Night)  
Organization  
Carmen de Bolívar, Bolívar**



Nawar Jiménez, 28, was a renowned human rights defender and legal representative of the Mariposas de la Noche Organization, which works to defend trans and cisgender women and sex workers, a population group to which she belonged. She was also part of the LGBTIQ+ collective reparation group in the municipality of El Carmen de Bolívar.

On the night of May 21, 2025, Nawar left her home and did not return. Hours later, on the morning of May 22, her body was found with injuries to her head, a stab wound, and signs of sexual violence, in a ditch by the road leading to the municipality of San Jacinto. It should be noted that since 2019, Nawar had been reporting threats against her life.

Several social organizations and institutions issued statements recognizing her work in defense of human rights and condemning this murder.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**MAY 30, 2025**

**JORGE ELIÉCER RANGEL QUINTERO**

**Official for the Ombudsman's**

**Office in La Gloria**

**La Gloria, Cesar**

Jorge Eliécer Rangel Quintero was a well-known social leader who, since April 2024, had been working as an official for the Delegate for the Regions and Territorial Coordination in the Cesar Regional Ombudsman's Office, more specifically in the municipality of La Gloria. He was the representative of La Gloria between 2008 and 2023 and was widely recognized in the community for his commitment to defending human rights in that municipality.

On May 30, 2025, Jorge was murdered by unknown assailants who attacked him with a firearm in the town center of La Gloria. The Cesar Governor's Office and La Gloria Mayor's Office offered a reward for information leading to the arrest of those responsible for Jorge's murder. For its part, the Ombudsman's Office issued a vehement statement condemning the events.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**MAY 31, 2025**

**LINA MARÍA PUENTES VEGA**

**Secretary of the Nueva Reforma**

**Community Action Board**

**Woman Seeker / Network of Seekers**

**In the Footsteps of Life**

**Nueva Reforma village, Baraya, Huila**

Lina María Puentes Vega was a renowned leader who served as secretary of the Community Action Board of the village of Nueva Reforma and belonged to the network of searchers *Tras las Huellas de Vida* (In the Footsteps of Life), from where she promoted the search for her brothers José Oswaldo and Wilson Armando Puentes Vega, who were forcibly disappeared in the context of the armed conflict. Her work was characterized by publicly denouncing the actions of illegal armed groups, which she accused of acting without political or social causes and of engaging in extortion and violent control of communities.

On the afternoon of May 31, 2025, Lina María was murdered in the village of Nueva Reforma, near the school where her granddaughter studied. According to community accounts, alias Víctor Chala (who is reported to be a member of the EMC, Jorge Suárez Briceño Bloc, Darío Gutiérrez substructure) arrived at the place where Lina María was, looking for a woman. Based on unconfirmed rumors, alias Victor Chala attacked her with a firearm, killing her on the spot.

**Alleged responsible parties:**  
**post-peace agreement groups**



**MAY 31, 2025**

**AQUILES VALLEJOS LÓPEZ**

**Artisan leader / Union leader  
of Mototaxistas de Linares  
Llanogrande village, Linares, Nariño**

Aquiles Vallejo López was a prominent social leader and artisan of the Nariño carnival who worked to preserve culture. In addition, he had been organizing the motorcycle taxi drivers' union in the municipality of Linares, in the department of Nariño.



On May 31, 2025, Aquiles was murdered by unknown individuals while riding his motorcycle in the village of Llanogrande, rural area of Linares. The motives and those responsible for the crime are still unknown, although it is worth noting the armed presence of the EMC, the Comuneros del Sur front, and the United Self-Defense Forces of Nariño in the region.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**MAY 31, 2025**

**EDGAR IVÁN VELASCO**

**Teacher at La Huella Educational Center**

**Leader of the Protective Environments**

**Network project**

**Caloto, Cauca**

46-year-old Edgar Iván Velasco was a renowned community leader who worked as a teacher at La Huella Educational Center, located in the Huellas indigenous reserve in rural Caloto, Cauca, where he was known for his dedication to teaching and his close ties to the Nasa community. He was also a leader of the Protective Environments Network Project, promoted by Benposta Young Men Nation.

On May 31, 2025, Edgar was riding his motorcycle home. As he was passing through the La Rivera neighborhood in the town of Caloto, he was approached by armed men who intended to steal his motorcycle. Edgar was killed at the scene during the robbery. The attackers immediately fled the scene.

Several indigenous, peasant, and community social organizations expressed their profound rejection of Edgar's murder, while highlighting the importance of his work within the Huellas reserve community.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**JUNE 1, 2025**

**MAURICIO ALEGRÍA LUCUMÍ**

**Youth soccer coach in the Los Chorros neighborhood**

**Los Chorros neighborhood,  
Cali, Valle del Cauca**

Mauricio Alegría Lucumí was a prominent community leader who worked as a youth soccer coach in the Los Chorros neighborhood, located in commune 18 of Cali, in Valle del Cauca. Mauricio was beloved by the community, especially by the children and youth of Los Chorros, whom he trained with dedication.

On June 1, 2025, Mauricio was murdered while exercising in Ingenio Park in southern Cali, when he was approached by unknown individuals who mugged him, stabbed him several times with a knife, and threw him into the Meléndez River. Hours later, Mauricio was found by people passing through the area, who noticed his body.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**





**JUNE 2, 2025**

**DANIEL MAURICIO TRUJILLO GUTIÉRREZ**

**Sports commentator and risk  
management liaison in Argelia  
San Juan de la Guadua, Argelia, Cauca**

Daniel Mauricio Trujillo Gutiérrez was a renowned community leader in the municipality of Argelia, Cauca, where he worked as a sports commentator and risk management liaison for the municipal mayor's office. His leadership was notable for his commitment to sports.

On June 2, 2025, Daniel Mauricio was returning on his motorcycle after participating as a commentator in the traditional sports weeks in Argelia, when unknown men intercepted him on the road leading to the village of San Juan de la Guadua and shot him several times, killing him instantly.

In Argelia, there is a presence of the EMC Carlos Patiño structure, the Diomer Cortés front of the Second Marquetalia, and the ELN.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**JUNE 3, 2025**

**LUIS AURELIO ARAUJO HERNÁNDEZ**

**Indigenous Coordinator of the Ricaurte**

**Camawari Awá Grand Council**

**Cuaiquer Viejo village, Ricaurte, Nariño**

Luis Aurelio Araujo Hernández was a renowned indigenous leader of the Awá people. He served as indigenous coordinator of the Awá Grand Council of Ricaurte Camawari. He was officially recognized by the Ministry of the Interior as general coordinator of the association on March 10, thus assuming legal representation of the ten indigenous reserves that make up this organization.



On the morning of June 3, 2025, the truck assigned by the National Protection Unit (UNP) for Luis Aurelio's security was intercepted by heavily armed men who fired indiscriminately at the vehicle, killing Luis Aurelio and his bodyguards, identified as Jesús Albeiro Chávez and Jackson Solarte. After the attack, the truck was burned with the bodies of the deceased inside. To date, there is no information about the motives or those responsible for the incident.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**

**JUNE 16, 2025**

**JUAN CAMILO ESPINOSA VANEGAS**

**Community leader and councilman  
of San Andrés de Cuerquía**

**Member of the Colombian Movement  
of Indigenous Authorities (AICO)**

**La Agüita village,  
San Andrés de Cuerquía, Antioquia**



Juan Camilo Espinosa Vanegas was a councilman in San Andrés de Cuerquía and a member of the Colombian Movement of Indigenous Authorities (AICO). His work was widely recognized because of his commitment to inclusion and justice for the most vulnerable communities in San Andrés.

On June 16, 2025, Juan Camilo was returning home when he was approached by two men in the village of La Agüita, in the rural area of San Andrés de Cuerquía. Without warning, the unknown assailants attacked him with a firearm, resulting in his death at the scene. Following the incident, a 17-year-old minor from Cali was arrested. According to information provided by the authorities, this person is believed to have ties with the EMBC 36th Front.

**Alleged responsible party:  
post-peace agreement groups – EMBC**

**JUNE 27, 2025**

**ANGIE LEANDRA HENAO ZAMBRANO**

**Village leader and member  
of the National Association  
of Peasant Users (ANUC)  
El Silencio village, Corinto, Cauca**

Angie Leandra Henao Zambrano was the mother of three children, a prominent village leader, and an active member of the National Association of Peasant Users (ANUC). Her work was recognized by the peasant communities in the rural area of Corinto, Cauca, for her commitment to defending peasant rights and community organization in the region.

On June 27, 2025, Angie Leandra was murdered by armed men who broke into her home and shot her in front of her minor children. Until now, the authorities have not made any statements about the alleged perpetrators or the motives behind the crime.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**



**JUNE 30, 2025**

**WILLIAM FERNEY PAZÚ TOCONÁS**

**Cultural facilitator and music teacher  
for the Nuestras Semillas artistic process  
La Mina village, Jambaló, Cauca**

William Ferney Pazú Toconás was a 23-year-old young man who worked as a cultural facilitator and music teacher for the Nuestras Semillas (Our Seeds) artistic process, a collective dedicated to teaching art to children and young people in the municipality of Jambaló, Cauca. He was known for his love of the flute and drums and was a member of the musical group Los Tira Flechas (The Arrow Shooters) of the Marden Arnulfo Betancur Educational Institution.

On June 30, 2025, William Ferney was found dead in the vicinity of the village of La Mina, in the rural area of Jambaló. It should be noted that the Ombudsman's Office had issued early warnings about the growing presence in the region of the EMC Dagoberto Ramos Front.

**Alleged responsible party: unknown**







CHARTER 1

# MORE FUEL TO THE FIRE?





**T**he first half of 2025 has been extremely difficult for the country. The Total Peace Policy continues to fail delivering the expected results. Instead, there has been an upsurge in armed actions and territorial control by illegal groups, which have left a greater humanitarian crisis in their wake. In the words of President Petro, “Amid great historical difficulties, we continue to bet on peace, a security issue that deserves careful consideration, because obviously this government has not achieved Total Peace” (DW, 2025 b)<sup>1</sup>.

The recent report by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), entitled “2025: on track to be the worst year of the last decade in terms of humanitarian consequences,” contains figures that illustrate the tragedy experienced by populations in different regions of the country during the first five months of the

year: 85.760 people were confined, 145.621 were forcibly displaced individually or in mass events, 136 were disappeared, and 524 were injured or killed by explosive devices, of which 340 were civilians. In addition, there were 101 cases of violence against health care (CICR, 2025, pág. 3).

The international organization highlights that “During the first half of 2025, the humanitarian situation in Colombia worsened considerably, with increasingly severe consequences for the civilian population. The impact on communities exceeded that recorded in the same period during 2024” (Ibid., 2025, page.3).

Despite this situation, **the government has not lacked the political will** during this semester to move forward with the peace processes with different groups and gangs<sup>2</sup>, but

<sup>1</sup> During the same speech before the Congress of the Republic, President Petro emphasized that “In Colombia, most of the country is at peace. In Colombia, most municipalities have no homicides: 662 municipalities in Colombia have no homicides. This is a success for this government” (DW, 2025 b). In contrast, an article written by Rafael Quintero Cerón in the newspaper El Tiempo presents other sources of measurement regarding the security issue raised by President Petro, noting that the reduction was 40% (El Tiempo, 2025 b).

<sup>2</sup> This semester, the government continued to make progress in talks with the AGC, the Sierra Nevada Conquerors Self-Defense Forces, the Bolivarian Army National Coordination Committee, the Second Marquetalia, the Southern Communards Front [Frente Comuneros del Sur], the EMBC, and the socio-legal dialogues of Chocó, Buenaventura, and the Aburrá Valley. In May 2025, the government expressed its willingness to open more socio-legal dialogues with other criminal gangs in Barranquilla, Barrancabermeja, and Tuluá. (El Espectador, 2025 c). Negotiations between the government, the ELN and the EMC are currently on hold.

it has not fully listened to social organizations and communities regarding Total Peace. For their part, the structures with which it has attempted to negotiate have not necessarily shown the same commitment. In this scenario, the president has added to his initial Total Peace strategy the proposal to achieve a negotiation through **“fragmented peace”**<sup>3</sup> or “territorialized” and express, with a view to obtaining concrete results before the end of his administration. This has generated diverse reactions in the country, given the complexities that these processes can bring to communities if the necessary social transformations and the actual dis-

mantling of illegal armed groups are not ensured.

Another decision taken by the national government is to respond to the serious security situation in departments such as Cauca, Catatumbo, Nariño, Guaviare, Valle de Cauca, Magdalena Medio, and Chocó with a greater military offensive. This strategy is not new and has been highly questioned in Colombia in the past for the following reasons: 1) its effects on respect for and guarantee of human rights, and 2) its low effectiveness in stopping the violence that the country has been suffering for several decades.

### **“Fragmented” or “territorialized” peace, the case of Southern Communards Front [Frente Comuneros del Sur] and the 33rd Front<sup>4</sup>**

Negotiating with structures that belong to or were part of illegal armed groups at the national level is not a new strategy. It is only needed to look back to the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s to recall other experiences, such as the Socialist Renewal Current (CRS), the People’s

Revolutionary Army (ERP), and the Guevarist Revolutionary Army (ERG), which also originated from the ELN guerrilla group (Razón Pública, 2025).

The results of these dialogues were partial. Although they served mainly to reduce the pressure exerted by these actors in the territories where they operated, they did not stop the violence perpetrated by other illegal groups, as they did not have sufficient strength to bring about profound changes in the armed dynamics. Nor did they have the expected social and political impact, insofar as they failed to bring about the transformations needed by the communities where these groups were present and exercised some level of control. And it is

<sup>3</sup> Term used as a question by Camilo González Pozo in his reflection entitled “From total peace to fragmented peace?” X Latin American Conference on Social Sciences. Panel on peace in Colombia.

<sup>4</sup> As the Somos Defensores Program has warned in other reports, if the peace process is not coordinated with the policy to dismantle criminal organizations, it could become a catalyst for new conflicts and violence.

worth remembering that they were not the only actors in the puzzle of political, social, and armed conflict in Colombia. In fact, while the state intensified its military withdrawal, it also colluded with paramilitaries and did not fully occupy the territories, which has allowed the cycle of violence to continue.

Now, since 2024, there has been a significant change in the Total Peace strategy, consisting of advancing dialogue processes with *territorial expressions of post-peace agreement groups (also known as FARC-EP dissidents)* and the ELN insurgency. According to Camilo González Pozo, president of Indepaz and former negotiator for the national government at the EMC table, the government has a *rhetoric that is both rigid and flexible*: on the one hand, President Gustavo Petro regularly urges the ELN and post-agreement groups to move decisively toward peace, while on the other hand, “Commissioner Otty Patiño and Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez have been more rigid in their stance of no ceasefires and prioritizing the targeting of mature groups to reach Transitional Location Zones (ZUT) and a short route to civi-

lian life.” (González, C, 2025, pág. 10)

Since Otty Patiño took office as High Commissioner for Peace, he has been the target of frequent criticism from communities and social organizations, which, in addition to referring to his lack of openness to dialogue and listening, condemn his silence and confusing messages when referring to negotiations with illegal armed groups and the humanitarian realities experienced in the territories. The session of the National Guarantees Committee on January 16, 2025, illustrates this point. Spokespersons for the territorial guarantees processes presented the situation of risk they are experiencing and asked whether the issue of humanitarian aid was being addressed in the talks with the armed groups. In response to these interventions, the High Commissioner for Peace did not answer the question and referred to the context analysis inappropriately, stating that “he did not have the same understanding and information about what was happening in the departments,” assuming an attitude of ignorance and confrontation with human rights organizations.

## Southern Communards Front Case

The national government is currently engaged in negotiations with this

group, which was previously affiliated with the ELN<sup>5</sup> and has been operating

<sup>5</sup> This front was structured with four companies: José Luís Cabrera, Guerreros Sindaguas, Jaime Toño Obando, and Elder Santos. It has had a presence and control

in ten municipalities: Cumbal, Guachucal, Providencia, Los Andes Sotomayor, Ricaurte, Mallama, Barbacoas, Samaniego, La Llanada, and Santacruz de Guachavés.

in the Nariño region since the early 1990s, and deserves special attention. These negotiations have been subject to various interpretations and criticisms, and the progress that has been achieved must be carefully analyzed, considering the challenges faced in one of the territories most affected by sociopolitical violence in Colombia, which is also geostrategically important for mining<sup>6</sup>, cocaine production, and transportation.

This dialogue began with considerable tension, stemming from a decision by the national government to negotiate with this front, while active negotiations were already underway with the ELN leadership (La Silla Vacía, 2024). By the end of August 2023, the then Southern Communards Front expressed its desire to move forward with the government, a proposal it reiterated in January 2024, sparking discussions between the ELN and government negotiators,

who considered it a strategy to cause division: “For the ELN’s national leadership, this split was the result of a process of infiltration by military intelligence as part of some sort of plot against them by the government, and for some sectors of the Petro administration, it could have been a strategy to try to push the guerrilla group as a whole to move more quickly in the negotiations” (Razón Pública, 2025)

A month after this tension arose, the ELN Central Command (COCE) decided to freeze the dialogue table. Subsequently, in May, the commander of Southern Communards Front, Gabriel Yepes Mejía, alias “HH,” announced the rupture with the ELN, which allowed for the establishment of the “dialogue process<sup>7</sup>. The aim was to build territorial peace in Nariño, for which three thematic areas<sup>8</sup> were defined and it was determined that the talks would be accompanied by the Organization of American States’ Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP-OAS) and the Episcopal Conference of Colombia (Presidencia de la República de Colombia, 2024).

---

<sup>6</sup> Mining districts “are a socio-environmental and economic planning tool aimed at regions where mining projects are developed and operated. The creation of these zones also aims to present complementary economic alternatives to communities that depend heavily on this type of activity. In addition, according to the regulations, the aim is to promote industrialization based on strategic minerals, the concerted resolution of conflicts caused by mining, the banking of those who carry out this work, and the promotion of both job retraining and partnerships between small-scale miners.” In the case of Nariño, the Piedmont and the Nariño Mountain Range in the Los Abades subregion are being considered (Portafolio, s.f.).

---

<sup>7</sup> According to the government, this process “will cover the municipalities of Nariño where the Southern Communards Front is present: Andes Sotomayor, Barbacoas, Cumbal, Guachucal, La Llanada, Mallama, Providencia, Ricaurte, Samaniego, and Santa Cruz de Guachavés” (Presidencia de la República de Colombia, 2024). After the signing, the name Southern Communards Front was adopted.

<sup>8</sup> The three pillars are: De-escalation of Violence, Implementation of Sustainable Territorial Transformations, and Transition of the Southern Communards Front to Full Citizenship.

In September 2024, the president of the republic authorized the establishment of the Table for the Co-Construction of Territorial Peace in Nariño, and an agreement was signed that provided for a bilateral and definitive ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, the definition of territorial concentration zones, the destruction of instruments of war, and humanitarian demining.

Regarding the progress of this process, which has been supported by the European Union and the Basque Parliament<sup>9</sup>, the government has reported<sup>10</sup>: 1) the destruction of weapons in April 2025, 2) the creation of a special protection route for children and adolescents, 3) the commitment to voluntarily replace 5,000 hectares of coca crops<sup>11</sup>, 4) the continuation of humanitarian demining, 5) the signing of an agreement to allow and

contribute to the search for missing persons, 6) the construction of a higher education center in Barbacoas and the opening of a new SENA center in Samaniego, 7) the agreement to establish a Temporary Location Zone in the rural area of the municipality of Mallama, 8) the signing of the protocol for the development of humanitarian actions, and 9) the creation of a collective reintegration route designed between the illegal armed group and the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization (ARN).

For his part, Alex González, Undersecretary of Peace for the Government of Nariño, stated that there was “an 87% reduction in forced displacement between 2023 and 2025, zero cases of confinement and recruitment of minors during the first quarter of 2025 [...] The peace talks have led to a 100% reduction in homicides of certified social leaders, a 68% reduction in homicides in the context of the armed conflict, and disarmament” (Radio Nacional de Colombia, 2025).

This statement is noteworthy. On the one hand, it refers to figures that contradict those provided by OCHA for 2024<sup>12</sup>, and on the other, it refers

<sup>9</sup> On July 14, 2025, the AECID announced: “1.5 million euros have been earmarked and already allocated for a women’s entrepreneurship program,” said the governor. Added to this are 20 billion pesos that were approved in Spain for the aqueduct in the municipality of Samaniego (Radio Nacional de Colombia, 2025).

<sup>10</sup> See the website of the Commissioner for Peace, which provides information on the process being carried out by the government with Southern Communards Front (Oficina del Consejero Comisionado para la Paz, 2025 a).

<sup>11</sup> This will be carried out in 10 prioritized municipalities: Samaniego, Santa Cruz de Guachavés, La Llanada, Los Andes, Sotomayor, Barbacoas, Ricaurte, Cumbal, Mayama, Providencia and Huachucal. This process includes declaring the municipality of Samaniego free of illicit crops by 2025 (Aramendez, L, 2025).

<sup>12</sup> Nariño appears as one of the departments where humanitarian access risks were most persistent. This department was affected in March 2024, when the highest peak of displacement in the year was experienced. Not only that, but five of the 15 municipalities most impacted by forced displacement throughout the year are located in the department of Nariño. It is one of the departments clas-

to a reduction in homicides of **“certified social leaders”**. The latter is a fact that we emphatically reject at the Somos Defensores Program, because in Colombia, a defender or leader does not require any certification to do their work. In addition, referring to selective leadership could be a strategy that conceals this selective violence. This type of institutional stance, which has sought to census or have single databases where social leaders are registered, are actions that limit participation, can lead to profiling, and disregard internal and international regulations on the right to defend human rights.

In contrast to the report of declines indicated by the Nariño Governor’s Office, the Somos Defensores Program documented 24 attacks against human rights defenders between 2024 and the first half of 2025, 11 of which were murders<sup>13</sup>. In one case, Southern Communards Front is presumed to be responsible, and in another case, the ELN has been identified as the alleged perpetrator by the Office of the President of the Republic<sup>14</sup>. Both cases correspond to

murders that occurred in Ricaurte, a municipality where most of the inhabitants belong to the Awá indigenous people and which is part of the area of influence of the negotiations with Comuneros del Sur.

Furthermore, this process has moved forward amid serious questions regarding the participation of social and indigenous organizations, which have expressed concern about the rearmament and emergence of other illegal armed groups in their territory (El Espectador, 2025 b). It has become clear that their participation has not been sufficiently broad and effective, which is why they reject any progress in defining the Mining District without conducting an open consultation with the communities and without taking into account the Escazú Agreement, which provides for the protection of human rights defenders who oppose this type of project.

Regarding the commitment to crop substitution, this was agreed upon without direct consultation with the individuals and families who currently depend on this activity. This process should not be implemented through imposition by the government and armed actors. The participation of those involved in planting and harvesting is essential, as evidenced by the experience of the design and implementation of Point 4, included in the agreement signed in 2016 between the Colombian State and the former

---

sified as being at persistent risk –which, for OCHA, is even higher than “high risk”– due, among other things, to the persistence of large-scale humanitarian emergencies and because it is an area of concern for violence against children and adolescents (OCHA, 2025).

<sup>13</sup> See Unprotected [Sin Protección], 2024 annual report of the Somos Defensores Program (2025), and the figures in this publication, which documents the attacks that occurred in the first half of 2025.

<sup>14</sup> See press release “President Petro attributes the ‘Dantesque death’ of three in-

---

digenous people to the ELN” (Presidencia de la República, 2025 b)

FARC-EP guerrilla group. Furthermore, there remains a serious lack of knowledge about the process of truth, justice, and reparation that will be available to the victims of the actions of Southern Communards Front and the legal framework that would support such negotiations<sup>15</sup>.

In addition to these questions, the humanitarian crisis resulting from armed confrontations has persisted. This was noted in the Ombudsman's report at the beginning of the year. The report states that, due to the dispute between the EMC and Southern Communards Front, there were forced displacements, confinements, and the use of communities to "prevent the entry of the security forces" (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2025). In July, the ICRC reported that 370 people were victims of confinement, 2.705 individual displacement, and 1.090 mass displacement. Despite this, the same organization noted that "[...] Nariño, which traditionally had the highest figures, reported a 92% decrease, an unusual trend compared to the rest of the country" (CICR, 2025).

The decrease in some types of aggression is very important, but it is also worth noting that movement restrictions continue in municipalities influenced by the dialogue process, as do the registration of residents'

cell phones, threats against human rights defenders, and restrictions on their work. Similarly, the prohibition on reporting crimes, the issuance of identity cards to the population, gender-based violence, sexual violence, forced abortion, the increase in extortion, and uncertainty about the possibility of continued collusion between members of the security forces and illegal groups, including paramilitaries, are also significant issues.

While these attacks continue without comprehensive responses that guarantee the protection of communities, the government is stepping up its military offensive against illegal armed groups through Task Force Hercules, Rapid Deployment Force No. 2<sup>16</sup> as part of Plan Ayacucho Plus<sup>17</sup>. It is also deploying Operation Cordillera, reinforced with weapons that have received significant media coverage, for example, when it was reported that "a 155-millimeter artillery system arrived at Antonio Nariño Airport in Chachagüi, along with strategic material, intended to strengthen the deployment in areas affected by the conflict" (El Tiempo, 2025 a). With similar measures, the Third Division

<sup>15</sup> In May, the national government suspended the extradition order for Gabriel Yepes Mejía, alias HH, on the condition that he would continue to actively participate in the dialogue process.

<sup>16</sup> Rapid Deployment Force No. 2 (FUDRA2), based in the village of El Gualtal, in the municipality of San Andrés de Tumaco, Nariño, and operationally attached to the Hercules Joint Stabilization and Consolidation Task Force, has its area of responsibility in the municipalities of San Andrés de Tumaco, Barbacoas, Magüi Payán, and Roberto Payán, Nariño. (Ejército Nacional, 2025).

<sup>17</sup> See Infobae report on the Franco Benavides structure's attack on a military aircraft (Infobae, 2025 a).



of the National Army announced in January that its objective was to guarantee security and territorial control.

Meanwhile, in several towns in the Nariño mountain region (known as 'Cordillera'), 800 families were displaced in May and a humanitarian crisis hit the rural area of Cumbitara town because of artillery fire during fighting, which put people's lives at serious risk and damaged their homes (Diario del Sur, 2025). In June, Indepaz reported two massacres, one in the municipality of Ricaurte, with a death toll of three people, and the other in the municipality of Magüí Payán, where four people were killed (2025). In both cases, the perpetrators are unknown (Indepaz, 2025). For their part, the communities are drawing attention to these events, which took place amid territories where Operation Cordillera is being carried out (Cambio, 2025).

The results of this process are fragile, given that Nariño is also home to the ELN, the Second Marquetalia, the EMC, the AGC – Gulf Clan, and the so-called United Self-Defense Forces of Nariño (AUN). The latter group appeared in the territory in 2023 and, according to the Ombudsman's Office, in 2024 it acted jointly with the Segunda Marquetalia and Southern Communards Front in the Nariño mountain range area to confront the advance of the EMC (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2024). This situation is of concern to human rights organizations and citizens, as the AUN is considered a paramilitary group, given the practices of terror and social con-

trol that have terrorized communities, reviving memories from the times of the Libertadores del Sur and Central Bolívar Bloc (Voragine, 2024).

For the leaders with whom the Somos Defensores Program has spoken, there are uncertainties as to whether this will be a genuine process or if it will "resemble that of the AUC, where there was no real dismantling and the civilian population was forced to adapt to the new groups that arrived." This would lead to a serious risk scenario, as it would set the stage for a new cycle of heightened violence.

In this scenario, questions such as the following arise: 1) What has been the role of the security forces in combating the AUN<sup>18</sup>?; 2) Given that the government is aware of this situation, what has been its strategy to prevent the AUN from establishing itself and controlling the territories and economies in the area where Southern Communards Front has been present?; 3) What is the strategy for

---

<sup>18</sup> On November 13, 2024, the National Army reported via its X account: "In response to the Security Forces' offensive in Nariño against illegal armed groups, two individuals and a minor surrendered to the authorities in two separate actions: In Cumbitara, a drone operator from the 'AUN' expressed his intention to turn himself in, handing over his equipment and explosives, which were detonated in a controlled manner." (Ministerio de Defensa, 2024). For its part, on August 15, 2025, the National Police reported the capture of an alleged member of the AUN in the municipality of Samaniego. (HSB Radio, 2025).



protecting communities in the event of a possible realignment of illegal armed groups in the area?; and 4) Is the presence of the AUN a strategy to secure economic and military interests that serve as a rear guard for Southern Communards Front?

In this context, it is urgent to coordinate this peace process with the Demilitarization Policy, which involves establishing a pilot plan for Nariño within the framework of the shock strategy that the national government has been developing since 2024. In addition, it must advance talks with other groups in the area, which is essential to ensure the success of this process and to prevent possible rearmament in scenarios of insecurity

for future ex-combatants. The national government must also comply with the provisions of the territorial transformation strategies known as 'Maquetas Paz' (Peace Models) and address the historical inequalities to which the population in these territories has been subjected. Likewise, the national government and the state as a whole must protect the lives, integrity, and safety of social leaders and human rights defenders, and also guarantee their work. Without these elements, the negotiation process would be yet another attempt in Colombia that, in addition to failing to bring about substantial changes for communities, could be a driving force encouraging the continuation of war.

### **Front 33 case, which belongs to the "Jorge Suárez Briceño Commander" Bloc, Magdalena Medio "Gentil Duarte Commander" Bloc, and "Raúl Reyes Commander" front (EMBF)<sup>19</sup>**

This front was formed following an internal crisis within the EMC that took place during the first half of 2024. Although it is not the same as what happened with Comuneros del Sur, which broke away from the ELN structure, this front also has characteristics of a "fragmented or territorialized peace," given that the government is moving forward with this front in a particular way while maintaining the general process with the EMBF.

After separating from the EMC, the government continued talks with the groups that came together under the name EMBF. During the second

half of 2024, it agreed to a six-month bilateral ceasefire with the latter, as well as a strategy for the participation of social organizations and an agenda for territorial transformation. However, amid the progress of this process<sup>20</sup>, in January 2025, the Cata-

<sup>19</sup> This front operates in Antioquia (northeast, north, and Bajo Cauca), Catatumbo (Tibú), southern Bolívar, San Vicente de Caguán, San José del Guaviare, Meta, Putumayo, and Caquetá.

<sup>20</sup> According to the report by the Commissioner for Peace, Otty Patiño, the progress of this process is linked to 1) actions "for the recognition of the rights of

tumbo region experienced a humanitarian crisis that revealed the violent actions planned and executed by the ELN. This created a situation of serious violations of international humanitarian law which, according to the Ombudsman's Office, led to the forced displacement of "64.783 people [...], 12.913 confined, 117 homicides [...]. In addition, six signatories were murdered and two disappeared" between January 16 and April 28, 2025. In this context, six human rights defenders were murdered in Norte de Santander, as described in chapter 3 of this semi-annual report, and organizational processes were stigmatized by both the 33rd Front and the ELN. Amid the January crisis, the ELN not only limited the right to defend rights, but also threatened and confined numerous social leaders. In addition, the 33rd Front published messages on their social media accounts stating that they would respond militarily to the ELN's actions<sup>21</sup>, generating

fear and anxiety in a population that was already terrified and affected.

Months before this tragedy, the Ombudsman's Office warned of the risks that clashes between the ELN and the 33rd Front could pose to the civilian population, as well as the territorial control and severe stigmatization of communities<sup>22</sup>. However, the authorities failed to protect the population, allowing illegal armed groups to continue their activities without major restrictions, resulting in the materialization of all the risks warned about. This occurred amidst peace talks, which did little or nothing to address these situations or the risks faced by leaders in the territories.

Due to the ELN's actions, President Petro ceased dialogue with the group and declared a state of internal unrest and economic emergency (Decree No. 062 of 2025) and ordered the reinforcement of the militarization of the territory<sup>23</sup> with more than 1,650 additional members of the security

peasants and indigenous peoples, peace with nature, and, equally important, the titling of vacant land (more than 20.000 hectares) to strengthen productive development and food sovereignty. Thanks to these days of social dialogue, 27 community production initiatives were also prioritized in territories such as Catatumbo, southern Bolívar, and Antioquia (Oficina del Consejero Comisionado para la Paz, 2025 b).

<sup>21</sup> See El Espectador (January 20, 2025) "FARC dissident leader in Catatumbo says they will respond to ELN attacks" available at: <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/paz-y-memoria/andrey-avendano-jefe-de-disidencia-de-farc-en-catatumbo-dice-que-responderan-a-ataques-de-eln/>

<sup>22</sup> See Early Warning No. 026 of 2024 and Early Warning No. 027 of 2024 from the Ombudsman's Office.

<sup>23</sup> The Armed Forces reported that, following the declaration of a state of internal unrest in Catatumbo, they deployed a contingent of more than 9.650 personnel to counter these atrocious acts with force, carrying out nearly 400 strikes against illegal groups. These actions included the recovery of 29 minors and the neutralization of 11 members of these structures, as well as the seizure of 237 firearms intended for attacks against the civilian population and security forces. (Comunicaciones Estratégicas COGFM, 2025)

forces (Presidencia de la República, 2025 a), in the style of Álvaro Uribe when he was president. This led to the issuance of more than 18 decrees that were extended for three months, some of them for longer. In fact, there are administrative acts that are still in force<sup>24</sup>. This measure was quite controversial because in the past it justified military operations that led to serious human rights violations and restrictions on the rights of the population. In addition, social strategies were implemented that had little or nothing to do with the proposals of the communities, such as the Centers for Comprehensive Action Consolidation (CCAI), which took place between 2004 and 2009.

Human rights platforms expressed their disagreement and argued that these solutions “do not resolve structural issues that have historically been neglected. Furthermore, we are concerned about the adoption of these measures without first addressing **the serious shortcomings of the security model that have allowed severe human rights violations by the Security Forces and their collusion with some of the parties involved in the conflict**” (CCEEUU, DESC & Alianza, 2025). In addition to this, the platforms urged the signing and

implementation of the Social Pact for Territorial Transformation in Catatumbo and the implementation of the Policy for the Dismantling of Criminal Organizations, with special emphasis on the dismantling of the financial, political, and institutional dimensions of armed groups (ibid., 2025).

Two months after the crisis began and a state of internal unrest was declared, President Gustavo Petro, in a cabinet meeting televised on March 3, stigmatized social, peasant, community, and indigenous organizations, stating that “we know that many of these organizations (...) are permeated by weapons, subordinated to weapons”<sup>25</sup>, which ultimately ends up **justifying** the actions of armed actors.

That same month, the government announced peace initiatives in Catatumbo with Front 33, which had been hit hard by ELN military action and by the demobilizations that took place between January and February<sup>26</sup> during the crisis mentioned above. The plan consisted of concentrating combatants in a Temporary Location

<sup>24</sup> See Presidency of the Republic (April 24, 2025) “Government lifts state of emergency in Catatumbo and extends transitional measures of 11 decrees” available at: <https://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/Paginas/Gobierno-levanta-la-conmocion-interior-en-Catatumbo-y-mantiene-medidas-transitorias-por-90-dias-250424.aspx>

<sup>25</sup> See press release from the Somos Defensores Program (March 6, 2025) available at: <https://x.com/SomosDef/status/1897676387097387471>

<sup>26</sup> According to an article in El Tiempo written by Penagos, J: “President Gustavo Petro highlighted that, by the end of January, 104 people linked to the 33rd Front had handed over their rifles. A month after the outbreak of the conflict in Catatumbo, approximately 150 members of the 33rd Front have been killed by the ELN” (Penagos, J, 2025).

Zone (ZUT), in accordance with the provisions of Law 2272 of 2022. To this end, in April, Decree 0448 was issued, according to which the transfer and pre-concentration of the “members of the EMBF would take place within a month in the municipality of Tibú.”

In this regard, the EMBF stated in a letter to President Gustavo Petro that, “It seems that we have been ambushed, **because the issue of ‘location zones’ has never been presented** in a generalized manner by either party at the Dialogue Table” (El Espectador, 2025 a) and clarified that this agreement would only apply to Front 33 due to the events that took place at the beginning of the year in Catatumbo. The transfer did not take place, which is why on May 3, the “Catatumbo Agreement” was signed, confirming that the ZUT would be located in the rural area of Tibú<sup>27</sup>.

Subsequently, on July 14, another series of commitments derived from Resolution 161 of May 23, 2025, were announced, which, in some cases, are currently being developed. It was noted that demining operations would be carried out to enable the installation of the ZUT and that socialization processes would be conducted with communities, peasant and

communal organizations, peace signatories, displaced persons, the Catatumbo Humanitarian Roundtable, and institutions, among other parties that have given their support to this initiative. It was also noted that the latter would allow for the collection of “observations so that the security of the population is prioritized and the full validity of the social rule of law in the ZUT is guaranteed” (Mesa de Diálogos del Gobierno Nacional con el EMBF, 2025).

This advance in the negotiation process<sup>28</sup>, raises questions such as: 1) Why carry out this concentration process in a territory where the ELN currently dominates and has no interest in negotiating with the national government, given that this would pose an obvious risk to the members of the 33rd Front who may eventually concentrate in that ZUT and the surround-

<sup>27</sup> It was noteworthy that this agreement did not bear the “signature of the chief negotiator of the Government Delegation, Camilo González, nor of the person who has been identified as the head of the armed group, Calarcá, nor of any guarantor from the international community” (Guerra, S, 2025 b).

<sup>28</sup> Once again other advances related to this case in the process with the EMBF are being quoted: “actions for the recognition of the rights of peasants, indigenous peoples, peace with nature, and, just as important, the titling of vacant land (more than 20,000 hectares) to strengthen productive development and food sovereignty. Thanks to these days of social dialogue, 27 community productive initiatives were also prioritized in territories such as Catatumbo, southern Bolívar, and Antioquia,” (Oficina del Consejero Comisionado para la Paz, 2025 b), aspects that have raised doubts about the legitimacy that this could be giving to the EMBF and the 33rd Front as armed actors in the territories and not as a result of a process of territorial transformation established by the government with the aim of moving toward ending cycles of violence.

ding communities? 2) What would happen to the process between the 33rd Front and the national government if the talks with the EMBF fail? 3) What is the possibility of implementing a territorial transformation agenda in line with the needs of the communities and not as a stronghold that the 33rd Front could use to legitimize itself? 4) What would be the role of the military forces in ensuring the security of this process in a highly turbulent area without affecting the communities? 5) If the establishment of the ZUT goes ahead, how can we guarantee that it will not become a scenario for the reorganization of the 33rd Front? and 6) What differentiated and territorialized measures will the national government implement to guarantee the life and integrity of social leaders and human rights defenders in Catatumbo, in the face of variables such as the convergence

of the ELN and the 33rd Front in the territory, illicit economies, and structural gaps in the current protection model?

The result that the government seeks to achieve after the crisis in Catatumbo is striking, showing an apparent capacity for leadership in negotiations with the 33rd Front, a structure that has been given an opportunity to transition to civilian life after the strong attack by the ELN. But beyond the benefits, for the government and the 33rd Front, the requirement is that these scenarios truly serve to enable the communities of Catatumbo to live without fear. However, this hope is fragile and quickly fades when one considers the position of the ELN, which maintains that it will not move forward with this government in the pursuit of Total Peace.

## More militarization means adding fuel to the fire

**Cañón del Micay Case<sup>29</sup>.** On February 19, President Gustavo Petro announced the appointment of Pedro

Arnulfo Sánchez Suárez as the new Minister of Defense. At the time, Sánchez was an active brigadier general in the Colombian Air Force and served as Chief of Security for the Presi-

---

<sup>29</sup> In 2023, the government presented its Security, Defense, and Citizen Coexistence Policy, "Guarantees for Life and Peace. 2022-2026", based on the concept of human security and which central objective is the protection of life. This policy is based on four pillars: 1) Strategies for security and protection conditions; 2) Strategies for the protection and preservation of biodiversity and water resources; 3) Strategies to safeguard territorial integrity, sovereignty, national independence, and constitutional order; and 4) Strategies to

---

strengthen the Public Force. In March of the same year, the General Command of the Colombian Armed Forces presented the Ayacucho Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (2023-2026), "the military strategy that accompanies the political intention of 'total peace,' and which approach and form of development is considered a milestone in more than 70 years of Colombian military history" (El Tiempo, 2023).

dency. Regardless of his decision to resign from his military career to take up this ministerial post, this act marked a rupture in a tradition that had been in place since the 1991 Constitution was enacted, consisting of the appointment of a civilian rather than a military officer to this ministry, even though this did not mean much in terms of guaranteeing and respecting human rights.

However, it is important to emphasize that “civilian leadership in the sector” has been a way of maintaining balance regarding the power of the military forces<sup>30</sup>. Besides, this could constitute a revolving door, allowing other presidents to continue along these lines, thereby perpetuating the questions that this raises in terms of human rights guarantees and social control.

This appointment is not simply a whim of the President; above all, it is a **decision to strengthen the military response to the deteriorating security situation**, and thus demonstrate to the country that it has the capacity to lead offensive strategies against the illegal armed groups with which it seeks to negotiate in territories such as Cauca, Catatumbo, Chocó, and Buenaventura, territories where the government committed to a territorial transformation agenda

that continues to be postponed.

This rapid change –which even contradicts the discourse of ending the eternal war that Colombia has experienced through Total Peace– has had implications for municipalities ravaged by violence. In an article published by the General Command of the Colombian Armed Forces (COG-FM), it was noted that: “in compliance with its constitutional mission, efforts have been focused on areas of special operational priority, such as the Catatumbo region in Norte de Santander, Cauca, Chocó, and the municipality of Buenaventura. There, with the operational deployment of nearly **23,000 additional personnel**, significant operational results have been achieved, allowing for the advancement of institutional control in coordination with the National Police and other state entities.” (Comunicaciones Estratégicas COGFM, 2025)

As for the results of this strategy of militarizing the territories, it should be noted that its goal of securing the areas has not been achieved, as evidenced by the experience in Cauca, where the harshness of the EMC’s actions continued. Or the department of Chocó, which experienced at least two lockdowns in the first half of 2025<sup>31</sup>. Similarly, Buenaventura continued to report murders, threats, and restrictions on mobility<sup>32</sup>.

<sup>30</sup> For her part, HRW director Juanita Goebertus expressed her concern about the appointment, describing it as a step backward. She also stated: “Regaining control of security does not depend on appointing a military officer. It depends on leadership to implement an effective security policy” (Goebertus, J, 2025).

<sup>31</sup> See ELN announces armed strike in Chocó in February (Cámara de Representantes, 2025) and May (DW, 2025 a)

<sup>32</sup> See El Colombiano (April 2, 2025) “Everything here seems paralyzed”: the



It is also worth noting that, in this scenario, part of the government's strategy has been to strike at the finances of illegal armed groups by seizing cocaine and destroying laboratories, which has a direct effect on both the economic income of these groups and the seizure of weapons. According to the report submitted in May<sup>33</sup> by the General Command of the Armed Forces:

In "**Cauca**: [...] its presence has been reinforced with more than 8.500 men throughout the department [...] since December 2024, there have been 26 combat operations, with operational results including the neutralization or capture of 54 GAO members, the recovery of 10 minors, and the seizure of more than 1.100 improvised explosive devices; [in] **Catatumbo**: Military Forces with a component of more than 9.650 uniformed personnel, [...] achieving nearly 400 impacts on illegal groups, including the recovery of 29 minors and the neutralization of 11 members of these structures; 237 firearms have also been seized [...] 3.480 kilograms of cocaine have been impounded, and 129 laboratories for the production of this alkaloid have been destroyed; [in] **Chocó**: [...]

With a total of 3.700 troops, the Armed Forces deploy their land capabilities with 102 platoons, maritime capabilities with riverine operations elements, and air capabilities with Búho aircraft. [...] military units have highlighted the seizure of 4.894 kilograms of cocaine, as well as the destruction of 63 laboratories and the decommissioning of three vessels used to transport the alkaloid [...] a total of 54 explosive devices have been neutralized. [In] **Buena-ventura**: [...] using its capabilities, it has 1.000 men at its disposal [...]. Since January 1, operations against drug trafficking have resulted in the seizure of 4.800 kilograms of cocaine and the destruction of five laboratories and two boats; and with constant overflights of the municipality and within the framework of the "Jácome" Intervention Plan, 619 boats and 373 vehicles have been inspected, **and more than 5.000 inhabitants of the region have been checked**. To date, the Armed Forces have carried out 105 operations against organized armed groups, resulting in the recovery of a minor, the seizure of 62 weapons, and the death of two individuals belonging to criminal structures during military operations" (Ibid., 2025).

drama in Buenaventura due to an escalation of violence that has left 50 dead so far in 2025" available at: <https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/consejo-seguridad-buenaventura-orden-publico-guerra-shottas-y-espartanos-PE27011619>

<sup>33</sup> This report does not specify the exact date of the results, but it does provide an account of actions taken since December 2024.

Unlike the Armed Forces' report on results, communities have denounced the impact this strategy has on their lives. They live in constant anxiety due to (i) constant overflights of neighborhoods and villages, (ii) the possibility of combat, and (iii) damage to homes during armed confrontations. As highlighted by the Armed Forces Command itself, in the case of

the inspections carried out in Buenaventura, these have led to the registration of more than 5.000 people, an action that ultimately ends up being a kind of census and causes stigmatization and control of the mobility of communities.

With the deployment of forces, which according to official sources numbered 23.000 troops, most of them in 2025, it is striking that illegal armed groups have continued their activities and even consolidated their position in priority areas. There is constant criticism from organizations and platforms, which highlight the setbacks in dismantling paramilitarism in Colombia, which, on the contrary, has expanded and strengthened. Civil society reports indicate that links persist between state agents and the AGC-Gulf Clan, as well as other groups, including post-agreement groups and criminal gangs.

On August 22, it was revealed that the Attorney General's Office (FGN) is investigating alleged links between members of the security forces and post-agreement groups, such as the 33rd Front operating in Catatumbo and the 28th Front operating in Arauca under the command of Antonio Medina. According to the FGN, Lieutenant Juan Sebastián Tagua delivered war material to the latter group. Likewise, the FGN points out that in 2024, combatants from the Western Block of Cauca were transported in National Army vehicles to Arauca to militarily reinforce Medina's structure. These types of events, in addition to reaffirming the concerns of com-

munities and social leaders, indicate that these criminal relationships have not ceased.

The case of Cauca is particularly critical. Since October 2024, it has been subject to "Operation Perseo, involving more than 1.400 troops [...]" This offensive brings together the most advanced military capabilities, including aircraft, artillery, armored vehicles, and surveillance and control systems"<sup>34</sup> (COGFM, 2024), seeking to retake the Micay Canyon, an area of geostrategic and economic interest where 75% of Cauca's coca crops are grown (La Voz de América, 2025). Not only that, but it is also a territory where the construction of the Los Arrieros del Micay dam has been decided, a project that has not been consulted with the communities and that would have a strong impact on their inhabitants and the natural environment. In this territory, the EMC has imposed itself and attacked the civilian population, ethnic authorities, and social leaders.

The order to militarize the territory was rejected by communities that, for more than 20 years, have suffered the effects of this type of government decision, as was the case with the Uribe, Santos, and Duque adminis-

---

<sup>34</sup> On October 13, the Public Officers Inspection Office requested protection for the civilian population "more because of a possible constraint that appears to exist in the territory, where a group of people are demanding that troops withdraw from El Plateado, Cauca" (Caracol Radio, 2024).



trations, in the context of actions that have not brought about any changes in living conditions. The residents and social organizations were quick to protest, feeling that their trust in the government of change and its rhetoric of protecting life and carrying out territorial transformations had been betrayed. They wonder what has become of intentions such as those set out in strategic plans like the Cauca Mission, the interest in maintaining dialogue with social organizations and coca-growing families; strategies that faded away when military action was prioritized, to the point of turning the Micay Canyon into a permanent scenario for military operations.

Tensions in the territory have increased, as evidenced by the constant fighting with the EMC, which has led to lockdowns<sup>35</sup>, displacement<sup>36</sup> and the detention of members of the security forces, as reported by residents in March<sup>37</sup> and June<sup>38</sup>. This situation was predictable in such a volatile territory, where the national government has not been clear about its

eradication policy<sup>39</sup>. In this complex scenario, the security forces must act with the utmost rigor in respecting human rights and international humanitarian law, while at the same time guaranteeing the life of the population as their primary objective. For this reason, stigmatizing rhetoric directed at communities is unacceptable, as it only increases their risks.

The pressure suffered by the civilian population cannot be justified solely by the operational results sought and the interest in recovering the territory. In this regard, the announcement of Operation Perseo II in the Micay Canyon continues to be an ineffective response to the needs of the communities, especially if stigmatizing and blaming narratives are used when they react to a military offensive, as expressed by Defense Minister Sánchez: "This is not a detention. No one can attack a member of the security forces. Anyone who does so is attacking Colombia. And we will not tolerate that" (Diario Occidente, 2025).

"Neutralization" is a concept that refers to deaths in combat, demobilizations, and captures of combatants and leaders of illegal armed groups. According to reports from the Ministry of Defense, there have been 16.400 such cases between 2022 and 2025 in Colombia. This ends up being a harmless strategy when one considers the increase and expan-

<sup>35</sup> See article in El País (January 23, 2025) "War intensifies: Army, FARC dissidents, and ELN engage in combat in Toribío, Silvia, López de Micay, and Buenaventura" (El País, 2025).

<sup>36</sup> According to the Ombudsman's Office, "The security forces continue their operations to take territorial control of **El Platteado**, which has led to the forced displacement of 450 families." (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2025 a).

<sup>37</sup> Residents detain eight police officers and one military officer (Swissinfo.co, 2025)

<sup>38</sup> 57 members of the military were detained (Prensa Latina, 2025).

<sup>39</sup> See Indepaz interview with the Minister of Defense about the plan to eradicate crops with glyphosate (Indepaz, 2025 a).

sion of illegal armed groups in the country, which have swelled their ranks through the forced recruitment of children and adolescents, as well as adults who receive “salaries based on their military experience,” in a context of precariousness and impoverishment<sup>40</sup>. So what is the reciprocity between having these military strategies of subjugation if, at the same time, illegal armed groups are growing in the territories?

This concern is even more profound if, on the one hand, members of the National Army were colluding with post-agreement structures and/or promoting paramilitary groups in Cauca. On May 8, images were relea-

sed showing three military personnel and two civilians acting together in combat against the EMC structure in the municipality of Ortega. According to Infobae, citing *Semana* magazine, there is a conversation between “General Federico Mejía, commander of the Third Army Division, and [...] a man identified as Joselito, who is known in the region for allegedly arming the community to confront dissidents.” (Bernal, J, 2025 c). As a result, General Emilio Cardozo informed the country that an investigation had been opened in the Military Criminal Justice System against 57 soldiers, who were removed from the area where Operation Perseo is being carried out.

## To conclude

As the communities point out, if Total Peace is lost, Colombia loses. It is therefore necessary to redouble efforts to find a negotiated solution to the political, social, and armed conflict, to fully implement the Peace Agreement, to carry out the territorial change strategies outlined by the government, to prioritize *the humanitarian agendas of communities and social organizations*, and to define respect and protection for leaders

and communities as a red line in talks with illegal armed groups.

The government must ensure that links between members of the security forces and paramilitaries, post-agreement groups, and other illegal armed groups are severed. In this regard, the policy of dismantling these groups is key, but so is the timely and swift action of the justice system. Likewise, state officials, especially the Minister of Defense and even President Petro himself, have an obligation to refrain from making accusations and stigmatizing the civilian population and organizational processes, which would put them at even greater risk.

---

<sup>40</sup> At the close of the report, on August 27, 2025, the Minister of Defense announced to the country that alias “Kevin,” leader of the Carlos Patiño, which is a structure of the EMC, had surrendered to the authorities (Sánchez, P, 2025).

Illegal armed actors have an obligation to respect international humanitarian law and a responsibility to engage in dialogue with the government in good faith. The country demands

an end to attacks on the civilian population and that their interests not take precedence over the possibility of building a democratic country free from violence.





AR.  
el día.

En uso de las facultades que le confiere el parágrafo 2.  
del \_\_\_\_\_

**CONSIDERANDO:**

Que el \_\_\_\_\_ Universidades el derecho a darse y modificar sus  
estatutos, designar a sus autoridades académicas \_\_\_\_\_ sus programas,  
académicos, definir y organizar sus labores formativas, académicas, docentes, científicas y culturales, otorgar los  
títulos \_\_\_\_\_ sus correspondientes  
regímenes y establecer, arbitrar y aplicar sus recursos para el cumplimiento de su misión social y de su función  
institucional \_\_\_\_\_

Que el parágrafo \_\_\_\_\_ de carrera de  
personal de Oficiales, Nivel Ejecutivo, Suboficiales y Agentes de la Policía Nacional, establece \_\_\_\_\_ de admisión  
Generales de la \_\_\_\_\_ para aprobación de \_\_\_\_\_

Que de acuerdo con el a \_\_\_\_\_ en establece entre las funciones de la Dirección de  
la Policía \_\_\_\_\_ a la Policía

incorporación: \_\_\_\_\_ la selección e incorporación del personal en la ley  
1. Nacional de Colombia, de acuerdo con los parámetros establecidos en la ley  
2. Coordinar con las Direcciones de la Policía Nacional, la selección del personal requiero para los procesos de  
definidas \_\_\_\_\_ tipo militar de acuerdo con el perfil y competencias

Página 1 de 497

Página 2 de 497

Por la cual se expide el Protocolo de \_\_\_\_\_

**POLICIA NACIONAL**

**RESOLUCION** \_\_\_\_\_

**EL DIRECTOR GENERAL DE LA POLICIA NACIONAL DE COLOMBIA**

la Policía Nacional

**CONSIDERANDO:**

**CHAPTER 2**  
**REHEATED**



**R**eheated. A useful concept for approaching Security Fronts, a term frequently quoted by various unions and local authorities despite the lack of an adequate definition. When discussing this topic, public servants, police commanders, and even some members of the press and non-governmental organizations often make a recurring mistake: explaining them on the basis of Permanent Directive No. 14 of 1995, an administrative act issued by the General Directorate of the National Police thirty years ago, which overlooks the many changes this concept has undergone in practice.

According to the directive in question, Security Fronts are a type of community organization around which leaders and the police work together to prevent risks that affect citizens in the block, sector, or neighborhood. Before referring to the gaps in this conceptualization, it should be emphasized that this concept was promoted from the outset based on objectives like those of military intelligence. By way of illustration, these fronts were expected to “gather information on *terrorism*, *urban subversion*, and organized crime,” which departmental police commanders would eventually forward to the Intelligence Directorate (National Police General Directorate, 1995: Section III. Execution, paragraphs 2.a. and 4). The police believed that such measu-

res would protect citizens from risks associated with concepts that, at the time, had a profound political impact on institutions.

To properly contextualize this figure, it is also necessary to recognize that it originated in the same period in which groups were institutionalized that would eventually operate in parallel with the public security forces. In fact, two years before this directive was issued, the Congress of the Republic had enacted Law 62 of 1993, which, in addition to regulating companies that sell private security and surveillance services in the country, created the Superintendency to monitor them. Similarly, in 1994, former President César Gaviria Trujillo signed Decree Law 356, which defined a statute for so-called “special private security and surveillance services” and “community private security and surveillance services,” entities that would eventually provide the legal basis for the structures known as *Convivir*<sup>1</sup>. In other words, the figure of

<sup>1</sup> The security cooperatives that would eventually be called Convivir would later be activated by Resolution 368 of 1995 of the Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security during the administration of Ernesto Samper. This would allow its members to carry long weapons and communication devices. According to Francisco Gutiérrez, although their formal objective was to coordinate citizen



the Security Fronts was institutionally recognized at a time when other figures were also formalized that would function as a kind of hinge between the legal and the expansion of paramilitarism in Colombia.

By the time this report is published, three decades will have passed since October 12, 1995, the date on which Permanent Directive No. 14 was issued. After all this time, it is worth asking why the Security Fronts continue to be so prevalent in a country where numerous bodies created by administrative acts are constantly ignored. Various administrative and police authorities defend the permanence of this figure based on reasoning that does not correspond to reality, such as, for example, that the Security Fronts have allowed for coordination between the police and certain citizens whom they recognize as leaders from within that institution. This is an assumption that has profound drawbacks, starting with a semantic problem that has deepened in recent years. From the perspective of these authorities, those who are linked to a Security Front are *leaders*, provided that this concept is defined in police jargon, which highlights the link between individuals, and this armed civilian body. The following quote from the instruction manual entitled *Es-*

*trategia de los Frentes de Seguridad (Security Front Strategy)* is illustrative in this regard, stating that “The leader who keeps the community united with their institution achieves his goals more quickly and is one step ahead in *neutralizing the elements that generate violence*” (National Police Operational Directorate, 2002).

Just as these representations must be viewed critically, so too must the pronouncements of certain current local authorities, who seek to validate and recycle this figure by drawing on notions from human rights and social movements. For example, the Government of Antioquia recently referred to the *philosophy* of the Security Fronts based on concepts such as harmony, social fabric, protection, and prevention (Secretariat of Security and Justice, 2024), ignoring the problems that this type of relationship between citizens and the security forces has had in practice in their department.

Before elaborating on this regional experience, it should be emphasized that the demands presented by the social movement based on the same concepts have not been treated with the same diligence and validity over time. The following paradoxical scenario illustrates this point. For several years, the National Guarantees Process has been calling for a comprehensive reform of the current protection model which, among other things, would prevent the outsourcing of protection measures for human rights defenders and recognize the risks associated with “the actions

---

collaboration in security, in practice, the Convivir allowed for paramilitary expansion, “Not only did it give them a veneer of legality [...] but it also allowed them to coordinate activities with all kinds of legal actors (including multinationals, officials, and politicians)” (2014: 182).



of State institutions and [the] individuals who, on the surface, appear to be acting within the law" (COSESU, 2024: 13). Not only has this demand still not been met, but there also appears to be coordination –either by action or omission– between national and regional authorities, which not only enables but also encourages the creation of Security Fronts, an invention of the 1990s that, in addition to having been mistakenly assimilated as a form of self-protection (COSESU, 2024: 14), could be contradicting the aims of the Public Policy on Dismantling agreed upon in the 2016 Final Agreement.

And not only that: also, the Political Constitution, considering the reforms that resulted from this state agreement. We refer more specifically to the changes that arose from the *National Political Pact* referred to in Point 3.4.2, which states that the national government will promote an agreement between diverse groups in the country so that weapons are never again used in politics and violent organizations such as paramilitaries are not promoted. This gave rise to Legislative Act 05 of 2017, which unfortunately is little remembered despite having added an extremely important article to the constitution. In effect, the administrative act in question added Article 22A to the Political Constitution of Colombia, the content of which openly contradicts the way in which numerous Security Fronts are operating, insofar as it states the following:

"Article 22. As a guarantee of non-repetition and in order to contribute to ensuring the legitimate monopoly of force and the use of weapons by the State, and in particular by the security forces, throughout the territory, *the creation, promotion, instigation, organization, instruction, support, tolerance, concealment or favoring, financing or official and/or private use of organized armed civilian groups for illegal purposes of any kind is prohibited*, including those known as self-defense groups, paramilitaries, as well as their support networks, structures or practices, security groups for illegal purposes or other equivalent names" (emphasis added).

As explained in the following section, this statement contradicts the declarations of various administrative and police authorities, who have promoted changes to the Security Fronts, citing (i) the lack of rigorous monitoring of this figure, and (ii) the existence of vague and outdated legal regulations. This would partially explain how a concept that was initially conceived for urban settings has been adapted to different security models and groups that support both the involvement of citizens as informants and joint work with private security companies. Greater attention should be paid to the implementation and diversification of these types of models, whose functioning should be reevaluated in light of the dire consequences that similar inventions have had in the past.

## 2.1. Bogotá, D.C., and its tendency to export erratic models

During Ernesto Samper's presidency, the Head of the Planning Office of the Colombian National Police stated: "The Metropolitan Police of Santafé de Bogotá has been successfully implementing the Comprehensive Security Plan through Local Security Fronts, which are organizations that directly support police work and promote institutional outreach to the community" (National Police General Directorate, 1995: Numeral 3). Based on this reasoning, the high command subsequently encouraged the expansion of this model to other parts of the country.

This is another telling fact. Security Fronts began in the capital of a deeply centralist country, where district administrations have fulfilled their duty to protect in a discretionary manner and selectively guaranteed access to basic services and social inclusion. In this scenario, instead of promoting a comprehensive institutional presence and a genuine strengthening of the community fabric, various municipal governments have encouraged the creation of Security Fronts in vulnerable sectors. A measure that has ultimately proven ineffective. If we look at the localities where the largest number of Fronts are concentrated—which are Ciudad Bolívar, Kennedy, Engativá, Fontibón, Usaquén, and Bosa—we see that two of them also rank high in extreme monetary poverty indicators (Saludata.gov, 2025), and that three of them contain the neighborhoods that two years ago had the highest crime rates

in the city (Secretariat of Security, Co-existence, and Justice, 2023).

Despite this evidence, it is striking that, since Enrique Peñalosa's administration, various district administrations have used the mayor's official website to highlight and promote the creation of Security Fronts as an effective measure to reduce violence and "strengthen the social fabric." This practice has been continued by the current mayor, Carlos Fernando Galán, and in the last two years, it has been replicated in the municipalities of Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Bucaramanga.

Many of these publications seem to suggest that the mere creation of the Security Fronts is proof that the mayor's office is fulfilling its duty to protect citizens. This idea has taken hold in urban settings, as evidenced by the concentration of active Security Fronts in metropolitan police forces—that is, police units covering urban areas and their zones of influence—which account for 55% of the 13,940 Fronts registered by the National Police Service Headquarters for the year 2024 (National Police Community Management Group, 2025). The problem is that their expansion has been encouraged without properly addressing some of their most profound shortcomings in the capital, such as: the abuse of force against young consumers; the misuse of clothing bearing police symbols; the receipt of funding from political parties; and the hyper-surveillance and profi-

ling of those who use public spaces (Navarrete, 2024). This support for the Fronts would also ignore the risks of a figure that could be militarizing everyday life, while strengthening a discourse of securitization and deepening mistrust among citizens.

Nevertheless, the district administrations of Bogotá D.C. have acted in different ways, and some have adopted measures that may be more harmful than others. The current mayor, Carlos Fernando Galán, illustrates this point, as he has blurred the already unclear position on the carrying of weapons. In fact, the initial directives stated that the Security Fronts would not be armed, insofar as their equipment—if any—would be limited to certain technological devices such as radios, loudspeakers, and cameras. Contrary to what was expected, during Galán's administration, the idea has been put forward that the Fronts could involve "the participation of private security companies to reinforce surveillance," a thesis that has not only been presented on the institutional website (Santa Fe Local Mayor's Office, 2025), but also in public statements made by the commander of the Bogotá Metropolitan Police before the Congress of the Republic<sup>2</sup>.


Therein lies a dangerous contradiction, as it is evident that private security and surveillance companies do use certain types of weapons. And that's not all. With measures such as these, which encourage a business model where private actors replace the police in matters of protection, local authorities could be creating new risks for citizens. Despite the risks associated with adopting such measures, there is concern about the approach taken by Galán's administration, which in 2024 alone, during its first year in office, created 25% of the city's existing Security Fronts.

---

<sup>2</sup> In this regard, it is worth noting that, during the previous administration of Iván Duque, this association was also promoted in the Defense and Security Policy, which also mentions that the Security Fronts could allow for coordination between the National Police and private security and surveillance companies (Mi-

---

nistry of National Defense, 2019: 61). Furthermore, if Directive 14 is analyzed, it can also be seen that there is a section that—without making it explicit—could have left the door open to this type of interpretation, by stating that "The possibility of involving private entities in prevention programs such as the one in question should not be ruled out, since, as legal entities, they are also obliged to comply with the duties set forth in Article 95 of the National Constitution and are therefore capable of contributing to the solution of social imbalances and problems that usually generate crime or are real factors of insecurity" (General Directorate of the National Police, 1995: Numeral G).



**Source:** Prepared internally based on information from the Bogotá Metropolitan Police (2025).

This scenario has also been present in other municipalities in the Cundinamarca savanna, such as Chía and Madrid, where the closeness between authorities and private security companies has led to the exercise of certain rights –such as the right to protest and freedom of association– being severely limited by individuals who act under the guise of institu-

tional authority, but without properly identifying themselves or providing clarity about their functions and limits. This is a practice that carries numerous potential risks, several of which are described in the following section, which goes into greater detail on some of the regional expressions of the Security Fronts.

## 2.2. Other hybridizations of the Security Fronts

One fact that demonstrates the changes this figure has undergone is the number of names and forms it has taken on in different parts of the country. Indeed, after the Local Security Fronts mentioned in the Permanent Directive of 1995, the *Neighborhood Fronts* and the Security

and *Coexistence Fronts* emerged in the city of Bucaramanga, the *Business Security Fronts*, created in 2001 by the National Police, the *Security Fronts in Malls* in Barranquilla, and the *Cattle Ranching's Security Fronts*, which are also occasionally referred to as *Solidarity Fronts for Security and*

*Peace*, alluding to an invention that the Colombian Federation of Cattle Ranchers (FEDEGAN), the largest cattle ranch association in the country, has attempted to promote. To analyze these transformations, their variation at the regional level must be recognized, which also makes it necessary to review the functioning of these figures in certain departments.

### 2.2.1. The Case of Antioquia

A significant portion of the labels mentioned above were created –or in some cases reinforced– during the first half of 2024, following a proposal to promote this figure by Andrés Julián Rendón, the current governor of Antioquia, when he spoke out about the murder of a soldier by the AGC - Gulf Clan. At the time of the events, there were plans to create –or, failing that, reinforce– other models in which civil society was linked in some way to the National Police, for example: the *safer farm strategy*, which began in the Southwest subregion and expanded geographically; the *coexistence managers*; and the *citizen support networks*<sup>3</sup>. In addition

to listing them, it is worth noting that these have not operated as expected. For example, in the Eastern region of Antioquia, there are doubts regarding the legality of the resources with which some individuals are financing the networks, or regarding their actions, insofar as there are members who are assuming roles that belong to the security forces. It is also feared, in the Aburrá Valley, that some of these figures may be serving to cover up the actions of illegal armed structures in some municipalities.

Rather than addressing the problems present in the existing figures, Rendón chose to promote the Security Fronts, despite the gaps that persist in this regard in the Antioquia Police Department, which, among other things (i) does not know whether some of the members of the Fronts possess legal or illegal weapons, (ii) does not conduct evaluations to verify the impact on crime rates, and (iii) does not identify special regulations or sanctions for its members (Antioquia Police Department, 2024: 2 and 4). Why, then, adopt such an approach?

<sup>3</sup> During the presidential term of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, new Police Service Regulations were issued through Resolution No. 00912 of 2009, which referred to the so-called *Citizen Support and Solidarity Networks*, which involved the coordination of activities between the National Police and the Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security, to obtain information on events, crimes, and behaviors that could affect peace and security, turning, among other things, to legal entities providing private security and surveillance services.

There would be a political reason. Not only because it is presented as a measure of the current government, which discursively would represent a change from what was done by the previous administration, but also because it has been presented as an action promoted at the regional level, which would seek to address problems of the national government in terms of lack of security and the crea-

tion of conditions for the action of the security forces. But in addition to this, the discourse on security has allowed the Rendón administration to “legitimize” the collection of new resources and justify certain budget allocations through decisions that have been the subject of legislative debates in the Congress of the Republic.

In fact, in addition to reviving the creation of the Fronts, Rendón allocated funds in his Development Plan for the creation and strengthening of “initiatives” such as the Security Fronts, with plans to allocate resources from the Territorial Security and Citizen Coexistence Fund (FONSET) (Government of Antioquia, 2024: Program 1.3.1; Secretariat of Security and Justice of the Government of Antioquia, 2024). Under the premise of security, his government has promoted the financing of Fronts with public money, defending a position that, to some extent, is similar to a bill filed in June 2025, which advocated for their financing with resources from FONSET and another Fund<sup>4</sup>. Within this framework, the

*Security and Citizen Coexistence Tax* was imposed, a surcharge that was justified on the grounds of improving the security conditions of the public forces in the department and strengthening the resources allocated to security.

Despite this apparent institutional strengthening, in practice it remains difficult to know who composes the Security Fronts and how they operate. They have been recognized at certain critical moments, such as the social unrest that took place in 2021, when some of their members made stigmatizing statements against the leadership, as evidenced in eastern Antioquia. However, other information gaps persist in regions where there is also an extensive presence of illegal armed actors, such as Bajo Cauca or the Northeast. Security Fronts have been created there, but their inhabitants say they are unaware of their existence, a lack of knowledge that could have different causes, such as the absence of information, the difficulty in distinguishing this figure from other similar ones or not feeling safe enough to file complaints, as the case may be.

<sup>4</sup> During the presidential term of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, new Police Service Regulations were issued through Resolution No. 00912 of 2009, which referred to the so-called *Citizen Support and Solidarity Networks*, which involved the coordination of activities between the National Police and the Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security, to obtain information on events, crimes, and behaviors that could affect peace and security, turning, among other things, to legal entities providing private security and surveillance services.

A revealing fact that illustrates the experience in Antioquia is that this (lack of) knowledge is not reciprocal. While citizens do not have sufficient information to identify and characterize the Security Fronts, the members of these groups do have the means to identify citizens. This is evident in the *block plan*, one of the components used by the established Fronts. This refers not only to

the sketch or map on which this figure is based, but also to “information on each family, including full names, exact addresses, telephone numbers, professions or occupations, and the location of vulnerable sites” (National Police, 2018: 4).

### **2.2.2. The case of the fronts promoted by the cattle ranching industry**


Once Andrés Julián Rendón made the announcement promoting the creation of Security Fronts, some public and political figures proceeded to express their public support for the governor. One example is the congresswoman from the Democratic Center political party, María Fernanda Cabal, and her husband, the president of FEDEGAN, José Félix Lafaurie, who took advantage of the opportunity to promote its creation even in rural settings. This led to the creation of the so-called Cattle Ranching Security Fronts, Solidarity Fronts for Security and Peace, or Solidarity Cattle Ranching Security and Peace Fronts. Regardless of its name, this invention illustrates how this same figure was appropriated by a cattle ranching trade association in the country, which launched a series of demonstrations in its favor in northern Colombia, that is, in the territory that the security forces identify as Police Region No. 8, which includes Sucre, Bolívar, Cesar, Atlántico, Magdalena, and La Guajira (National Police Community Management Group, 2025). These departments, incidentally, have the highest concentration of Security Fronts in the entire country.

Since the piloting of the Cattle Ranching Security Fronts in the department of Cesar in February 2024, this concept has been referred to as a way of tackling crimes that affect the cattle ranching sector, such as what they call “land invasion,” kidnapping, extortion, theft, cattle rustling, and slaughter. In other words, the Security Fronts, a concept that emerged thirty years ago in an urban setting, which does not have a definition that fits reality, and which has significant information gaps for the security forces, is now being extrapolated to rural settings where there are long-standing territorial disputes along with a wide range of other crimes. And while debates about the legality and appropriateness of these acts are being resolved, FEDEGAN has already launched many of these fronts, despite ongoing debates about, for example, how to prevent such a figure from becoming an expression of private security that takes justice into its own hands, as has happened previously with other institutional figures in the same region.

Relevant observations such as this have been met with suspicion by FEDEGAN and other organizations that support such a measure. Paradoxically, while defending the creation of Security Fronts as an effective strategy in the fight against crime in the Capital city, they point out that detractors of this figure in the countryside are part of a ‘bubble’. Or even worse, they have participated in the debate with interventions that stigmatize vulnerable populations who



## Number of Security Fronts by Police Region up to December 31, 2024





have developed self-protection figures in scenarios of political, social, and armed conflict, as illustrated by the statements made by the Association of Retired Officers (ACORE) which, in the context of its support for the FEDEGAN initiative, referred to peasant and indigenous guards as figures who collude with criminal organizations against the security forces (ACORE in *Semana* magazine, 2024).

Contrary to what happened with the Security Fronts, many of these self-protection figures have not received the institutional recognition they deserve—as is the case with the peasant guards, for example—despite the fact that they have served as a guarantee for the permanence of communities in risk scenarios neglected by the Colombian State. With this in mind, similar accusations by various public and trade union authorities, which, among other things, ignore the strategies deployed by armed actors to break the mechanisms and ties of the social movement, are not only unfair but can also exacerbate the threats faced by ethnic and peasant organizations amidst the armed conflict.

### **2.2.3. The case of the department of Santander**

In addition to exemplifying the stigmatization of existing self-defense groups by some former high-ranking members of the security forces, ACORE's statements reveal the latter's support for models that endorse the existence of security fronts. This is

evident not only in their statements, but also in the actions they take once they are appointed to certain public and private positions. For example, in January 2024, retired General Fernando Murillo Orrego began working as a "security strategist for FEDEGAN" and positioned the solidarity fronts for cattle ranching security as the ideal strategy for crime prevention and coordination between cattle ranchers and state authorities (CON-textoganadero, 2024).

Specifically, in May 2024, the creation of the first Cattle Ranching's Security Front in this department was announced. This took place at a meeting held in Barrancabermeja, which brought together around fifty members of the Santander Cattle Ranchers' Federation (FEDEGASAN). Among those promoting this initiative were José David Cavanzo, who is a councilman in Bucaramanga and an active member of FEDEGASAN, and Fernando Murillo, the aforementioned retired general of the National Police who is now part of FEDEGAN. The Fronts that were promoted would function as an intelligence system, issuing early warnings and facilitating a coordinated response among the cattle ranchers themselves, who would report suspicious activities to the state security forces to seek a more effective response. Although many of these announcements appeal to the security of "citizens" or "the community", these initiatives are repeatedly aimed at benefiting certain segments of the population. This case exemplifies this, insofar as they would be security

fronts integrated and financed by the agricultural producers themselves, in alliance and coordination with the public forces (i.e., the police and the national army), which, according to Councilman Cavanzo himself, would seek to “achieve that common goal, which is the security of us, the cattle ranchers” (Ortiz, 2024).

Furthermore, there have been cases where these types of measures have been proposed by first responders from municipal or departmental governments, as is also evident in the department of Santander. Juvenal Díaz Mateus, a retired Major General of the National Army who constantly refers to the dominance of fear and insecurity, is currently the governor of that department. His administration has also promoted the creation of Security Fronts in municipalities with a presence of various illegal armed actors such as the AGC – Gulf Clan or the ELN, something that is reportedly happening in Barranca-bermeja, Puerto Wilches, Sabana de Torres, San Vicente de Chucurí, and Carmen de Chucurí<sup>5</sup>.

For its part, under the slogan “It’s time for security, it’s time for Santander,” from mid-2024 and throughout 2025, the Santander Governor’s Office, through the Secretariat of the Interior and the Directorate of Security and Citizen Coexistence –two agencies that, incidentally, are also led by retired military personnel– intensified the creation of new Security Fronts in important urban centers and municipalities in the department. In this case, 32 Fronts were created, each consisting of ten alarm horns with their respective equipment, according to official information. According to the Governor’s Office, these are intended to “alert the community about suspicious activities in their territory, are connected 24 hours a day, and will seek to protect residents from situations that put their safety at risk by alerting the police quadrants” (Government of Santander, 2024). These were deployed in the city of Bucaramanga (eight neighborhoods), Floridablanca (one neighborhood), Girón (eight neighborhoods and one village), Piedecuesta (one neighborhood), Lebrija (six neighborhoods), and San Vicente de Chucurí (six neighborhoods and three villages). Furthermore, the implementation and monitoring of this initiative does not appear to be carried out by the public sector, but rather by the security company Focus Ingeniería (Ibíd.), which appears to be operated by a temporary union.

<sup>5</sup> In this regard, it should be noted that there is currently a trend among departmental capital administrations to hire former members of the security forces to provide security services. This has been attempted through various figures, such as community managers in the city of Ibagué (Notibague, 2025), or the so-called guardians of order, with whom the current mayor of Bogotá D.C. intends to have retired police and military personnel mediate minor conflicts in the city (Reynoso, 2025).

Based on the same slogan, the Governor’s Office also began implementing what in some municipalities was called the “Safe Zone” project

and in another program, “Safe Village.” Within the framework of these programs, the creation of Rural Security Fronts is being promoted in order to strengthen security and coexistence in rural areas through coordination between the police, the army, the Attorney General’s office, industry (in this case, businesspeople and cattle ranchers), and local mayors. This link is promoted on the assumption that such fronts are necessary to prevent crime and ensure safer environments for rural communities.

The launch of the first Rural Security Front took place at the end of 2024 in the village of El Cerrito in the municipality of Sabana de Torres, where it was announced that a “group formed by businesspeople, cattle ranchers, and residents of El Cerrito already has alert button technology connected to a special military and police team that will ensure their safety”, and that “immediate and decisive action will be taken against criminal acts”. It was also added that “the municipal administration awarded the ‘Meritorious Civic Citizen’ recognition to 22 men committed to rural security who have already taken concrete actions that led to important arrests of criminals” (Municipality of Sabana de Torres, 2024). Interest in this figure has continued this year, as illustrated by the announcement made in the village of Árbol Soto in the municipality of Socorro, where, once again, with a meeting that was publicized in the media, the same type of Front was launched in 13 interconnected farms, which had a

community communication system with WiFi connection and 16 video surveillance cameras (Government of Santander, 2025).

In practice, this has not only led to people being pressured to join these citizen groups in virtual spaces, such as WhatsApp groups linked to the police and army, as reported by social organizations at the Territorial Guarantees Committee meeting in November 2024, but also to reports of people arriving who do not live in the municipality. It has also happened that those who choose not to participate in these networks are stigmatized and singled out –for example, for not wanting to cooperate with the community– even when they play a leadership role in their community. Not only that but encouraging the creation of these figures in areas disputed by illegal armed groups that do not always wear uniforms further exacerbates the presence of these individuals, who carry out control actions without the legality of their actions being clear, as illustrated by the individuals who occasionally conduct searches and patrol in trucks in San Vicente de Chucurí.

As things stand, we are seeing the return of an old security model in Santander. It should be noted that 88% of the existing Fronts in the department of Santander originated between 2009 and 2013 (National Police Community Management Group, 2025), which could be partially explained by the implementation of the National Community Surveillance Plan

by Quadrants in 2009<sup>6</sup>. However, it should also be noted that during the same period, the creation of so-called citizen support and solidarity networks was encouraged. Among other things, these networks promoted the collection of information on events and behaviors that could affect security, thanks to a relationship between the police and private security and surveillance companies. The latter is a fundamental variable in the regional context, given the widespread presence of this type of company, which use has been encouraged in recent administrations of departmental capitals, such as Bucaramanga.

Indeed, Jaime Andrés Beltrán Martínez, a Christian pastor and self-proclaimed politician like Nayib Bukele in Santander—who was also elected on a campaign against insecurity and “gender ideology”—proposed the figure of “community heroes” for this purpose as part of their security strategy, “Plan Candado.” Before his election was nullified on August 21, 2025, videos and official speeches had been made public in which he, as the city’s top police authority, praised this initiative while appearing accompanied by the police and representatives of the five companies

currently associated with the strategy. According to documentation from human rights organizations in that department, these companies have routinely censored acts of denunciation and historical memory, such as erasing the mural that read “*las cuchas tienen razón*” (*the old women are right*), referring to mothers searching for victims of forced disappearance in the context of the armed conflict.

In this scenario, the elected representative bodies have not opposed these initiatives, nor have they limited the activities of private security and surveillance companies. On the contrary, the Municipal Council of Bucaramanga approved Municipal Agreement 024 of 2024, promoted by the mayor, with serious gaps in its implementation, the lack of definition of the functions of the partners, the limits of intervention, the incentives to be given to private companies and citizens, and the forms of supervision (Corporación Compromiso, 2025: 19). With a similar measure, this collegiate body acted in a manner analogous to that of the Departmental Assembly of Antioquia when, based on its own interpretation of Law 2272 of 2022, better known as the Total Peace Law, it issued Ordinance 50 to authorize the Security and Citizen Coexistence Tax promoted by the governor. In other words, in Bucaramanga, the collegiate body validated a measure adopted by an administrative authority which, based on the discourse of security and the desire to boast of a reduction in crime, reinforced a link that has proven problematic in practice.

<sup>6</sup> By changing the Community Surveillance model that had been in place since 2006 and focused on shock or reaction groups, the National Community Surveillance Plan by Quadrants emphasized interaction with citizens, integration with the community, and the shared responsibility derived from this relationship (Paez et al, 2020: 310).

### **2.3. The national-level strategy: ignore it?**

If entities such as the Security Fronts do not receive adequate oversight at the local level, one would expect that the opposite would be true for national law enforcement authorities. Furthermore, when faced with relevant and timely questions, such as whether it is possible to link private security companies with security fronts, something that was questioned in July 2025 to the Undersecretary of Security of the current district administration of Bogotá D.C., he simply ‘transfer by jurisdiction’ the entire request to the National Police, without informing what the legal regulation is and under what conditions this union, which they have publicly promoted, can take place (see response from the Undersecretary of Security, Coexistence, and Justice, 2025).

As for national government and state institutions, not only have there been no clear guidelines, but there have also been persistent problems arising from the appointment of individuals to key positions in the monitoring of security fronts and private security and surveillance companies. For example, the first Superintendent of Surveillance and Private Security appointed by the current national government, Alfonso Sneider Manzur, a retired military officer who was the subject of a disciplinary investigation for granting licenses to 18 private security companies in different cities across the country –which included the approval of security plans– due

to possible irregularities in the authorization process (Public Officers Inspection Office, 2025). Similar events draw attention to an issue that deserves further attention, related to the implications of outsourcing the security measures provided by the National Protection Unit, in a country where monitoring its operations –including, of course, access to information– is extremely difficult to carry out.

Now, returning to the shortcomings in the guidelines on Security Fronts issued by government entities, it is worth highlighting, unfortunately due to its absence, the work of the Directorate of Security, Citizen Coexistence, and Government. This is a department of the Ministry of the Interior which, in addition to coordinating “with civil authorities and security and justice agencies, the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of public policies for internal public order”, is in charge of the Technical Secretariat Group of the Intersectoral Commission for Rapid Response (CIPRAT), that is, the institutional mechanism for coordinating preventive and reactive measures in response to risk situations identified in early warnings. Well, even with a court order against it, this Directorate has not reported what guidelines it has issued regarding the operation of the Security Fronts during the four administrations that have passed through that ministerial portfolio in the first

three years of President Gustavo Petro's government<sup>7</sup>.

There have been situations that have given rise to occasional statements, such as the warning from the so-called *solidarity fronts for cattle ranching security*. When this happened, there were posts on President Gustavo Petro's social media accounts, but the evidence shows that this is not enough to adopt comprehensive measures, let alone address a structural problem. At that time, there were also statements by the former Minister of Defense, Iván Velásquez, who said at a press conference that "Crimes are fought by the authorities, not by private individuals. The

government does not sponsor, promote, support, or endorse any project that involves private individuals in an organization that reacts to any criminal act" (Velásquez in Osorio, 2024). While these calls were valid in light of the country's history, the truth is that they have not translated into new directives on the matter in the last three years.

The actions taken by the Public Ministry in this area are also not encouraging. Since this figure was created in 1995, the Public Officers Inspection Office has opened six disciplinary proceedings and six administrative proceedings against members of the security forces or administrative authorities in connection with actions related to the Security Fronts. However, as of July 2025, there was no information in its Mission Information System on sanctions imposed for the same acts (Support Directorate of the Public Officers Inspection Office, 2025). Does this mean that this institution has no problems at all?

Clearly it is not the case, just as it is equally indisputable that official information on the matter is extremely scarce, probably due to the lack of rigorous monitoring of this figure. The burden of documentation has therefore fallen on some civil society organizations and programs, which are making an effort to understand what is happening, warning of the risks of dynamics neglected by the Colombian state, and at the same time continuing to demand institutional measures that guarantee comprehensive protection for vulnerable

---

<sup>7</sup> On May 21, 2025, Nhora Yhanet Mondragón Ortiz, in her capacity as director of the Directorate of Security, Citizen Coexistence, and Government of the Ministry of the Interior, was asked to report (i) the guidelines of that office regarding the existence and operation of the Security Fronts, and (ii) the actions taken in response to the administrative acts of collegiate bodies and local authorities that promote these entities. This request was supported by the Office of the Ombudsman for Constitutional Affairs on June 18, 2025, but no response was received, which is why it was decided to file a writ of protection on August 4, 2025. After gathering evidence, the 36th Criminal Court of the Circuit of Bogotá D.C. issued Writ 2025-00160, which upheld the right of petition of the Somos Defensores Program and ordered the Directorate of Security, Citizen Coexistence, and Government of the Ministry of the Interior to send the response it had supposedly already issued within 48 hours. By September 18, 2025, this has not happened, which is why it is expected to return to court.

communities. While truly recognizing the organizational forms and historical demands of the latter, institutions must realistically assess the scope and risks that may arise from entities that they are promoting, either explicitly or implicitly, such as the Security Fronts and the private security and

surveillance companies mentioned above. If structural measures are not put in place, duly formalized and geared towards long-term reforms, both entities will continue to expand and transform in ways that will become increasingly difficult to monitor and anticipate.





NOMBRE:

*Luigi Rossi*

CARGO:

*Lider  
Secund*

UBICACIÓN



HORARIOS:

- *12:00 - 1:00*
- *7:30 - 8:30*
- *9:45 - 10:45*

FAMILIA:

- *Padre: Luigi (49 años)*
- *Madre: Maria (45 años)*
- *Hijos: Antonio (11 años)*

RUTINAS:

*... en la casa de Luigi y Maria  
... la casa de Luigi y Maria  
... la casa de Luigi y Maria  
... la casa de Luigi y Maria  
... la casa de Luigi y Maria*

CHAPTER 3

EASY PREY



**B**etween January and June 2025, the Information System on Attacks against Human Rights Defenders in Colombia (SIADDHH, according to its Spanish acronym) of the Somos Defensores Program<sup>1</sup>, recorded a total of 342 individual attacks committed against 308 people, as in some cases, several people were victims of more than one type of attack during the same incident. Compared to the same period in 2024, the total number of attacks recorded showed a slight decrease of 3% (10 fewer incidents). Many of these acts of violence took place in humanitarian crisis situations that arose or worsened during the first half of 2025. In some cases, such as in Catatumbo, this happened despite warnings issued by the Ombudsman's Early Warning System the previous year.

Over the first six months of this year, there was also a 6% increase in incidents of social unrest<sup>2</sup>, with the Om-

budsman's Office recording 1.834 such incidents in 395 municipalities. It also identified that "the greatest increases from one period to another were observed in conflicts arising from non-compliance with the agreement to end the armed conflict" (2025).

In many areas where people exercised their right to defend their rights, there were also confrontations between legal and illegal armed actors who committed violations of international humanitarian law. Examples of this include restrictions on movement, forced displacement, and confinement. In regions where the same entity identified eight active hotspots of armed conflict, "134.000 Colombians were forced to flee their territories or barricade themselves in because of these criminal actions" (Ombudsman's Office, 2025b). The impact of this can be illustrated in departments such as Norte de Santander, which was the territory most affected by lockdowns during that semester, and Chocó, which is the second most affected by the imposition of these lockdowns. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, "between January and May, 58.160 people were displaced in ten departments, representing an

---

<sup>1</sup> This system registers information known to the Somos Defensores Program from open sources and direct sources, including social organizations and non-governmental organizations that report cases to the Program. SIADDHH only publishes cases that it has directly confirmed.

<sup>2</sup> With this concept, the Ombudsman's Office refers to complaints arising from the lack of State presence and investment, and demonstrations concerning the guarantee of the rights to life, integri-

---

ty, security, and freedom, in addition to rights associated with work and education.

increase of 117% compared to the same period in 2024” (2025).

It is paradoxical that this picture does not coincide with a considerable increase in the overall number of attacks against social leaders. The decrease observed during the period under review is not indicative of an improvement: human rights defenders in Colombia are immersed in situations of silencing, which prevent them from denouncing, reporting, or taking action to raise awareness of the attacks they have suffered, which has an impact on individuals, families, and communities. Intimidation tactics derived from territorial presence and control affect the well-being and guarantee of the rights of communities, including their leaders.


An insecure and discouraging context for the coming scenario, marked by an election period in which serious violent events have already occurred, such as the murders of pre-candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in Bogotá D.C., human rights defender and Pacto Histórico activist Luis Alberto Peña in Miranda (Cauca), and

possible attacks against those with electoral aspirations in the regions, which increases the climate of insecurity for the elections.

With that in mind, in Colombia, the legitimate exercise of defending human rights continues to be a major challenge, despite the progress made in forums such as the National Seminar on Comprehensive Public Policy Guarantees. Although this seminar provided a space for dialogue with spokespersons from across the country, there are still no effective measures in place to protect the lives of those who exercise the right to defend human rights.

That said, below is a reference to the temporary behavior of assaults during the first half of 2025. As in the previous year, April was the month with the highest number of assaults, with 98, followed by January with 76, March with 61, February with 46, May with 34, and June with 27. Although January ranks second, the pattern observed in previous years continues, with the first month of the year showing high vulnerability.

**Number of aggressions per month  
SIADDHH figures January-June 2025**



## Attacks by gender

The SIADDHH of the Somos Defensores Program continues to identify attacks against defenders with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities (SOGID). Out of the 308 human rights defenders and social leaders who were attacked, 74 (24%) were women, one of whom was a trans woman, and 234 (76%) were men, one of whom had a diverse gender identity. Compared to the same period in 2024, the number of female victims decreased by 27% (28 fewer victims), while in the case of men, the record showed an increase of 8% (18 more victims). It should be noted that, in order to calculate these percentages, the gender identity and sexual orientation of SOGID individuals identified in 2024 was deter-

mined, an exercise that had not been done in previous publications by the Somos Defensores Program.

In the case of women, 83 violent acts were directed at the 74 people registered. Threats (53 incidents) were the most common, followed by murders (10 incidents), forced displacement (8 incidents), life-threatening attacks (6 incidents), forced disappearances (3 incidents), and kidnappings (3 incidents). It is worth noting that one of the murders is considered by SIADDHH to be a gender-based murder (femicide).


Regarding those allegedly responsible for attacks against women, as in the first half of 2024, unknown actors

rank first with 36 cases. They are followed by post-peace agreement groups with 20 cases, broken down as follows: 2 murders, 15 threats, 2 forced disappearances, and one kidnapping. The ELN has a record of 11 attacks, corresponding to 8 threats, 1 kidnapping, and 2 forced displacements. Paramilitary groups are believed to be responsible for 10 incidents, individual perpetrators for 3 incidents, criminal gangs for 2 incidents, and the security forces for 1 incident.

About leaders with diverse sexual orientations and genders, SIADDHH recorded three attacks against two

individuals. One of which was a gender-based murder committed against a transgender woman who was an LGBTIQ+ leader. In the other case, a threat and forced displacement were recorded against a man who was an LGBTIQ+ leader.

As for men, there were 259 attacks against 234 individuals. Threats (122 incidents) were the most common type of attack, followed by murders with 68 cases, forced displacements with 22, life-threatening attacks with 16, prosecutions with 11, and forced disappearances with the same figure.



Attacks according to the type of violence

During the first half of 2025, the SIA-DDHH recorded 78 murders of human rights defenders, representing a worrying increase of 20% (13 more incidents) compared to the same period in 2024; a figure that reflects the increase in lethal violence directed at those who exercise social leadership and/or defend rights. During the first half of 2025, a human rights defender was murdered in the country approximately every two days.

Concerning the other recorded attacks, threats, with 175 cases, remain the most recurrent event, despite a 17% reduction compared to the first half of 2024. As in the first half of the previous year, forced displacements increased, this time by 15% due to four additional incidents. Attacks, meanwhile, decreased by five

incidents, equivalent to 19%. There is concern about the considerable 100% increase in forced disappearances, a form of attack that registered seven additional incidents this semester. With regard to prosecutions, no cases were documented in the first half of 2024, while in the first half of 2025, 11 incidents were recorded. Kidnappings, on the other hand, remained at the same level as the previous year. Information theft, with one fewer incident, decreased by 75%, while torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment recorded one incident, equivalent to a 67% decrease. Finally, in this period, there were no known cases of arbitrary detention or sexual violence, which in 2024 recorded one incident each.

Types of individual attacks	Attacks January–June 2024	Attacks January–June 2025
Threats	211	175
Murders	65	78
Force displacements	26	30
Life-threatening attacks	27	22
Forced disappearances	7	14
Judicializations	0	11
Kidnappings	10	10
Theft of information	4	1
Torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment	3	1
Arbitrary detentions	1	0
Sexual violence	1	0
Total attacks	355	342



Similarly to the first half of 2024, there has been a notable decrease in six of the eleven types of attacks that SIADDHH monitors, a trend that, we recognize once again, is closely related to persistent underreporting. In any case, this statement must be contrasted with the increase in attacks such as murders or forced displacements, which in many cases were linked to other types of violent acts, such as threats or attacks.

For its part, the increase in forced disappearances, which are considered a crime against humanity and in some cases precede murders, raises concerns about the perpetrators' interest in subjecting family members, processes, and communities to a state of permanent anxiety. This is particularly relevant in a country such as Colombia, which, according to figures from the Missing Persons Search Unit, has more than 132.877 missing persons (UBPD, 2025). The incidents recorded by SIADDHH occurred mainly in the departments of Guaviare (8 cases) and Cauca (2 cases), followed by Antioquia, Arauca, Norte de Santander, and Sucre, which recorded one case each.


The humanitarian crisis resulting from political, social, and armed

conflict has led to an increase in accusations from various quarters and sectors against individuals and communities who have been linked to armed actors present in the regions. Such is the case of the eight social and religious leaders who disappeared in Guaviare during the month of April. According to a report by the Attorney General's Office, the Armando Ríos Front of the EMC is allegedly responsible for this case, having summoned "these individuals to question them about the alleged creation of another armed group in the region" (Vásquez, 2025).

About kidnappings, it should be noted that nine of the ten incidents recorded by SIADDHH occurred within the first quarter of the year, specifically in the departments of Norte de Santander (five incidents), Cauca (three incidents), and Cesar. The remaining incident was documented in Chocó during the second quarter of 2025. It is important to note that six of the incidents recorded took place in the Catatumbo region, which since January has been immersed in a humanitarian crisis in the country, with serious consequences and persistent risk scenarios resulting from ongoing armed actions.



Alleged responsible parties



As for the alleged perpetrators, the SIADDHH of the Somos Defensores Program found that, of the 342 verified attacks, 40% were attributed to unknown perpetrators, 26% to post-peace agreement groups, 12% to the ELN, 12% to paramilitaries, 4% to individual perpetrators, 3% to state institutions, 1.5% to criminal alliances, 1% to criminal gangs, 0.3% to the security forces, and 0.3% to Southern Communards Front.

As in the same period last year, unknown perpetrators remain in first place with 138 incidents, and post-peace agreement groups remain in second place with 88 incidents. In the case of the latter, the structures that are part of the EMC, the EMBF, the Second Marquetalia and its splinter group, known as the Bolivarian Army National Coordination (CNEB), which is formed by the Border Commandos (Lewin and Parada, 2025), which operate in the department of Putumayo, and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee, which is present in the department of Nariño (the department where negotiations with the CNEB are progressing).

The ELN, which ranked fourth in the previous biannual report, moved up to third place in this period with 41 incidents. Meanwhile, the paramilitaries, who previously ranked third, have now moved down to fourth place with 42 incidents, mainly attributable to the AGC, also known as the Gulf Clan, which various sources consider to be "the largest armed group in Colombia" (FIP, 2025), with established power and influence in

approximately 300 municipalities. In fact, they continue to expand, with approximately 9.500 members who, according to the security forces, are organized into "a Joint Chiefs of Staff, six blocs, and 40 fronts" (Ideaspaz, 2025). It is known that the national government is moving forward with exploratory talks with this group in Qatar and may at some point announce the opening of a process of negotiations.

Returning to the list, in fifth place are individual perpetrators with 13 incidents, followed by state institutions with 11 incidents, criminal alliances with 5 incidents, criminal gangs with 2 incidents, and the security forces and the Southern Communards Front with one incident each.

Incidents attributed to unknown perpetrators increased by 14% (17 more incidents) of the total recorded: 56 are threats, 47 murders, 21 attacks, 5 forced disappearances, 4 kidnappings, 3 forced displacements, 1 incident associated with a case of torture, and 1 with information theft. The departments in which unknown perpetrators committed the most incidents were Cauca (43 incidents), the Capital District (10 incidents), Valle del Cauca (10 incidents), Santander (10 incidents), Nariño (9 incidents), and Norte de Santander (9 incidents).

The alleged responsibility attributed to post-peace agreement groups increased by 4% (with three more incidents), and the attacks attributed to them correspond to 61 threats, 8

murders, 8 forced disappearances, 7 forced displacements, 3 kidnappings, and 1 attack. As in 2024, the department of Cauca recorded the highest number of incidents with 43, followed by Valle del Cauca with 19, Guaviare with 9, Antioquia with 7, Norte de Santander with 4, and Arauca, Guainía, and Huila with 2 each. Indigenous leaders continue to be the most affected by the actions of these groups, and the high number of attacks carried out by these groups against union leaders in the first half of the year is also noteworthy. Among the structures identified in this category are the Jorge Suárez Briceño Bloc, the Armando Ríos Front, the 30th Front, the 33rd Front, the 36th Front, the Dagoberto Ramos Front, and the Jaime Martínez Front.

The ELN rose from fourth to third place. Contrary to the decline documented in the first half of 2024, this time there was a worrying increase in the alleged responsibility for attacks: 21 more incidents, representing a 105% increase, mainly in Norte de Santander and the Capital District. Among the attacks attributable to this armed group, the following were documented: 25 threats, 6 murders, 6 forced displacements, 3 kidnappings, and 1 forced disappearance. The departments where the attacks took place were: Norte de Santander (19 incidents), the Capital District (17 incidents), Arauca (2 incidents), Cauca, Chocó, and Tolima (1 incident) each.

As for incidents in which paramilitary groups are the alleged perpetrators,

the registry showed a decrease of 50% (42 fewer incidents). The previous semester also reported fewer attacks than in the first semester of 2023. This trend could be explained by the same reasoning used in the previous two years, when we referred to the consolidation of the AGC in territories that are not always in open dispute with other legal and illegal armed actors. Regarding attacks attributable to this category, the registry recorded 26 threats, 5 murders, and 11 forced displacements. The departments most affected by the attacks of these armed groups were Antioquia (19 incidents) and Santander (13 incidents). The other affected departments were Córdoba, Sucre, and Tolima (with 2 incidents each), and Atlántico, Bolívar, Chocó, and Risaralda (with 1 incident each). The following structures were identified in the nine affected regions: the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), La Cordillera, and Los Pachenca.

As for the acts allegedly committed by individuals, these decreased by 35% and consisted of 8 murders, 4 threats, and 1 forced displacement.

State institutions, which had not filed any reports during the first half of 2024, are now once again responsible for 11 incidents involving the prosecution of leaders who have opposed mining operations in Jericó, Antioquia.


Criminal alliances, responsible for five incidents, showed an increase of 25% (with one more incident). All in-

cidents attributable to this category occurred in Putumayo, where three murders, one threat, and one forced displacement were committed by the Border Commandos. It is important to note that this group is considered by the Colombian State to be a dissident faction of the FARC—which is equivalent to the category of post-peace agreement groups in the theoretical framework of SIADDHH—and is currently engaged in a dialogue process. Notwithstanding the above, and taking into account its *modus operandi* in the territory, the Somos Defensores Program places it in the category of criminal alliances.

Regarding criminal gangs, there was an 89% decrease, due to one threat and one forced displacement in Santander.

Meanwhile, attacks in which the security forces appear to be responsible decreased by 50% (one fewer incident), with one incident recorded in the department of La Guajira, involving one threat. Finally, there is Southern Communards Front, who are allegedly responsible for a murder that took place in the department of Nariño, where they are currently engaged in a dialogue process with the national government<sup>3</sup>.

**Alleged responsible parties for attacks  
SIADDHH figures January-June 2025**



<sup>3</sup> The Southern Communards Front (Comuneros del Sur) is an armed group operating outside the law that split from the ELN and is currently engaged in a process of dialogue and demobilization with the national government as part of the “total peace” po-

licy. As their status as a political or armed group has not been defined, and there is no category in which to include them, from 2025 onwards, SIADDHH will register them as allegedly responsible, based on the name by which they call themselves.



During the first half of 2025, attacks against human rights defenders occurred in 26 departments and in the Capital District, a figure equivalent to 82% of the national territory. The departments with the highest number of attacks were Cauca (88 incidents), Antioquia (42 incidents), Norte de Santander (32 incidents), the Capital District (30 incidents), Valle del Cauca (30 incidents), Santander (25 incidents), Nariño (10 incidents), Guaviare (9 incidents), Cesar (9 incidents), and Arauca (7 incidents).


Despite a 27% decrease, the department of Cauca recorded the highest number of attacks, once again ranking first. Antioquia saw a 19% decrease in attacks and remained in second place. Meanwhile, the department of Norte de Santander saw a 78% increase and moved into third place. Noteworthy are the Capital District, which saw a striking 200% increase, and Valle del Cauca, which, contrary to what was documented in the first half of last year, saw a 114% increase. Santander presented a decrease equivalent to 7% with two fewer cases. And Nariño, which in the same period last year had seen a considerable decrease (even leaving the departments with the highest number of attacks), rebounded in the first half of the year with a 100% increase. The latter is particularly striking, given that it is the department where two negotiation processes with illegal armed groups are taking place and, paradoxically, the highest number of attacks occur in municipalities influenced by the two pro-

cesses. It is important to note what happened in Guaviare, which in the first half of 2024 was not among the departments with the highest number of attacks and in this period of analysis showed an overwhelming increase of 800% (with 8 more incidents). For its part, Cesar showed an increase of 29%, and Arauca remained among the departments with the highest number of attacks despite reporting a decrease of 36%.

Behind these figures, leaders have had to leave their territories quietly or remain under the conditions imposed by those who operate or fight over them. Communities are mired in fear or facing the consequences of living in a war zone, and it is there that leaders are most vulnerable, along with their families and their organizational processes.

Where negotiations are progressing, communities are silenced, not only because they are unable to participate actively, but also because they have been forced to remain silent amid pressure and accusations from various parties who mistakenly assume that their continued presence in a territory is linked to the armed actors present there. During this period, the Somos Defensores Program knew that community leaders and communities have once again been attacked by members of the security forces and state actors, and that intimidatory practices such as threats, persecution, acts of looting, and attacks involving minors (either as witnesses or direct victims) have resumed. It

has not been possible to document these incidents, even with evidence, as leaders feel exposed and have been warned that they will suffer consequences if what is happening there becomes known, placing them in an even greater position of vulnerability.




During this period of analysis, a warning from the previous year materialized: in El Chocó, people live at the mercy of controls and restrictions, as evidenced by the armed strikes established by the ELN, contrary to the progress that had been made in the negotiations at one point. This situation is exacerbated by the presence of other armed actors in the department, such as the AGC.

## Assaults by type of leadership

During the first half of 2025, as in the same period of the previous year, there were attacks against 13 types of leaders: 28% were indigenous leaders, 23% were community leaders, 14% were local leaders, 8% were peasant leaders, 9% were union leaders, 5% were environmental leaders, 4% human rights activists, 4% victims' leaders, 2% women's rights defenders, 1.5% Afro-descendant leaders, 1% LGBTIQ+ leaders, 1% youth leaders, and 0.5% student leaders.

Of the 342 attacks, indigenous leaders continue to be the most affected.

As in 2024, there was a 14% decrease in attacks against them, from 111 to 96 incidents during this period. Community leaders now occupy second place, with a 52% increase during this period, with 27 more incidents. As for other types of leadership, attacks against community leaders were confirmed with 47 incidents, peasants with 27, union leaders with 30, environmental leaders with 17, human rights activists with 15, victims' leaders with 13, women's rights defenders with 6, Afro-descendant leaders with 5, LGBTIQ+ leaders with 3, youth leaders with 3, and student leaders with 1.





## Murders of human rights defenders

During the first half of 2025, the SIA-DDHH of the Somos Defensores Program confirmed 78 murders. Compared to the same period in 2024, this figure represents an increase of 20%, with 13 more incidents. March, with 18 cases, was the month with the most murders, followed by January and February, with 15 cases each, then May with 14 cases, April with 10 cases, and finally June, which had the lowest number of cases in the semester, with 6.

As previously mentioned, the Somos Defensores Program continues to identify defenders with diverse sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGID). With this in mind, it is worth noting that of the 78 cases documented during the semester, 10 victims were female (13%), one of whom was a trans woman, and 68 were male. According to the documented cases, murders of female leaders and defenders decreased by 9% (1 fewer case), a figure that remains worrying and highlights the high levels of risk and violence to which women are exposed when exercising leadership in different parts of the country. Meanwhile, male leaders and defenders saw an increase of 26% (14 more cases), a trend contrary to that documented in the first half of 2024.

Regarding gender-based murders, which refer to those where the possible motive is the victim's gender identity, during the first half of 2025, two cases were recorded, one com-

mitted against an indigenous leader in Guaviare and another against a transgender leader, which involved signs of sexual violence against the victim, allegedly in the context of a romantic relationship that took place in the department of Bolívar.

The departments where the 10 murders of women defenders and leaders took place were: Cauca (4), Antioquia (1), Bolívar (1), Guaviare (1), Huila (1), Tolima (1), and Valle del Cauca (1). Three of them were community leaders, two were peasant leaders, two were community leaders, one was a women's rights defender, one was an indigenous leader, and one was an LGBTIQ+ leader.


Regarding the alleged perpetrators of the murders of women defenders, it was observed that in 5 cases the perpetrators were unknown, in 3 cases they were individuals, and in 2 cases they were groups that emerged after the peace agreement.

In 6 of the cases, firearms were used; in 2 cases, knives were used; in 1 case, an explosive device was used; and in 1 case, the type of weapon used is unknown.

In terms of attacks, which are considered attempted murders, 22 incidents were recorded, representing a decrease of 19% (5 fewer incidents) compared to the first half of the previous year. Six of these were committed against women and 16 against

men. Eight incidents resulted in physical injury, 18 involved the use of firearms, three involved weapons of unknown type, and one involved the use of explosives.


Murders by department



Similarly to the first half of 2024, the 78 murders occurred in 19 departments and the Capital District, which is equivalent to 60% of the national territory. Among the departments with the highest number of documented cases is Cauca with 18 incidents, a figure that—following the trend of recent years—keeps it in first place with an increase of 50% (6 more incidents). Antioquia moved into second place with 8 incidents and a worrying increase of 100% (4 more incidents). Norte de Santander, with 7 incidents, ranked third with an increase of 75% (3 more incidents); and Valle del Cauca moved into fourth place with 7 incidents and an increase of 40% (2 more incidents). Nariño, with 6 incidents, recorded


an overwhelming 500% increase (5 more incidents) and is once again among the first places. This department is followed by Putumayo with 5 incidents; Bolívar and Chocó with 4 incidents each; Santander with 3 incidents; Arauca, Atlántico, Cesar, the Capital District, and Huila with 2 incidents each; and Caquetá, Guaviare, La Guajira, Magdalena, Tolima, and Vichada with 1 incident each.

In 64 cases, a firearm was used; in 7 cases, a bladed weapon was used; in 2 cases, different types of weapons were used; in 1 case, the murder was carried out using an explosive device; and in 4 cases, the type of weapon used is still unknown.



In 10 cases, the victims were subjected to forced disappearance prior to their murder. These incidents took place in Antioquia (4), Chocó (4), Arauca (1), and Cauca (1). In nine cases, the murder was committed with cruelty; in 3 cases, torture was involved; in 2 cases, the victims had received prior threats; in 16 cases, others were affected; in 2 cases, the murders occurred in the context of kidnappings; and in 2 cases, they occurred as part of a massacre.

It is also important to note the municipalities with the highest concentration of murders: Toribío (Cauca), Tibú (Norte de Santander), and Cali (Valle del Cauca), with three incidents each, had the highest rates. These are followed by the municipalities where two homicides occurred, which are as follows: Cartagena in Bolívar; Argelia, Inzá, Páez, and Santander de Quilichao in Cauca; Quibdó in Chocó; the Capital District; Ricaurte and Tumaco in Nariño; Puerto Caicedo in Putumayo; and Palmira in Valle del Cauca.



### Leaders affected by the murders

The murders were committed against people who exercised different types of leadership. In first place is community leadership with 30 ca-

ses (11 more than the previous year); then comes communal leadership with 18 cases (1 less than the previous year); followed by indigenous

leadership, which remains in third place with 15 cases (4 more than the previous year); then peasant leadership, which remains in fourth place with 7 cases; union leadership, which recorded 2 cases this semester and had no cases in the same period last year; and finally, one human rights activist, one women's rights defender, one victims' rights defender, one LGBTIQ+ defender, and one environmental defender. The latter two groups remain at the same level as in 2024, except environmental activists, a sector in which no murders were recorded during the first half of the previous year. Youth leaders, also with one case, recorded 3 fewer than the previous year, and finally there

are Afro-descendants, of whom there were no reports during this period.

Concerning indigenous leadership, it is important to mention that the exercise of traditional authority represents a greater risk in the territories. Cauca continues to suffer from these incidents, and more specifically the Nasa people, where all the documented murders against this population group in this department occurred. In the department of Nariño, 4 indigenous leaders were murdered, 3 of whom belonged to the Awá people, who are located in areas where the two negotiation processes between the national government and illegal armed actors are taking place.

Murders of human rights defenders by type of leadership	January –June 2024	January –June 2025
Community leadership	19	30
Communal leadership	19	18
Indigenous leadership	11	15
Peasant leadership	7	7
Union leadership	0	2
Youth leadership	4	1
LGBTIQ+ leadership	1	1
Victims leadership	1	1
Environmental leadership	0	1
HR leadership	1	1
Defenders of women's rights	1	1
Afro-descending leadership	1	0
Total overall	65	78

### Alleged responsible parties

As for those allegedly responsible for the 78 murders, it was found that 47 were allegedly committed by unknown persons, 8 by post-peace agreement groups, 8 by individual

actors, 6 by the ELN, 5 by paramilitary groups, 3 by criminal alliances, and one by the Southern Communards Front.

Alleged responsible parties	January –June 2024	January –June 2025
Unknown	17	47
Post-peace agreement groups	19	8
Individual actors	8	8
ELN	4	6
Paramilitary groups	7	5
Criminal alliances	2	3
Southern Communards Front	Sin referencia	1
Criminales gangs	8	0
Total overall	65	78

This time, murders allegedly committed by unknown perpetrators once again ranked first, with an increase of 176%. Meanwhile, those allegedly committed by post-peace agreement groups fell to second place, with a decrease of 58%. The ELN showed an increase of 50%, coinciding with the trend in the overall record of attacks, where its alleged responsibility also increased. One incident was

recorded in which the alleged perpetrator was the Southern Communards Front, which occurred in the area of influence of the negotiation process with that group in Nariño. Finally, contrary to what happened during the first half of 2024, this time there were no murders in which criminal gangs were the alleged perpetrators.

## Individual threats

During the first half of 2025, 175 individual threats were confirmed. Despite a 17% decrease, with 36 fewer incidents (a trend that has continued over the last three years), threats remain the most used form of aggression against human rights defenders


and social leaders. Threats account for 51% of all attacks recorded during this period and continue to be a mechanism used by aggressors to attempt to disrupt organizational and social processes, intimidate leaders, or curb their actions.

## Threats by department

The threats occurred in 21 departments and in the Capital District, covering 67% of the country. Among the regions with the highest number of incidents, the department of Cauca once again ranks first, remaining the region with the highest number of threats (57 incidents), despite a 37% decrease (34 fewer incidents). Meanwhile, the situation in the Capital District (with 27 incidents) is worrying, with an increase of 350% (21 more incidents). Following the same upward trend is Valle del Cauca (20 incidents), which now ranks third, with an increase of 122% (11 more incidents). Santander follows, with 20 incidents (equivalent to a 5% decrease with one fewer case). Antioquia, which ranked second last year, now ranks fifth (11 incidents) with a 58% decrease (15 fewer incidents). Norte de Santander (8 incidents) also

saw a decrease of 27% (3 fewer incidents). These two are followed by Cesar (5 incidents), La Guajira (4 incidents), Tolima (3 incidents); Arauca, Atlántico, Bolívar, Cundinamarca, Nariño, Risaralda, and Sucre (2 incidents each); and Boyacá, Chocó, Córdoba, Guainía, Magdalena, and Putumayo (with 1 incident each).

As for the number of threats documented in the department of Norte de Santander, it's worth noting that there's been a decrease. This trend once again supports the hypothesis that there is an underreporting of attacks due to the silencing of leaders. This department ranks sixth, even though the greatest humanitarian crisis occurred in this territory and that the consequences for communities and their leaders remain.



## Alleged perpetrators of threats


Of the 175 threats confirmed during the first half of 2025, it was found that in 35% of these cases (corresponding to 61 incidents), the alleged perpetrators were post-peace agreement groups; in 32% of the threats recorded (56 incidents), the perpetrators were unknown; in 15% (26 incidents) the perpetrators were paramilitaries; in 14% (25 incidents) the ELN; in 2% (4 incidents) the perpetrators were individuals; in 1% (1 incident) the perpetrators were the security forces; in 1% (1 incident) the perpetrators were criminal gangs; and finally, in 1% (1 incident) the perpetrators were criminal alliances.

When comparing the behavior of those allegedly responsible for the threats with the figures for the first half of the previous year, it can be seen that in this period, post-peace agreement groups moved from third to first place, with an increase of 17% (with nine more incidents); unknown perpetrators, who were in first place, moved to second place with a decrease of 37% (19 fewer incidents); the ELN, which had seen a decrease in threats, had a considerable increase of 150% (15 more incidents) during this period; paramilitaries fell from second to fourth place with a decrease of 58% (30 fewer incidents). Individual perpetrators, despite recording a decrease of



33% (two fewer incidents), rose from sixth to fifth place. Criminal alliances (with one incident) rose from seventh to sixth place. Contrary to what happened the previous year, criminal

gangs showed a decrease of 90% (with one fewer incident), and finally, the security forces remained in last place (with one incident).




## Types of threats

During the period covered by this report, those allegedly responsible for the threats used various methods to try to stop their victims from continuing their work in leadership and human rights defense.

Once again, pamphlets were the most commonly used method for sending intimidating messages to leaders (54 incidents), followed by

harassment (41 incidents), text messages (23 incidents), landline or cell phone calls (16 incidents), email or social media (15 incidents), intimidation with firearms (13 incidents), damage to property or animals as a form of intimidation (2 incidents), the use of explosive materials (1 incident), and in 10 incidents the form of threat was not identified.



# CONCLUSIONS

The results of the 2022 elections showed that citizens wanted a change in the way various problems facing the country were addressed, including those arising from the persistence of political, social, and armed conflict, and the absence of a comprehensive State presence. In effect, an alternative was chosen that promoted a new perspective on peace as a right, seeking to mark a distinction from the dialogues that successive governments have periodically held with illegal armed groups. In the perspective promulgated at the time by then-candidate Gustavo Petro, these talks would be based on a model of peace that, among other things, had a strong territorial component. Paradoxically, after three years of government, it has become evident that many of the talks initiated since then have not sufficiently engaged with social organizations and human rights defenders in the territories where the armed groups with which they are negotiating are present.

In addition to this, there have been persistent gaps in the national government's strategy, which have led to the territorial expansion of illegal armed groups, their fragmentation, and the victimization of the civilian population in the context of the humanitarian crises generated by their disputes. In fact, illegal armed groups have not shown a serious commitment to achieving peace, which would involve ceasing their armed actions, their violent economic dynamics, and their

suffocation of the civilian population. For its part, the government seems to have resorted to old prescriptions, such as adopting a passive stance toward figures who use citizens to monitor themselves and prioritizing the militarization of territories. The combination of some of these factors, which have also been encouraged by previous governments, has increased lethal violence against human rights defenders, as evidenced by the figures recorded by the Somos Defensores Program in the first half of 2025.

Attempting to respond to the critical situation facing communities by resorting to old formulas, such as simply increasing troop numbers, reviving old military strategies, and stigmatizing the civilian population, is part of an outdated and worn-out approach that not only leads to human rights violations but also prevents the state from establishing a comprehensive presence and can result in greater risks for communities. However difficult the **path to peace** may be, it is necessary to persevere along it and, above all, to seek non-military solutions to conflicts. We do not expect the military forces to operate outside the constitutional order, but rather that at the heart of the government's strategy for change lies the transformation of the causes that have given rise to this dramatic situation, which every day claims the lives of citizens, their leaders, and the defenders who seek real change for their territories.

We therefore maintain that the government could be “adding fuel to the fire” by maintaining this strategy, even though experience has shown that it is not the right one. The “alternative” paths it has proposed, such as maintaining dialogue with “the territorial structures of illegal armed groups,” do not seem to represent a significant change either, insofar as they appear to prioritize mere disarmament and do not enable a process of real transformation of the conditions that generate and fuel the conflict; decisions that could lead to new reconfigurations in the cycle of violence in Colombia.

At the beginning of the current national government, it was often repeated that, for the first time, there were alternative positions in the executive branch, a statement that gave rise to hopes for a change in the historical paradigms of the security forces. We are not only referring to those models that have subordinated the guarantee of human rights to the actions of the armed forces, but also to the support of figures promoted by the National Police and local authorities who foster problematic links between citizens and the security forces. However, this has not been the case. On the contrary, the administrative permanence of figures who have mutated thanks to considerable legal loopholes, such as *security fronts* and private security and surveillance companies, has been allowed.

Failure to act promptly regarding the expansion of these figures has allowed them to multiply –and mutate in unexpected ways– in recent years, giving rise to “creations” that in the

past have had dire consequences, such as the strengthening of what were once the *Convivir* as a revolving door for paramilitarism. Failure to act in a timely manner in this regard has also allowed local authorities, as the primary police authorities and as political actors seeking to solve problems that they misleadingly encompass within the concept of *security* to promote relationships which outcome is unknown, such as the introduction of retired military personnel to address coexistence issues, or the linking of citizens, the police, and private security and surveillance companies.

We continue to bear the burden of policies adopted by previous governments in the 1990s and early 2000s, which, among other things, rely on the civilian population for intelligence and promote hypervigilance that makes use of actors who are not part of the security forces. This is a recipe that in any case does not stop the attacks currently directed against the civilian population, which, in the case of human rights defenders, show an alarming increase in murders, displacements, and forced disappearances during the first half of 2025. Furthermore, the promotion of figures who are difficult to identify, who carry weapons and act under a halo of legality without being part of the security forces –as is the case with security companies– is extremely complex in a country where unknown actors continue to be the main suspects in attacks against leaders.

In this context, the *Somos Defensores* Program calls for (i) reconsidering –or at least regulating more

appropriately— these types of entities, which have undergone problematic changes under the negligent gaze of successive governments for almost thirty years, (ii) prioritizing territorial and social transformation strategies over military ones, and (iii) create decent living conditions and employment opportunities for young people and adults.

Colombia is going through a critical moment, and this translates into persistent attacks against communities and human rights defenders. This situation is worsening, as evidenced by the attacks in Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Antioquia, actions perpetrated against the security forces, and, in the case of Cali, the death and injury of

civilians<sup>1</sup>, and the anxiety about what is to come for the 2026 elections. It is therefore time to (re)assess what has happened in light of the facts, and to consider actions to prevent the continuation of dynamics such as the rise in lethal violence observed during the first half of 2025. These actions should not be assessed in isolation, but in conjunction with all the upcoming events—for example, the electoral scenarios, the dialogue tables that are being held with illegal armed groups, or the dialogues on public policy guarantees or the restructuring of the current protection model— as all of these will be decisive for the well-being of citizens and human rights defenders, both under this government and those that come in the future.

---

<sup>1</sup> On August 21, 2025, two attacks were carried out in which civilians and members of the security forces were killed, one in Cali, Valle del Cauca, and the other in Amalfi, Antioquia. (France 24, 2025) These actions were attributed to the 36th Front of the EMBF and the EMC. Subsequently, the ELN publicly claimed responsibility for the attack in Antioquia.

## REFERENCIAS

- Antioquia Police Department (2024). Response to request for information on security fronts. COSEC-PRECI-20.1.
- Aramendez, L. (2025). Inputs for understanding the dynamics of the Comuneros del Sur Front. Internal document of the Somos Defensores Program.
- Bernal, J. (2025 c). Infobae. Retrieved from: <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2025/05/05/denuncian-posible-alianza-entre-paramilitares-y-el-ejercito-en-combates-contra-las-disidencias-en-cauca-comandante-del-ejercito-pidio-investigar-el-caso/>
- Bogotá Metropolitan Police (2025). Document filed under COMAN-PRE-CI-13.0 with the subject line "response to right of petition."
- Cambio (2025). Massacres in Nariño: what is happening in the government's peace laboratory? Retrieved from: <https://cambio colombia.com/conflicto-armado-en-colombia/el-laboratorio-de-paz-de-narino-quien-esta-masacrando-la-poblacion>
- Caracol Radio (2024). Operation Perseo: Public Officers Inspection Office calls for protection of the civilian population of El Plateado, Cauca. Retrieved from <https://caracol.com.co/2024/10/13/operacion-perseo-procuraduria-llama-a-protger-a-la-poblacion-civil-de-el-plateado-cauca/>
- CCEEUU, DESC & Alianza (2025). Peace cannot be built through exceptionalism or militarization: rejection of the state of internal commotion. Retrieved from <https://coeuropa.org.co/la-paz-no-se-construye-con-excepcionalidad-ni-militarizacion-rechazo-al-estado-de-conmocion-interior/>
- CICR (2025). 2025, on track to be the worst year of the last decade in terms of humanitarian consequences. Retrieved from <https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/Actualizaci%C3%B3n%20Balance%20Humanitario%20CICR%202025%20%281%29.pdf>
- Civil Society Monitoring Committee on Ruling SU-546 of 2023 – COSESU (2024). First set of observations on the comprehensive plan for the protection of the rights of leaders and human rights defenders.
- COGFM (2024). Military forces launch Operation Perseo to recover El Plateado - Cauca. Retrieved from <https://www.cgfm.mil.co/es/multimedia/noticias/fuerzas-militares-lanzan-operacion-perseo-para-recuperar-el-plateado-cauca>
- Colombia Informa (2025). Attorney General's Office presented evidence of links between dissidents and military forces. Retrieved from <https://www.colombiainforma.info/fiscalia-presento-evidencias-de-vinculos-entre-disidencias-y-fuerzas-militares/>
- Comunicaciones Estratégicas COGFM (2025). The Colombian Armed Forces present results in areas of special operational priority in the country. Retrieved from <https://www.cgfm.mil.co/es/multimedia/noticias/las-fuer>

zas-militares-de-colombia-presentan-resultados-en-areas-de-especial

CONtextoganadero (2024). Meet Fedegán's new security strategist, General Fernando Murillo Orrego. Available at: <https://www.contextoganadero.com/gremialidad/conozca-al-nuevo-estratega-de-seguridad-de-fedegan-el-general-r-fernando-murillo-orrego>

Corrillos (2024). "My safe village, my safe neighborhood," strategy in Curití. Portal Corrillos. Available at: <https://www.corrillos.com.co/mi-vereda-segura-mi-barrio-seguro-estrategia-en-curiti/>

Del Cauca Newspaper (2025). Operation in Nariño deals heavy blow to dissidents: a ton of drugs ready for distribution found. Retrieved from <https://diariodelcauca.com.co/operativo-en-narino-asesta-duro-golpe-a-disidencias-hallan-tonelada-de-droga-lista-para-distribucion/>

Del Sur Newspaper (2025). Humanitarian Crisis in the Nariño Mountain Range: Communities Denounce Forced Displacement and Human Rights Violations. Retrieved from <https://www.diariodelsur.com.co/crisis-humanitaria-en-la-cordillera-de-narino-comunidades-denuncian-desplazamiento-forzado-y-violaciones-a-los-derechos-humanos/>

DW (2025 a). Colombia: ELN announces "armed strike" in the department of Chocó. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/es/eln-anuncia-paro-armado-en-departamento-colombiano-de-choco/C3%B3/a-72420611>

DW (2025 b). Petro admits that he "has not achieved total peace" with guerrilla groups. Retrieved from <https://>

[www.dw.com/es/petro-reconoce-que-no-ha-logrado-la-paz-total-con-guerrillas/a-73345331](https://www.dw.com/es/petro-reconoce-que-no-ha-logrado-la-paz-total-con-guerrillas/a-73345331)

EI Espectador (2025 a). Calarca dissidents respond to Petro and say they will only accept the Catatumbo location zone. Retrieved from <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/paz-y-memoria/petro-y-disidencia-de-calarca-grupo-armado-solo-aceptara-zona-de-ubicacion-de-catatumbo-y-pide-cese-al-fuego/>

EI Espectador (2025 b). The only lifeline in the shipwreck of total peace is breaking: Comuneros del Sur. Retrieved from <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/analistas/comuneros-del-sur-la-unica-tabla-de-salvacion-en-el-nafragio-de-la-paz-total-se-esta-rompiendo/>

EI Espectador (2025 c). Dialogue tables and election campaign: This is how total peace stands in Petro's final stretch. Retrieved from <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/paz-y-memoria/petro-y-la-paz-total-en-2026-las-mesas-de-dialogo-y-negociaciones-con-grupos-armados-y-la-campana-electoral-noticias-hoy/>

EI País (2025). The war intensifies: The army, FARC dissidents, and the ELN engaged in combat in Toribío, Silvia, López de Micay, and Buenaventura. Retrieved from <https://www.elpais.com.co/judicial/se-intensifica-la-guerra-ejercito-disidentes-de-las-farc-y-el-eln-protagonizaron-combates-en-toribio-silvia-lopez-de-micay-y-buenaventura-2318.html>

EI Tiempo (2023). Ayacucho military plan: hope for freedom and order. Retrieved from <https://www.eltiempo.com>

com/opinion/columnistas/pedro-javier-rojas-guevara/plan-militar-aya-cucho-esperanza-de-libertad-y-orden-pedro-javier-rojas-755585

El Tiempo (2025 a). 'With more artillery, we strengthen Operation Cordillera: measures in Nariño to avoid the horror of the Catatumbo war.' Retrieved from <https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/con-artilleria-fortalecemos-la-operacion-cordillera-ofensiva-del-ejercito-en-narino-3420147>

El Tiempo (2025 b). Checking: How many municipalities have no homicides? The figure is lower than that stated by President Petro but corresponds to 40% of Colombia. Obtained from <https://www.eltiempo.com/datos/chequeo-en-cuantos-municipios-no-hay-homicidios-cifra-es-inferior-a-la-que-dijo-que-presidente-petro-pero-corresponde-al-40-de-colombia-3473962>

France 24 (2025). Colombia: Death toll rises to at least 20 in two attacks attributed to FARC dissidents. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20250822-colombia-suba-a-siete-cifra-de-muertos-por-ataque-en-cali-13-polic%C3%ADas-asesinados-por-ataque-en-amalfi>

Goebertus, J. (2025). @JuanitaGoe. Retrieved from [https://x.com/JuanitaGoe/status/1892384937749467582?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1892384937749467582%7Ctwgr%5Eb3fe016a8a6c6da205503af5c4d1ce9654fc3a1d%7Ctwcon%5Es1\\_&ref\\_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.elcolombiano.com%2Fcolombia%2Fhumans-rig](https://x.com/JuanitaGoe/status/1892384937749467582?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1892384937749467582%7Ctwgr%5Eb3fe016a8a6c6da205503af5c4d1ce9654fc3a1d%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.elcolombiano.com%2Fcolombia%2Fhumans-rig)

González, C. (2025). From total peace to fragmented peace? 10th Latin American Conference on Social Sciences. Panel on peace in Colombia. Retrieved from <https://indepaz.org.co/de-la-paz-total-a-la-paz-fragmentada/>

Government of Antioquia (2024). Development Plan for Antioquia Firme 2024-2027. Andrés Julián Rendón Cardona, Governor.

Government of Santander (2024). #SantanderSeguro With the installation of 32 Security Fronts in #Santander. Facebook. Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1484114622480245>

Government of Santander (2024). Government of Santander implements 'Safe Zone' project in the village of Árbol Solo in the municipality of Socorro. Government website. Available at: <https://santander.gov.co/publicaciones/10953/gobernacion-de-santander-implementa-proyecto-zona-segura-en-la-vereda-arbol-solo-del-municipio-de-socorro/>

Guerra, S. (2025 b). Razón Pública. Obtained from Concentration of the 33rd Front in Catatumbo: Local wars pushing for peace?: <https://razonpublica.com/concentracion-del-frente-33-catatumbo-las-guerras-locales-empujan-la-paz/>

Gutiérrez, F. (2014). The Orangutan in a Tailcoat: One Hundred Years of Democracy and Repression in Colombia (1910–2010). Published by IEPRI and Debate.

House of Representatives (2025). Reactions in the House to a new armed strike in Chocó. Retrieved from: <https://www.camara.gov.co/reaccio->



nes-en-la-camara-ante-un-nuevo-pa-ro-armado-en-el-choco

HSB Radio (2025). ayó hombre vinculado a las Autodefensas Unidas de Nariño. Obtenido de <https://www.hsbnoticias.com/cayo-hombre-vinculado-a-las-autodefensas-unidas-de-narino/>

Indepaz (2025 a). Defense Minister responds to controversy over plan to eradicate crops with glyphosate. Retrieved from <https://indepaz.org.co/ministro-de-defensa-responde-a-polemica-por-plan-para-erradicar-cultivos-con-glifosato/>

Indepaz (2025). Massacres 2025 b. Retrieved from <https://indepaz.org.co/informe-de-masacres-en-colombia-durante-el-2020-2021/>

Infobae (2025 a). Videos have been released showing the moment when dissidents attacked an Army helicopter in Cumbitara, Nariño. Retrieved from <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2025/05/20/se-conocen-videos-del-momento-en-el-que-las-dissidencias-atacaron-un-helicoptero-del-ejercito-en-cumbitara-narino/>

Infobae (2025 b). The government suspended the extradition of alias HH, commander of Comuneros del Sur, due to his role in the peace process. Obtained from <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2025/05/23/gobierno-suspendio-la-extradicion-de-alias-hh-comandante-de-comuneros-del-sur-por-su-rol-en-el-proceso-de-paz/>

Infobae (2025 c). The Minister of Defense confirmed that at least 12 soldiers who had been kidnapped during Operation Perseo II were released. Retrieved from <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2025/08/19/minis->

tro-de-defensa-confirmando-que-al-menos-12-militares-que-habian-sido-secuestrados-durante-la-operacion-perseo-ii-fueron-liberados/

La Silla Vacía, 2024. Así va el proceso de paz con comuneros del sur. Disponible en: <https://www.lasillavacia.com/silla-nacional/asi-va-el-proceso-de-paz-con-el-frente-comuneros-del-sur/>

Ministry of Defense (2024). Retrieved from <https://x.com/mindefensa/status/1856782542432821612>

Ministry of National Defense (2019) Defense and Security Policy.

Municipality of Sabana de Torres (2024). Launch of the First Rural Security Front of Sabana de Torres. Municipal Mayor's Office website. Available at: <https://www.sabanadetorres-santander.gov.co/noticias/lanzamiento-primero-frente-de-seguridad-rural-de-sabana>

National Army (2025). Retrieved from <https://www.ejercito.mil.co/fuerza-de-despliegue-rapido-n-2/>

National Government Dialogue Table with the EMBF (2025). Regarding the development of the Temporary Location Zone (ZUT) in the rural area of Tibú. Retrieved from [https://www.consejeriacomisionadadepaz.gov.co/prensa/Paginas/Acerca-del-desarrollo-de-la-Zona-de-Ubicacion-C3%B3n-Tenmporal-\(ZUT\)-en-zona-rural-de-Tibu.aspx](https://www.consejeriacomisionadadepaz.gov.co/prensa/Paginas/Acerca-del-desarrollo-de-la-Zona-de-Ubicacion-C3%B3n-Tenmporal-(ZUT)-en-zona-rural-de-Tibu.aspx)

National Police (2018). Instruction 005 DISEX-GRUPE-70 of July 31, 2018.

National Police Community Management Group (2025). Response to PQRS No. 695227-20250528 dated May 28, 2025.

- National Police Headquarters (1995). Permanent Directive No. 14 Organization and development of local security fronts in the country.
- Navarrete, J. (2025). Local security fronts. In Desde Abajo newspaper. Available at: <https://www.desdeabajo.info/ediciones/edicion-no324/item/frentes-de-seguridad-local-negocio-discriminacion-y-capital-electoral.html>
- Notibague (2025). Fourteen managers and veterans of the security forces will reinforce surveillance in Ibagué. Available at: <https://notibague.com/veteranos-fuerza-publica-refuerzan-seguridad-ibague/>
- Occidente Newspaper (2025). Operation Perseo II begins in the Micay Canyon to regain territorial control in Cauca. Retrieved from <https://occidente.co/regionales/cauca/ejercito-lanza-operacion-perseo-ii-en-el-canon-del-micay/>
- Office of the Commissioner for Peace (2025 a). Table for the Co-Construction of Territorial Peace in Nariño. Retrieved from <https://www.consejeriacomisionadadepaz.gov.co/Mesa-Co-ConstruccionPazNari%C3%B1o/>
- Office of the Commissioner for Peace (2025 b). PAZa la página. Read and learn about the progress of the Government of Change's peace processes in 2025 and much more. Retrieved from <https://indd.adobe.com/view/1f8a7a72-b04f-4d02-a529-a12d31665b9a>
- Ombudsman's Office (2024). Dispute over territorial and population control between illegal armed groups puts communities in the Nariño mountain range at risk. Retrieved from <https://www.defensoria.gov.co/en/-/disputa-por-control-territorial-y-poblacional-entre-estructuras-armadas-ilegales-tiene-en-riesgo-a-comunidades-de-la-cordillera-nari%C3%B1ense>
- Ombudsman's Office (2025 a). Humanitarian emergencies in Colombia today. Retrieved from <https://www.defensoria.gov.co/documents/20123/3085684/CRISIS+HUMANITARIA+ENERO+FEBRERO+2025.pdf/5d3c-dcac-2859-fc24-5e89-03671a55cd46?t=1739798738522>
- Ombudsman's Office (2025 b). El Catatumbo in Crisis. Challenges in Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. Retrieved from <https://www.defensoria.gov.co/en/-/el-catatumbo-padece-la-emergencia-humanitaria-mas-grande-desde-que-hay-registro-en-colombia-a-cause-del-conflicto-armado>
- Ombudsman's Office (2025). Humanitarian emergencies in Colombia today. Retrieved from <https://www.defensoria.gov.co/documents/20123/3085684/CRISIS+HUMANITARIA+ENERO+FEBRERO+2025.pdf/5d3c-dcac-2859-fc24-5e89-03671a55cd46?t=1739798738522>
- Operational Directorate of the National Police (2002). Instruction No. 213/DIROP-ASECI Security Front Strategy. Bogotá 20062002.
- Ortiz, L. (2024). "Cattle ranching's security fronts" begin operating in Colombia: Santander will have the first one. Infobae. Available at: <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2024/05/03/ya-empezaron-los-frentes-de-seguridad-ganadera-en-colombia-santander-tendra-el-primero/>

- Osorio (2024). The new cattle ranching security strategy revives paramilitary fears. In El País newspaper, Spain. Available at: <https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2024-02-23/la-nueva-estrategia-de-seguridad-ganadera-revive-el-miedo-paramilitar.html>
- Páez, C.; Sandoval, L.; Peón, I. (2020). Characterization of the national community surveillance model by quadrants in Bogotá from a systemic approach. In Revista Científica General José María Córdoba. ISSN 2500-7645. Available at: <https://revistacientificaesmic.com/index.php/esmic/article/view/591/664>
- Penagos, J. (2025). Retrieved from <https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/asi-seria-el-plan-de-paz-del-gobierno-con-frente-33-de-las-disidencias-de-las-farc-en-catumbo-3433734>
- Portafolio (s.f.). Mining districts: what is the status of the government's initiative to organize this activity? Retrieved from <https://www.portafolio.co/energia/que-son-los-distritos-mineros-y-cuantos-hay-en-colombia-622119>
- Prensa Latina (2025). 57 soldiers detained by residents of the Micay Canyon in Colombia. Retrieved from <https://www.prensa-latina.cu/2025/06/22/retenidos-57-militares-por-pobladores-de-canon-del-micay-en-colombia/>
- Presidency of the Republic (2024). National Government and Southern Community Leaders Front begin talks for territorial peacebuilding in Nariño. Retrieved from <https://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/Paginas/Gobierno-Nacional-y-Frente-Comuneros-del-Sur-inician-dialogos-para-la-const-240720.aspx>
- Presidency of the Republic (2025 a). Offensive ordered by President Petro in Catatumbo leaves 45 cocaine laboratories destroyed by the security forces. Retrieved from <https://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/Paginas/Ofensiva-ordenada-por-el-Presidente-Petro-en-el-Catatumbo-deja-45-laboratorio-250224.aspx>
- Presidency of the Republic (2025 b). President Petro attributes the "Dantesque death" of three indigenous people to the ELN. Retrieved from <https://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/Paginas/Presidente-Petro-atribuye-al-ElN-muerte-dantesca-de-tres-indigenas-250603.aspx>
- President of the Republic (1994). Decree Law 356 of 1994. Issuing the Private Security and Surveillance Statute.
- Press Office of the Presidency of the Republic (2022). President Petro presents the leadership of the Security Forces that will oversee Human Security. Available at: <https://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/Paginas/Presidente-Petro-presenta-cupula-de-la-Fuerza-Publica-que-dirigira-la-Segur-220812.aspx?utm>
- Public Officers Inspection Office (2025). Bulletin 548-2025. Investigation of former Superintendent of Surveillance for alleged irregularities in the issuance of licenses to security companies. Available at: <https://www.procuraduria.gov.co/Pages/Investigacion-exsuperintendente-vigilancia-por-presuntas-irregularidades-expedicion-licencias-empresas.aspx>
- Radio Nacional de Colombia (2025). International cooperation streng-

thens peace in Nariño with a million-dollar investment from Spain. Retrieved from <https://www.radionacional.co/noticias-colombia/narino-recibira-15-millones-de-euros-de-espana-para-la-construccion-de-paz>

Razón Pública (2025). Comuneros del Sur: a drop of peace amid a desert of violence. Retrieved from <https://razonpublica.com/comuneros-del-sur-una-gota-paz-medio-desierto-violencia/>

Reynoso, L. (2025). 'The Guardians of Order', the proposal by the Mayor of Bogotá that places former military and police officers on the front line to combat insecurity. In El País newspaper, Spain. Available at: <https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2025-03-24/los-guardianes-del-orden-la-propuesta-de-la-alcaldia-de-bogota-que-pone-en-primera-fila-a-exmilitares-y-expolicias-para-combatir-la-inseguridad.html>

SaluData (2025). Poverty in Bogotá, D.C. Updated on May 12, 2025. Available at: <https://saludata.saludcapital.gov.co/osb/indicadores/pobreza-y-desigualdad-en-bogota-d-c/>

Sánchez, P. (2025). @PedroSanchez-Col. Retrieved from <https://x.com/PedroSanchezCol/status/1960664145243590994?t=-Qhk-dBeG4t4PPeik2OOW3Q&s=08>

Santa Fe Local Mayor's Office (2025). Security fronts: the power of citizen cooperation. Available at: <http://www.santafe.gov.co/noticias/frentes-seguridad-poder-la-cooperacion-ciudadana>

Secretariat of Security and Justice of the Government of Antioquia (2024).

Response to request for information filed under No. 202430000025 of 2024.

Secretariat of Security, Coexistence, and Justice of the District Mayor's Office of Bogotá, D.C. (2023). Press release. Available at: <https://scj.gov.co/es/noticias/plan-bogot%C3%A1-focalizado-60-barrios-muestra-tendencia-la-baja-8-delitos-alto-impacto-los#:~:text=Este%20Plan%20se%20viene%20adelantando,comercio%2C%20%2D3%25%20en%20hurto>

Secretariat of Security, Coexistence, and Justice of the District Mayor's Office of Bogotá, D.C. (2025). Communication with file number 2-2025-56759. Subject: transfer due to jurisdiction with file number SDSCJ 1-2025-48421.

Semana Magazine (2024). Acore supports Fedegán's Security Fronts: 'The government's position constitutes stigmatization of legitimate self-defense.' Available at: <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/acore-respalda-los-frentes-de-seguridad-de-fedegan-posicion-del-gobierno-constituye-una-estigmatizacion-a-la-legitima-defensa/202427/>

Support Directorate of the Public Officers Inspection Office (2025). Document S-2025-024786. Response to the request with reference number E-2025-245873.

Swissinfo.co (2025). Petro promises to recover "the whole of Micay," a guerrilla enclave where agents were held captive in Colombia. Obtained from <https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/petro-promete-recuperar-%22el-total-del-micay%22,-enclave-gue>

rrillero-donde-retuvieron-a-agentes-en-colombia/88993273

espanol/el-micay-colombia-un-canon-en-guerra/

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - OCHA (2025). Report: Humanitarian Trends and Impact in Colombia 2024.

Voragine (2024). The obscure self-defense group that overshadows the peace talks in Nariño. Retrieved from <https://voragine.co/historias/reportaje/el-oscuro-grupo-de-autodefensa-que-opaca-los-dialogos-de-paz-en-narino/>

Voice of America (2025). El Micay Colombia: a canyon at war. Retrieved from <https://projects.voanews.com/>

## Human Rights defenders murdered between January - June 2025 -SIADDHH-

Nº	DATE	DEPARTMENT OF THE FACTS	MUNICIPALITY OF THE FACTS	NAME OF THE VICTIM	ORGANIZATION OR PROCESS	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
1	13/01/2025	Antioquia	Turbo	Daniel Esteban Raigoza Castañeda	Teacher at the Urabá Higher Education Institution and member of the Antioquia Teachers' Association (ADIDA)	Community Leadership	Unknown
2	15/01/2025	Norte de Santander	Tibú	Miguel Ángel López	Tubú Humanitarian undertaker	Community Leadership	Unknown
3	16/01/2025	Norte de Santander	Hacarí	Cruz Evelio Bautista Pérez	Former President of the Community Action Board in Hacarí and member of the Catatumbo Peasant Unity Association (ASUN-CAT)	Communal Leadership	ELN
4	16/01/2025	Norte de Santander	Convención	Carmelo Guerrero Reyes	Peasant Guard of the Catatumbo Peasant Unity Association (ASUNCAT), survivor and member of the Patrotic Union	Peasant Leadership	ELN
5	17/01/2025	Atlántico	Barranquilla	Miller Ojeda Muñoz	Administrator Block 11 - Las Gardenias Residential Unit	Community Leadership	Unknown
6	17/01/2025	Valle del Cauca	Cali	Jhony Alexander Córdoba	Presidente del Sindicato de campesinos de Terrón Colorado	Union Leadership	Unknown
7	18/01/2025	Norte de Santander	Tibú	Pedro María Ropero Delgado	ASUUNTAS Delegate, Field Six	Communal Leadership	ELN
8	20/01/2025	Chocó	Quibdó	Javier Alejandro Valencia	Member of the "Dance Guys" Troupe	Community Leadership	Unknown
9	20/01/2025	Chocó	Quibdó	Juan David Ramírez Rodríguez	Member of the "Dance Guys" Troupe	Community Leadership	Unknown
10	20/01/2025	Norte de Santander	El Tarra	José Carrillo	Member of the Peasant Guard of the Association for Peasant Unity of Catatumbo – ASUNCAT	Peasant Leadership	ELN
11	21/01/2025	Norte de Santander	Teorama	Pedro Nel Angarita Ascanio	Vice President, Multiactiva Cooperative for Reintegration and Peace - REINCORPAZ	Community Leadership	ELN
12	21/01/2025	Valle del Cauca	Cali	Ricardo Cardona	Special jurisdiction of commune 20, Justice of the Peace Mediator in community conflicts and promoter of dialogue - Commune 20	Community Leadership	Unknown

Nº	DATE	DEPARTMENT OF THE FACTS	MUNICIPALITY OF THE FACTS	NAME OF THE VICTIM	ORGANIZATION OR PROCESS	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
13	25/01/2025	Santander	Bucaramanga	Orlando Vesga Badillo	Community leader, Girardot neighborhood	Communal Leadership	Unknown
14	27/01/2025	Cauca	Páez	José Albeiro Liz Muchicon	Elder and ancestral sage -THE WALA- traditional doctor, from the U'sxa Guyumtis territory	Indigenous Leadership	Unknown
15	30/01/2025	Cauca	Argelia	Ubicael López Noguera	Chairman of the Community Action Board for the Jardín Plateado neighborhood	Communal Leadership	Unknown
16	2/02/2025	Nariño	Ricaurte	James Tomás Guanga Quelal	Youth leader Association of Traditional Indigenous Authorities of the Awá Grand Council of Ricaurte Camawari	Indigenous Leadership	"Comuneros del Sur"
17	6/02/2025	Nariño	Tumaco	Jhon Alberto Plaza Llano	Cultural and sports leader, Community Action Board, Candelillas district	Community Leadership	Unknown
18	7/02/2025	Antioquia	Santo Domingo	Jorge Enrique Cano Jaramillo	"Teacher at Roberto López Rural Educational Institution Member of the Antioquia Teachers' Association (ADIDA) Member of FECODE"	Community Leadership	Unknown
19	7/02/2025	Cauca	El Tambo	Amilcar Mambuscay Tintinaguo	Promoter of road improvements, former member of the Community Action Board of Santa Bárbara village	Communal Leadership	Unknown
20	9/02/2025	Putumayo	Puerto Asís	Leonairo Zamir Montero Paz	Governor of the Kwe'sx Tata Wala council	Indigenous Leadership	Criminal alliances
21	10/02/2025	Cauca	Toribío	Alberto Quitumbo Yatacue	Kiwe Thegna (Indigenous Guard) Toribío Reserve	Indigenous Leadership	Post-peace agreement groups
22	18/02/2025	Cauca	Páez	Jacinto Chocué	Elder, ancestral sage, and traditional Nasa healer	Indigenous Leadership	Unknown
23	18/02/2025	Chocó	Litoral de San Juan	Célimo Chilivico Hurtado Bulgara	Wounaan indigenous leader from the Chigapien Medio community	Indigenous Leadership	Unknown
24	21/02/2025	Vichada	Cumaribo	Hernán Amaya Velásquez	Sikuanay Indigenous, National Association of Ethnic Signatories Building Peace (ANFECP), Eastern Region Ethnic Committee, Advocate for Agrarian Reform in Vichada.	Indigenous Leadership	Unknown
25	23/02/2025	Huila	Algeciras	Luis Alirio Delgadillo Muñoz	President of the Community Action Board for the Barranquilla City neighborhood	Communal Leadership	Post-peace agreement groups

Nº	DATE	DEPARTMENT OF THE FACTS	MUNICIPALITY OF THE FACTS	NAME OF THE VICTIM	ORGANIZATION OR PROCESS	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
26	24/02/2025	Distrito Capital	Distrito Capital	William Leandro Hernández Mayorga	"Founder of Colectivo Familia 545 Rap Singer Worked in the prevention of violence against children, adolescents, and young people in the Usme district"	Youth leadership	Individual perpetrators
27	25/02/2025	Atlántico	Sabanalarga	Jorge Luis Terán Castillo	Teacher at the Maximo Mercado educational institution in Sabanalarga. Member of the Atlantic Coast Educators Association.	Community Leadership	Individual perpetrators
28	27/02/2025	Bolívar	Cartagena	Jerónimo Martínez Ballesteros	Former president of the Colomblación neighborhood community action board; social leader in the Flor del Campo neighborhood	Community Leadership	Unknown
29	27/02/2025	Tolima	Herveo	Lucero Velásquez	Community leader in the village of Curubital	Community Leadership	Unknown
30	28/02/2025	Magdalena	Santa Marta	José Díaz Castillo	Advisor and political leader of the Comunes party	Community Leadership	Unknown
31	1/03/2025	Antioquia	Puerto Berrio	Dairo León Isaza	Citizen overseer in Puerto Berrio	Community Leadership	Unknown
32	1/03/2025	Cauca	Toribío	Edgar Tumiñá Gembuel	Indigenous Guard - Kiwa Thegnas Toribio reserve and in the Nasa Life Plan Project	Indigenous Leadership	Post-peace agreement groups
33	3/03/2025	Cauca	Rosas	Ana Elsy Arteaga Camilo	Chairwoman of the Community Action Board of the Pan de Azúcar village	Communal Leadership	Unknown
34	3/03/2025	Chocó	Juradó	Lorenzo Rentería Arboleda	"President of the Juradó Community Action Board Former president of the Mojauó Minor Community Council Leader of the Puro Corazón Juradó movement"	Community Leadership	Paramilitaries
35	4/03/2025	Distrito Capital	Distrito Capital	Duván Armando Lizcano Sánchez	Community teacher at the Techo Popular Sports and Arts School	Community Leadership	Individual perpetrators
36	9/03/2025	Antioquia	Vegachi	Jaime Alonso Gallego Gómez	"Leader of the Northeast Antioquia Environmental Mining Board Segovia Human Rights Committee President of the Segovia and Remedios Mining Board President of the Gigantona Committee's Carnival and Pre-Carnival Leader of the Historic Pact"	Environmental Leadership, Union Leadership, Leadership	Paramilitaries



Nº	DATE	DEPARTMENT OF THE FACTS	MUNICIPALITY OF THE FACTS	NAME OF THE VICTIM	ORGANIZATION OR PROCESS	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
37	9/03/2025	Nariño	Tumaco	Cristian Fernando Guanga	"Leader of the Awá Pigüambi Palangala Indigenous Reserve Former deputy governor of the Awá Pigüambi Palangala Indigenous Reserve"	Indigenous Leadership	Unknown
38	12/03/2025	Caquetá	Cartagena del Chairá	Ismael Borray	President of the Community Action Board, Caño Santo Domingo district	Communal Leadership	Unknown
39	12/03/2025	Cauca	Guachené	Neisair Ramos Navas	"Social and political leader of Guachené Co-founder of the municipality of Guachené"	Community Leadership	Unknown
40	14/03/2025	Cauca	Inzá	Ernesto Muñoz Casamachin	"Active member of the Community Action Board of the village of San Miguel, as well as the Peasant Association of Inza Tierradentro (ACIT). Member of the National Association of Peasant Reserves (ANZORC). Member of the Popular Unity Process of Southwestern Colombia (PUPSOC). Member of Marcha Patriótica."	Peasant Leadership	Unknown
41	14/03/2025	Santander	Barrancabermeja	Diego Alexander Herrera Carranza	Human Rights Defender; Member of the Barrancabermeja Victims' Participation Board	Victims' leadership	Unknown
42	16/03/2025	Guaviare	Miraflores	Diandra Natalia Zamora Henao	Youth leader of the Tucán de Caño Giriza reserve and member of the Association of Indigenous Authorities of Miraflores, coordinator of the women and family line of the Association of Traditional Indigenous Authorities of Guaviare (ASATIRIMIG).	Indigenous Leadership	Post-peace agreement groups
43	18/03/2025	Arauca	Arauquita	Luis Alfonso Sánchez Barrera	"Member of the Coexistence and Conciliation Committee of the Community Action Board of Lejanías Equity Conciliator of the same Community Action Board"	Communal Leadership	ELN
44	20/03/2025	Antioquia	Carepa	Dyanis Valderrama Tuberquia	Community leader in the village of La Provincia in the rural area of the municipality of Carepa	Community Leadership	Individual perpetrators
45	23/03/2025	Valle del Cauca	Pradera	Diego Fernando Ruiz Soto	Community process in Pradera	Community Leadership	Unknown

Nº	DATE	DEPARTMENT OF THE FACTS	MUNICIPALITY OF THE FACTS	NAME OF THE VICTIM	ORGANIZATION OR PROCESS	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
46	24/03/2025	Putumayo	San Miguel	Wilmer Solarte Pascal	Former Awá indigenous governor. He supported the work of the indigenous guard of the Magma la Dorada Council.	Indigenous Leadership	Unknown
47	27/03/2025	Valle del Cauca	Palmira	Lácides Castellanos	Peasant organization in Valle del Cauca, community aqueduct, and the peasant association ASOMUTE.	Peasant Leadership	Unknown
48	30/03/2025	La Guajira	Dibulla	Hermes Ricardo Wilchez	Community leader of the Cuatro Veredas sector, La Punta township	Community Leadership	Unknown
49	2/04/2025	Santander	Puerto Wilches	Hemerson Reinel Pérez	Community leader and former councilman of Puerto Wilches	Community Leadership	Unknown
50	6/04/2025	Arauca	Tame	Jaime Enrique Benítez	President of the Inter-Guild Council and member of the Municipal Territorial Council for Peace in Tame	Community Leadership	Unknown
51	12/04/2025	Cauca	Toribio	Erik Anderson Menza Pavi	Khabuwe'sx Authority of the San Francisco Territory	Indigenous Leadership	Post-peace agreement groups
52	12/04/2025	Nariño	Yacuanquer	Manuel Betancourt	Deputy Governor of the Yacuanquer Indigenous Community, Quillasinga Village	Indigenous Leadership	Unknown
53	17/04/2025	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao	Esther Julia Camayo	Member of the National Association of Peasant Users (ANUC)	Peasant Leadership	Unknown
54	19/04/2025	Antioquia	Yondó	José Francisco Romero Zamudio	"Active member of the Community Action Board in Dosquebradas village Active member of the Cattle Ranching Committee in La Cristalina village Signatory to the peace agreement"	Communal Leadership	Paramilitaries
55	19/04/2025	Bolívar	Cantagallo	Arbey Morales Hernández	Conciliator Community Action Board, La Poza district	Communal Leadership	Paramilitaries
56	26/04/2025	Bolívar	Cartagena	Guillermo Arturo Galviz Plazas	"Former coordinator of the Wildlife Care and Assessment Center (CAV) Wildlife researcher and conservationist"	Community Leadership	Individual perpetrators

Nº	DATE	DEPARTMENT OF THE FACTS	MUNICIPALITY OF THE FACTS	NAME OF THE VICTIM	ORGANIZATION OR PROCESS	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
57	27/04/2025	Putumayo	Orito	Wimer Yair López Santander	Former councilman and political leader of Orito	Community Leadership	Criminal alliances
58	28/04/2025	Cesar	Valledupar	Walberto Quintero Medina	"Vice President of the Unitary Workers' Central (CUT) Cesar Sub-Directorate Executive Member of the National Union of Agri-Food System Workers (SINALTRAINAL)"	Union Leadership	Unknown
59	1/05/2025	Cauca	Miranda	Luis Alberto Peña	"Member of the Association for the Constitution of the Peasant Reserve Zone of the Municipality of Miranda Cauca (ASPROZONAC) Member of the Popular Unity Process of Southwestern Colombia (PUPSOC)"	Peasant Leadership	Unknown
60	1/05/2025	Putumayo	Puerto Caicedo	Juan Carlos Rodríguez	Prosecutor for the Circasias Community Action Board / Representative of the Chontaduro Growers' Guild	Communal Leadership	Unknown
61	1/05/2025	Putumayo	Puerto Caicedo	Ángel Arthey Vallejo Rosas	President of the Community Action Board of Palmar del Picudito	Communal Leadership	Criminal alliances
62	7/05/2025	Valle del Cauca	Tuluá	José Jesús Monsalve	President of the Community Action Board of the Piedritas township	Communal Leadership	Unknown
63	10/05/2025	Cauca	Inzá	Tedfilo González Coqui	Indigenous spiritual leader of the La Gaitana reservation	Indigenous Leadership	Individual perpetrators
64	11/05/2025	Valle del Cauca	Palmira	Sirley Vanessa López Loaza	Leader of the Salem UV Palmira Collective	Womens' rights defender	Individual perpetrators
65	14/05/2025	Antioquia	El Bagre	William Arnulfo Marín Amaya	Equity conciliator for the Community Action Board of the village of El Castillo, Puerto Claver township	Communal Leadership	Paramilitaries
66	18/05/2025	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao	Zuleima Mosquera Beltrán	Chairwoman of the Community Action Board, Puente Real district	Communal Leadership	Unknown
67	19/05/2025	Norte de Santander	Tibú	Freddy Ballesteros	President of the Community Action Board of El Milagro village	"Communal Leadership"	Post-peace agreement groups

Nº	DATE	DEPARTMENT OF THE FACTS	MUNICIPALITY OF THE FACTS	NAME OF THE VICTIM	ORGANIZATION OR PROCESS	TYPE OF LEADERSHIP	ALLEGED RESPONSIBLE
68	22/05/2025	Bolívar	Carmen de Bolívar	Nawar Jiménez	Human Rights Defender, Legal Representative of the Mariposas de la Noche Organization	LGBTQ+ Leadership	Individual perpetrators
69	30/05/2025	Cesar	La Gloria	Jorge Eliecer Rangel Quintero	Officer at the Ombudsman's Office in La Gloria	Human Rights Activist	Unknown
70	31/05/2025	Cauca	Caloto	Edgar Iván Velasco	Teacher at La Huella Educational Center/ Project leader for the Protective Environments Network	Community Leadership	Unknown
71	31/05/2025	Huila	Baraya	Lina Maria Puentes Vega	Secretary of the JAC, Nueva Reforma village Searcher woman / Tras las Huellas de la Vida (Following life's footsteps) searchers' network	Communal victims' Leadership	Post-peace agreement groups
72	31/05/2025	Nariño	Linares	Aquiles Vallejos López	Artisan leader / Union leader of Mototaxi drivers in Linares	Community Leadership	Unknown
73	1/06/2025	Valle del Cauca	Cali	Mauricio Alegria Lucumí	Youth soccer coach in the Los Chorros neighborhood	Community Leadership	Unknown
74	2/06/2025	Cauca	Argelia	Daniel Mauricio Trujillo Gutiérrez	Sports commentator and risk management liaison in Algeria	Community Leadership	Unknown
75	3/06/2025	Nariño	Ricaurte	Luis Aurelio Araujo Hernández	Indigenous coordinator of the Awá Grand Council of Ricaurte-Camawari	Indigenous Leadership	Unknown
76	16/06/2025	Antioquia	San Andrés de Cuerquía	Juan Camilo Espinosa Vanegas	"Community leader and council member of San Andrés de Cuerquía Member of the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia Movement (AICD)"	Community Leadership	Post-peace agreement groups
77	27/06/2025	Cauca	Corinto	Angie Leandra Henao	Village leader and member of the National Association of Peasant Users (ANUC)	Peasant Leadership	Unknown
78	30/06/2025	Cauca	Jambaló	William Ferney Pazú Toconás	Facilitator of the musical process Kwesx Fxiw / member of the Alvaro Ulcué Chocué Youth Movement of the Jambaló ancestral territory	Community Leadership	Unknown